Valuations

Highlights Risks assets have entered­ a FOMO-driven mania phase that could last for a few more weeks. Markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. A weaker than expected global recovery and rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China are the two primary risks that will weigh on EM risk assets after this mania phase runs out of steam.  We are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. Within EM, local rates will perform well in both risk-on and risk-off phases. Feature The recovery in global risk assets has entered a fear-of-missing-out, or FOMO, mania phase. Like any mania, this one could last longer and go further than any fundamental analysis could presume. Investors who are long or cannot afford to stay on the sidelines should play this rally with tight stop points. Investors with longer time horizon should wait for a pullback in EM equities and currencies to buy. Within EM, local rates offer the best risk-reward profile.  A recovery in global trade and mainland industrial sectors is necessary for EM equities and currencies to rally on a sustainable basis. The global equity rally has taken place amid a shrinking forward EPS. The top panel of Chart I-1 demonstrates that even the ever-bullish bottom-up analysts have been cutting their expectations of the level of corporate 12-month forward earnings per-share. As a result, the global forward P/E ratio has spiked to a 18-year high (Chart I-1, bottom panel).   Chart I-1An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels An Unprecedented Divergence: Surging Stocks Prices Amid Plunging Forward EPS Levels Chart I-2EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling EM Forward EPS Level Has Been Falling Chart I-2 illustrates that the same phenomenon is true for EM equities. Their forward EPS has been contracting and their forward P/E has jumped to a decade high.  Any overdrive in asset prices without supporting fundamentals can last for a while but typically ends with a crash. This FOMO-driven mania is unlikely to be any different. It is fair to say that during the March carnage, many investors operated on a “sell now, think later” principle. Since the rally began, they have switched to a “buy now, ask questions later” attitude. As this rally persists, global stocks and credit will become overbought and expensive. At that point, any negative shock could produce a sharp pullback that would likely devolve into another nasty selloff as investors shift back to a “sell now, think later” mentality. The Narratives Driving The Rally The narratives supporting this mania are simple and seem to be both accepted and embraced by a growing number of investors. We agree with some and disagree with others: Economies around the world are opening, which will ensure that an economic recovery will follow. Our interpretation: Surely as confinement policies are eased, activity will improve. However, in our opinion, this should not come as a surprise to investors. This is especially pertinent for the trend-setting US stock market. With US equity valuations not particularly cheap, the market was never pricing in extended lockdowns. Hence, it appears strange to us that markets have so exuberantly cheered the reopening of the economy. Looking forward, the key to the medium-term (six-month) equity outlook is the shape of the recovery following the initial partial normalization. The latter presently looks V-shaped because as stores and businesses reopen economic activity is bound to improve. Yet the odds are that following this initial normalization, the shape of the recovery is most likely to be U-shaped. For what it’s worth, manufacturing PMIs in export-oriented economies like Korea, Japan and Taiwan made new lows in May (Chart I-3). We are not suggesting these indicators will not improve in the months ahead; they surely will. Nevertheless, a marginal rise in diffusion indexes like PMIs from extraordinary depressed levels do not signify a profit recovery. This recession differs from previous ones as the level of business activity has dropped below breakeven points for more businesses than it did in other recessions. When a company operates below its breakeven level, a marginal rise in sales may not be sufficient to improve its debt-servicing capacity, hiring and capital spending intentions. However, it seems markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. This is why we feel risk assets are in a FOMO-driven mania phase, where fundamentals do not matter. Authorities around the world are stimulating, with the US pumping enormous amounts of fiscal and credit stimulus into the economy (Chart I-4, top panel). Chart I-3Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Asian Manufacturing PMIs Made New Lows In May Chart I-4An Unparalleled Global Money Boom An Unparalleled Global Money Boom An Unparalleled Global Money Boom   Chart I-5China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China Is Ramping Up Stimulus China has finally embarked on aggressive stimulus. The National People’s Congress has set the monetary policy objective for 2020 as follows: Substantially accelerate the growth of broad money supply and total social financing (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Our interpretation: Indeed, government stimulus worldwide is massive. Yet, it is hard to know if it will be sufficient to produce a V-shaped recovery. The rise in money supply at the moment is being offset by the drop in the velocity of money. As a result, nominal GDP levels are extremely low. That said, last week we upgraded our growth outlook for China because of the above-mentioned aggressive policy stimulus. It is possible that China’s credit and fiscal impulse will reach about 15% of GDP before year-end (Chart I-5). What presently deters us from recommending outright long positions in China-related plays is the escalating US-China confrontation and the risk of a relapse in global stocks. Central banks around the world both in DM and EM are monetizing debt and injecting immense liquidity into the system. Our interpretation: Correct, but equally relevant is investors’ animal spirits. The latter will determine whether and when these liquidity injections leak into risk assets. For now, it seems that once again central banks’ actions have been successful in lifting asset prices, despite poor fundamentals. Equity valuations are cheap, especially outside the US. This is especially true given the low risk-free rate. Our interpretation: We agree that EM equities are cheap, something we have been highlighting since mid-March (Chart I-6). Yet valuations are not a good timing tool, as they can stay depressed so long as profits are not worsening.  Meanwhile, US equities are expensive (Chart I-7). Critically, we argued in a recent report that equity multiples depend not only on the risk-free rate but also on the equity risk premium (ERP). Chart I-6EM Equities Are Cheap EM Equities Are Cheap EM Equities Are Cheap Chart I-7US Stocks Are Expensive US Stocks Are Expensive US Stocks Are Expensive   Given the immense ambiguities investors are facing with respect to both the business cycle and economic, political and geopolitical trends, the ERP should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount factor – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. In this context, US equity valuations are rather expensive, despite the very low risk-free rate. In short, the expensive US stock market has until very recently been the locomotive of this rally. If US share prices had not rallied hard in the past two months, EM and other international bourses would not have caught a bid. The Fed’s public debt monetization is a structural, not near-term negative for the greenback. The US dollar is expensive and will depreciate a lot due to unrestrained fiscal and monetary stimulus in the US. Our interpretation: The US dollar is one standard deviation expensive (Chart I-8) and EM currencies have become cheap (Chart I-9). Chart I-8US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated US Dollar Valuations Are Elevated Chart I-9EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap   Chart I-10EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals EM Currencies And Stocks Correlate With Industrial Metals We do not disagree with the view that the US dollar is vulnerable in the long term due to the Federal Reserve’s aggressive debt monetization and that the Fed will eventually fall behind the inflation curve. Yet inflation is not imminent, and the Fed’s public debt monetization is a structural, not near-term negative for the greenback. As such, these potholes for the US dollar may not be pertinent in the next several months. Critically, Chart I-10 illustrates that EM currencies move with industrial metals prices, and EM stocks correlate with global materials stocks. The common driver of all of these markets is global growth in general and China’s industrial sectors in particular. In short, a recovery in global trade and mainland industrial sectors is necessary for EM equities and currencies to rally on a sustainable basis. Investors are underinvested in global equities in general and cyclical plays in particular. Our interpretation: Indeed, we showed last week that institutional equity investors had been skeptical of this rally. What has driven or supercharged this equity rally since late March has been unsophisticated retail investors. They have been opening up broker accounts worldwide and aggressively trading since March lockdowns. We cited a few pieces of anecdotal evidence confirming this phenomenon in last week’s report.  However, it seems that institutional investors in recent weeks have capitulated by raising their risk exposure in general and their exposure to cyclical plays in particular. This explains the recent surge in cyclical equities and currencies.  Bottom Line: The narratives driving this rally are only partially correct. Markets are ignoring the particularities of this recession and are treating the post-lockdown activity snapback as a V-shaped recovery. A weaker than expected global recovery and rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China are the two primary risks that will weigh on EM risk assets after this FOMO-driven mania phase runs out of steam.  Nuances To Beware Of There are several nuances about the market’s internals and characteristics that we would like to draw investors’ attention to: There is mixed evidence as to whether China’s economy in general and its industrial sectors in particular have entered a sustainable recovery. First, examining the Taiwanese manufacturing PMI data could help in assessing the growth outlook for both the mainland economy and for global trade. The basis is that Taiwan has done extremely well by avoiding COVID-19 outbreaks and lockdowns. Therefore, there are no domestic reasons for weak output growth. In addition, its manufacturing sector is very export-oriented, with about 40% of exports destined for mainland China. PMI export orders for Taiwan's aggregate manufacturing and its three key sectors plunged to new lows in May (Chart I-11). This includes both the electronic optical (semiconductor) and basic materials sectors. The latter correlates well with global materials stocks. There has so far not been a bullish signal from this indicator (Chart I-11, second panel).    Second, China’s domestic A-share market in general and its cyclical sectors in particular have not yet broken out (Chart I-12). Given China was the first nation to exit from lockdowns, its share prices should be the first to signal a sustainable economic recovery. Yet onshore share prices have been rather subdued. China’s economy will eventually stage a recovery later this year. Our point is that global cyclicals might have run ahead of themselves by pricing in a recovery too early. Chart I-11Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Taiwanese Manufacturing PMIs In May: New Lows Across All Industries Chart I-12Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery Chinese Onshore Share Prices Are Not Flagging An Imminent Recovery   Equity market and sector leadership changes occur during selloffs or at the inception of rallies.  Chart I-13 illustrates EM relative stock prices versus DM along with the global equity index. Over the past 25 years, there have been several major leadership changes between EM and DM. And all of them occurred during selloffs in global share prices. Chart I-13EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs EM Versus DM Equity Leadership Rotations Took Place During Selloffs Similarly, the relative performance of global growth versus value stocks experiences trend reversals during global bear markets (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Global Growth Versus Value Leadership Rotations Occurred During Bear Markets Chart I-15EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks EM Could Outperform DM For A Few Weeks Leadership of US equities and global growth stocks did not change during the March crash nor during the following two-month rally from the bottom. Only in the past week or so have US equities and global growth stocks begun to lag EM bourses and global value, respectively (Chart I-15). In brief, the latest leadership rotation from US to EM did not occur during the selloff or at inception of the rally – i.e., it does not fit the typical profile of sustainable leadership reversal. As such, it may not be enduring. The internals of this rally are consistent with the fact that it might already be at a late stage. During rallies, laggards are the last to catch a bid. Contrarily, during selloffs, outperformers are the last to be liquidated. For example, US growth stocks were the last ones to be liquidated in both the 2015-early-2016 and 2018 selloffs. When the decade-long leaders – US growth stocks – were finally stamped out, it marked the bottom of those selloffs. We are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. The Fed’s purchases of US bonds will likely continue pushing investors into EM credit markets. Using an analogous framework for this rally, the latest extraordinary spike in the laggards such as EM, Europe and both value and cyclical stocks could be a sign of bear capitulation, and could signify the final phase of this equity rally.  Bottom Line: There are several nuances to the current equity market rally, but investors seem reluctant to consider them amid a FOMO-driven mania. Investment Considerations The FOMO-driven rally could last for several more weeks. Afterwards it will be followed by a major setback. Investors who are long or cannot afford to stay on the sidelines should play this rally with tight stop points. Investors with longer time horizon should wait for a pullback in EM equities and currencies to buy.  Chart I-16EM Local Rates Offer Value EM Local Rates Offer Value EM Local Rates Offer Value We are making the following adjustments and changes to our strategy and trade recommendations: In regard to our EM versus DM asset allocation strategy, we are making one change: we are upgrading EM sovereign and corporate credit from underweight to neutral within a global credit portfolio. The Fed’s purchases of US bonds will likely continue pushing investors into EM credit markets. Consistently, we are closing two positions: (1) our short EM corporate and sovereign credit / long US investment-grade corporate bond trade; and (2) our long Asian investment-grade /short high-yield corporate bond trade. Within the EM credit space, we continue to favor sovereigns versus corporates – a strategy recommended on April 23. We are still reluctant to strategically upgrade EM stocks versus DM ones even though odds of EM outperforming DM stocks are high in the coming weeks. In light of the potential FOMO-driven rally, to protect profits we are closing the following two currency positions: Take profits on short BRL/long USD trade. It was initiated on November 29, 2019 and has produced a 19% gain. Book profits on short SGD/long JPY position. This recommendation has generated a 2.3% gain since its initiation on June 8, 2018. We are still maintaining shorts in the following EM currencies: CLP, ZAR, TRY, IDR, PHP and KRW. They could continue rallying in the near term but will relapse afterwards. We are also structurally short low beta currencies: the RMB and the Saudi riyal. Within EM, local rates offer the best risk-reward profile: they will perform well in both risk-on and risk-off phases. Real bond yields remain somewhat elevated in many EMs, as shown in Chart I-16. We continue to receive long-term rates in Mexico, Colombia, Russia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, China and Korea, as well as 2-year rates in South Africa. Their central banks will reduce policy rates much further. In addition, several of these local bond markets will benefit from ongoing quantitative easing by their central banks. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Investment Grade Sector Valuation: Our investment grade corporate bond sector valuation models for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia show some common messages, as markets have adjusted to a virus-stricken world. The most attractive valuations can be found within Energy and Financials, with defensive sectors like Utilities and Consumer Non-Cyclicals looking expensive everywhere. Global Corporate Bond Strategy: Investors should focus global investment grade corporate bond allocations along country lines, while keeping overall spread risk close to benchmark levels, over the next 6-12 months. Specifically, we favor overweighting the US (especially at maturities of five years or less where the Fed is buying) and the UK, while keeping a neutral allocation to euro area corporates. We also like Australian and Canadian corporate debt versus sovereigns in both countries. Feature Chart 1A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control Global policymakers have responded swiftly and aggressively to the COVID-19 outbreak and associated deep worldwide recession. This includes not only fiscal stimulus and monetary easing, but central banks buying corporate debt outright and providing other liquidity backstops. Coming at a time of collapsing economic growth and deteriorating corporate credit quality, these combined policy initiatives have reduced the negative tail risk for growth-sensitive assets like corporate debt. The result: a sharp tightening of corporate bond spreads across the developed markets (Chart 1). After such a large and broad-based rally, the easiest gains from the “beta” of owning corporate credit have been exhausted. Additional spread tightening is still expected in the coming months as governments begin to restart their economies after the COVID-19 quarantines start to loosen and global growth slowly begins to improve. Spreads are unlikely to return all the way to the pre-virus tights, however, as the recovery will be uneven and there is still the threat of a second wave of coronavirus infections later this year. To that end, it makes sense for investors to begin seeking out the “alpha” in corporate debt markets by looking at relative valuations across sectors to find opportunities. It makes sense for investors to begin seeking out the “alpha” in corporate debt markets by looking at relative valuations across sectors to find opportunities.  In this report, we will conduct a review of our entire suite of global investment grade corporate sector relative value models. We will cover the US, provide fresh updates of our recently published look at the euro area1 and the UK,2 while also revisiting our relative value framework for Canada first introduced last year.3 We will also apply the same corporate bond sector value methodology to a new country: Australia. In addition, we will examine value across credit tiers using breakeven spread analysis for each of these regions. A Brief Note On Our Corporate Bond Relative Value Tools Before delving into the results from our models, we take this opportunity to refresh readers on the methodology underpinning these analyses. Our sector relative value framework determines “fair value” spreads for each of the major and minor industry level sub-indices of the overall investment grade universe of individual developed market economies (using Bloomberg Barclays bond indices). The methodology takes each sector’s individual option-adjusted spread (OAS) and regresses it with all other sectors in a cross-sectional model. The models vary slightly across countries/regions, as the independent variables in the regression are selected based on parameter significance and predictive power for local sector spreads. Using the common coefficients from that regression, a risk-adjusted "fair value" spread is calculated. The difference between the actual OAS and fair value OAS – a.k.a. the residual from the regression - is our valuation metric used to inform our sector allocation ranking. We then look at the relationship between these residuals and duration-times-spread (DTS), our primary measure of sector riskiness, to give a reading on the risk/reward trade-off for each sector. We then apply individual sector weights based on the model output and our desired level of overall spread risk to come up with a recommended credit portfolio. The weights are determined at our discretion and are not the output from any quantitative portfolio optimization process. The only constraints are that all sector weights must add to 100% (i.e. the portfolio is fully invested with no use of leverage) and the overall level of spread risk (DTS) must equal our desired target. To examine value across credit tiers, we use a different metric - 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. Specifically, we calculate how much spread widening is required over a one-year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds versus duration-matched government debt. We then show those breakeven spreads as a percentile ranking versus its own history, to allow comparisons over periods with differing underlying spread volatility. With the key details of our models squared away, we will now present the results of our models for each country/region, along with our recommended allocation across sectors. We also discuss our recommended level of overall spread risk for each country/region, which helps inform our specific sector weightings. A Country-By-Country Assessment Of Investment Grade Corporates US In Table 1, we present the latest output from our US investment grade sector valuation model. In keeping with the framework used by BCA Research US Bond Strategy, we use the average credit rating, duration, and duration-squared (convexity) of each sector as the model inputs. To determine our US sector recommendations, we not only need to look at the spread valuations from the relative value model, but we must also consider what level of overall US spread risk (DTS) to target. Table 1US Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle With the Fed now purchasing investment grade corporates with maturities of up to five years in the primary and secondary markets, it makes sense to take advantage of that explicit support by focusing exposures on shorter-maturity bonds. Thus, we recommend targeting a relatively moderate level of spread risk (within an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporates) by favoring sectors with a DTS less than or equal to that of the overall US investment grade index. The sweet spot, therefore, is the upper-left quadrant in Chart 2 - sectors with positive risk-adjusted spread residuals from the relative value model and a relatively lower DTS. Chart 2US Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 3US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers On that basis, some of the most attractive overweight candidates are Cable Satellite, Media Entertainment, Integrated Energy, Diversified Manufacturing, Brokerage/Asset Managers, and Other Financials. Meanwhile, the least attractive sectors within this framework are Railroads, Communications, Wirelines, Wireless, Other Industrials and Utilities (including Electric, Natural Gas, and Other Utilities). While we have chosen to underweight much of the Energy space (with the exception of Integrated Energy) because of generally high DTS numbers, investors who are comfortable with taking on a higher level of spread risk can find some of the most attractive risk-adjusted valuations within oil related sectors. Our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy expect oil prices to continue to steadily rise in the months ahead, with Brent oil trading, on average, at $40/bbl this year and $68/bbl in 2021.4 We recommend targeting a relatively moderate level of spread risk (within an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporates). Across credit tiers, the higher-quality portion of the US investment grade corporate bond market appears unattractive, with spreads ranking below the historical median for Aaa- and Aa-rated debt (Chart 3). Conversely, Baa-rated debt appears most attractive, with spreads almost in the historical upper quartile. Euro Area In Table 2, we present the results of our euro area investment grade sector valuation model. The independent variables in this model are each sector’s duration, trailing 12-month spread volatility, and credit rating. Note that we will be using the same independent variables in our UK model. Table 2Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Spreads have already tightened significantly since our last discussion of euro area corporates in mid-April, with credit markets more fully pricing in greater monetary stimulus from the European Central Bank (ECB) – including increased government and corporate bond purchases. Thus, we believe it is reasonable to target a neutral level of overall portfolio DTS close to that of the benchmark index (within a neutral allocation to euro area investment grade). This means that, visually, we can think about our overweight candidates as sectors that are in the top half of Chart 4 - with positive residuals from our relative value model - but close to the dashed vertical line denoting the euro area benchmark index DTS. Target a neutral level of overall portfolio DTS close to that of the benchmark index (within a neutral allocation to euro area investment grade). Chart 4Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 5Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Within this framework, the most attractive sectors are Diversified Manufacturing, Packaging, Media Entertainment, Wireless, Wirelines, Automotive, Retailers, Services, Integrated Energy, Refining, Other Industrials, Bank Subordinated Debt and Brokerage/Asset Managers. The most unattractive sectors are Chemicals, Metals & Mining, Lodging, Restaurants, Consumer Products, Pharmaceuticals, Independent Energy, Midstream Energy, Airlines, Electric Utilities, and Senior Bank Debt. On a breakeven spread basis, all euro area investment grade credit tiers look attractive and rank well above their historical medians (Chart 5). The greatest value is in the upper rungs, with Aa-rated spreads ranking in the historical upper quartile; Aaa-rated and A-rated spreads almost meet that qualification as well, with Baa-rated spreads lagging a bit further behind (but still well above median). UK In Table 3, we present the latest output from our UK relative value spread model. With the Bank of England’s record expansion of corporate bond holdings still underway, we see good reason to maintain our overweight allocation to UK investment grade corporates on a tactical (0-6 months) and strategic basis (6-12 months). We are also targeting an overall portfolio DTS higher than that of the benchmark index—which we accomplish by overweighting sectors in the upper right quadrant of Chart 6. Table 3UK Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 6UK Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 7UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa Based on this framework, some of the most attractive overweight candidates are Diversified Manufacturing, Cable Satellite, Media Entertainment, Railroads, Financial Institutions, Life Insurance, Healthcare and Other Financials. Meanwhile, the most unattractive sectors are Basic Industry, Chemicals, Metals and Mining, Building Materials, Lodging, Consumer Products, Food & Beverage, Pharmaceuticals, Energy, and Technology. On a breakeven spread basis, Aa-rated spreads appear most attractive while A-rated and Baa-rated spreads also rank above their historical medians (Chart 7). Canada Table 4 shows the output from our Canadian relative value spread model. The independent variables in this model are: sector duration, one-year ahead default probability (as calculated by Bloomberg) and credit rating. Table 4Canada Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle This week, the Bank of Canada (BoC) will join peer central banks in purchasing investment grade debt via its Corporate Bond Purchase Program (CBPP). First announced in April, the program has a maximum size of C$10 billion, equal to only 2% of the Bloomberg Barclays Canadian investment grade index. Nonetheless, the BoC’s actions have already helped rein in corporate spreads. Yet given this unprecedented support from the central bank, with room to add more if necessary to stabilize Canadian financial conditions, we feel comfortable recommending an overweight allocation to Canadian investment grade corporates vs. Canadian sovereign debt, but with spread risk close to the overall index. Consequently, we are targeting sectors in the upper half of Chart 8 with a DTS close to the corporate average denoted by the dashed line. Chart 8Canada Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 9Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Our top overweight candidates are concentrated within the Financials category: Life Insurance, Healthcare REITs and Other Financials. Meanwhile, we recommend underweighting Construction Machinery, Environmental, Retailers, Supermarkets, Wirelines, Transportation Services, Cable Satellite, and Media Entertainment. On a breakeven spread basis, there is value in all credit tiers in the Canadian investment grade space, with Aaa-rated, Aa-rated, and Baa-rated spreads all in the uppermost historical quartile (Chart 9). Australia Table 5 shows the output from our new Australia relative value spread model. The independent variables in this model are sector credit rating, one-year ahead default probability (as calculated by Bloomberg), and yield-to-maturity. Due to the relatively small size of the Australian corporate bond market, we are focusing our analysis on Level 3 sectors within the Bloomberg Barclays Classification System (BCLASS) rather than the more granular Level 4 analysis we have employed for other markets. Table 5Australia Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle We recently recommended going overweight Australian investment grade corporate debt vs. government bonds.5 We feel comfortable reiterating that overweight stance while maintaining a neutral level of overall spread risk. As with Canada, we are looking for sectors in Chart 10 that show positive risk-adjusted valuations and have a DTS close to the Australian corporate benchmark. Chart 10Australia Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 11Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Based on that, our top overweight candidates are Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclicals, Energy, Other Utility, Insurance, Finance Companies, and Other Financials. Meanwhile, we are avoiding sectors such as Technology, Transportation, Electric and Natural Gas. On a breakeven spread basis, Baa-rated spreads look incredibly attractive, ranking at the 99.9th percentile; A-rated spreads are also above their historical median (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the higher quality Aaa and Aa tiers are relatively unattractive. As the relevant data by credit tier are not available in the Bloomberg Barclays Indices, we have instead used the Bloomberg AusBond Indices for this particular case, which unfortunately limits the history of our analysis to mid-2014. Bottom Line: Investors should focus global investment grade corporate bond allocations along country lines, while keeping overall spread risk close to benchmark levels, over the next 6-12 months. Specifically, we favor overweighting the US (especially at maturities of five years or less where the Fed is buying) and the UK, while keeping a neutral allocation to euro area corporates. We also like Australian and Canadian corporate debt versus sovereigns in both countries. Comparing Sector Valuations Across Markets The above analyses have allowed us to paint a picture of sector valuation within regions. However, there is added benefit in looking at risk-adjusted valuations across the three major corporate bond markets—the US, euro area and UK—with the intent of spotting broader sector level trends in the global investment grade universe that are not limited to just one market. Looking at Table 6, we can see some clear patterns: Table 6Valuations Across Major Corporate Bond Markets Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 12Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis The most attractive sectors across the board are concentrated in the Financials space. Brokerage/Asset Managers, Insurance—especially Life Insurance - REITs and Other Financials all look well positioned. Valuations for Oil Field Services and Refining within the Energy space are also creating an attractive entry point ahead of the steady rebound in oil prices. Conversely, the most expensive sectors are the traditionally “defensive” ones, such as Utilities, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, and even Technology, which is now debatably a defensive sector. Most interesting are the idiosyncratic stories. These are sectors which have benefited or lost in outsized ways due to the unique impacts of COVID-19 on the economy, but which also have relatively wide or tight risk-adjusted spreads across all three countries. For example, Packaging and Paper, which should benefit from the increased demand for online shopping, and Media Entertainment, which benefits from a captive audience boosting streams and ratings, both have attractive spreads. On the other hand, we have Restaurants, with unattractive spread valuations at a time where more people will choose to stay home rather than take the health and safety risks associated with eating out. The most expensive sectors are the traditionally “defensive” ones, such as Utilities, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, and even Technology, which is now debatably a defensive sector. Finally, we can also employ our breakeven spread analysis to assess value across investment grade corporate bond markets and the country level (Chart 12). Within this framework, all the regions we have covered in this report appear attractive – especially Canada, the euro area and the UK – with Australia only appearing fairly valued. Bottom Line: Our investment grade corporate bond sector valuation models for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia show some common messages, as markets have adjusted to a virus-stricken world. The most attractive valuations can be found within Energy and Financials, with defensive sectors like Utilities and Consumer Non-Cyclicals looking expensive everywhere.   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy What The Central Banks Are Buying", dated April 14, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great White North: A Framework For Analyzing Canadian Corporate Bonds", dated August 28, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "US Politics Will Drive 2H20 Oil Prices", dated May 21, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End", dated May 13, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

How Rich Are Valuations? How Rich Are Valuations? The SPX 12-month forward P/E climbed to a new near two-decade high recently, as it almost kissed off the 21 handle (bottom panel). While investors begin to worry about lofty valuations, keep in mind that calendar 2020 profits are far from trend EPS. Peering across the valley to calendar 2021 and 2022 profits reveals that there is still more room for valuations to expand. Our sense is that the SPX some time next year can reclaim our trend EPS estimate near $162, and thus bring down the forward multiple to a more reasonable level (middle panel).  The Fed’s ultra-dovish stance is a key driver behind the multiple expansion phase of late. Tack on the recent dip in fed funds futures below the zero lower bound, and factors have fallen into place for a sustained valuation overshoot phase. Bottom Line: We remain constructive on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. ​​​​​​​

Highlights Even though EM equities appear cheap, the key near-term threats to them are their poor fundamentals and a renewed sell off in the S&P 500. Given the immense uncertainty, the current equity risk premium (ERP) should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount rate – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. This makes US equity valuations rather expensive. The key risk to our defensive strategy is that the rally in global growth stocks evolves into a full-fledged mania. Feature Every investor is aware that global corporate profits have collapsed due to nationwide lockdowns and profits will eventually recover as the lockdowns are gradually eased. This thesis, though, is not helpful for equity investors. To price equities properly, investors need to know how low corporate profits will fall and how fast and strong the eventual recovery will be.  Currently, visibility on the magnitude and speed of the decline in profits and the subsequent recovery is factually nil. In fact, very few companies are providing any guidance. There is enormous uncertainty surrounding the pace at which economies will be reopened, the possibility of secondary infection outbreaks and the discovery of a remedy or a vaccine for this virus. Besides, it is hard to forecast how fast animal spirits will revive among consumers and businesses worldwide. Thus, it is impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude and pace of both the decline in corporate profits and the subsequent recovery. What framework should investors use to value stocks when facing extremely low visibility? The CAPE Ratio Presently, the best method for valuing stocks is the Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. This is a structural valuation measure that looks beyond the profit cycle, i.e., removes the cyclicality of earnings per share (EPS) from P/E ratio calculations. When the profit outlook is as muddy as it is today and the possible range of outcomes is very wide, it is safe to assume that in the next 12-18 months corporate profits will revert to their historical trend, i.e., drop below and then recover to their structural trend. This is a better conjecture than any attempt to forecast the magnitude and speed of both the profit plunge and subsequent recovery. Hence, the appropriate question for investors at this time is: what is the forward P/E multiple on equities assuming that EPS will plummet and then recover to their historical trend over the next 12 to 18 months? The CAPE model provides the answer to this question. Presently, the best method for valuing stocks is the Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. Chart I-1 illustrates our EM CAPE model, showing EM equities as cheap as they were at previous major bear market bottoms. The EM CAPE is presently 12.5 assuming EM EPS plunge further in the coming months but recover to their long-run trend in 12-18 months from now (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Our measure for US CAPE presently stands in high 20s, well above its historical average of 18 (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Equity Valuations Are Low EM Equity Valuations Are Low EM Equity Valuations Are Low Chart I-2US Equity Valuations Are Expensive US Equity Valuations Are Expensive US Equity Valuations Are Expensive   Box I-1 on page 3 elaborates how our CAPE model is built and how it differs from Shiller’s CAPE ratio. Even though EM equities are very cheap, the key near-term threats to them are two-fold: (1) EM fundamentals remain downbeat, which is creating a near-term risk to share prices; and (2) a renewed sell off in the S&P 500 would drag EM stocks lower, despite cheap EM equity valuations. In the next section, we explore US equity valuations in a bit more detail. BOX I-1 Our CAPE Versus The Shiller CAPE: Differences In Methodologies Due to the lack of historical data for EM, we were unable to use Robert Shiller's methodology for constructing the CAPE ratio for developing markets. The Shiller method uses a 10-year moving average of EPS to calculate the cyclically adjusted EPS. However, in the case of EM aggregate EPS, data only goes back to 1986. If we were to calculate a 10-year moving average for EM EPS, we would lose 10 years of data, and the valuation indicator would only start in 1996. This is too short a time-frame for a structural valuation indicator. Chart I-3Comparing Two CAPE Methodologies Comparing Two CAPE Methodologies Comparing Two CAPE Methodologies Instead, we used the following methodology to construct the CAPE ratio for EM: We deflated EM EPS and EM equity prices (both in US dollar terms) by US consumer price inflation to get EM EPS and EM share prices in real (inflation-adjusted) US dollar terms. Then we ran a regression of EM EPS in real US dollar terms against a time trend. The resulting trend line represents the cyclically adjusted or structural EPS in real US dollar terms (Chart I-1, bottom panel on page 1). Finally, we divided EM stock prices in real US dollar terms by the cyclically-adjusted real US dollar EM EPS trend line. The outcome is the EM CAPE ratio (Chart I-1, top panel on page 1). To be sure that our methodology produced a reasonable outcome, we computed a CAPE ratio using our methodology for the US stock market and compared it with the Shiller CAPE ratio. Chart I-3 illustrates that our methodology generated a CAPE ratio that is similar to Shiller’s CAPE ratio. We are therefore confident that the results generated by our CAPE methodology are robust and sensible. Low Visibility = High Equity Risk Premium Chart I-4CAPE Ratio Negatively Correlates With Corporate Bond Yields CAPE Ratio Negatively Correlates With Corporate Bond Yields CAPE Ratio Negatively Correlates With Corporate Bond Yields It is a well-known fact that US equity multiples are very high. However, a common narrative in the investment community often justifies currently high US equity multiples by very low interest rates. One consideration that is missing in this argument is the equity risk premium. The P/E ratio is negatively correlated to the discount rate.1 The discount rate is the sum of the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium (ERP). Chart I-4 demonstrates that US CAPE ratio has been inversely correlated with corporate bond (BAA) yields. The latter includes both risk-free government bond yields and corporate credit spreads. Presently, one should use an ERP that is materially higher than its historical mean. Investors are currently facing record high uncertainty related to the business cycle as well as the structural trends in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. In short, enormous lingering uncertainty warrants using an ERP that is at the upper range of its historical trend. Critically, ERP is not a static variable. Yet, many equity valuation models assume that the ERP is constant and, therefore, compare equity multiples with risk-free rates. Such models are wrong-headed because a change in the ERP can in itself cause large fluctuations in share prices. Chart I-5Estimated US Equity Risk Premium Estimated US Equity Risk Premium Estimated US Equity Risk Premium Going forward, visibility on both the evolution of the virus containment measures and the global business cycle will eventually improve and, thereby, decrease ERPs that investors require. This will produce a lower discount rate heralding higher equity multiples. As of today, however, the tremendous uncertainty about the outlook still warrants a higher ERP. Chart I-5 illustrates that the US ERP based on our CAPE model is presently 270 basis points. It is elevated but still below historic peaks recorded in 2008 and 2011. Provided we face extremely limited visibility about the global outlook, we contend that the US ERP will likely rise in the short run. The latter will depress US equity valuations and prices. Bottom Line: Given the immense ambiguities investors are facing in regard to the business cycle and to economic, political and geopolitical trends, the ERP should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount factor – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. We conclude that US equity valuations are rather expensive despite the very low risk-free rate. Falling US stocks will drag EM share prices lower.  EM Versus The S&P 500: Three Conditions For A Reversal Chart I-6Relative CAPE Ratio: EM Versus US Relative CAPE Ratio: EM Versus US Relative CAPE Ratio: EM Versus US The relative EM versus US CAPE ratio is shown on Chart I-6. According to it, EM equities relative to their US counterparts are as cheap as they were at their previous major bottom in 2001. Nevertheless, valuation is not a good timing tool. For EM to start outperforming the S&P 500, three conditions are required: 1. China’s economy should embark on a cyclical recovery that is greater than the natural snapback in activity that it has been experiencing in the wake of the end of its lockdown. So far, the mainland economy is still in a snapback phase rather than in an expansion mode. 2. Global equity sector leadership should rotate from growth to value stocks, such as resource-related and banks. This has not occurred yet. The EM equity index is more sensitive to the performance of financials than the S&P 500 is. Table I-1 and I-2 represents individual EM and US sector weights in terms of both market cap and total corporate earnings in their respective equity benchmark. Financials account for 36.6% of EM total earnings and 20.9% of EM market cap. The same ratios for US financials in America’s broad equity index are 22.2% for earnings and 10.5% for the market cap. Table I-1EM Equity Sector Earnings And Market Cap Weights Equity Valuations Amid Low Visibility Equity Valuations Amid Low Visibility Table I-2US Equity Sector Earnings And Market Cap Weights Equity Valuations Amid Low Visibility Equity Valuations Amid Low Visibility   Further, EM equity prices remain highly correlated to global materials stocks (Chart I-7). As we discussed in our October 10, 2019 report, the rationale is as follows: both industrial metal prices and EM equities are driven primarily by China. Enormous lingering uncertainty warrants using an ERP that is at the upper range of its historical trend. 3. The US dollar should enter an extended bear market. The greenback has been resilient despite the Federal Reserve’s outright debt monetization and the general risk-on mood in global equity and credit markets. Further, the EM ex-China currency index has failed to rebound despite the noteworthy rally in the S&P 500 since late March (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Stocks Correlate With Global Materials EM Stocks Correlate With Global Materials EM Stocks Correlate With Global Materials Chart I-8EM Currencies Have Failed To Rally EM Currencies Have Failed To Rally EM Currencies Have Failed To Rally   For the greenback to depreciate, US dollars should be recycled overseas via augmented US imports or capital outflows from the US. It seems that none of this is currently taking place. The dollar is probably experiencing the last leg of its structural bull market that commenced in 2011. In financial markets, the final phase of a structural trend can last longer and run further than many investors expect. Odds are that the greenback will overshoot before topping out. Chart I-9 presents the real effective exchange rate for the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen, based on unit labor costs. This is our favored currency valuation measure. It reveals that the greenback is already expensive, but that its valuation can become even more expensive and reach two standard deviations above fair value before the US dollar peaks. In turn, according to the same measure, valuations of commodity currencies like NZD, AUD and CAD have downshifted considerably (Chart I-10). Nevertheless, they are not yet very cheap. Therefore, further undershoots cannot be ruled out. Chart I-9G3 Currency Valuations G3 Currency Valuations G3 Currency Valuations Chart I-10Commodity Currencies Valuations Commodity Currencies Valuations Commodity Currencies Valuations   Bottom Line: The conditions for EM stocks to begin outperforming the S&P 500 have not yet been satisfied. EM outperformance is not imminent. The Key Risk The key risk to our strategy of not chasing the recent equity rebound is as follows: The rally in expensive global growth stocks could evolve into a full-fledged mania. The latter would then lift the broader equity index, including value stocks. The average retail investor in any corner of the world can now make the case for an exponential rise in growth stocks: major central banks are printing money, risk-free interest rates are at zero, businesses in “new economy” are relatively immune to COVID shutdowns and, moreover, they represent the future. All conditions for a bubble formation are present: a concept that captures the average person’s imagination, good fundamentals and solid past performance, as well as liquidity overflow.  Growth companies that are leading this rally are very expensive and over-owned while the laggards – the value stocks – have a ruinous profit outlook. The only problem with this thesis is that these stocks have already rallied massively over the past decade and are consequently expensive and over-owned (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Each Decade Had A Mania Each Decade Had A Mania Each Decade Had A Mania Can they still go higher, dragging up overall equity indexes? They can, as the human imagination has no limits. If retail investors continue piling up on stocks – and there is some evidence they have been doing so – share prices will rise despite the expensive valuation of growth companies and the disastrous profit outlook for value stocks. Like any bubble, this mania, if it occurs, will eventually culminate with a crash. Investment Conclusions Chart I-12Growth And Value Stocks Growth And Value Stocks Growth And Value Stocks EM equities have become cheap and oversold, which is why we closed our short position in EM stocks on March 19. Nevertheless, we have not yet recommended buying or overweighting EM stocks. The near-term outlook remains risky and EM valuations could remain depressed for a while given that investors currently face zero visibility. Consistently, the risk-reward of global and EM equities is yet not attractive. The basis is as follows: Growth companies that are leading this rally are very expensive and over-owned while the laggards – the value stocks – have a ruinous profit outlook (Chart I-12).  For now, we continue recommending underweighting EM versus DM equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnote 1   The P/E ratio inversely correlates to the discount rate: P/E ratio = (Payout rate x (1 + Growth rate)) / (Discount rate – Growth rate)

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy is aimed at quashing volatility, lifting asset prices and debasing the currency, all of which are equity market bullish. Grim, but backward looking, macro data are already reflected in the significant restaurant relative share price correction. Upgrade to neutral. Book profits in the underweight S&P rails portfolio position and lift exposure to neutral on the back of: a.) already reflected grim ISM services data, b.) resilient industry pricing power, c.) firming railroad profit margin backdrop and d.) encouraging signs from our EPS growth model.   Recent Changes Augment the S&P restaurants index to neutral, today. Upgrade the S&P railroads index to a benchmark allocation, today. Table 1 The Bottomless Punchbowl The Bottomless Punchbowl Feature The SPX made a fresh run to recovery highs last week, cheering forward looking news of reopening of the economy and neglecting backward looking downbeat employment and PMI releases. Extremely easy fiscal and monetary policies remain the dominant macro themes, and underpin our sanguine equity market view for the coming 9-12 months. While Bill Martin’s infamous 1955 portrayal of the Fed as “the chaperone who ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up”,1 the Jay Powell led Fed has done the opposite, and rightly so: it has ordered and delivered a bottomless punchbowl. The Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy is aimed at quashing volatility (Chart 1), lifting asset prices and debasing the currency, all of which are equity market bullish. According to Leo Krippner’s shadow short rates (SSR) estimate, the shadow fed funds rate is negative and should continue to support the SPX (SSR shown inverted, Chart 2). Chart 1Vol Will Melt Vol Will Melt Vol Will Melt Chart 2Crumbling Shadow Rates Underpin The SPX… Crumbling Shadow Rates Underpin The SPX… Crumbling Shadow Rates Underpin The SPX…   In fact, there are two distinct avenues that declining interest rates underpin equities: First, falling interest rates are a boon to equities via a rising price-to-earnings multiple (SSR shown inverted, Chart 3). While the 12-month forward multiple is above a 20 handle, the highest point since the dotcom bubble era, using second and third fiscal year sell-side profit estimates – which better resemble trend EPS – results in a more tame forward P/E multiple with more upside (Chart 4). Second, while the Fed would never admit to it, it is trying to devalue the US dollar and reflate the global economy, which will indirectly boost S&P 500 revenues. As a reminder, 40% of SPX sales are internationally sourced and thus a falling greenback is a boon to S&P 500 turnover (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 3…Via Higher Valuations …Via Higher Valuations …Via Higher Valuations Keep in mind that most of global trade is conducted in USD and when trade collapses it creates a US dollar shortage (i.e. fewer US dollars are circulating around) that lifts the value of the reserve currency and vice versa. Cognizant of that, the Fed is trying to provide ample US dollar liquidity and aid in pushing the greenback lower (top panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Peer Across The EPS Valley, And Valuations Have Room To Rise Peer Across The EPS Valley, And Valuations Have Room To Rise Peer Across The EPS Valley, And Valuations Have Room To Rise Chart 5Depreciating USD Is A Boon For SPX Sales Depreciating USD Is A Boon For SPX Sales Depreciating USD Is A Boon For SPX Sales Drilling beneath the SPX’s surface, early-cyclical consumer discretionary equities are the primary beneficiaries of negative SSR. The top panel of Chart 6 shows that over the past three decades relative share prices are the mirror image of interest rates. This cycle, household finances are in order and coupled with generationally low interest rates signal that consumer spending will recover smartly as the economy opens up in coming quarters. Thus, consumer discretionary stocks should sustain their outperformance (middle & bottom panels, Chart 6). A small digression with regard to the reopening of the economy is in order. Pundits have been discussing and showing the three distinct waves of the Spanish flu as the closest parallel with the current pandemic. Chart 7 shows these three waves using UK data, but the UK equity market (and the DOW for that matter) did not really budge back then. Keep in mind this was in the midst of a recession as the Great War was about to end on November 11, 1918 (Remembrance Day). Chart 6Stick With Consumer Discretionary Exposure Stick With Consumer Discretionary Exposure Stick With Consumer Discretionary Exposure Chart 7The 1918 UK Parallel, Including Equities The 1918 UK Parallel, Including Equities   The 1918 UK Parallel, Including Equities     While no one really knows how in the long-term this pandemic will affect the economy, the stock market, society in general and consumer behavior in particular, our sense is that uncertainty will continue to recede in the coming months irrespective of the second and third likely waves. Why? Because not only do governments know more about this invisible enemy, but they (and hospitals) will also be more prepared to deal with any future outbreaks. Moreover, given that there is a race to get a novel coronavirus vaccine (and treatment) the world over, a breakthrough will soon materialize; MRNA’s recent FDA phase II clinical trial for their vaccine candidate is a case in point. Receding uncertainty is great news for stock investors. Meanwhile, in recent research we highlighted that early-cyclical interest rate-sensitive equities do in fact lead the GICS1 sector pack in recessionary recoveries based on empirical evidence.2 As a reminder, in mid-April we lifted the S&P consumer discretionary sector to overweight and this week we are updating our views on a hard hit subindex. We are also upgrading a deep cyclical services industry to neutral. Preparing To Dine Out It no longer pays to be underweight the S&P restaurants index; upgrade to neutral today. Not only the reopening of the economy will, at the margin, bring back diners (take out mostly) to restaurants, but the two heavyweights that comprise 80% of the market cap of the S&P restaurants group are anything but discretionary. In our view, MCD is defensive and SBUX has become a staple. Thus, as the economy slowly reopens and store traffic picks up, these bellwether stocks will lead this index higher. Relative share prices have corrected to the twenty-year uptrend line and hover near the previous two breakout points in 2011/12 and 2015/16 where they should find enough support (top panel, Chart 8). With regard to macro data, most of the restaurant-relevant releases are looking in the rear view mirror. In other words, the trouncing in restaurant retail sales and employment, food-away-from-home PCE and even the collapse in the Restaurant Performance Index were “known knowns” (Chart 8). Therefore, all of this grim news is already reflected in the 30% drubbing in relative performance from peak-to-trough. Chart 8Grim Data Priced In Grim Data Priced In Grim Data Priced In Chart 9Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator Domestic restaurant sales should stabilize in the coming months. If the Fed manages to devalue the US dollar (please see discussion above), then even international revenues in general and Chinese sourced sales in particular will rekindle overall industry turnover (Chart 9). Keep in mind that China’s economy reopening is leading the global economy by about six weeks. Importantly, construction spending on restaurants is falling like a stone and this decline in supply and industry capex will provide a much needed offset to free cash flow generation (middle panel, Chart 10). Nevertheless, three key concerns keep us at bay and prevent us from turning outright bullish. First, net debt-to-EBITDA has taken a steep turn for the worst of late, and while it is mostly driven by the shortfall in cash flow, it is still quite unnerving (bottom panel, Chart 11). Second, there is margin trouble that restauranteurs have yet to work out, and a rising wage bill will continue to weigh on profit growth (second panel, Chart 11). Finally, relative valuations are lofty for our liking. On a 12-month forward P/E basis the S&P restaurants index is trading at 53% premium to the SPX and 26% above the historical mean (third panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Supply Restraint Is Positive Supply Restraint Is Positive Supply Restraint Is Positive Chart 11Watch These Risks Watch These Risks Watch These Risks Netting it all out, grim but backward looking macro data are already reflected in the significant restaurant relative share price correction. Lift exposure to a benchmark allocation. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P restaurants index to neutral for a relative loss of 13.7% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST – MCD, SBUX, YUMB, CMG, DRI. Upgrade Rails To Neutral Over the past three years we have been mostly on the right side of rails both in bull and bear phases; today we recommend cementing relative gains of 6.4% since inception, and lifting exposure to neutral. Rails are the largest transports subgroup and this services industry is showcasing impressive resilience in times of adversity. True, the latest ISM non-manufacturing survey made for grim reading. Both the headline number and most of the key subcomponents of the survey were tough to digest: the overall survey fell near the GFC lows (bottom panel, Chart 12), the Business Activity Index collapsed to 26%, an all-time low. While this survey can fall anew next month, we deem that extreme pessimism reigns supreme, and as the US economy is slated to reopen some semblance of normality will return in coming months. Tack on the improving export data out of China, and we are cautiously optimistic that rail hauling services will soon stage a comeback (middle panel, Chart 12). Chart 12As Bad As It Gets As Bad As It Gets As Bad As It Gets Chart 13Green Shoots Green Shoots Green Shoots The defensive nature of rails is most evident in industry pricing power (third panel, Chart 13). Railroad selling prices are holding their own despite a sizable drop in volumes. Moreover, CEOs exercised caution and refrained from adding to headcount. Taken together, they are boosting our profit margin proxy, which can serve as a catalyst to lift relative share price momentum out of its recent funk (second panel, Chart 13). Similarly, our 3 factor S&P rail EPS growth model is heralding a pickup in profits in the back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 13). Despite all these tailwinds, there are some powerful offsets that tame our optimism on railroards. Intermodal rail shipments are a major freight category and thus a key determinant of rail profitability. As consumer confidence remains in freefall, downbeat retail sales will cast a dark shadow on this essential rail freight category (Chart 14). Finally, the industry’s rising debt profile is still a primary concern. Rail executives neglected capex in recent years and instead raised debt in order to retire equity and enhance shareholder value. We continue to view this “investment” backdrop with skepticism and prior to further augmenting exposure to an overweight stance we would want to see an easing on the debt uptake directed at these shareholder friendly activities (Chart 15). Chart 14The Consumer Is A Sore Spot The Consumer Is A Sore Spot The Consumer Is A Sore Spot Chart 15Debt Burden Flashing Red Debt Burden Flashing Red Debt Burden Flashing Red In sum, we are compelled to take profits in our underweight S&P rails portfolio position and lift exposure to neutral on the back of: a.) already reflected grim ISM services data, b.) resilient industry pricing power, c.) firming railroad profit margin backdrop and d.) encouraging signs from our EPS growth model. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P railroads index to a benchmark allocation today booking a profit of 6.4% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL – UNP, NSC, CSX, KSU.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/statements-speeches-william-mcchesney-martin-jr-448/address-new-york-group-investment-bankers-association-america-7800 2     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Fight Central Banks At Your Own Peril” dated April 14, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations The Bottomless Punchbowl The Bottomless Punchbowl Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps  June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights Competitive devaluation will remain the dominant policy landscape in the near term. This means that paradoxically, currencies with high and/or positive long-term interest rates remain at risk. The CAD may be the next shoe to drop. Crude oil may have put in a structural bottom, but conditions for long-term appreciation in the CAD are not yet in place. That said, the broad US dollar trend will be the key driver of CAD in the shorter term. This means upside later this year as global growth picks up and risk assets ride a liquidity wave. The CAD will, however, continue to underperform at the crosses. Our favorite vehicles to express this view are long AUD/CAD, short CAD/SEK, and short CAD/NOK. Also remain long the SEK both against the euro and the USD. Feature Chart I-1A One-Way Bet For Yields? A One-Way Bet For Yields? A One-Way Bet For Yields? This week saw four major central banks convene for their scheduled policy meetings. The currency implications from all four were clear: Competitive devaluation will remain the dominant policy landscape in the near term, as no central bank will tolerate tightening in financial conditions.1  This means that paradoxically, currencies with high and/or positive long-term interest rates remain at risk, while low-beta currencies could be the outperformers in the near term (Chart I-1). Specifically: The Bank Of Japan kicked things off by introducing unlimited buying of government bonds. The previous ¥80 trillion target had been largely symbolic, since purchases have been below that level since 2016, and are currently running at around ¥20 trillion. The yen rallied on the news, as long-term interest rates in Japan are already at zero. Other measures included increasing the amount of commercial bonds and paper that the BoJ can purchase,  while easing collateral requirements and funding costs for loans, scheduled for small and medium-sized enterprises.  The Riksbank left policy unchanged with the repo rate at zero, and quantitative easing capped at SEK 300 billion by September 2020. With other central banks stepping into unlimited QE, this was interpreted as a hawkish surprise by the market. The SEK surged. That said, even unlimited QE may not have produced a different result, given how low government debt in Sweden is. The Federal Reserve strengthened its forward guidance, suggesting the rapid pace of balance sheet expansion is set to continue. This will continue to boost the US money supply. A commitment to continue pumping more dollars into the economic plumbing system knocked down the DXY. The European Central Bank left its policy rate unchanged, with long-term interest rates in the core countries already below zero. However, it did introduce PELTRO, or Pandemic Emergency Long-Term Refinancing Operations. Starting from June, it will also lend money to banks as cheaply as -1% via its TLTRO program. Short of unlimited QE, the euro rallied on the news.   Usually, the normal relationship between currencies and interest rates is positive, in that high or rising interest rates are usually accompanied by currency appreciation (Chart I-2). However, in competitive devaluation, currencies with high interest rates are at risk, since no central bank wants a tightening in financial conditions. Chart I-2AThe Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged The Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged The Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged Chart I-2BThe Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged The Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged The Dollar And Interest Rates Have Diverged This, in turn, means that, so long as fears over the pandemic continue to loom large, the outperformers will be the low-beta currencies with long-term interest rates already at zero. This was the unified currency market response to policy actions this week. This in turn means that while the SEK and JPY could continue to outperform the dollar in the near term, the CAD, NZD and AUD could underperform. Competitive devaluation will remain the dominant policy landscape in the near term.  Bottom Line: Maintain a barbell strategy for the time being by going long the cheapest currencies (SEK) together with some safe havens (JPY). This view was reinforced by our model results last week.2   The Loonie: The Next Shoe To Drop? It is well known that an important driver for the loonie has been the price of crude oil (Chart I-3). While the drop in the price of the WTI blend to -$40 per barrel may have been the structural bottom, conditions for long-term appreciation in the CAD are not yet in place. For one, crude oil continues to trade in an extremely volatile pattern, with double-digit gains and losses daily. Meanwhile, long-term prices still remain below cash costs for many Canadian producers, suggesting a prolonged period of low prices could lead to severe capital destruction. Three factors suggest that even if crude oil recovers, the Canadian dollar rally is likely to be lukewarm as it underperforms at the crosses. There has been a paradigm shift in oil production, with US shale producers aggressively grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC producers. Currently, Canada produces only 5.5% of global crude versus 15% for US production. Admittedly, Canadian market share has also been rising, but the tectonic shift in US production has severely dampened the positive correlation between crude prices and the loonie (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Loonie And Oil Still Tied To The Hip Loonie And Oil Still Tied To The Hip Loonie And Oil Still Tied To The Hip Chart I-4Oil Production: US Versus Canada Oil Production: US Versus Canada Oil Production: US Versus Canada As low prices and falling relative productivity in the Canadian oil patch start to infect peripheral businesses, part of the rise in the unemployment rate will prove to be structural (Chart I-5). Admittedly, the more recent job losses have been concentrated in the service sectors as the economy has been on lockdown. Most of these jobs should return as the economy reopens. But more importantly, Canadian jobs started deteriorating in October last year when crude oil was still well above $50 per barrel. Housing remains a pillar of household wealth in Canada, and the recovery in prices has been uneven (Chart I-6). The risk is that this continues to restrain spending, as nationwide house price growth slows to a standstill. Chart I-5Worst Jobs Report In Decades Worst Jobs Report In Decades Worst Jobs Report In Decades Chart I-6Uneven House Price Recovery Uneven House Price Recovery Uneven House Price Recovery The path for Canadian housing prices is likely to be as follows: 1) Government support combined with macroprudential measures will likely continue to lead to a convergence in prices between low- and high-priced cities. Specifically, Vancouver (and to a certain extent Toronto) should continue to see soft pricing growth, while Montreal and other cities recover; 2) As prices start to deviate away from nominal incomes in lower-priced cities, the risk of wider macroprudential measures greatly increases. Both rising indebtedness and falling affordability are likely to present a key macro risk to the Canadian economy. The second point is crucial, since the rise in Canadian home prices has been more pronounced than in other countries, say Australia or the US. This means that both rising indebtedness and falling affordability are likely to present a key macro risk to the Canadian economy. Residential construction is a non-negligible part of the Canadian economy (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Residential Construction Is Important Residential Construction Is Important Residential Construction Is Important Chart I-8More Scope To Increase Debt In Canada More Scope To Increase Debt In Canada More Scope To Increase Debt In Canada A weaker consumer in Canada means the government is likely to step in as the spender of last resort. Meanwhile, there is much more scope for the Canadian government to increase spending (Chart I-8), but much less so for the Canadian consumer (Chart I-9). This means that incrementally, the potential for the Bank of Canada to monetize deficits is rising. This will weigh on the CAD longer term, as investors will require a cheaper currency to finance the deficit. There is much more scope for the Canadian government to increase spending, but much less so for the Canadian consumer. That said, these are longer-term trends. The path of the DXY index will be the key driver of the CAD in the shorter term. This means upside later this year as global growth picks up and risk assets ride a liquidity wave. What is clear is that the CAD is likely to still underperform at the crosses. Long AUD/CAD and short CAD/SEK and CAD/NOK are our favorite vehicles to express this view (Chart I-10). Chart I-9A Debt Ceiling For The Canadian Consumer A Debt Ceiling For The Canadian Consumer A Debt Ceiling For The Canadian Consumer Chart I-10Short CAD/SEK and CAD/NOK Short CAD/SEK and CAD/NOK Short CAD/SEK and CAD/NOK Aside from falling productivity, transportation bottlenecks in Canada will prove to be a formidable hurdle in closing the current discount between WCS and Brent (Chart I-11). While Canadian crude is likely to remain trapped in the oil sands, North Sea crude will face less transportation bottlenecks in the near term. This suggests the path of least resistance for the CAD/NOK is down. Chart I-11A Structural Discount To Canadian Oil A Structural Discount To Canadian Oil A Structural Discount To Canadian Oil Bottom Line: Stay short the CAD at the crosses as a strong-conviction view.   Stay Long The SEK Chart I-12EUR/SEK Is Stretched EUR/SEK Is Stretched EUR/SEK Is Stretched Not only the CAD will suffer from a stronger SEK. We continue to favor long SEK positions, both against the euro and the US dollar. Swedish data has been outperforming that in the rest of the euro area. The latest manufacturing PMI data was 43.2 for Sweden versus 33.6 for the euro area. There was an even bigger divergence in the service PMI print: 46.9 in Sweden versus 11.7 in the euro area. Sweden, which mostly kept its economy open during the pandemic, has seen better economic data at the expense of higher fatalities. Technically, the EUR/SEK cross is mean-reverting from an overbought extreme, having faced powerful overhead resistance above the 11 level (Chart I-12). The SEK is much cheaper than the euro. According to our PPP models, the SEK is undervalued by 35% while the euro is undervalued by 18%. Bottom Line: Remain long the SEK against a basket of the EUR and the USD.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Are Competitive Devaluations Next?”, dated March 6, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Introducing An FX Model”, dated April 24, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been negative: Real GDP contracted by 4.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, led by rapid declines in demand. Core PCE grew by 1.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, up from 1.3% the previous quarter. Durable goods orders slumped by 14.4% month-on-month in March.  The goods trade deficit widened from $60 billion to $64 billion in March. Initial jobless claims increased by another 3.8 million, higher than the expected 3.5 million. The DXY index fell by 0.4% this week. On Wednesday, the Fed decided to keep the interest rate steady and repeated its willingness to do “whatever it takes” to support the economy. The Fed will continue to purchase Treasury securities and agency residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities in the amounts needed to support the flow of credit to households and businesses. Report Links: Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Dollar Funding Crisis - March 19, 2020 Are Competitive Devaluations Next? - March 6, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: The economic sentiment indicator plunged from 94.2 to 67 in April. Headline inflation dropped from 0.7% to 0.4% year-on-year and core inflation slipped by 10 bps to 0.9% in April. However, they were both higher than expectations. GDP contracted by 3.3% yearly in Q1, the lowest reading over the past three decades. Money supply (M3) surged by 7.5% year-on-year in March, fuelled by the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). EUR/USD appreciated by 0.4% this week. The ECB held off on major policy moves this week but said it is ready to increase stimulus as needed, given the worst GDP numbers in recent history. EUR/USD rallied, suggesting this was a hawkish surprise. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanses Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: The unemployment rate ticked up from 2.4% to 2.5% in March. The jobs-to-applicants ratio dropped from 1.45 to 1.39. Retail sales plunged by 4.6% year-on-year in March, down from 1.6% increase in February. Industrial production fell by 5.2% year-on-year in March, slightly better than the previous reading of -5.7%. USD/JPY fell by 0.5% this week amid broad dollar weakness. On Monday, the BoJ kept interest rates unchanged while taking further steps to expand its monetary stimulus. The BoJ pledged to buy an unlimited amount of government bonds and boost the purchases of corporate bonds and commercial papers to 20 trillion yen. Together with the record 1.1 trillion yen spending package announced last week, this will help ease the financial pain caused by COVID-19. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been negative: The business barometer plunged from 6 to -32 in April. Consumer confidence remains low at -34 in April. Retail sales declined by 5.8% year-on-year in March. The CBI’s Distributive Trades Survey reported the sharpest fall in sales since the GFC. Nearly all (96%) retailers reported cash difficulties, and nearly half (40%) reported facing difficulties to meet tax liabilities. The British pound is up by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Last Friday, the BoE announced that weekly auctions of one month and three month sterling funds under the Contingent Term Repo Facility (CTRF) will remain in place until the end of May. Encouragingly, there are signs that the government’s support is providing great relief to retailers, with many of whom are opting for tem porary rather than permanent lay-offs. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly positive: Headline inflation came in at 2.2% year-on-year in Q1, up from 1.8% the previous quarter, the highest over the past 5 years. Import prices fell by 1% quarter-on-quarter, while export prices soared by 2.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. Private sector credit grew by 1.1% month-on-month in March. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. While the RBA achieved its inflation target in Q1, consumer prices are expected to drop in Q2 amid the global COVID-19 crisis and are likely to remain subdued for the rest of the year. Moreover, the sharp decline in energy prices will be a headwind for inflation and the economy. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar   Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mostly negative: The trade deficit widened from NZ$3.3 billion to NZ$3.5 billion in March. ANZ final business confidence fell further by 3% to -67%, but this was a small improvement versus the preliminary April reading of -73%. The New Zealand dollar rose by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The final April ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook released this Wednesday was slightly less bleak than the preliminary results published earlier this month, showing “a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel”. Besides, the inflation expectations bounced back from 1.2% in March to 1.7% in April, suggesting that the launch of QE has had some success in keeping inflation closer to target. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly negative: GDP growth stalled in February, following 0.3% monthly growth in January. Bloomberg Nanos confidence was little changed at 37.1 for the week ended April 24. The CFIB business barometer increased from 37.7 to 46.4 in April. The Canadian dollar appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week, alongside the rebound in oil prices. The latest Statistics Canada GDP report showed that the mining, quarry and oil/gas extraction sector declined for the sixth consecutive month in February, prior to the COVID-19 crisis, due to lower international demand. Transportation, manufacturing and financial sectors have also seen significant slowdown in February. Please refer to our front section this week for a more detailed analysis on the Canadian dollar. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: ZEW expectations soared from -45.8 to 12.7 in April. Real retail sales contracted by 5.6% year-on-year in March. Total sight deposits increased by 14 billion CHF to 651 billion CHF last week. KOF Economic Barometer plunged from 91.7 to 63.5 in April, close to Great Financial Crisis lows. The Swiss franc rose by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. While Switzerland normally runs budget surpluses, it is now predicted to have a budget deficit of roughly 30 to 50 billion franc this year due to rising unemployment. The Swiss Finance Minister Ueli Maurer expressed intentions to use payouts from the SNB exclusively to finance spending. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: GDP contracted by 1.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, the largest contraction since 2010. Retail sales fell by 0.9% month-on-month in March, down from 2% increase the previous month. The Norwegian krone rebounded by 2% against the US dollar this week, fuelled by rising oil prices. The slowdown of Norwegian economy in Q1 was mostly led by accommodation and food service activities. Arts, entertainment and other services and transportation have also seen significant declines. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: PPI declined further by 3.6% year-on-year in March, following a contraction of 1.2% in February.   The trade surplus shrank by 8.6 billion SEK to 4.1 billion SEK in March. Retail sales grew by 0.6% year-on-year in March, compared with 3.7% expansion the previous month. The Swedish krona appreciated by 2% against the US dollar this week. The Riksbank held its interest rate unchanged at 0% on Tuesday. The majority of economists had expected no change in interest rates while 25% were expecting a rate cut. The Riksbank argues that they prefer to focus on credit supply to counteract a rise in rates rather than applying negative rates. However, they also said that negative rates are not ruled out should conditions worsen later this year. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Analyses on Chinese autos and Brazil are available below. Highlights The Fed’s aggressive monetization of public and some private debt has inspired investors to allocate cash to risk assets However, a number of cyclical indicators continue to flash red or amber, suggesting this rally is not about a cyclical economic recovery.  Continue underweighting EM equities and credit markets versus their DM counterparts. We will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. Feature Neither the ongoing plunge in corporate profits nor a great deal of uncertainty about the economic outlook justify this rally. It seems the sole driver of the rally from March’s lows has been the Federal Reserve’s enormous purchases of various securities. These unprecedented actions are crowding out investors into riskier parts of fixed-income markets and persuading them to purchase equities. Neither the ongoing plunge in corporate profits nor a great deal of uncertainty about the economic outlook justify this rally. It Has Not Been About Profits And Valuations In the past two months, the S&P 500 index has experienced not only the fastest and steepest crash on record, but also the speediest rebound (Chart I-1). Investors have had to make swift investment decisions amid extremely low economic visibility. Chart I-1The S&P 500: The Fastest Crash And Speediest Recovery The S&P 500: The Fastest Crash And Speediest Recovery The S&P 500: The Fastest Crash And Speediest Recovery Indeed, it is fair to say that during the mayhem and carnage many investors operated on a “sell now, think later” principle, and on the subsequent rebound with a “buy now, ask questions later” framework. Remarkably, the plunge and subsequent recovery in global share prices has been so rapid that even equity analysts’ forward earnings estimates cannot keep up. The top panel of Chart I-2 illustrates that the global forward EPS usually tracks the world equity index. When share prices rally, analysts upgrade their earning expectations; when equities sell off, analysts’ downgrade their earnings outlooks. In the past month, analysts have continued to slash forward EPS estimates despite the strong equity rebound. As a result, the 12-month forward P/E ratio for global stocks is back to its post-2008 highs (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Chart I-2Rising Share Prices Amid Collapsing Forward Earnings Rising Share Prices Amid Collapsing Forward Earnings Rising Share Prices Amid Collapsing Forward Earnings Chart I-3China: A Decoupling Between Economy And Equities China: A Decoupling Between Economy And Equities China: A Decoupling Between Economy And Equities Elsewhere, Chart I-3 illustrates China’s domestic orders for 5000 industrial enterprises historically correlated with the Shanghai Composite equity index. Since early this year, domestic orders have plummeted due to the country-wide lockdown. Yet equity prices in China have not fallen enough to reflect the downfall in economic activity and corporate profits. This underscores that investors’ purchases of global and Chinese stocks in the past month have been driven by factors other than the corporate profit outlook.   This leaves two rationales for justifying roaring equity purchases in recent weeks: (1) liquidity overflows due to central banks’ balance sheet expansion, and (2) valuations. We examine the first argument in this report and will revisit the topic of equity valuations in forthcoming publications. In a nutshell, although equity valuations may be cheap in EM, Europe and Japan, they are expensive in the US. Nevertheless, the US stock market has been substantially outperforming EM and DM ex-US equities. Further, the most expensive stocks in the US – FAANGM – have by far outperformed the rest. Chart I-4China: A Decoupling Between New And Old Economy Stocks China: A Decoupling Between New And Old Economy Stocks China: A Decoupling Between New And Old Economy Stocks In China, the ChiNext index – a Nasdaq proxy of the onshore market – has massively outperformed the Shanghai Composite index, which is dominated by “old” economy stocks (Chart I-4). The trailing P/E ratios on the ChiNext and Shanghai Composite indexes are 62 and 14, respectively. In short, the fact that most expensive equity segments/sectors have outperformed suggests that cheap valuation have not been the key driver of this rally. Bottom Line: Neither profits nor considerations of equity valuations have been the driving factor behind the recent equity rally.  The Sole Driver Of This Rally The Fed’s aggressive monetization of public and some private debt has inspired investors to allocate cash to risk assets. The US broad money supply is surging at a record pace, both in nominal and real terms (Chart I-5). Is there too much money relative to the size of financial assets? Chart I-5US Broad Money Supply Is Booming US Broad Money Supply Is Booming US Broad Money Supply Is Booming Today we explore how the level of US broad money supply (M2) relates to the market cap of all bonds and stocks denominated in US dollars. US broad money (M2) supply encompasses all deposits and cash of residents and non-residents in and outside the US. Chart I-6 exhibits the ratio of US broad money supply (M2) relative to the sum of: Chart I-6The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization the US equity market capitalisation (the Wilshire 5000); the market cap values of all US-dollar bonds, including government, corporate, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and commercial mortgage backed securities (the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index); the market cap value of US dollar-denominated bonds issued by EM governments and corporations; minus the Fed’s and US commercial banks’ holdings of all types of securities. The higher this ratio is, the more US dollar deposits (liquidity) is available per one dollar of outstanding securities – excluding those held by the Fed and US commercial banks. Based on the past 25 years, the US M2-to-market value of securities ratio is somewhat elevated. This means liquidity is relatively abundant. However, this may not preclude the ratio from drifting higher like it did in 2008. This scenario would be consistent with a renewed selloff in equity and credit markets. Interestingly, back in January, the ratio was almost at a 20-year low – i.e., money supply (liquidity) was tight relative to the market value of outstanding US dollar-denominated securities. This was contrary to the prevalent perception in the global investment community that in 2019 the advances in share prices and credit markets were liquidity-driven. We discussed what constitutes pertinent liquidity for financial assets in our January 16 report titled, A Primer On Liquidity. The key takeaways of the report were: Money supply – not central bank assets – is the ultimate liquidity available to economic agents to purchase goods and services as well as invest in both real and financial assets. Changes in the velocity of money are as important as those in money supply. Yet forecasting changes in the velocity of money is a near-impossible task, as it entails foreseeing the behavior of economic agents. A large and expanding stock of money in and of itself does not guarantee greater liquidity for asset markets. Gauging liquidity flows to asset markets boils down to predicting investor behavior. Liquidity flows into financial assets when “animal spirits” among investors improve, and vice versa. Bottom Line: Even though the US money supply is expanding at a record pace, the key to financial asset price fluctuations is willingness among investors to purchase those assets. In turn, willingness to allocate cash to securities is generally driven by (1) the potential income and cash flow generation by securities issuers; (2) uncertainty related to future income (the risk premium); and (3) the opportunity cost of holding cash. Presently, the opportunity cost of holding cash is the sole reason to buy risky securities. Cash flow/income generation is currently impaired for the majority of equities and credit instruments. Further, there is a great deal of uncertainty about issuers’ ability to generate cash/income for investors – i.e., the required risk premium should be very high. All of these circumstances make the risk-reward profile of this rally poor. Reasons To Fade This Rally There are several market-based indicators that do not corroborate a further run-up in EM and DM equity prices. Our Risk-On / Safe-Haven Currency Ratio has struggled to gain traction (Chart I-7, top panel). It is not confirming the rebound in EM share prices. It is essential to emphasize that this indicator is agnostic to the direction of the US dollar, as it is calculated as the ratio of cyclical commodities currencies (AUD, NZD, CAD, ZAR, BRL, MXN, CLP, RUB, and IDR) versus safe-haven currencies such as the Swiss franc and Japanese yen on a total-return basis – i.e., all exchange rates include the cost of carry. Chart I-7Various Reflation Indicators Have Been Slugish Various Reflation Indicators Have Been Slugish Various Reflation Indicators Have Been Slugish Our Reflation Confirming Indicator has not been sending a strong bullish reflation signal either (Chart I-7, bottom panel). This indicator is composed of an equally-weighted average of industrial metals, platinum and US lumber prices. The Global Cyclical-to-Defensive Equity Sectors Ratio has formed a classic head-and-shoulders pattern, and has broken down (Chart I-8, top panel). The latest rebound has not altered this pattern. Therefore, the path of least resistance for this ratio is still down, which entails underperformance of the global cyclical equity sector versus global defensives. The latter often occurs in selloffs. Similarly, the relative performance of Swedish versus Swiss non-financial stocks has failed to rebound, having experienced a major breakdown in March (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Swedish non-financial stocks are much more cyclical than Swiss ones. Finally, the global business cycle is experiencing its deepest recession in the post-World War II period, with the pace and nature of the recovery remaining highly uncertain. Chart I-9 portends global EPS in SDR, which is the proper measure given the greenback’s weight in SDR is 58%, the euro’s 39%, the yen’s 11%, and the yuan’s 1%. Chart I-8Global Cyclical Stocks Have Not Outperformed Global Cyclical Stocks Have Not Outperformed Global Cyclical Stocks Have Not Outperformed Chart I-9Global Corporate EPS In Perspective Global Corporate EPS In Perspective Global Corporate EPS In Perspective Global EPS shrank by 28% in 2001-2002 and by 40% in the 2008 recession. Given the current recession will be deeper, global EPS will likely shrink by about 50%. We do not think equity markets are discounting such a dire outcome after the recent rally. Bottom Line: A number of cyclical indicators continue to flash red or amber, suggesting this rally is not about a cyclical economic recovery.     Investment Strategy We closed our short position in EM equities on March 19, and on the March 26 report we argued that it was too late to sell but still too early to buy. Given the rally in global equities is overstretched from a short-term perspective, we will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. Chart I-10EM Currencies And S&P 500 EM Currencies And S&P 500 EM Currencies And S&P 500 That said, we maintained our underweights in both EM stocks and credit versus their DM peers. Also, we have continued to short EM currencies versus the US dollar. Chart I-10 demonstrates that EM currencies have failed to rally despite the strong rebound in the S&P 500.   Given the rally in global equities is overstretched from a short-term perspective, we will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. For dedicated EM equity managers, our recommended overweights are Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, central Europe, Mexico and Peru. Our underweights are Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, India and the Philippines. We are neutral on other bourses. Last week we published two reports for fixed-income investors: EM: Foreign Currency Debt Strains and EM Domestic Bonds And Currencies. In the first report we assessed individual EM countries' vulnerabilities to foreign debt and discussed strategies for EM sovereign and corporate credits. In the second report, we upgraded our stance on EM local markets from underweight to neutral. Before upgrading to a bullish stance, we would first need to upgrade our stance on EM currencies.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Chinese Auto Sales: Disappointments Ahead Chinese automobile sales plunged 42% year-on-year over the first quarter of this year, due to the Covid-19 lockdowns (Chart II-1). We still expect auto sales in China to be flat or very mildly negative year-on-year over the period of April-December of this year. First, official data shows the growth rate for nominal disposable income was falling toward zero, but realistically it was probably negative in the first quarter (Chart II-2, top panel). Very sluggish household income growth – in combination with the still-elevated uncertainty of the job market (Chart II-2, bottom panel) – will restrain Chinese auto demand. Chart II-1Auto Sales In China: A Rate Of Change Recovery Ahead Auto Sales In China: A Rate Of Change Recovery Ahead Auto Sales In China: A Rate Of Change Recovery Ahead Chart II-2Sluggish Household Income Growth Will Constrain Chinese Auto Demand Sluggish Household Income Growth Will Constrain Chinese Auto Demand Sluggish Household Income Growth Will Constrain Chinese Auto Demand While household income growth will recover from current level later this year, it will likely remain much lower than the previous years’ 8-9% growth. Second, Chinese households are already quite leveraged. Their debt levels reached over 94% of annual disposable income, almost as high as in the US (Chart II-3). Third, peer-to-peer lending – an important source of auto loans in recent years – has shrunk considerably and is unlikely to pick up this year (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Chinese Household Debt Burden Is High Chinese Household Debt Burden Is High Chinese Household Debt Burden Is High Chart II-4Auto Financing Has Become More Scarce Auto Financing Is Becoming More Scarce Auto Financing Is Becoming More Scarce Bank lending rates for household consumption loans and peer-to-peer lending rates are currently about 5% and 10%, respectively. Such borrowing costs are restrictive given the tame growth of household income. Finally, the stimulus packages intended to boost automobile demand this year are no greater than they were last year. This entails that the net stimulus is close to zero. The focus of this year’s stimulus remains on the demand for new energy vehicles (NEV), which is in line with the central government’s strategic goal. Given that NEVs account for only 5% of auto sales, any boost to NEV demand is unlikely to make a huge difference in aggregate auto sales.  Another boost to auto sales is the relaxation of license controls in the first-tier cities. The extent of these measures is so far considerably smaller than it was last year. About 60,0001 additional new license plates have so far been added, accounting for only 0.2% of Chinese auto sales. This number was 180,000 last year.2  This year local governments in 16 cities announced cash subsidies for auto buyers.3 Despite larger geographic coverage, the amount of cash subsidies is similar to what it was last year – at about 3% of the retail price. This is too small to make any meaningful impact on auto sales. Investment Implications The lack of considerable new stimulus for auto purchases and lower household income growth will make the recovery in passenger car sales halting and hesitant. The lack of considerable new stimulus for auto purchases and lower household income growth will make the recovery in passenger car sales halting and hesitant. Chinese auto stock prices in the domestic A-share market are breaking down (Chart II-5). Lingering demand contraction as well as possible price cuts will further curtail auto producers’ profits. Disappointing Chinese auto sales will lead to sluggish auto production and, consequently, to weak demand for metals like steel, aluminum and zinc. Chinese auto exports will outpace its imports (Chart II-6). As China accounts for about 30% of global auto sales and production, rising net exports of automobiles from China may diminish other global producers’ margins. Chart II-5Avoid Chinese Auto Stocks For Now Avoid Chinese Auto Stocks For Now Avoid Chinese Auto Stocks For Now Chart II-6Rising Chinese Auto Net Exports Are Negative To Other Global Auto Producers Rising Chinese Auto Net Exports Are Negative To Other Global Auto Producers Rising Chinese Auto Net Exports Are Negative To Other Global Auto Producers   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Brazil: Not Out Of The Woods Yet We believe risks to Brazilian assets remain to the downside. Political infighting among various branches of power and state institutions will depress consumer and business confidence, lengthening the recession. Chart III-1Brazil: Recurring Crises Brazil: Recurring Crises Brazil: Recurring Crises Political infighting among various branches of power and state institutions will depress consumer and business confidence, lengthening the recession (Chart III-1). Political turmoil also reduces the probability of structural reforms. This combined with a delayed economic recovery will further strain the already precarious public debt dynamics.  First, the country is in a full-blown political crisis. The Supreme Court's decision to reject Bolsonaro's nomination for Director of the Federal Police manifests broad-based political infighting among Brazilian institutions. Further, the Supreme Court has started an investigation into the President as calls for impeachment intensify among both the public and the Congress. The rift between President Bolsonaro and Congressional President Maia is especially worrisome. Given Maia’s future political ambitions, we do not expect a truce between the two. On the contrary, they will continue to stand off in order to assert control over the fragmented Congress. As a result, structural reforms such as the national tax program and privatizations will be delayed. Second, Bolsonaro’s popularity is also plunging due to his slow and controversial response to the COVID-19 outbreak. This week, Bolsonaro’s disapproval ratings jumped above those of former president Lula da Silva, and public support for impeachment is now over 54%. Third, Congress has allowed the government to go over the limit of fiscal spending this year, which has resulted in almost 1.2 trillion reais in emergency fiscal spending, or about 16% of GDP. This will push the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio to well above 100% by the end of 2020. Chart III-2This Large Gap Makes Public Debt Dynamics Untenable This Large Gap Makes Public Debt Dynamics Untenable This Large Gap Makes Public Debt Dynamics Untenable In order to stabilize its public debt-to-GDP ratio, a government’s borrowing costs should be below nominal GDP growth. Brazil fails to meet this condition. Local currency interest rates at 5.5% are well above nominal GDP growth, which will likely be negative in 2020 (Chart III-2). This assures unsustainable debt dynamics. Finally, in terms of monetary policy, the central bank’s policy rate cuts have not been efficiently transmitted to the real economy, as discussed in our March 31st Special Report. Borrowing costs for companies and households remain elevated relative to their nominal income growth. Overall, the sole feasible way for Brazil to stabilize its public debt-to-GDP ratio is to push nominal GDP growth above interest rates. Further, this is only possible with falling interest rates and further material currency depreciation. The continued currency devaluation represents a risk to foreign investors holding local assets. Investment Recommendations Continue to underweight Brazil within EM equity and credit portfolios. We reiterate our trade to short the BRL versus the US dollar. Even though the BRL is moderately cheap (Chart III-3), there is still considerable downward pressure on the currency. The BRL is tightly correlated with commodities prices (Chart III-4). Until these do not bottom out, the real will continue depreciating. Critically, the real needs to depreciate to lift nominal GDP growth above borrowing costs. The latter is essential to stabilize public debt dynamics. Chart III-3The BRL Is Only Modestly Cheap The BRL Is Only Modestly Cheap The BRL Is Only Modestly Cheap Chart III-4The BRL Correlates With Commodities Prices The BRL Correlates With Commodities Prices The BRL Correlates With Commodities Prices Finally, we are underweight both local currency and US$ denominated bonds in Brazil due to worrisome public debt dynamics and high foreign currency stress.   Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Shanghai announced to add 40,000 new license plates this year while Hangzhou increased 20,000 new license plates. 2   There were 100,000 additional license plates approved by Guangzhou province and an additional 80,000 by Shenzhen in 2019. 3   The cash subsidies are about RMB1000-3000 for buying regular cars, RMB3000-5000 for car replacement (e.g., scrapping their autos with Emission Standard 3 and buying autos with new Emission Standard 6), and RMB5000-10,000 for NEV purchases. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Real Yield Curve: Last week’s negative oil print could signal the peak in deflationary sentiment for this cycle. It’s a good time for bond investors to enter real yield curve steepeners. Buy a short-maturity real yield (1-year or 2-year) and sell a long-maturity real yield (10-year or 30-year). High-Yield: High-yield bond spreads are much too tight relative to the VIX and ratings migration. This is justified for Ba-rated issuers that can tap the Fed’s emergency programs. However, B-rated and below spreads look vulnerable. Investors should overweight Ba-rated junk bonds and underweight the B-rated and below credit tiers. Bank Bonds: US bond investors should overweight subordinate bank bonds within an allocation to investment grade corporate credit. Subordinate bank bonds are Baa-rated and thus offer reasonably high spreads. But unlike other Baa-rated bonds, banks should avoid ratings downgrades during this cycle. Feature Oil was the big mover in financial markets last week, with the WTI price dropping briefly into negative territory on the day before expiry of the May futures contract.1  Bond markets didn’t react much to the negative oil price (Chart 1), but this doesn’t mean that the energy market is unimportant for yields. On the contrary, the oil price often sends important signals about the near-term outlook for inflation, a key input for bond investors. Chart 1Negative Oil Didn't Shock The Bond Market Negative Oil Didn't Shock The Bond Market Negative Oil Didn't Shock The Bond Market A Bond Market Trade Inspired By Negative Oil The Fisher Equation is the formula that relates nominal yields, real yields and inflation expectations. In its simplest form the Fisher equation is: Nominal Yield = Real Yield + Inflation Expectations When applying this equation to the act of bond yield forecasting we find it helpful to note that both the nominal yield and inflation expectations have specific valuation anchors. The Federal Reserve sets the valuation anchor for nominal yields because it controls the overnight nominal interest rate. If you enter a long position in a nominal Treasury security and hold to maturity you will make money versus a position in cash if the average overnight nominal interest rate turns out to be lower than the nominal bond yield at the time of purchase. The oil price often sends important signals about the near-term outlook for inflation, a key input for bond investors. Similarly, inflation expectations are anchored by the actual inflation rate. If you enter a long position in inflation protection and hold to maturity you will make money if actual inflation turns out to be higher than the rate that was embedded in bond prices at the time of purchase.2 Turning to real yields, we see why the Fisher Equation is important. Real yields have no obvious valuation anchor. This means that the best forecasting technique is often to: (1)   Use our known valuation anchors (the fed funds rate and inflation) to forecast the nominal yield and inflation expectations. (2)  Use the Fisher Equation to back-out a fair value for real yields. With all that said, let’s apply this framework to today’s bond market in light of last week’s dramatic oil price moves. Inflation Compensation The cost of inflation protection tracks the oil price, more so at the front end of the curve than at the long end. This makes sense given that recent oil price trends tell us a fair amount about the outlook for inflation over the next year but very little about the outlook for inflation over the next 10 or 30 years. The inflation market didn’t react much to oil’s dip into negative territory last week, but this year’s broader drop in the WTI price from above $50 to below $20 had a big impact on TIPS breakeven inflation rates and CPI swap rates, particularly at short maturities (Chart 2). In fact, consistent with expectations for a very low oil price, the bond market is now pricing-in deflation over the next two years. Chart 2Bond Market Priced For Deflation Bond Market Priced For Deflation Bond Market Priced For Deflation Nominal Yields The Fed’s zero interest rate policy is having a profound effect on nominal bond yield volatility. Because the consensus investor expectation is that the Fed will keep rates pinned near zero for a long time, almost irrespective of economic outcomes, even a significant market event like a plunge in the oil price will do very little to move nominal bond yields. During the last zero-lower-bound period, nominal bond yield volatility fell across the entire yield curve but fell much more at the short end of the curve than at the long end (Chart 3). The same phenomenon will re-occur during the current zero-lower-bound episode. Chart 3The Zero Lower Bound Crushes Nominal Bond Yield Volatility The Zero Lower Bound Crushes Nominal Bond Yield Volatility The Zero Lower Bound Crushes Nominal Bond Yield Volatility Real Yields Using the Fisher Equation, we can deduce how real yields must move given changes in inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. With the Fed ensuring that short-maturity nominal yields remain stable, the recent decline in oil and inflation expectations caused short-dated real yields to jump (Chart 4). Long-maturity real yields remain low because (a) the shock to inflation expectations was smaller at the long-end of the curve and (b) the Fed’s forward rate guidance doesn’t suppress nominal bond yield volatility as much for long maturities. Chart 4There's Value In Short-Maturity Real Yields There's Value In Short-Maturity Real Yields There's Value In Short-Maturity Real Yields Investment Implications If we assume that last week’s -$37.60 WTI print will mark the cyclical trough in oil prices, US bond investors can profit by implementing real yield curve steepeners.3  Short-dated real yields will fall as oil and short-dated inflation expectations recover and nominal yields remain stable. In this scenario, real yields are more likely to rise at the long-end of the curve, given the greater volatility in long-dated nominal yields and the fact that long-maturity inflation expectations are not as depressed. Looking at the 2008 episode as a comparable, we see that the cost of inflation protection bottomed around the same time as the trough in oil, and about 7 months before the trough in 12-month headline CPI (Chart 5). After that trough, with the Fed keeping short-dated nominal rates pinned near zero, the inflation compensation curve flattened and the real yield curve steepened. Chart 5Initiate Real Yield Curve Steepeners Initiate Real Yield Curve Steepeners Initiate Real Yield Curve Steepeners Bottom Line: Last week’s negative oil print could signal the peak in deflationary sentiment for this cycle. It’s a good time for bond investors to enter real yield curve steepeners. Buy a short-maturity real yield (1-year or 2-year) and sell a long-maturity real yield (10-year or 30-year). Poor Junk Bond Valuations Illustrated In recent reports we have been advising investors to own spread products that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support.4 This includes investment grade corporate bonds and Ba-rated high-yield bonds, but not junk bonds rated B or below. In past reports we also showed that B-rated and below junk spreads don’t adequately compensate investors for likely default losses. But this week, we want to quickly illustrate that junk spreads are trading too tight even compared to other common coincident indicators. Specifically, we zero in on the VIX and ratings migration. In 2008, the cost of inflation protection bottomed around the same time as the trough in oil, and about 7 months before the trough in 12-month headline CPI. Charts 6A, 7A and 8A show the historical relationship between the VIX and Ba, B and Caa junk spreads. In all three cases, spreads are well below levels that have been historically consistent with the current reading from the VIX. Charts 6B, 7B and 8B show the historical relationship between the monthly Moody’s rating downgrade/upgrade ratio and Ba, B and Caa spreads. These charts tell a similar story. In fact, March saw nearly 12 times as many ratings downgrades as upgrades, the third highest monthly ratio since 1986. With more downgrades coming in the months ahead, it is apparent that junk spreads are stretched. Chart 6ABa Spreads & VIX Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Chart 6BBa Spreads & Ratings Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Chart 7AB Spreads & VIX Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Chart 7BB Spreads & Ratings Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Chart 8ACaa Spreads & VIX Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Chart 8BCaa Spreads & Ratings Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation Relatively tight spreads are probably justified in the Ba space where firms will benefit from the Federal Reserve’s Main Street Lending facilities.5 However, B-rated and below securities have mostly been left out in the cold. We see high odds of spread widening for those credit tiers.  Bottom Line: High-yield bond spreads are much too tight relative to the VIX and ratings migration. This is justified for Ba-rated issuers that can tap the Fed’s emergency programs. However, B-rated and below spreads look vulnerable. Investors should overweight Ba-rated junk bonds and underweight the B-rated and below credit tiers. Subordinate Bank Debt Is A Good Bet The Fed’s decision to exclude bank bonds from its primary and secondary market corporate bond purchases complicates our investment strategy. We want to focus on sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support, but should we carve out an exception for bank bonds? Bank Bonds Are A Defensive Sector First, we note that banks are a defensive corporate bond sector. This is due to bank debt’s relatively high credit rating and low duration. Notice that banks outperformed the rest of the corporate index when spreads widened in March, but have lagged the index by 131 bps since spreads peaked on March 23 (Chart 9). Bank equities don’t exhibit the same behavior and have in fact steadily underperformed the S&P 500 since the start of the year (Chart 9, bottom 2 panels). Chart 9Bank Bonds Are Defensive... Bank Bonds Are Defensive... Bank Bonds Are Defensive... However, if we consider senior and subordinate bank debt separately, a different picture emerges (Chart 10). Senior bank bonds behave defensively, as described above, but the lower-rated/higher duration subordinate bank bond index is more cyclical. It has outperformed the corporate benchmark by 316 bps since March 23 (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10...Except Subordinate Debt ...Except Subordinate Debt ...Except Subordinate Debt The Value In Bank Bonds Despite being a defensive sector, senior bank bonds offer attractive risk-adjusted value. The average spread of the senior bank index is 18 bps above the spread offered by the equivalently-rated (A) corporate bond benchmark. Further, the senior bank index has lower average duration than the A-rated benchmark, making the sector very attractive on a per-unit-of-duration basis (Chart 11A). Chart 11ASenior Bank Bond Valuation Senior Bank Bond Valuation Senior Bank Bond Valuation Chart 11BSubordinate Bank Bond Valuation Subordinate Bank Bond Valuation Subordinate Bank Bond Valuation ​​​​​​​Turning to subordinate bank bonds, risk-adjusted value looks only fair compared to other equivalently-rated (Baa) corporate bonds (Chart 11B). However, in absolute terms the subordinate bank index offers a spread of 246 bps, compared to a spread of 178 bps on the senior bank index. Downgrade Risk Is Minimal We think investors should overweight subordinate bank bonds for two reasons. First, we think the Fed’s aggressive policy response means that investment grade corporate bond spreads, in general, have already peaked. We would expect defensive senior bank bonds to underperform in this environment of spread tightening, even though they offer attractive risk-adjusted value. Subordinate bank bonds should outperform the index in this environment, even if other Baa-rated sectors offer better value. Second, other Baa-rated corporate bond sectors offer elevated spreads because downgrade risk remains high. The Fed’s facilities will prevent default for investment grade firms, but many Baa-rated issuers will end up taking on a lot of debt to avoid bankruptcy and will get downgraded. We think banks are insulated from this downgrade risk. Even in the Fed's "Severely Adverse Scenario", three of banks' four main capital ratios remain above pre-GFC levels. Chart 12 shows the four main capital ratios calculated for US banks, and the dashed line shows the minimum value the Fed estimates that those ratios will hit under the “Severely Adverse Scenario” from the 2019 Stress Test. Three of the four ratios would remain above pre-crisis levels, and the Tier 1 Leverage Ratio would be only a touch lower. Chart 12Banks Have Huge Capital Buffers Banks Have Huge Capital Buffers Banks Have Huge Capital Buffers Further, our US Investment Strategy service observes that the large banks had sufficient earnings in the first quarter to significantly ramp up loan loss provisions without taking any capital hit at all.6 Our US Investment Strategy team believes that, as long as the shutdown doesn’t last more than six months, the big banks will have sufficient earnings power to absorb loan losses this year, without having to mark down their capital ratios, which in any case are extremely high. Bottom Line: US bond investors should overweight subordinate bank bonds within an allocation to investment grade corporate credit. Subordinate bank bonds are Baa-rated and thus offer reasonably high spreads. But unlike other Baa-rated bonds, banks should avoid ratings downgrades during this cycle. In short, subordinate bank debt looks like a reasonably safe way to capture high-beta exposure to the investment grade corporate bond market.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For a more detailed explanation of the WTI price’s shocking move please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Alert, “WTI In Free Fall”, dated April 20, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 2 An example of a long position in inflation protection would be buying the 5-year TIPS and shorting the equivalent-maturity nominal Treasury security. 3 Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s view is that the WTI oil price will average ~$60 to $65 in 2021. For further details please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “US Storage Tightens, Pushing WTI Lower”, dated April 16, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Is The Bottom Already In?”, dated April 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on the Fed’s different emergency facilities please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Big Bank Beige Book, April 2020”, dated April 20, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We remain comfortable with a 3,000 SPX fair value estimate backed up by our DDM, forward ERP and sensitivity analyses. The path of least resistance remains higher for the SPX on a 9-12 month cyclical time horizon. The oil price collapse is eliciting a massive supply response that should help rebalance the oil markets, and coupled with glimmers of hope on reopening the economy, it should put a floor under oil prices. CB are injecting unprecedented amounts of liquidity in the markets and at some point this will lead to a growth revival which is negative for gold prices. Taken together, and given all-time lows in relative valuations and technicals, we are compelled to go long US oil & gas exploration & production stocks at the expense of global gold miners. We are putting the S&P managed health care index on downgrade alert to reflect the risk that rising unemployment poses to health care enrollment. Falling interest rates also weigh on industry profitability at a time when relative valuations are perky and technicals are overbought. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P oil & gas exploration & production/short global gold miners pair trade, today. Table 1 Gauging Fair Value Gauging Fair Value Feature Equities marked time last week, despite the passage of a fresh mini fiscal 2.0 package and efforts to restart the economy in parts of the globe. In contrast, news that President Trump may delay reopening the economy along with negative crude oil prices weighed heavily on the S&P 500. Nevertheless, energy equities fared very well, defying the oil market carnage and impressively relative energy share prices have led the SPX trough (Chart 1). We remain constructive on the broad equity market on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. Following up from last week’s SPX dividend discount model (DDM) update, we complement our research with two additional ways of approximating the SPX fair value: EPS and multiple sensitivity analysis and a forward equity risk premium (ERP) analysis. While at the nadir the stock market priced in a collapse in EPS close to $104 for the current year (please refer to our analysis here1), in 2021 EPS can return to their long-term trend line near $162. At first sight this spike in EPS seems unrealistic. However, here are two salient points: Chart 1Energy As A Leading Indicator Energy As A Leading Indicator Energy As A Leading Indicator First, hard-hit COVID-19 subsectors are a small fraction of SPX profits and market capitalization. In other words, the S&P 500 is a market cap weighted index and has already filtered out hotels, cruises, restaurants, homebuilders, autos, auto parts, airlines, and even energy as they comprise a small part of the SPX. Second, historical precedents show an explosive year-over-year growth increase in EPS from recessionary troughs. In fact, the steeper the collapse the more violent the rebound. Hence, our recovery EPS estimate is more or less in line with empirical evidence (Chart 2). Chart 2Violently Oscillating EPS Violently Oscillating EPS Violently Oscillating EPS For comparison purposes, the Street is still penciling in EPS near $135 and $170 for 2020 and 2021, respectively. Table 2 shows our sensitivity analysis and an SPX ending value of just above 2,900 using $162 EPS and an 18x forward multiple as our base case. This multiple is slightly below the historical time trend using IBES data dating back to 1979, and represents our fair value PE estimate (please see page 17 of our April 6, 2020 webcast2 available here). Table 2SPX EPS & Multiple Sensitivity Gauging Fair Value Gauging Fair Value With regard to the forward ERP analysis, our starting point is an equilibrium ERP of 440 basis points (bps). The way we derived this number was using the last decade’s average observed forward ERP (middle panel, Chart 3). We used to think equilibrium ERP was closer to 200bps. However, if the Fed’s extraordinary – and unorthodox – measures since the onset of the GFC did not manage to bring down the ERP (middle panel, Chart 3), then in the current recession with uncertainty on the rise, it only makes sense to model a higher than previously thought equilibrium ERP (middle panel, Chart 4). Chart 3The Forward Equity Risk Premium… The Forward Equity Risk Premium… The Forward Equity Risk Premium… Chart 4…Will Recede …Will Recede …Will Recede And, just to put the forward ERP in perspective, keep in mind that it jumped from 350bps to just below 600bps year-to-date (Chart 4)! A doubling in the 10-year US treasury yield to 120bps is another assumption we are making along with using our trend EPS estimate of $162 for calendar 2021. Backing out price results in a roughly 2,900 SPX fair value estimate (Table 3). Table 3Forward Equity Risk Premium Analysis Gauging Fair Value Gauging Fair Value We remain comfortable with a 3,000 SPX fair value estimate backed up by our DDM, forward ERP and sensitivity analyses. Despite the much needed current consolidation phase, the path of least resistance is higher for the SPX on a 9-12 month cyclical time horizon. This week we are putting a health care subgroup on downgrade alert and initiating a high-octane intra-commodity market-neutral pair trade to benefit from the looming handoff of liquidity to growth. Time To Buy “Black Gold” At The Expense Of Gold Bullion We have been long and wrong on the S&P energy sector and its subcomponents, as neither we nor our Commodity & Energy Strategists anticipated -$40/bbl WTI crude oil futures prices. Nevertheless, as the energy sector is drifting into oblivion within the SPX – it is now the second smallest GICS1 sector with a 2.77% market cap weight slightly higher than materials – we think that WTI May contract reaching -$40/bbl marked the recessionary trough. Similar to the early-2018 “volmageddon” incident when a volatility exchanged trade product blew up and got dismantled and marked that cyclical peak in the VIX, the recent near collapse of USO and shuttering of another oil related levered exchange traded product serve as the anecdotes that likely mark the low in oil prices. True, negative WTI futures prices are no longer taboo and the CME prepared for them by reprograming its systems to handle negative futures prices, thus they can happen again. With regard to the significance of anecdotes in market tops and bottoms, another interesting one that comes to mind is from our early days at BCA in May of 2008 where we worked for the Global Investment Strategy team as a senior analyst. Back then, we vividly remember a Goldman Sachs analyst slapping a $150/bbl target on crude oil,3 and only days later in unprecedented hubris Gazprom’s CEO upped the ante with an apocalyptic $250/bbl prediction.4 This prompted us to create our first mania chart at BCA with crude oil prices on June 20, 2008 (please see chart 16 from that report available here5), which proved timely as oil prices peaked less than a month later at $147/bbl. Today, we are compelled to perform the opposite exercise and run a regression of previous equity sector market crashes on the S&P oil & gas exploration & production index (E&P, that most closely resembles WTI crude oil prices) in order to gauge a recovery profile. Chart 5 suggests that if the anecdotes are accurate in calling the trough in oil prices, then E&P stocks should enjoy a steep price appreciation trajectory in the coming two years. Beyond the overweights we continue to hold in the S&P energy sector and all the subgroups we cover, we believe that there is an exploitable trading opportunity to go long S&P E&P/short global gold miners (Chart 6). Chart 5Heed The US Equity Strategy’s Crash Index Message Heed The US Equity Strategy’s Crash Index Message Heed The US Equity Strategy’s Crash Index Message This high-octane trade is extremely volatile, but the recent carnage in the oil markets offers a great entry point for investors that can stomach heightened volatility, with an enticing risk/reward tradeoff. The gold/oil ratio (GOR) is trading at 112 as we went to press and we think that it will have to settle down. The Fed is doing its utmost to dampen volatility, and historically, suppressed volatility has been synonymous with a falling GOR (Chart 7). As a result, our pair trade will have to at least climb back to its recent breakdown point, representing a near 34% return (top panel, Chart 6). Chart 6Buy E&P Stocks At The Expense Of Gold Miners Buy E&P Stocks At The Expense Of Gold Miners Buy E&P Stocks At The Expense Of Gold Miners From a macro perspective the time to buy oil equities at the expense of gold miners is when there is a handoff from liquidity to growth (bottom panel, Chart 6). While we are still in the liquidity injection phase we deem the Fed and other Central Banks (CB) are committed to do “whatever it takes” to sustain the proper functioning of the markets. Therefore, at some point likely in the back half of the year when the economy slowly reopens, all these CB programs will bear fruit and growth will recover violently (middle panel, Chart 6), especially given our long-held view that the US will avoid a Great Depression. Chart 7VIX Says Sell The GOR VIX Says Sell The GOR VIX Says Sell The GOR With regard to balancing the oil market, nothing like price to change behavior. In more detail, the recent collapse in oil prices will work like magic to bring some semblance of normality back to the crude oil market, as it will naturally cause a shut in of production; there is no doubt about it. Not only has the supply response commenced, but it is also accelerating to the downside as the plunging rig count depicts (Chart 8). This will lead to some longer-term bullish oil price ramifications. As a reminder, while demand drives prices in the short-term, supply dictates the oil price direction in the long-term. Chart 8Oil Price Collapse Induced Supply Response Oil Price Collapse Induced Supply Response Oil Price Collapse Induced Supply Response Turning over to gold and gold miners, all this liquidity is forcing investors to chase bullion and related equities higher. Tack on that every CB the world over is trying to debase their currency, and factors are falling into place for sustainable flows into gold and gold mining equities. However, there are high odds that all this money sloshing around will eventually generate growth especially in the western hemisphere that is slowly contemplating of restarting its economic engines. As a result, real yields will rise which in turn is negative for gold and gold miners (Chart 9). Finally, relative valuations and technicals could not be more depressed, which is contrarily positive (Chart 10). Chart 9Liquidity To Growth Handoff Beneficiary Liquidity To Growth Handoff Beneficiary Liquidity To Growth Handoff Beneficiary Netting it all out, the oil price collapse is eliciting a massive supply response that should help rebalance the oil markets, and coupled with glimmers of hope on reopening the economy, it should put a floor under oil prices. CB are injecting unprecedented amounts of liquidity in the markets and at some point this will lead to a growth revival which is negative for gold prices. Taken together, and given all-time lows in relative valuations and technicals, we are compelled to go long US oil & gas exploration & production equities at the expense of global gold miners. Chart 10As Bad As It Gets As Bad As It Gets As Bad As It Gets Bottom Line: Initiate a long US oil & gas exploration & production/short global gold miners pair trade today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG: BLBG: S5OILP – COP, EOG, HES, COG, MRO, NBL, CXO, APA, PXD, DVN, FANG, (or XOP:US exchange traded fund) and GDX:US exchange traded fund, respectively. Put HMOs On Downgrade Alert We upgraded the S&P managed health care index last April, the Monday after Bernie Sanders re-introduced his “Medicare For All” bill.6 Our thesis was that the drubbing in this sector was a massive overreaction and we, along with our Geopolitical Strategists, thought that he would have low chances of clinching the Democratic Presidential candidacy and threatening to render HMOs obsolete. A year later, this thesis has panned out and the S&P managed care index is up 30% versus the S&P 500. Nevertheless we do not want to overstay our welcome and are putting it on our downgrade watch list and instituting a 5% rolling stop in order to protect gains in our portfolio (top panel, Chart 11). Relative share prices have broken out to fresh all-time highs, not only courtesy of a more moderate Democratic Presidential candidate, but also because a significant boost to margins and profits is looming. The delayed effect of fewer elective procedures (i.e. hip and knee replacements and even non-life threatening bypass surgeries) owing to the coronavirus pandemic will result in a sizable, yet temporary, margin expansion phase (second panel, Chart 11). Tack on, still roughly 20% health care insurance CPI and the outlook for HMO margins and profits further improves (bottom panel, Chart 11). Nevertheless, there are some negative offsets. Over the past 5 weeks unemployment insurance claims have soared to 26.5mn, erasing all the employment gains of the past decade, thus private insurance enrollment will take a sizable hit (top panel, Chart 12). Chart 11The Good… The Good… The Good… Chart 12…And The Bad …And The Bad …And The Bad Moreover on the income side, the premia that HMOs take in are typically invested in the risk free asset and given the two month fall from 1.5% to around 0.6% in the 10-year Treasury yield, managed health care earnings will also, at the margin, suffer a setback (bottom panel, Chart 12). True, the HMOs earnings juggernaut has been one of a kind over the past decade underpinning relative share prices (top panel, Chart 13). However, we reckon a lot of the good news and very little if any of the bad news is priced in extremely optimistic relative profit expectation going out five years (middle panel, Chart 13). Keep in mind that the bulk of the M&A activity is behind this industry as the dust has now settled from the previous two year frenzied pace of inter and intra industry combinations (top panel, Chart 14). Chart 13Lots Of Good News Is Already Priced In Lots Of Good News Is Already Priced In Lots Of Good News Is Already Priced In Chart 14Preparing Not To Overstay Our Welcome Preparing Not To Overstay Our Welcome Preparing Not To Overstay Our Welcome Finally, relative technicals are in overbought territory close to one standard deviation above the historical mean and relative valuations are also becoming a tad too lofty for our liking (middle & bottom panel, Chart 14). Adding it all up, we are putting the S&P managed health care index on downgrade alert to reflect the risk that rising unemployment poses to health care enrollment. Falling interest rates also weigh on industry profitability at a time when relative valuations are perky and technicals are overbought. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P managed health care index, but it is now on our downgrade watch list. We are also instituting a rolling 5% stop as a portfolio management tool in order to protect profits. Stay tuned. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH-UNH, ANTM, HUM, CNC.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “What Is Priced In?” dated March 30, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     https://www.icastpro.ca/events/bca/2020/04/06/us-equity-market-what-the-future-holds/play/16925 3    https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/business/21oil.html 4    https://www.reuters.com/article/gazprom-ceo/russias-gazprom-sees-higher-gas-prices-ceo-idUSL1148506420080611 5    Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Strategy Outlook - PART 1 - Third Quarter 2008” dated June 20, 2008, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Show Me The Profits” dated April 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Gauging Fair Value Gauging Fair Value Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth May 10, 2018 Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights Why is the gap between the stock market and the economy so wide?: It is well established that stocks can diverge considerably from fundamentals in the near term, but lately it is as if the stock tables and the front-page headlines are from entirely different newspapers. It may be because the virus poses much less of a threat to the owners of equities than the general populace: More affluent households are more readily able to work from home and to practice social distancing. They also have access to better medical care. With the S&P 500 having hit technical resistance, however, the gap may be nearing its upper limit: Large-caps have run in place since retracing half of their peak-to-trough losses, and the next Fibonacci resistance level is only another 5% higher. Where are the shoddy loans?: During the expansion, corporations were able to borrow on prodigally easy terms. If banks aren't holding the loans, who is? Feature That’s New York’s future, not mine – “Hold On” (Reed) For someone who entered the business as a sell-side trader, it is a matter of course that prices can diverge from fundamentals. The trading desk had a one-day horizon, and the traders necessarily made their way on price signals while barely considering fundamentals. Though the junior traders had been exposed to dividend discount models at their fancy colleges, the ones who lasted recognized they weren’t relevant to the desk’s mission. Trading the daily flow required accepting that new news can have a dramatically larger effect on stocks in the here and now than it would on the lifetime stream of earnings available to common shareholders. Long-run fair value might solely turn on the fundamentals, but animal spirits hold sway over any given tick. The sudden stop imposed by stay-at-home orders has made backward-looking economic data nearly irrelevant, but the sizable upward surprises in unemployment claims should not be ignored. Our Global Investment Strategy colleagues showed last week just how difficult it is for even severe near-term shocks to materially alter the present value of aggregate future earnings.1 Furthermore, the market effects of negative earnings shocks are inherently self-limiting at the margin because they tend to be accompanied by lower interest rates, driving up the equity risk premium and making stocks more attractive relative to “safe” fixed income alternatives. Bear markets coincide with recessions, though, as near-term earnings expectations are revised lower and animal spirits droop (Chart 1). Given that the recession just begun is expected to be the worst since the Great Depression, one would expect that equities would be stumbling in search of a bottom as investors remained fearful of taking on risk. Chart 1Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip They have instead been acting like the S&P 500 found that bottom on March 23rd, when the index completed a 35% peak-to-trough decline in just 23 sessions. It then proceeded to gain 28.5% over the next eighteen sessions. Some retracement is to be expected after a sudden, sharp move, and the S&P 500 has only recovered half of the ground that it lost. It certainly priced in a great deal of bad news on the way down, but the data have been worsening, and investors have been forced to give up on the notion of a swift economic recovery. Why are stocks rising when economic projections are being downwardly revised and good virus news has been few and far between? We ourselves have been barely glancing at backward-looking economic data releases that merely confirm the well-understood fact that draconian social distancing measures have wrung much of the life out of the economy. The degree to which job losses have outrun consensus forecasts stands out nonetheless. Aggregate initial unemployment claims over the last five weeks have exceeded consensus expectations by 5.5 million (Table 1). Even though the forecasts have caught up to the situation on the ground, the claims data suggest that unemployment is now pushing 20%, a worst-case-scenario level that is far above the first forecasts that incorporated the effects of stay-at-home orders. Claims may well have peaked, but they’re still an order of magnitude higher than normal, and they are not finished exerting upward pressure on the unemployment rate. Table 1Job Losses Have Been Worse Than Expected Dichotomy Dichotomy Meanwhile, COVID-19 data have yet to provoke much optimism. The rate of US infections has yet to come down to Italy’s level (Chart 2), and hopes that remdesivir might prove to be a wonder drug were dashed late last week. Clients are increasingly asking us why the stock market is traveling such a dramatically different path than the economy and the virus. How could stocks have plunged at a record rate as the coronavirus drew a bead on the United States, but surged after crippling social distancing measures were put in place? Chart 2The US Has Fallen Behind Italy's Pace Dichotomy Dichotomy A Tale Of Two Boroughs The simplest answer is that the Fed’s response was swifter and more far-reaching than expected. Ditto Congressional actions, and we expect that DC will continue to deploy its fiscal firepower to try to shield households and businesses from the worst of the effects of the anti-virus measures. We believe the monetary and fiscal efforts will make a difference, and do not think it’s a coincidence that equities turned around the week of March 23rd, which began with the Fed’s rollout of a formidable new arsenal and ended with the passage of the CARES Act. But the market action has not accounted for the shift from expectations of a V-bottom to talk of Us, Ls and Ws. Two articles published a week apart in The New Yorker vividly illustrated a demographic virus gap. The first looked at COVID-19 from the perspective of financial professionals at hedge funds and other sophisticated investment aeries.2 Although the views of the investors in the profile shifted with the tide of the incoming data, they were generally of the mind that the health threat was being dramatically overhyped. One retired hedge fund manager boasted about his and his family’s non-stop early March air travel between New York, London and a Wyoming ski resort. The second article followed an emergency room resident at Elmhurst, a publicly funded hospital in a working-class Queens neighborhood, which has been described as the epicenter of the outbreak in several local media reports.3 “‘It’s become very clear to me what a socioeconomic disease this is,’” he said. “‘Short-order cooks, doormen, cleaners, deli workers – that is the patient population here. Other people were at home, but my patients were still working. A few weeks ago, when they were told to socially isolate, they still had to go back to an apartment with ten other people. Now they are in our cardiac room dying.’” Stock ownership is largely reserved to the affluent, with the top percentile of households owning 53% of equities as of the end of 2019, and the rest of the top decile owning another 35% (Chart 3). For households in the top decile, maintaining a healthy distance from the virus isn’t that difficult. Knowledge workers equipped with a laptop and a reliable internet connection can work from anywhere, unlike the Elmhurst patients in low-skilled service positions who have to work onsite. The tonier precincts of Manhattan feel nearly deserted, with their residents having decamped for second homes in lower-density areas. Perhaps it's because the Fed's attempts to shore up the economy have far more personal relevance for investors than the spread of the virus. There are no comprehensive data series on virus infections and outcomes by zip code, which would facilitate analysis of the link between household wealth and COVID-19, but New York state reports age-adjusted fatality rates in four racial/ethnic categories. In New York state ex-New York city, which has lesser extremes of wealth than the city itself, the cross-category disparities are striking (Chart 4). Race/ethnicity is far from an ideal proxy for inequality, but it is fair to conclude that financial market participants have a sound basis for being more sanguine about the virus than the overall population. Assuming that more affluent households will be able to remain out of the virus’ reach, the dichotomy can persist for as long as the economic impacts do not become so bad that investors cannot reasonably look through them. Chart 3Demographics Drive Stock Ownership ... Dichotomy Dichotomy Chart 4... And COVID-19 Fatalities Dichotomy Dichotomy Technical Resistance Back on the trading desk, technical analysis was the go-to tool for traders pricing large blocks of stock in real time. Following sizable moves, the Fibonacci sequence provided a popular method for assessing how far a stock might retrace its steps before resuming its course. The most widely used Fibonacci retracement levels are 38% and 62%, and 50%, a round number exactly between the two, has also become an anticipated stopping point. From the February 19 closing high of 3,386.15 to the March 23 closing low of 2,237.40, the S&P 500 lost 1,148.75 points. The 38%, 50% and 62% retracement levels are 2,673.93, 2,811.78 and 2,949.63, respectively. The S&P paused at the 38% level for just two days before breaking through it decisively, but it’s had more trouble making its way through 2,812, failing to hold above it for more than a day or two at a time (Chart 5). Should it escape 2,812, the 2,950 level waits just 5% higher. Chart 5Fibonacci Retracement Levels For The S&P 500 Fibonacci Retracement Levels For The S&P 500 Fibonacci Retracement Levels For The S&P 500 We are fundamental investors who do not get hung up on technical levels, though they can become self-fulfilling prophecies if enough participants are following them. Given the popularity of Fibonacci retracement, it is possible that a critical mass of short-term investors may view 2,812 and 2,950 as preferred levels for exiting long positions in the S&P. Our bigger near-term concern is that it is hard to see US equities making much more headway while the virus and ongoing distancing measures have the potential to cause investors to revise their fundamental expectations lower and/or lose a little bit of their policy-fueled nerve. Who's Left Holding The Bag? Multiple commentators have expressed alarm at the post-2008 increase in corporate debt, especially given anecdotal reports that lending covenants had been loosened dramatically. If the banks don’t hold the debt, as we’ve argued, who does, and could a wave of virus-inspired defaults cause larger problems in the financial system? The Fed’s fourth quarter Flow of Funds report, published last month, provides some clues, but does not answer the question definitively. As we saw in higher frequency data on aggregate banking system exposures, bank loans to nonfinancial corporations grew modestly (3.2% annualized) since December 31, 2008. Nonfinancial corporations borrowed in the bond market at double that rate (6.2% annualized). Foreign loans, powered by near doubling in 2017 and 2018, grew at an annualized 13.4% pace, and are four times as large as they were at the end of 2008. Finance company loans have shrunk, and trade payables grew at a modest 2% rate. (Chart 6). Chart 6Debt Risks Are Pretty Well Diffused Dichotomy Dichotomy Publicly available data from Preqin on the capital raised by direct lending funds suggests that their impact has been modest, accounting for only about a quarter of outstanding bank loans if every dollar they’ve raised is currently deployed. Demand for leveraged loans, senior floating-rate debt issued to high-yield borrowers, was occasionally intense as investors sought protection from rising rates. The desire for duration protection has faded as rates have plunged to new lows, but ETFs and CLOs were eager buyers at points during the last expansion. In a Special Report published last summer, our US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services concluded that the ownership of leveraged loans is diffuse enough that credit strains are unlikely to pose a systemic threat. They were also encouraged that leveraged loans and high yield corporate bonds act as substitutes, keeping one another in check as investor preferences for fixed and floating instruments wax and wane. They also noted that leveraged loan lending standards had tightened last year, with a reduced share of covenant-lite loans being issued, though standards have eased again since they published their report (Chart 7). Chart 7Covenant Protections Have Eroded Covenant Protections Have Eroded Covenant Protections Have Eroded Chart 8Diverse Corporate Bond Ownership Will Help Mitigate The Effect Of Defaults Dichotomy Dichotomy There is no way around the fact that high yield corporate bondholders (Chart 8), owners of CLO tranches rated below AAA and leveraged loan holders face elevated credit losses as the broad economic shutdown provokes a wave of defaults in instruments without Fed support. We expect that the default losses will be spread out across enough constituents that they will not become worryingly concentrated, but they may contribute to a further erosion of risk appetites.       Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the April 23, 2020 Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Could The Pandemic Actually Raise Stock Prices?" available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Paumgarten, Nick. "The Price of a Pandemic." The New Yorker, April 20, 2020, pp. 20-24. The article, relaying traders’ conversations, contains some profanity. 3 Galchen, Rivka. "The Longest Shift." The New Yorker, April 27, 2020, pp. 20-26. The article, relaying ER conversations, contains some profanity.