Valuations

Dear Client, In addition to this short weekly report, you will also receive a Special Report on investment themes over the next decade, penned by our colleagues in the US Equity Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services. The implications for the dollar could be profound, and I hope you will find it insightful. This will be our final publication for the year. We will resume publication on January 10, 2020. Thank you for your readership and wishing you a prosperous New Year. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor Highlights We expect the USD/CAD to fall to 1.20 in the coming months. However, we recommend favoring both the aussie and the euro over the loonie. Stand aside on sterling for now. Feature We expect CAD/USD to gravitate higher in the next few months. In a somewhat hawkish shift, the Bank of Canada kept rates on hold at its last policy meeting. It may however later view this move as a policy mistake, not because the economy was under pressure, but because other central banks have been mostly cutting rates this year (Chart I-1). Upward pressure on the CAD will tighten domestic financial conditions. This will ensure that while CAD/USD may touch 0.80-0.82 cents in the next few months (Chart I-2), it will likely underperform its procyclical peers. Chart I-1Peak ##br##Divergence? Chart I-2Interest Rate Differentials Could Push USD/CAD To 1.20 More recently, Canadian data is beginning to take a surprising turn to the downside. The November jobs report was the worst since the financial crisis. This was the second consecutive monthly drop, with losses spread across both part-time and full-time (Chart I-3). Most importantly, the unemployment rate in Canada has tended to stage powerful V-shaped recoveries, and the rise in November suggests caution (bottom panel). Manufacturing and resources in Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia bore the brunt of the employment declines. Chart I-3Worst Job Report Since 2007 Chart I-4Uneven Housing Recovery Housing remains a pillar of household wealth in Canada, and the recovery in prices remains uneven (Chart I-4). The risk is that this continues to restrain spending in Canada, which has remained weak despite robust wage growth. Nationwide house price growth has slowed to a standstill. A study by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand shows that on average, the elasticity of consumption growth to house price changes is asymmetric to the downside.1 Negative housing shocks tend to hurt consumption by more than the boost received from positive shocks. This makes sense since at very elevated debt levels, leveraged gains are used to pay down debt aggressively, whereas leveraged losses hit bottom lines directly. Housing remains a pillar of household wealth in Canada, and the recovery in prices remains uneven. The increase in the budget deficit next year is mainly due to the increase in pension liabilities (low rates led to lower returns), rather than significant new spending (Chart I-5).2 This means the scope for the BoC to raise rates could be much less compared to other central banks, should the global economy pick up steam next year. Fiscal spending looks much more forthcoming in Europe, Japan and the US (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Projected Federal Budgetary Balance The latest inflation print shows that domestic prices in Canada remain well anchored at the midpoint of the BoC’s target band. However, there are downside risks from the lagged effect of softening producer prices (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Higher Budget Deficits Outside Canada Chart I-7Risk To Canadian Inflation More importantly, terms of trade in Canada have been slowing, especially when compared to its commodity peers (Chart I-8). Rising energy prices, as we expect, will be a tailwind, but the Western Canadian Select discount and persistent infrastructure problems are headwinds. Fiscal spending looks much more forthcoming in Europe, Japan and the US. We favor the aussie over the loonie since the downturn in the Australian housing market appears much further advanced compared to Canada. Historically, policy divergences between the RBA and the BoC have followed the relative growth profiles of their biggest export markets, and the message so far is that the RBA is well ahead of the curve in its dovish bias (Chart I-9). Our expectation is that the recent green shoots in Chinese growth are a prelude to another mini-up cycle, in line with the view of our colleague Jing Sima from BCA’s China Investment Strategy service Chart I-8CAD, AUD, NZD And Terms Of Trade Chart I-9Buy AUD/CAD This week, we are also recommending investors buy EUR/CAD. First, valuations and balance-of-payment dynamics favor the euro versus the Canadian dollar. Second, we estimate there is more scope for long-term interest rate expectations to rise in the euro area than in Canada. This is just a matter of mathematics, since European rates have already fallen to rock-bottom levels. Meanwhile, economic surprises are inflecting higher in the Eurozone relative to Canada (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Buy EUR/CAD EUR/CAD is sitting at the bottom of the upward trending channel that has existed since 2012. On a technical basis, the downside has been eliminated for now. Meanwhile, initial upside resistance rests at the triple top, a nudge above 1.6 (Chart I-11). Chart I-11EUR/CAD Technicals: Limited Downside Housekeeping We were stopped out of our long GBP/JPY trade for a profit of 9.6%. On a tactical basis, we are standing aside for now as volatility could rise, especially amid thin holiday trading. Meanwhile, on a technical basis, EUR/GBP is also due for mean reversion (Chart I-12). That said, our eventual target for GBP/USD is 1.40 for clients willing to stomach the volatility. Chart I-12Tactical Upside For EUR/GBP Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Mairead de Roiste, Apostolos Fasianos, Robert Kirkby, and Fang Yao, “Household Leverage and Asymmetric Housing Wealth Effects - Evidence from New Zealand,” Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Discussion Paper Series, (April 2019). 2 Jordan Press, “Morneau’s fiscal update shows Canada’s deficit increased by billions for next 2 years,” Global News, The Canadian Press, December 16, 2019. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Markit flash manufacturing PMI marginally fell to 52.5, while services PMI increased to 52.2 in December. The New York Empire State Manufacturing index increased to 3.5 from 2.9 in December, while the Philly Fed Manufacturing index fell sharply to 0.3 from 10.4. On the housing market front, NAHB housing market index increased to 76 from 71 in December. Both building permits and housing starts increased by 1.5 million and 1.4 million month-on-month, respectively in November. The DXY index increased by 0.3% this week following the recent plunge. Various dollar indicators continue to point to the downside, including interest rate differentials, the bond-to-gold ratio, portfolio inflows, and rebounding global growth. We went short the DXY index last week. Stay with it. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 45.9 from 46.9 in December, while services PMI increased to 52.4. The trade surplus increased to €24.5 billion from €18.7 billion in October. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1% and 1.3% year-on-year, respectively in November. EUR/USD fell by 0.2% this week. The weaker-than-expected manufacturing PMI releases on Monday were not adequate to alter our positive view on global growth. Both German and Korean exports have been stabilizing, which signals that global trade is on a recovery path. We expect the euro to outperform in the near term and we suggest to play the euro strength via the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Manufacturing PMI fell marginally to 48.8 from 48.9 in December. The trade deficit widened to ¥82.1 billion in November. Exports and imports both plunged by 7.9% and 15.7% year-on-year, respectively. USD/JPY increased by 0.2% this week. On Wednesday, the BoJ held its interest rate unchanged. With the key short-term cash rate at -0.1%, and asset purchases already tapering, the BoJ has little room to act. On the fiscal front however, the recently announced stimulus package brightens the Japanese economy’s outlook. We continue to recommend the Japanese yen as a safe-haven hedge. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mixed: Both Markit manufacturing and services PMIs fell to 47.4 and 49 in December. The ILO unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.8%. Average earnings continued to grow by 3.2% year-on-year in October, however this slowed from 3.7% the previous month. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.5% and 1.7% year-on-year respectively, in November. Retail sales grew by 1% year-on-year in November. The British pound fell by 2.5% against the US dollar this week, erasing the gains from positive election news last week. Meanwhile, the BoE kept interest rates unchanged at 0.75% as widely expected, with two dissenting members that favored a cut. The pound is likely to stay volatile until January 31st, but the ultimate resting spot for GBP/USD is around 1.40. We will stand aside for now, ahead of thin holiday trading. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart I-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: Both manufacturing and services PMIs fell to 49.5 and 49.4, respectively in December, but the decline was not specific to Australia. 40K new jobs were created in November, including 36K new part-time jobs and 4K new full-time jobs. The unemployment rate fell further to 5.2% in November. The Australian dollar fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. In its latest meeting minutes, the RBA stated that “the depreciation (in the Australian dollar) reflected the reduction in the interest differential between Australia and the major advanced economies, and had occurred despite an increase in the terms of trade over this period.” The fact that Australian balance of payments is improving tremendously suggests that the exchange rate is on the cheaper end.  Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: The Westpac consumer index increased to 109.9 from 103.1 in Q4. ANZ business confidence increased to -13.2 from -26.4 in December. ANZ activity outlook also increased by 17.2% month-on-month in December. The current account deficit widened to NZ$6.4 billion from NZ$1.1 billion in Q3. The trade deficit narrowed to NZ$753 million from NZ$1,039 million in November. Exports rose 7.6% year-on-year, and imports also increased by 2% year-on-year. GDP growth accelerated by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q3, compared with only 0.1% the previous quarter. NZD/USD fell by 0.4% this week. Both hard data and soft data in New Zealand are starting to look up, which is consistent with our positive view on global growth. The New Zealand dollar is likely to outperform along with the economic expansion in 2020. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 201 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mixed: Manufacturing sales fell by 0.7% month-on-month in October. Core inflation was unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in November. Headline inflation, however, soared to 2.2% from 1.9% in November, mostly attributable to higher gasoline prices. ADP recorded an increase of 31K jobs in November, lower than the expectations of 67K. The Canadian dollar rose by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, post the inflation print. While we believe that the loonie will outperform the USD, it is likely to underperform its petrocurrency peers and other high-beta currencies. Please refer to our front section this week for a more in-depth analysis on the loonie. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been negative: The trade surplus narrowed slightly to CHF 2.2 billion in November 2019, the smallest trade surplus since August. The Swiss franc appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. In the Q4'19 Quarterly Bulletin released this week, the SNB stated that “the franc remains highly valued, and that negative interest rates and the willingness to intervene counteract the attractiveness of Swiss franc investments and thus ease upward pressure on the currency.” Moreover, the SNB lowered its inflation projection compared with the previous forecast in September. Our bias is that EUR/CHF will appreciate in the coming months, as the SNB stems appreciation in its currency. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The trade surplus came in at NOK 18.8 billion in November. This is an improvement compared with a surplus of only NOK 5.9 billion the previous month and a deficit of 1.4 billion in September. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.6% this week, supported by rising energy prices. WTI crude oil prices are up 16% since the bottom in October this year. The Norges Bank kept its interest rate on hold at 1.5% this week. The still attractive interest rate differential and positive oil outlook both suggest that the krone will be one of the best performing currencies going into next year. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: The consumer confidence index increased to 94.1 from 92 in December. USD/SEK fell by 0.7% this week. On Thursday, the Riksbank raised its interest rate by 25 bps to 0%, abandoning negative interest rates after almost 5 years. The bank also said in a statement that “the conditions are good for inflation to remain close to the target going forward.” Interest rate differentials are moving in favor of the SEK. Moreover, we believe that the previous weakness in the Swedish krona had been mostly led by soft data, while hard data remain resilient. We continue to recommend long SEK as our high-conviction trade for next year. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

An analysis on Ukraine is available below.   Highlights A number of liquidity and technical reasons have led us to give benefit of the doubt to the bullish market action and chase this EM rally. We still doubt that the US-China trade truce alone is sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. However, it seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. Therefore, we are initiating a long position in the EM equity index as of today. Despite the potential for higher EM share prices in absolute terms, we are still reluctant to upgrade EM versus DM stocks. The basis is that EM corporate profits will continue lagging those in DM. Feature We could be in for a replay of the 2012-2014 DM equity rally, where EM stocks rebounded in absolute terms but massively underperformed DM on a relative basis. Chart I-1EM Share Prices: In Absolute Terms And Relative To DM EM share prices have spiked on the announcement of a trade truce between the US and China. As a result, our buy stop at 1075 on the EM MSCI Equity Index has been triggered, and we are initiating a long position in EM stocks as of today (Chart I-1, top panel). That said, we are still reluctant to upgrade EM versus DM stocks. Regardless of the direction of the market (bull, bear or sideways), EM share prices will likely underperform the global equity benchmark. As we discussed in our report, the primary risk to our view has been that EM share prices get pulled higher as a result of rallying DM markets. Nevertheless, our fundamental assessment remains that EM corporate profits will lag those in DM, heralding EM relative equity underperformance. In fact, we could be in a replay of the 2012-2014 DM equity rally where EM stocks massively underperformed (Chart I-1, bottom panel), as we elaborated in our November 28 report. In this report, we review the indicators that support a bullish stance, the ones that are inconclusive and those that are not confirming the current rally in China-plays in general and EM risk assets in particular. Bullish Liquidity And Technical Settings The following points have led us to give benefit of the doubt to recent market action and to chase this rally: The global liquidity backdrop appears to be conducive for higher share prices. Global narrow and broad money growth have accelerated (Chart I-2). That said, a caveat is in order: These money measures do not always strongly correlate with both global share prices and the global business cycle. There are numerous times when they gave a false signal or were too early or late at turning points. Chart I-2Global Narrow And Broad Money: A Useful But Not Always Reliable Indicator   The technical profile of EM equities is rather bullish. As shown on the top panel of Chart I-1 on page 1, EM share prices have found a support at their six-year moving average. When a market fails to break down below its long-term technical support line, odds are that a major bottom has been reached, and the path of the least resistance is up. The reason we look at these long-term (multi-year) moving averages is because they have historically worked very well for key markets like the S&P 500 and 10-year US Treasury bond yields (Chart I-3A & I-3B). Chart I-3AThe Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages Chart I-3BThe Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages   As another positive development, both EM share prices in local currency terms and the EM equity total return index in US dollar terms have bounced from their three-year moving averages (Chart I-4). Chart I-4A Bullish Chart Formation For EM Equities In addition, when a market does not drop below its previous top, this creates a bullish chart configuration (Chart I-4). This seems to be the case with EM share prices currently. Bottom Line: A number of liquidity and technical reasons have led us to give benefit of the doubt to the bullish market action and to chase this rally. Inconclusive Indicators It is rare that all types of indicators – directional market, business cycle, valuation and technical – all line up together to convey the same investment recommendation. Below we present the market indicators and signals that we have been watching to get confirmation of sustainability in the bull market in EM risk assets, commodities and global cyclical equity sectors. They are still inconclusive: The US broad trade-weighted dollar has recently sold off, but it has not broken down technically (Chart I-5). A decisive relapse below its 200-day moving average will signify that the greenback has entered a major bear market. The latter would be consistent with a sustainable and extended bull market in EM risk assets, commodities and global cyclical equity sectors.  Chart I-5The US Dollar Has Fallen But Not Broken Down Chart I-6Indecisive Signals From Commodities And Commodity Currencies   Even though copper prices have recently rebounded, they have not yet broken above their three-year moving average (Chart I-6, top panel). The latter can be viewed as the neckline of the head-and-shoulders pattern that has formed in recent years. The same holds true for the overall London Metals Exchange Industrial Metals Price Index, as well as our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio1 (Chart I-6, middle and bottom panels). Barring a decisive break above their three-year moving averages, the jury is still out on the durability of the rally in commodities prices and EM/China plays.   Finally, global industrial share prices and US high-beta stocks have advanced to their 2018 highs, but have not yet broken out (Chart I-7). The same is true for the euro area aggregate stock index in local currency terms (Chart I-8). A decisive breakout above these levels will confirm that global equities in general and cyclical segments in particular are in an enduring bull market. Chart I-7Decisive Breakouts Here Are Needed To Confirm The EM Rally Chart I-8European Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture   Bottom Line: Several cyclical and high-beta segments of global financial markets are at a critical juncture. A decisive breakout from these key technical levels is required for us to uphold that EM risk assets and global cyclical plays are in a medium-term bull market. The Eye Of The Storm? There are a number of leading indicators and market signals that do not corroborate the common narrative of a sustainable improvement in global manufacturing/trade in general and China’s industrial cycle in particular: First, China’s narrow and broad money growth appear to be rolling over (Chart I-9). Notably, the money impulses lead the credit impulse, as illustrated in Chart I-10. Consequently, we expect the credit impulse – which is the main indicator currently portraying a revival in the Chinese economy as well as in the global business cycle – to roll over in early 2020. Chart I-9China: Narrow And Broad Money Growth Are Rolling Over Chart I-10China: Money Impulses Are Coincident Or Lead Credit Impulse   This entails that the recent tentative improvements in China’s manufacturing, its imports and global trade will not be sustained going forward. Crucially, China’s narrow money (M1) growth point to the lack of a cyclical upturn in EM corporate profits in H1 2020 (Chart I-11). In short, EM listed companies’ profit growth rate stabilizing at around -10% is not a recovery. Second, government bond yields in both China and Korea are not corroborating a revival in their respective business cycles (Chart I-12). Chart I-11EM Corporate Profit Growth To Remain Negative In H1 2020 Chart I-12Asian Rates Are Not Confirming A Recovery   Chinese onshore interest rates have been a reliable compass for both its business cycle as well as EM share prices and currencies as we illustrated in Chart 15 of the November 28 report. For now, the mainland fixed-income market is not predicting an upturn in China’s industrial economy (Chart I-12, top panel). In Korea, exports account for 40% of GDP. Hence, without a considerable export recovery, there cannot be a business cycle revival in Korea. In brief, the latest relapse in local bond yields could be sending a downbeat signal for global trade (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Third, the four-month rise in the Chinese Caixin manufacturing PMI can be partially explained by front-running production and shipments of smartphones, laptops, computers and other electronics ahead of the December 15 round of US tariffs on imports from China. Right after President Trump announced these tariffs in the summer, businesses likely did not take a chance to wait and see. In fact, whether or not these tariffs would have come into effect was unknown till December 13. Manufacturers and US importers of these electronic goods initiated orders, produced and shipped these goods to the US ahead of December 15. Chart I-13Caixin And Taiwanese PMIs Benefited From Front Running Given the focus on that particular round of tariffs was electronics, producers of these goods got a temporary but notable boost from such front-running. Smartphone and electronics manufacturers and their suppliers are predominantly located in Shenzhen and Taiwan. The Caixin manufacturing PMI is a survey of 500 companies, many of which are private enterprises located in Shenzhen. Not surprisingly, the Caixin manufacturing PMI index often fluctuates with Taiwan’s electronics and optical PMI (Chart I-13). In brief, there has been meaningful improvement in China’s and Taiwan’s tech manufacturing. Yet it can be attributed to front-running of production and shipments of electronic products to the US ahead of the December 15 tariff deadline as well as stockpiling of semiconductors by China. The odds are that these measures of manufacturing will slump in early 2020 as the front-running ends. Chart I-14Commodities Prices In China Finally, several commodities prices in China, that troughed in late 2015 ahead of the bottom in global and EM/Chinese equities in early 2016, continue to drift lower or exhibit only a mild uptick. Specifically, these include prices of nickel, steel, iron ore, thermal coal, coke, polyethylene and rubber (Chart I-14). They corroborate that there has been no broad-based amelioration in the mainland’s industrial sector. Bottom Line: In China, narrow and broad money growth has rolled over, onshore interest rates are subsiding and many commodities prices are weak. All of these signify the lack of sustainable growth revival in China in the coming months.  Putting It All Together EM risk assets have rallied on the consensus market narrative that the temporary truce between the US and China will lift global growth. We have written at length that China’s domestic demand – not its exports – has been the epicenter of and basis for the global slowdown over the past two years. Without Chinese domestic demand and imports, not exports, staging a material amelioration, global trade and manufacturing are unlikely to experience a cyclical upturn.   In short, we doubt that the US-China trade truce is alone sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. Yet, when the majority of investors perceive things the same way and act on these perceptions, asset prices can move a lot. We continue to believe that China’s industrial sector, global trade, EM ex-China domestic demand and consequently EM corporate profits will continue to disappoint in the first half of 2020. Nevertheless, we presently concede that we need to give benefit of the doubt to markets. We still doubt that the US-China trade truce alone is sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. It could be that the EM equity and currency market rallies are not driven by their fundamentals – i.e., corporate profits/exports do not matter. However, it is rather possible that this rally is only stoked by the worst-kept secret in the investment industry: the search for yield. If that is the case, then there is no dichotomy between our fundamental thesis – that EM/China profits/growth will disappoint in H1 2020 – and the rally in EM markets. It seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. We had thought that the ongoing and enduring contraction in EM corporate profits (please refer to Chart I-11 on page 8) amid various structural malaises would overwhelm the impact of the global search for yield. However, it seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. Overall, we are initiating a long position in the EM equity index as of today. Provided the high uncertainty over the outlook, we are also instituting a stop point at 1050 for the MSCI EM equity index, 5% below its current level. For global equity investors, we continue recommending favoring DM over EM stocks. Finally, our country equity overweights are Korea, Thailand, Russia, central Europe, Pakistan, Vietnam and Mexico. A basket of these bourses is likely to outperform the EM equity benchmark in any market scenario in terms of EM absolute share price performance. We have been and remain neutral on Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese and Brazilian equities. As always, our list of overweight, underweight and market weight recommendations for EM equities, local and US dollar government bonds and currencies are available at the end of our report on pages 17-18 and on our website.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Ukraine: Buy Local Currency Bonds EM fixed-income investors should buy Ukraine local currency government bonds as well as overweight Ukraine sovereign credit within an EM credit portfolio. The exchange rate is the key for EM fixed-income investors. The Ukrainian hryvnia will be supported by high real interest rates, improving public debt and balance of payment dynamics, as well as abating geopolitical risks. In turn, a stable currency will keep inflation at bay. In such an environment, investors should favor local currency government bonds, as local interest rates will continue falling.  Chart II-1Inflation Will Fall Further In turn, a stable currency will keep inflation at bay (Chart II-1). In such an environment, investors should favor local currency government bonds, as local interest rates will continue falling. The primary risk of owning Ukrainian domestic bonds is a major depreciation in the hryvnia stemming from a risk-off phase in EM. However, as a periphery country, Ukraine’s financial markets might not correlate with their EM peers. Besides, these bonds offer high carry, which protects them against moderate currency depreciation. Overall, the case for buying Ukraine local currency government bonds is based on the following: First, Ukraine satisfies the two prerequisites for public debt sustainability, namely (1) it runs a robust primary fiscal surplus and/or (2) the government’s borrowing costs are below nominal GDP growth. The public debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 56% and will continue to fall so long as the above two conditions are satisfied. The primary consolidated fiscal surplus currently amounts to 1.8% of GDP (Chart II-2). The recently approved 2020 budget projects the primary surplus to be above 1% of GDP and the overall fiscal deficit to be close to 2% of GDP.  Local currency interest rates are below nominal GDP growth (Chart II-3). In addition, public debt servicing is at 3.2% and 9% as a share of GDP and total government expenditures, respectively. According to the new budget, the government plans to use close to 12% of total spending for debt repayments in 2020. This will further help reduce the public debt load. Chart II-2A Healthy Fiscal Position Chart II-3Interest Rates Are Below Nominal GDP Growth And Are Falling Second, the central bank has more scope to cut interest rates because various measures of inflation will continue falling. Real (adjusted for inflation) interest rates are still very elevated. In particular, the prime lending rate is at 17% for companies and 35% for households, both in nominal terms. Provided core inflation is running at 6%, lending rates are extremely high in real terms. Not surprisingly, narrow and broad money growth are sluggish (Chart II-4). Commercial banks are undergoing major balance sheet deleveraging: their asset growth is in the low single digits in nominal terms, while their value is dropping relative to nominal GDP (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Money Growth Is Sluggish Chart II-5Deleveraging In The Banking Sector Meanwhile, tighter regulations are forcing banks to recognize bad assets and boost their capital. This has led to a sharp drop in the number of registered banks. Such a structural overhaul of the banking system is cyclically deflationary and warrants lower interest rates. Critically, these reforms are a positive for the exchange rate in the long run. Third, receding foreign funding pressures are helping the balance of payments dynamics and are supportive for the currency. Ukrainian exports have been outperforming global exports since 2017 (Chart II-6). Agricultural exports – which represent 40% of total exports – are an important source of foreign currency revenue for the country. Chart II-6Ukraine Exports Are Outperforming Global Trade Chart II-7Tight Fiscal And Monetary Policies Are Good For The Current Account Balance The current account deficit has been narrowing due to slowing domestic demand, arising from tight fiscal and monetary policies (Chart II-7). Foreign ownership of local currency government bonds is $4.6 billion and it makes only 12% of total outstanding amount. Consequently, risk of major foreign portfolio capital outflows due to a risk-off phase in global markets is low. Lastly, Ukraine’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payment and amortization – have been declining and are presently well covered by exports. They comprise 34% of total exports. Finally, geopolitical risks will continue to subside over the coming months. Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia will continue. Importantly, two sets of constraints could force Ukraine and Russia towards resolving the conflict. Specifically: Russia is constrained by its commitment to be a reliable gas supplier to the EU. Half of its gas export capacity passes through Ukraine. European demand for Russian gas is falling and Gazprom gas revenues are decelerating. Cutting transit of gas through Ukraine could now severely jeopardize Russia’s relations with Europe. Therefore, as much as Europe is dependent on Russian gas, Russia is as dependent on European demand for its natural gas.   The EU’s support for Ukraine is contingent on reliable transits of Russian gas into EU countries. As such, President Zelensky is under pressure from Europe to assure transmission of Russian gas to Europe. This has led Zelensky into opening a dialogue with Russia and motivated him to seek a new gas transit deal with Gazprom. Given President Zelensky’s high popularity at home, he has political capital to pursue a rapprochement with Russia and attempt to find a resolution to end the conflict in the Donbass. All of these developments have been, and will continue to be, positively perceived by international investors, sustaining the recent stampede into Ukraine’s fixed-income markets. Investment Recommendation We recommend investors purchase 5-year local currency government bonds currently yielding 12%. EM fixed-income investors should also consider overweighting US dollar sovereign bonds in an EM credit portfolio on the back of improving public debt and balance of payments dynamics.   Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

This is the final report of the year from BCA’s Global Fixed Income and US Bond Strategies. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 7, 2020. We wish you a happy, healthy and prosperous new year.   Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed’s next interest rate move will be a hike, but it probably won’t occur until 2021. It will not occur until either long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target band of 2.3%-2.5% or financial asset valuations reach extreme levels. We provide several indicators to monitor to assess the timing of the next Fed hike. Balance Sheet Policy: The era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. The Fed will continue to grow its balance sheet in 2020, and will also tweak regulations to make banks more indifferent between holding Treasury securities and reserves. Strategic Review: The exact form of any new policy strategy is uncertain, but we expect the Fed to make an announcement in mid-2020 that makes it clear that it will explicitly target above-2% inflation for some unspecified period of time in order to re-anchor inflation expectations and make up for past inflation misses. Feature Last week, both our Global Fixed Income Strategy and US Bond Strategy services published their key fixed income views for 2020.1  Those reports presented investment ideas that we think will be profitable next year, but only discussed Fed policy to the extent that it informs those views. This Special Report delves into exactly what we expect to see from the US Federal Reserve in 2020. Specifically, we consider what the Fed will do with its interest rate and balance sheet policies in 2020, and also what might result from the Fed’s ongoing strategic review. Interest Rate Policy The final FOMC meeting of 2019 took place last week, and we learned that the Fed’s reaction function underwent a significant dovish shift between the September and December meetings. Currently, only 4 FOMC participants expect to lift rates in 2020 while the remaining 13 expect the funds rate to stay in its present range between 1.5% and 1.75% (Chart 1). Back in September, 9 participants thought the fed funds rate would be above 1.75% by the end of 2020. Chart 1Fed Will Stay On Hold In 2020, Market Still Priced For Cuts The yield curve is still discounting a slight decline in the funds rate next year, and the Fed will of course deliver more rate cuts if economic growth deteriorates. However, given our positive global growth outlook for 2020, we think rate cuts are unlikely.2 Rather, we expect a flat fed funds rate next year followed by rate hikes in 2021. The Fed’s reaction function underwent a significant dovish shift between the September and December meetings.  If our economic view pans out, then getting a sense of what will be required for the Fed to lift rates is the most pressing monetary policy issue. On that front, we continue to believe that inflation expectations and financial conditions are the two most important factors to monitor.3  Recent remarks from Fed officials have only strengthened our conviction in that view. Inflation Expectations & The Fed’s Phillips Curve Model Last week, when Chair Powell was asked what it will take to lift rates again, he said that he wants to see “a significant move up in inflation that’s also persistent”. This scripted response reveals a lot about the Fed’s reaction function in 2020, and about the importance of inflation expectations. To see why, let’s consider the Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve, the typical model that the Fed uses to assess trends in inflation. An example of this sort of model, taken from a 2015 Janet Yellen speech, is presented in Box 1.4 Box 1The Fed's Inflation Model According to the Fed’s model, core inflation is determined by: (i) inflation expectations, (ii) resource utilization and (iii) relative import prices. But inflation expectations are especially important because they determine inflation’s long-run trend. As explained by former Chair Yellen: Chart 2The Importance Of Inflation Expectations … economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from its longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations. This is what Chair Powell means when he says he wants to see a “persistent” move up in inflation. He wants to make sure that inflation expectations return to levels that are consistent with the Fed’s target in order to re-anchor inflation’s long-run trend. The widespread consensus that the “Phillips Curve is flat” makes inflation expectations even more important in the minds of Fed policymakers. When people say that the “Phillips Curve is flat”, they mean that there is very little relationship between resource utilization and inflation. In other words, the coefficient b4 in Box 1 is very small. Logically, if the relationship between resource utilization and inflation is weak, then expectations become an even more important driver of core inflation. As Fed Vice Chair Richard Clarida recently said:5 A flatter Phillips Curve makes it all the more important that inflation expectations remain anchored at levels consistent with our 2 percent inflation objective. Simply put, the Fed needs to see a re-anchoring of inflation expectations before it lifts rates. Our sense is that this will be achieved when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. We are not yet close to those levels. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rates currently sit at 1.71% and 1.79%, respectively (Chart 2). Meanwhile, household survey measures from the University of Michigan and the New York Fed also show very low inflation expectations (Chart 2, bottom 2 panels). With all this in mind, the big question for monetary policy is how long will it take for inflation expectations to rise back to “well anchored” levels? Will it occur next year, or not until 2021? How Long Until Inflation (And Inflation Expectations) Return To Target? Chart 3High Inflation No Longer A Worry We have long held the view that inflation expectations adapt only slowly to changes in the actual inflation data.6 In other words, inflation expectations are low today because actual inflation has been consistently below the Fed’s target for much of the past decade. This makes it very difficult for people to believe that inflation will be high in the future. In fact, when asked what CPI inflation is likely to average over the next 10 years, most forecasters think it will be in a range between 2% and 2.5%, consistent with the Fed’s target.7 This is similar to what forecasters thought in 2004 when TIPS breakeven rates were well-anchored within our target band (Chart 3). The main difference between 2004 and today is that in 2004 a sizeable minority thought inflation might average above 2.5% over the next 10 years. Now, almost nobody expects a significant overshoot of the Fed’s inflation target, and a sizeable minority think inflation will undershoot. The lesson we take from these survey responses is that in order for TIPS breakeven inflation rates to reach our 2.3%-2.5% target, more people need to expect a significant overshoot of the Fed’s 2% inflation target. This will only happen if actual inflation rises to the Fed’s target, or above, and stays there for a significant period of time. Long enough to bring the fear of high inflation back to the forefront of investors’ minds. To further quantify this notion, our Adaptive Expectations Model of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate pegs current fair value for the 10-year breakeven at 1.94% (Chart 4). The model’s fair value is primarily determined by the 10-year rate of change in core CPI, meaning that a prolonged period of year-over-year core inflation near (or above) the Fed’s target will be required before our model’s fair value pushes above 2.3%. So how long will it take before core inflation is sustainably running at, or above, the Fed’s target? While we expect core inflation to continue along its slow upward trend. It probably won’t be high enough to push long-maturity TIPS breakevens into our target range until 2021, or late-2020 at the earliest. Chart 4Adaptive Expectations Model Chart 5Trimmed Means Are Rising... At present, core PCE inflation is running at a year-over-year rate of 1.59%, considerably below the Fed’s 2% target. One point in favor of rising core inflation is that trimmed mean price measures are accelerating more quickly than core measures (Chart 5). This will tend to drag core inflation higher over time. However, there is still a long way to go before core inflation reaches the Fed’s target and many leading inflation indicators have moderated this year (Chart 6):   Chart 6...But Many Headwinds Remain Unit labor cost growth rebounded in the past few quarters, but has yet to break out of its post-crisis range (Chart 6, top panel). The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge rolled over sharply in 2019 (Chart 6, panel 2). NFIB surveys of planned and reported price increases have also turned down (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels). Considering the main components of core inflation, we find that the strong month-over-month core inflation prints of June, July and August were driven mostly by accelerating goods prices (Chart 7). Goods inflation has reversed course since then, and should continue to be a drag on core inflation going forward. This is because core goods inflation follows import price inflation with a long lag, and some import price deflation is already baked in (Chart 8). Chart 7CPI Components Chart 8Expect Some Import Price Deflation On the flipside, we have also seen core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) inflect higher during the past six months (Chart 7, panel 4). Continued strength in this component is essential if overall core inflation is going to move up. Shelter is the largest component of core inflation and we expect it to trend sideways as we head into 2020. The rental vacancy rate has flattened off at a low level, and the Apartment Market Tightness Index is just barely in net tightening territory (Chart 9). Neither indicator is sending a strong signal in either direction. Chart 9Shelter Inflation Trending Sideways All in all, we see core inflation and TIPS breakeven rates moving slowly higher in 2020. But it will take some time before inflation is strong enough to push long-maturity breakeven rates into our target range of 2.3%-2.5%. Given the importance placed on re-anchoring inflation expectations, the Fed won’t hike rates again until our TIPS breakeven target is met. We don’t expect this to occur until 2021, or late-2020 at the earliest. The Financial Conditions Wildcard Chart 10The Importance Of Financial Conditions We mentioned above that the Fed’s interest rate policy will be determined by two factors: inflation expectations and financial conditions. In a perfect world, financial market valuations will stay at reasonable levels and inflation expectations will determine the timing of the next Fed rate hike. However, we must also consider what is likely to happen if it takes a very long time for inflation expectations to reach our target. The longer it takes, the longer that monetary conditions will be accommodative, and any extended period of easy money could lead to an asset bubble. Eventually, if valuations look bubbly enough, there may be a case for the Fed to sacrifice a bit on its inflation target and attempt to deflate a potentially de-stabilizing bubble in financial markets. This is not just a hypothetical situation. As Governor Lael Brainard remarked last December:8 The last several times resource utilization approached levels similar to today, signs of overheating showed up in financial-sector imbalances rather than in accelerating inflation. With greater focus on financial stability than in the past, it is conceivable that we could eventually see Fed tightening to head off an asset bubble. But we are not close to such bubbly conditions yet (Chart 10). The Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor is close to neutral, and while corporate bond spreads are tighter than average, they are well above the lows seen in the mid-2000s. Meanwhile, the S&P 500’s forward multiple is not yet back to its early-2018 level, let alone the highs of the late 1990s (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The Fed’s next interest rate move will be a hike, but it probably won’t occur until 2021. It will not occur until either long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target band of 2.3%-2.5% or financial asset valuations reach extreme levels. Balance Sheet Policy 2019 was a tumultuous year for the Fed’s balance sheet policy. At the start of the year, the Fed was continuing the process of balance sheet shrinkage that started in October 2017. The goal was never to return the Fed’s balance sheet to its pre-crisis size. Policymakers had already decided that they would shift permanently to a floor system of monetary policy implementation. A floor system is one where the central bank supplies more reserves to the banking system than are demanded, pushing interest rates down toward a floor that is set by the Fed. In this case, the floor is the Fed’s overnight reverse repo facility (ON RRP). Using this facility, the Fed agrees to borrow any excess cash at the ON RRP rate in return for a security from the Fed’s balance sheet as collateral. To implement this policy correctly, the Fed’s balance sheet must remain large so that bank reserves are plentiful. The Fed thought that it was supplying more reserves than the banking system demanded, but banks found themselves hoarding liquidity for a few days in September. Everything was going smoothly until September when this strategy hit a snag. The Fed thought that it was supplying more reserves than the banking system demanded, but banks found themselves hoarding liquidity for a few days in September. The result was that the fed funds rate shot higher, and actually printed outside the Fed’s target band for one day (Chart 11).9 Chart 11The Fed Briefly Lost Control Of Rates In September Clearly, the Fed had actually not been supplying the banking system with more reserves than it wanted, otherwise overnight liquidity would have remained plentiful throughout September. Even more vexing is that surveys of primary dealers and market participants all showed that reserve supply was comfortably above demand (Chart 12), even though this turned out not to be the case. Chart 12The Fed Was Blindsided Though there are many questions that still need to be answered, the Fed quickly took action and intervened in the repo market to increase the daily reserve supply. It also re-started T-bill purchases at a rate of $60 billion per month, ending the period of balance sheet shrinkage. Then just last week, the Fed announced a program of term repo agreements that will increase overnight liquidity heading into the volatile year-end period. After all that, the Fed’s balance sheet is once again growing as we head into 2020. But there is much uncertainty about how the balance sheet will evolve during the next 12 months.  A Two-Pronged Strategy In 2020 the Fed will attack its balance sheet problems on two fronts. 1) Increase Reserve Supply First, it will purchase T-bills in order to increase the supply of reserves. Chart 13 shows how the Fed’s securities holdings and bank reserves will evolve in the first half of 2020, assuming that the Fed buys $60 billion of T-bills per month. We also assume that maturing MBS roll over into Treasury securities and that currency in circulation grows at a rate of 5% per year. Table 1 gives a breakdown of what the Fed’s balance sheet looks like today and what it will look like at the end of June, according to our assumptions. Chart 13The Fed's Balance Sheet Over Time But increasing the reserve supply will be a bit more difficult than that. For one thing, Table 1 shows that the Treasury Department’s General Account at the Fed is expected to grow by another $106 billion. All else equal, this will drain $106 billion of reserve supply. The Treasury depleted its cash holdings down to $130 billion in August, as it took extraordinary measures to stay under the debt ceiling. But now that the debt ceiling has been suspended until July 2021, the Treasury has been re-building its cash stores, targeting a level of $410 billion. Table 1Fed’s Balance Sheet: Projections Second, Table 1 assumes that Fed repos stay flat at $213 billion. But if the Fed decides to extricate itself from the repo market in the first half of 2020 then, all else equal, reserve supply will shrink by $213 billion. So far the Fed has provided very little guidance about its future presence in the repo market, but we expect it to err on the side of caution. That is, the Fed will not completely unwind its repo operations until it is confident that reserve supply is comfortably above demand. What we can say for certain is that the Fed will try to increase the reserve supply in early-2020. Then, at some point during the year, it will decide that the reserve supply is high enough and it will shift to purchasing only enough securities to keep pace with growth in non-reserve liabilities, holding reserve supply flat. It is unknown when that shift will occur, but whenever it does, the Fed’s balance sheet will still be growing, just more slowly. We can say decisively that the era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. At some point in 2020 the Fed will probably also introduce a standing repo facility. This will act as the mirror image of the current ON RRP, providing a ceiling on interest rates. The facility will promise to supply overnight cash at a stated rate in return for Treasury collateral. If reserve supply is sufficiently high, then the standing repo facility is irrelevant. It would merely be a safety measure in case of periods like last September when reserve demand spiked. 2) Decrease Reserve Demand Other than increasing reserve supply, the Fed will also take steps in 2020 to reduce the amount of reserves demanded by the banking sector. It will do this by tweaking some banking regulations that possibly encouraged banks to hoard reserves in September. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is the regulation that requires banks to hold enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover 30 days of cash outflows in a stressed scenario. Bank reserves and Treasury securities both count as HQLAs, as do other fixed income securities with a haircut. In theory, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio shouldn’t prevent banks from swapping reserves for Treasuries in the repo market. But banks also undergo frequent internal stress testing, in preparation for the Fed’s periodic stress tests, and those internal tests may place a premium on reserves over Treasuries. It is very likely that, in 2020, the Fed will take steps to make banks increasingly indifferent between holding reserves and Treasury securities. This should reduce overall reserve demand and make cash more freely available in the overnight repo market. Investment Implications With all that said, we place very little importance on the Fed’s balance sheet policy in terms of what it means for asset returns. Our longstanding view is that asset purchases were only an effective policy tool because they reinforced the Fed’s forward guidance about changes in the funds rate. In fact, any perceived correlation between changes in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and financial asset prices is only because balance sheet policy was moving in the same direction as interest rate policy. That is, during the past few years, periods of Fed asset purchases have always coincided with easier interest rate policy and periods of balance sheet shrinkage have always coincided with tighter interest rate policy. It is the interest rate policy that determines movements in asset prices, not the balance sheet. Finally, in 2019, we witnessed a period when balance sheet policy diverged from interest rate policy and we were able to test our thesis. Between December 2018 and July 2019, the Fed was shrinking its balance sheet but also easing its forward rate guidance and preparing for rate cuts. Outstanding bank reserves fell by $124 billion, but the expected 12-month change in the fed funds rate fell from +11 bps to -88 bps. It is very likely that, in 2020, the Fed will take steps to make banks increasingly indifferent between holding reserves and Treasury securities. What happened during this period? Bond yields declined and the dollar depreciated (Chart 14). Meanwhile, risk asset prices shot higher (Chart 15). In other words, markets behaved as you would expect if the Fed were easing policy, clearly taking their cues from interest rate policy not the balance sheet. Chart 14Rates Policy Trumps Balance Sheet Part I Chart 15Rates Policy Trumps Balance Sheet Part II Bottom Line: The era of balance sheet shrinkage is over. The Fed will continue to grow its balance sheet in 2020, and will also tweak regulations to make banks more indifferent between holding Treasury securities and reserves. But more importantly, the Fed’s balance sheet policy is now completely de-linked from its interest rate policy. That being the case, investors should largely ignore trends in the Fed’s balance sheet and focus on interest rate policy as the main driver of asset returns. The Fed’s Strategic Review The Fed is currently undertaking a strategic review of its monetary policy strategy, tools and communications practices. Chair Powell has said that he expects the review to be completed by the middle of 2020, and it is likely that some important changes will be announced. According to the Fed, the review is taking place because “the US economy appears to have changed in ways that matter for the conduct of monetary policy.” Specifically, the Fed believes that the neutral fed funds rate – the rate consistent with stable inflation – is structurally lower. The Fed is concerned that this increases the risk of the fed funds rate being pinned at its effective lower bound (ELB), making it more difficult to consistently hit its inflation target. The review is about considering different strategies and tools that the Fed could use to more consistently hit its 2% inflation target in the future, but the 2% target itself is not up for discussion. The Fed has already decided that 2% inflation is most consistent with its price stability mandate. Policy Strategy Chart 16A Big Miss One thing that’s clear is that most Fed participants agree that some changes to policy strategy are necessary. There is widespread concern about the fact that the Fed has not hit its inflation target during the past decade. The Fed officially adopted a 2% target for PCE inflation in January 2012, but inflation has not come close to those levels since. Headline and core PCE have increased at average annual rates of only 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively, since 2012 (Chart 16). At the July and September FOMC meetings, the Fed discussed several different strategies that could make it easier to hit its inflation target. Most of the proposals fall into the category of “makeup strategies”, strategies where the Fed tries to make up for a period of below-2% inflation by targeting above-2% inflation for a stretch of time. In theory, most Fed members agree that such strategies make sense. From the September FOMC minutes:10 Because of the downside risk to inflation and employment associated with the ELB, most participants were open to the possibility that the dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and stable prices could be best served by strategies that deliver inflation rates that over time are, on average, equal to the Committee’s longer-run objective of 2 percent. Promoting such outcomes may require aiming for inflation somewhat above 2 percent when the policy rate was away from the ELB, recognizing that inflation would tend to be lower than 2 percent when the policy rate was constrained by the ELB. The main problem with these sorts of makeup strategies is what Fed Governor Lael Brainard calls the time-inconsistency problem.11 For example, if inflation has been running well below – or above – target for a sustained period, when the time arrives to maintain inflation commensurately above – or below – 2 percent for the same amount of time, economic conditions will typically be inconsistent with implementing the promised action. In other words, when it comes time to deliver on its past promises, the Fed may not want to. But if it fails to deliver, it makes any future promises less impactful. Governor Brainard thinks that this problem can be mitigated by adopting a more flexible approach. That is, rather than following a strict rule that says that the Fed must aim for average inflation of 2 percent over a specific timeframe, it could simply opportunistically change its target inflation range based on the circumstances. She gives the following example: For instance, following five years when the public has observed inflation outcomes in the range of 1-1/2 to 2 percent, to avoid a decline in expectations, the Committee would target inflation outcomes in a range of, say, 2 to 2-1/2 percent for the subsequent five years to achieve inflation outcomes of 2 percent on average overall. We think it is very likely that something similar to Brainard’s plan will be announced when the review is completed in 2020. There is widespread consensus that the Fed should temporarily target an overshoot of its 2 percent inflation target to ensure that inflation expectations stay anchored near target levels. Opportunistically shifting the inflation target to 2%-2.5% on a temporary basis seems like the easiest way to communicate that goal. ELB Tools In addition to potential changes to policy strategy, the Fed has also been talking about potential policy tools that could be deployed the next time that interest rates reach the ELB. Policymakers took up this question in detail at the October FOMC meeting and generally agreed that the combination of forward guidance and asset purchases had been effective at delivering policy accommodation at the lower bound. Now that the committee is comfortable with these tools, we would expect them to be deployed very quickly the next time that the fed funds rate reaches zero. In all likelihood, if the funds rate reaches zero again, the Fed will quickly announce a round of asset purchases and pledge to keep rates on hold until some economic outcome – likely related to inflation – is met. The Fed also discussed the possibility of cutting rates into negative territory, but there is very little appetite for negative rates policy in the US. From the October FOMC minutes:12 All participants judged that negative interest rates currently did not appear to be an attractive monetary policy tool in the United States. Participants commented that there was limited scope to bring the policy rate into negative territory, that the evidence on the beneficial effects of negative interest rates abroad was mixed, and that it was unclear what effects negative rates might have on the willingness of financial intermediaries to lend and on the spending plans of households and businesses. If, during the next ELB phase, the combination of forward rate guidance and asset purchases does not appear to be working quickly enough, we think it’s most likely that the Fed will follow the Bank of Japan and simply extend these policies further out the yield curve. For example, the Fed would set a cap on some intermediate-maturity Treasury yield (say the 2-year yield), and pledge to buy as many securities as necessary to keep the yield below that cap. This potential tool was discussed at the October FOMC meeting, and it received a more favorable response than the negative rates policy. Results Of The Strategic Review The exact form of any new policy strategy is uncertain, but we expect the Fed to make an announcement in mid-2020 that makes it clear that it will explicitly target above-2% inflation for some unspecified period of time in order to re-anchor inflation expectations and make up for past inflation misses. This will make it even more important to use inflation expectations as our guide for detecting shifts in Fed policy, rather than the actual inflation data. In many ways, the Fed’s reaction function has already moved toward targeting expectations. The results of the 2020 strategic review will make that even more explicit. There is less urgency to announce any potential new tools for conducting policy at the ELB, and we do not expect much in that regard. Other than some ideas for further study.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning”, dated December 10, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For details on BCA’s economic outlook for 2020 please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2020: Heading Into The End Game”, dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 5  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20190926a.htm 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 CPI inflation runs about 0.4%-0.5% above PCE inflation, so the Fed’s 2% PCE target translates to a 2.4%-2.5% target for CPI. 8  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20181207a.htm 9 This September episode is discussed in detail in the US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “What’s Up In US Money Markets?”, dated September 24, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20190918.htm 11 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20191126a.htm 12 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20191030.pdf

Highlights The key risk to a dollar bearish view is a US-led rebound in global growth. This would allow the Federal Reserve to tighten monetary conditions much faster than other central banks, supporting the dollar in the process. Watch the performance of cyclicals versus defensives and non-US markets versus the S&P 500 as important barometers for this risk. Feature We were on the road last week, visiting clients in South Africa. The biggest preoccupation was what could put a dollar bearish view offside, especially vis-à-vis the rand. Many understand that the dollar is a countercyclical currency and tends to depreciate when global growth is rebounding. Yet there was still a good amount of trepidation on the totality of this argument. The dollar has been in a bull market since 2011, but there have been a couple of growth cycles during that period. One of our last meetings was in the beautiful city of Stellenbosch, a university town lined with majestic landscapes and rooted deep in South African history. A multi-asset fund manager had just met with two FX strategists before meeting with us. One of them was a dollar bull, and the other a bear. We could sense from his demeanor that indecisiveness was not part his ‘modus operandi,’ and he definitely wanted some clarity from our meeting. What transpired was an honest conversation on currencies, especially vis-à-vis our bearish dollar view. The conversation embodied the sentiment we had been getting from most other fund managers, which is that the view on the dollar is highly polarized. As we went through a swathe of charts, I noted his insightful questions, many of which drilled to the core of where the view could go wrong. Is The Dollar That Countercyclical? The observation that the dollar is a countercyclical currency rests on two pillars. The first is that the US economy is driven more by services than manufacturing. As such, when global growth is rebounding, more cyclical economies benefit most from this growth dividend, and as such, capital tends to gravitate to their respective economies. This is aptly illustrated by the fact that whenever global cyclical sectors (higher concentration outside the US) are outperforming defensive ones, the dollar is in a bear market (Chart I-1). In the US, a wider fiscal deficit tends to be partly financed by new money creation.  More importantly, the Fed tends to be the lender of last resort to the global economy, not least because the US dollar remains a reserve currency. In times of crises, the authorities pursue macroeconomic policies that tend to weaken the dollar, such as lowering rates and/or running a wider fiscal deficit. In the US, a wider fiscal deficit tends to be partly financed by new money creation. Part of the feedback loop in this mechanism is that it leads to a flow of greenbacks outside US borders. This eases offshore rates while greasing the international money supply chain (Chart I-2). Chart I-1The Dollar Tends To Weaken When Cyclicals Are Outperforming Chart I-2An Increasing Supply##br## Of Dollars Where can this view go wrong? If the Fed’s mandate is vis-à-vis the domestic US economy rather than maintaining international financial stability, then the biggest risk to a bearish dollar view is one in which global growth rebounds (or decelerates), but the US economy holds up well, allowing the Fed to pursue a relatively tighter monetary stance. This week, we got the US Markit and ISM PMIs, and the gaping wedge between the two is the highest since the 2015 manufacturing recession. Given sampling differences, where the Markit PMI surveys more domestically oriented firms, it is fair to assume it is also a barometer of US domestic growth relative to global output. Put another way, whenever the US services PMI is outperforming its manufacturing component, the dollar tends to appreciate (Chart I-3). If global growth rebounds but the US is leading the rebound (the Fed has been one of the most dovish central banks after all), the dollar can continue to rally. Our view is that this remains a tail risk. The slowdown in the global economy has been driven by the manufacturing sector, so it is fair to assume that this is the part of the economy that is ripe for mean reversion. Not to mention, cyclical swings in most economies tend to be driven by manufacturing and exports rather than services. Meanwhile, on the services front, the US economy appears to be rolling over relative to global. Even relative to China, the US appears to remain victim to the repercussions of the trade war (Chart I-4). This divergence is likely to keep the Fed on the sidelines, at least relative to other central banks. Meanwhile, on the political spectrum, our geopolitical strategists  observe that historically, it has been extremely rare for the Fed to raise interest rates a few months ahead of an election cycle. Chart I-3The Risk To A Bearish Dollar View Chart I-4Conflicting Messages A source of support for this view arises from the German bund versus US Treasury spread. In short, it is a battle of manufacturing versus services. Ever since the European debt crisis, the velocity of money in the euro area has collapsed relative to that of the US. In the financial world, relative long bond yields have followed suit in tight correlation (Chart I-5). If this reverses, it will be a key sign that the neutral rate of interest in the Eurozone is rising relative to that of the US, albeit from a low starting point. The message from bond markets is that such a shift is already taking place. Chart I-5R-Star For The Euro Area Could Move Higher There have been two powerful disinflationary forces for the velocity of money in the US. The first is the lagged effect from the Fed’s tightening policies in 2018. This is especially important given that the fed funds rate was eerily close to the neutral rate of interest, providing little incentive for firms to borrow and invest. Inflation is a lagging indicator, and it will take a sustained rise in economic vigor to lift US inflation expectations. This will not be a story for 2020 (Chart I-6A). Second, the recent rise in the dollar and fall in commodity prices is likely to continue to anchor US inflation expectations downward (Chart I-6B). This should keep the Fed on the sidelines. Chart I-6AVelocity Of Money Versus Inflation Chart I-6BVelocity Of Money Versus Inflation Bottom Line: The key risk to a bearish dollar view is a US-led global growth rebound, allowing the Fed to adopt a much more hawkish stance relative to other central banks. This would be an environment in which US inflation would also surprise to the upside. So far, the move in bond markets suggests this remains a tail risk (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Stalemate Equity (And Bond) Capital Flows The nascent upturn in a few growth indicators is also coinciding with a positive signal from financial variables. Global cyclical stocks have started to outperform defensives, and the traditional negative correlation with the dollar appears to be holding (previously referenced Chart I-1). Correspondingly, flows into more cyclical ETF markets are accelerating. These are usually a small portion of overall FX flows, but the information coefficient is directionally quite good. The key risk to a bearish dollar view is a US-led global growth rebound, allowing the Fed to adopt a much more hawkish stance relative to other central banks. The S&P 500 has been the best performing market for a few years now, so a crucial part of the dollar call lies in international equity markets outperforming the US. Markets such as the Swedish OMX, the Swiss Market Index and the TSX, among others, have broken out – indices with large international exposure and which are very much tied to the global cycle. Such market breakouts also tend to correspond with a weaker dollar, especially when the return on capital appears marginally higher outside the US. In a nutshell, the performance of more cyclical currencies will require confirmation of a breakout in their relative equity market performance. This applies to both the South African rand and other emerging and developed market currencies (Chart I-8A and Chart I-8B). The catalyst will have to be rising relative returns on the capital outside the US, but the starting point is also extremely attractive valuations. Chart I-8ACapital Flows And Exchange Rates Chart I-8BCapital Flows And Exchange Rates Over a shorter horizon, sentiment might drive stock market performance, but valuations matter a lot for the longer term. Chart I-9A shows the composite valuation indicator for the US relative to other developed markets. The message is quite clear: Any investor deploying fresh capital into the US today is doing so with the prospect of much lower longer-term returns, at least compared to the euro area and Japan. With inflows into US assets having rolled over, this will likely remain a source of concern for longer-term investors. This is compounded by the fact that expectations for the US technology sector going forward are likely to be hampered by regulatory concerns and lofty valuations. For South African investors, structural reforms will be needed for much more juicy long-term equity returns, beyond a terms-of-trade benefit (Chart I-9B). Chart I-9AReturns To US Equities Look Dire Chart I-9BReturns To US Equities Look Dire On the fixed-income front, international investors may still find US bond markets attractive in an absolute sense due to higher interest rate spreads. However, the currency risk is just too big a potential blindside to bear. Markets with the potential for currency appreciation such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even Sweden might be better bets. Flow data also highlight just how precarious it is to be long US dollars. As of September, overall flows into the US Treasury market have been negative, which may have contributed to the bottom in bond yields. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive, but the momentum in these flows is clearly rolling over. This is more than offset by official net outflows that are running at $350 billion (Chart I-10). As interest rate differentials have started moving against the US, so has foreign investor appetite for Treasury bonds. Chart I-10A Growing Dearth Of Treasury Buyers Bottom Line: Flows into US assets are rapidly dwindling. This may be partly because as the S&P 500 makes new highs amid lofty valuations, long-term investors are slowly realizing that future expected returns will pale in historical comparison. Given that being long Treasurys and the dollar remains a consensus trade, international investors run the risk of being potentially blindsided by a sharp drop in the dollar. Rebuy NOK/SEK We were stopped out of our long NOK/SEK position last week. We are reinstating this trade as relative fundamentals, especially from an interest rate perspective, still favor the cross. We are reinstating long NOK/SEK as relative fundamentals, especially from an interest rate perspective, still favor the cross. We remain oil bulls on the back of a pickup in global demand and OPEC production discipline. This should lead to the outperformance of energy stocks, benefiting inflows into Norway (Chart I-11). Chart I-11No Near-Term Replacement For Oil Chart I-12Interest Rates Favor NOK/SEK Interest rate differentials continue to favor NOK over SEK. The Riksbank will probably – at the margin – be more hawkish than the Norges Bank in an attempt to exit negative interest rates, but the carry will remain wide (Chart I-12). Meanwhile, Norway mainland GDP growth continues to outpace that of Sweden (Chart I-13). Finally, the cross has approached an important technical level, with our intermediate-term indicator signaling oversold conditions. Should the NOK/SEK pattern of higher lows and higher highs in place since the 2015 bottom persist, we should be on the cusp of a powerful rally (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Growth Favors NOK/SEK Chart I-14Rebuy NOK/SEK   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been positive: The ISM and Markit data are sending conflicting signals: the Markit manufacturing PMI edged up to 52.6, while the ISM number dipped towards 48.1 in November. On the services front, the Markit PMI was unchanged at 51.6, while the ISM PMI fell to 53.9. ADP employment recorded an increase of 67K jobs in November, well below expectations. The jobs report on Friday will be especially important. The trade deficit narrowed by $4 billion to $47.2 billion in October. The DXY index fell by 0.9% this week. Incoming data have been consistent with our base case view that global growth has bottomed and will rebound in 2020. Along with a manufacturing sector recovery, pro-cyclical, or higher-beta currencies are poised to outperform the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 201 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area signal a tentative recovery: Preliminary headline and core inflation both rebounded to 1% and 1.3% year-on-year, respectively in November. The Markit manufacturing PMI increased to 46.9 in November. The Services PMI also edged up to 51.9. Retail sales grew by 1.4% year-on-year in October, lower than the 2.7% yearly growth from the previous month. GDP growth was unchanged at 1.2% year-on-year in Q3. EUR/USD appreciated by 0.6% this week. The recent rebound in both inflation and PMI has brightened the outlook for the euro area and boosted investor confidence. Our Global Investment Strategy upgraded euro area equities to overweight recently. We continue to remain positive on the euro against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Construction orders soared by 6.4% year-on-year in October. Manufacturing PMI increased to 48.9 from 48.6 in November. Consistently, the services PMI also increased to 50.3. Vehicle sales fell by 14.6% year-on-year in November. This series is extremely volatile, especially given the front-loading of purchases ahead of the consumption tax hike. USD/JPY fell by 0.8% this week. Sluggish growth in Asia, together with the consumption tax hike have weighed on the Japanese economy through 2019. However, the Japanese yen remained resilient due to its safe-haven nature. The Abe government has revealed a sizeable fiscal stimulus, but the potential impact on the economy is still being digested. At the margin, fiscal stimulus reduces the scope for the BoJ to adopt more experimental monetary policies, which is bullish the yen. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been upbeat: On the PMI front, both Markit manufacturing and services PMIs increased to 48.9 and 49.3, respectively in November. The construction PMI also rebounded to 45.3 from 44.2. Consumer credit increased by £1.3 billion in October. The British pound has appreciated by nearly 2% against the US dollar this week, making it the best performing G10 currency over the past few weeks. Our Geopolitical strategists believe that the UK election will not reintroduce a no-deal Brexit risk, either in the short-term or long-term. This is positive for the UK economy overall, and bullish for the British pound especially given it is still trading well below its long-term real effective exchange rate. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been robust: GDP growth soared to 1.7% from 1.4% year-on-year in Q3. On the PMI front, both AiG manufacturing and services PMIs fell to 48.1 and 53.7, respectively in November. The Commonwealth manufacturing PMI was little changed at 49.9, while the services PMI increased to 49.7.   The current account balance increased to 7.9 billion from 4.7 billion in Q3. AUD/USD increased by 0.8% this week. On Monday, the RBA kept interest rates unchanged at 0.75%. Governor Lowe implied that after 3 rate cuts this year, the current low cash rate is already boosting Australian asset prices and household spending. Combined with government spending and a growing population, this should help underpin the Australian economy and the Aussie dollar in the long run. We remain overweight the Aussie dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data from New Zealand this week: Terms-of-trade increased by 1.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q3. NZD/USD increased by 1.7% this week. As a small open economy, New Zealand should benefit once global growth stabilizes. Moreover, rising terms-of-trade, mainly in dairy and meat prices, are lifting New Zealand exports and the trade balance this year. We remain positive on the kiwi against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 201 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mixed: Annualized GDP increased by 1.3% quarter-on-quarter in Q3, well below the 3.5% quarterly growth in the second quarter. The Markit manufacturing PMI slightly increased to 51.4 in November. The Ivey PMI also soared to 60 from 48.2 on a seasonally-adjusted basis in November. Imports slightly increased to C$51 billion in October. Exports also increased to C$49.9 billion. The trade deficit, as a result, narrowed to C$1.1 billion. USD/CAD fell by 1% this week. On Wednesday, the BoC held interest rates unchanged at 1.75%. A catalyst was probably early signs of a global growth recovery. The BoC is one of the few central banks that haven't eased monetary policy this year amid the trade war and a manufacturing sector slowdown. Going forward, we are positive on energy prices, and believe that the loonie is primed for a breakout. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been soft: The KOF leading indicator fell to 93 from 94.8 in November. Real retail sales increased by 0.7% year-on-year in October, from 1.6% the previous month. Headline inflation increased from -0.3% to -0.1% year-on-year in November. The Swiss franc increased by 1.2% against the US dollar this week, amid broad dollar weakness. Inflation has been negative for a second consecutive month in November, and a strong franc does not offer any help. While we remain positive on the Swiss franc, the biggest risk to an appreciating franc is intervention from the central bank. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Retail sales fell by 0.8% month-on-month in October. The current account surplus narrowed by NOK 2.6 billion to NOK 23.9 billion in Q3. The Norwegian krone increased by 0.8% this week against the US dollar, supported by rising oil prices and a brightened outlook for global growth. The EIA reported a decrease of crude oil stocks by 4.9 million barrels for the week ended November 29th. Combined with a revival in oil demand, this is bullish for the oil prices and the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mostly positive: GDP increased by 1.6% year-on-year in Q3, an improvement from 1% the previous quarter. The manufacturing PMI fell to 45.4 from 46 in November. This was in contrast to other euro area countries. The current account surplus improved to SEK 69 billion from SEK 37 billion in Q3. USD/SEK decreased by 1% this week. Typically, a weak krona helps the manufacturing sector by a lag of about 12 months. Moreover, the weak krona is also improving balance of payments dynamics in Sweden. Going forward, we remain bullish on the Swedish krona, and are playing krona strength via the New Zealand dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within an EM equity portfolio. Fixed-income investors should consider purchasing 5-year local currency government bonds. The balance-of-payments adjustment is probably over. Hence, the currency will be stable, allowing inflation and interest rates to drop. Feature The country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Chart I-1Pakistani Stocks: The Worst Is Over We downgraded Pakistani equities in March 2017  and put this bourse on our upgrade watch list this past May (Chart I-1). In the past two years, the country has been going through a severe balance-of-payments crisis and a correspondingly painful adjustment. In recent months, the country’s macro dynamics have shown signs of stabilization. This has begun benefiting share prices in both absolute terms and relative to the EM equity benchmark. Today we are upgrading Pakistani stocks to overweight within an EM equity portfolio and recommend buying 5-year local currency government bonds. The worst is over for the economy and its financial markets for the following reasons. First, the country’s balance-of-payments position will improve. In real effective exchange rate (REER) terms, the Pakistani rupee has depreciated 15% over the past two years (Chart I-2). This will boost exports and cap imports, narrowing both trade and current account deficits further (Chart I-3).   Chart I-2Considerable Depreciation In Pakistani Rupee… Chart I-3…Will Boost Exports And Cap Imports We expect exports to grow 5-10% next year. The country’s competitiveness has improved considerably, with its top commodities exports all having shown impressive growth in volume terms, despite weakening global growth (Chart I-4). Besides, in order to boost exports, the government has reduced the cost of raw materials and semi-finished products used in exportable products by exempting them from all customs duties in fiscal 2020 (July 2019 – June 2020). The government has also promised to provide sales tax refunds to the export sector. Chart I-4Increasing Competitiveness In Pakistan Exports In addition, falling oil prices will help reduce the country’s import bill. Remittance inflows – currently equaling 9% of GDP – have become an extremely important source of financing for Pakistan’s trade deficit. In the past 12 months, remittances sent from overseas have risen to US$22 billion, and have covered most of the US$28 billion trade deficit.   Financial inflows are also likely to increase in 2020 and will be sufficient to finance the current account deficit. The IMF will disburse roughly US$2 billion to Pakistan. Other multilateral/bilateral lending/grants and planned issuance of Sukuk or Euro bonds will provide the government with much-needed foreign funding.  As the economy recovers, net foreign direct inflows are also likely to increase. Net foreign direct investment received by Pakistan has grown 24% year-on-year in the past six months, with 56% of the increase coming from China. Overall, the improvement in Pakistan’s balance-of-payments position will continue, resulting in a refill of the country’s foreign currency reserves. Odds are that the central bank will purchase foreign currency from the government as the latter gets foreign funding. This will provide the government with local currency to spend. At the same time, the central bank’s purchases of these foreign exchange inflows will boost the local currency money supply – a positive development for the economy and stock market. Chart I-5 shows that the Pakistani stock market closely correlates with swings in the nation’s narrow money growth. The Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Chart I-5Pakistan: Ameliorating Balance-Of-Payments Position Will Benefit Stock Prices Chart I-6Pakistan: Improving Fiscal Balance Second, Pakistan’s fiscal balance also shows signs of improvement. Pakistan and the IMF have agreed to set the target for the overall budget and primary deficits at 7.2% of GDP and 0.6% of GDP, respectively, for the current fiscal year (Chart I-6). This will be a considerable improvement from the 8.9% of GDP and 3.3% of GDP, respectively, last fiscal year. In early November, the IMF praised Pakistan for having successfully managed to post a primary budget surplus of 0.9% of GDP during the first quarter (July 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019) of its current fiscal year. The authorities are determined to maintain strict fiscal discipline. The country’s tax-to-GDP ratio is at about 12%, one of the lowest in the world, so there is room to expand the tax base. Third, the Pakistani central bank will soon start a rate-cutting cycle as the exchange rate stabilizes. This is a typical recovery process following a balance-of-payments crisis and substantial currency devaluation. Both headline and core inflation seem to have peaked (Chart I-7). Headline inflation fell to 11% in October, which already lies within the central bank’s target range of 11-12% for the current fiscal year. The policy rate is currently 225 basis points higher than headline inflation. As inflation drops and the currency finds support, interest rates will be reduced to facilitate the economic recovery. In addition, there has been much less public debt monetization by the central bank. After borrowing Rs3.16 trillion from the central bank in the previous fiscal year, the federal government has curtailed such borrowing to only Rs122 billion in the first three months of this fiscal year. Diminishing debt monetization will also help ease domestic inflation. Chart I-7Inflation Has Peaked Chart I-8Manufacturing Activity Is Likely To Recover Soon Fourth, manufacturing activity in Pakistan has plunged to extremely low levels, comparable to the 2008 Great Recession (Chart I-8). With a more stabilized local currency, easing domestic inflation and interest rate reductions, Pakistan’s economic activity is set to recover soon from a very low base.  Finally, Phase II of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is set to begin this month. Under Phase II of the CPEC, five special economic zones will be established with Chinese industrial relocation. Phase II will also bring forward dividends from Phase I projects. The nation’s infrastructure facilities built by China over the past several years have enhanced the productive capacity of the Pakistani economy. The significant increase in electricity supply and improved railway/highway transportation will promote higher productivity/efficiency gains. Bottom Line: We are upgrading Pakistani equities to overweight within the emerging markets space. Both absolute and relative valuations of Pakistani stocks appear attractive (Charts I-9 and I-10). Chart I-9Pakistani Stocks: Valuations Are Attractive In Absolute Terms... Chart I-10…And Relative To EM Equities Meanwhile, we recommend going long Pakistani 5-year local currency government bonds currently yielding 11.5%, as we expect interest rates to drop quite a bit (Chart I-11).  Chart I-11Go Long Pakistani 5-Year Local Currency Government Bonds   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Chart 1Manufacturing PMIs Track Bond Yields November’s manufacturing PMI data were released yesterday, giving us an update for two of our preferred global growth indicators: the Global Manufacturing PMI and the US ISM Manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Unfortunately, the two indicators sent conflicting signals, providing us with very little clarity on the global growth outlook. On the positive side, the Global Manufacturing PMI jumped back above 50 for the first time since April. China is the largest weighting in the global index, and its PMI rose for the fifth consecutive month. Conversely, the US ISM Manufacturing PMI dipped further into contractionary territory in November – from 48.3 to 48.1. Optimistically, the index’s inventory component contracted by more than the new orders component, meaning that the difference between new orders and inventories rose to its highest level since May. The difference between new orders and inventories often leads the overall ISM index by several months. All in all, we continue to see tentative signs of stabilization in our preferred global growth indicators. But a more significant rebound will be necessary to push bond yields higher in the first half of next year, as we expect. Stay tuned. Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 63 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +494 bps. We consider three main factors in our credit cycle analysis: (i) corporate balance sheet health, (ii) monetary conditions and (iii) valuation.1 On balance sheets, our top-down measure of gross leverage is high and rising (Chart 2). In contrast, interest coverage ratios remain solid, propped up by the Fed’s accommodative stance. With inflation expectations still depressed, the Fed can maintain its “easy money” policy for some time yet. The third quarter’s tightening of C&I lending standards is a concern, because it suggests that monetary conditions may not be sufficiently stimulative for banks to keep the credit taps running (bottom panel). But the yield curve, another indicator of monetary conditions, has steepened significantly since Q3, suggesting that lending standards will soon move back into “net easing” territory. For now, we see valuation as the main headwind for investment grade credit spreads. Spreads for all credit tiers are below our targets, with the Baa tier looking less expensive than the others (panels 2 & 3).2 As a result, we advise only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds, with a preference for the Baa credit tier. We also recommend increasing exposure to Agency MBS in place of corporate bonds rated A or higher (see page 7). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +671 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 22 bps on the month and currently sits at 370 bps, 131 bps above our target (Chart 3). Ba and B rated junk bonds outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 79 bps and 76 bps, respectively, in November. But Caa-rated credit underperformed Treasuries by 89 bps. This continues the trend of Caa underperformance that has been in place since late last year (panel 3). We analyzed the divergence between Caa and the rest of the junk bond universe in last week’s report and came to two conclusions.3 First, the historical data show that 12-month periods of overall junk bond outperformance are more likely to be followed by underperformance if Caa is the worst performing credit tier. Second, we can identify several reasons for this year’s Caa underperformance that make us inclined to downplay any potential negative signal. Specifically, we note that the Caa credit tier’s exposure to the shale oil sector is responsible for the bulk of this year’s underperformance (bottom panel). With elevated spreads, accommodative monetary conditions and a looming recovery in global economic growth, we expect junk spreads to tighten during the next 6-12 months.    MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +22 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 3 bps on the month, as a 5 bps tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was offset by a 2 bps increase in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). We recommend an overweight allocation to Agency MBS, particularly relative to corporate bonds rated A or higher, for three reasons.4 First, expected compensation is competitive. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS is now 50 bps (Chart 4). This is very close to its pre-crisis average and only 3 bps below the spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (panel 4). Also, spreads for all investment grade corporate bond credit tiers trade below our targets. Second, risk-adjusted compensation heavily favors MBS. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency MBS plot well to the right of investment grade corporates. This means that the sector is less likely to see losses versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. Finally, the macro environment for MBS remains supportive. Mortgage lending standards have barely eased since the financial crisis (bottom panel), and most homeowners have already had at least one opportunity to refinance their mortgages. This burnout will keep refi activity low, and MBS spreads tight (panel 2). Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +197 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 36 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +513 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 24 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +245 bps. Meanwhile, Foreign Agencies outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +266 bps. Domestic Agencies outperformed by 11 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +51 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +36 bps. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to USD-denominated sovereign bonds, given that spreads remain expensive compared to US corporate credit (Chart 5). However, we noted in a recent report that Mexican and Saudi Arabian sovereigns look attractive on a risk/reward basis.5 This is also true for Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities, as shown in the Bond Map in Appendix C. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service also thinks that worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, and that bond yields embed too high of a risk premium (bottom panel).6 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 70 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +6bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 4% in November, and currently sits at 83% (Chart 6). We upgraded municipal bonds in early October, as yield ratios had become significantly more attractive, especially at the long-end of the Aaa curve (panel 2).7 Specifically, 2-year and 5-year M/T yield ratios are somewhat below average pre-crisis levels at 68% and 72%, respectively. However, M/T yield ratios for longer maturities (10 years and higher) are all above average pre-crisis levels. M/T yield ratios for 10-year, 20-year and 30-year maturities are 84%, 93% and 97%, respectively. Fundamentally, state & local government balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both of these trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outnumber downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted higher in November, steepening out to the 7-year maturity and flattening beyond that. The 2/10 Treasury slope was unchanged on the month. It currently sits at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps to end the month at 59 bps (Chart 7). In a recent report we discussed the 6-12 month outlook for the 2/10 Treasury slope.8 We considered the main macro factors that influence the slope of the yield curve: Fed policy, wage growth, inflation expectations and the neutral fed funds rate. We concluded that the 2/10 slope has room to steepen during the next few months, as the Fed holds down the front-end of the curve in an effort to re-anchor inflation expectations. However, we see the 2/10 slope remaining in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps, owing to strong wage growth and downbeat neutral rate expectations. Despite the outlook for modest curve steepening, we continue to recommend holding a barbelled Treasury portfolio. Specifically, we favor holding a 2/30 barbell versus the 5-year bullet, in duration-matched terms. This position offers strong positive carry (bottom panel), due to the extreme overvaluation of the 5-year note, and looks attractive on our yield curve models (see Appendix B). TIPS: Overweight   Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 47 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -70 bps.The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.62%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.73%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s target. The divergence between the actual inflation data and inflation expectations remains stark. Trimmed mean PCE inflation has been fluctuating around the Fed’s target for most of the year (Chart 8). However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain stubbornly low. As we have pointed out in prior research, it can take time for expectations to adapt to a changing macro environment.9 That being said, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 29 bps too low according to our Adaptive Expectations Model, a model whose primary input is 10-year trailing core inflation (panel 4). It is highly likely that the Fed will have to tolerate some overshoot of its 2% inflation target in order to re-anchor inflation expectations near desired levels. We anticipate that the committee will do so, and maintain our view that long-dated TIPS breakevens will move above 2.3% before the end of the cycle. ABS: Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +74 bps. Chart 9ABS Market Overview The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 34 bps; its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS rank among the most defensive US spread products and also offer more expected return than other low-risk sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. However, we remain wary of allocating too much to consumer ABS because credit trends continue to shift in the wrong direction. The consumer credit delinquency rate is still low, but has put in a clear bottom. The is true for the household interest expense ratio (panel 3). Senior Loan Officers also continue to tighten lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising delinquencies (bottom panel). All in all, our favorable outlook for global growth causes us to shy away from defensive spread products, and deteriorating ABS credit metrics are also a cause for concern. Stay underweight. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +221 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 1 bp on the month. It currently sits at 72 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but somewhat above levels seen in 2018 (Chart 10). The macro outlook for commercial real estate (CRE) is somewhat unfavorable, with lenders tightening loan standards (panel 4) in an environment of tepid demand. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks saw slightly stronger demand for nonfarm nonresidential CRE loans in Q3, after four consecutive quarters of falling demand (bottom panel). CRE prices are still not keeping pace with CMBS spreads (panel 3). Despite the poor fundamental picture, our Excess Return Bond Map shows that CMBS offer a reasonably attractive risk/reward trade-off compared to other bond sectors (see Appendix C). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +107 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month, and currently sits at 54 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer a compelling risk/reward trade-off. An overweight allocation to this high-rated sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 26 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index.   To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of November 29 2019) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of November 29, 2019) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 45 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 45 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of November 29, 2019) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Corporate Bond Investors Should Not Fight The Fed”, dated September 17, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   For details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Perspective On Risk And Reward”, dated October 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Malaysia, Mexico & Central Europe”, dated October 31, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 7  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com   Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights BCA still sees green shoots: Our latest view meeting reinforced BCA strategists’ optimistic global outlook, and we are methodically adding international and cyclical exposures to reflect it. Relatively modest M&A activity is not a sign of a top, … : Last Monday was the busiest Merger Monday of the year, but relative merger volumes are not anywhere near the peaks that coincided with the end of the last two expansions. … and neither is small-cap equity underperformance: There is no empirical basis for concluding that small-cap underperformance heralds economic weakness, stock market weakness or heightened risk aversion. Feature Onward. At our latest editorial view meeting, held last week, we completed the step we first began discussing in the spring, upgrading Eurozone equities to overweight in global equity portfolios. BCA continues to recommend investors remain underweight sovereign bonds in balanced and dedicated fixed income portfolios, and we expect that a top in the dollar versus the more cyclical major currencies is coming soon. We downgraded US equities to underweight to make room for the Eurozone overweight, along with new overweights in British and Japanese equities. The move reflects the BCA consensus that global growth has bottomed and is poised to accelerate. Against an improved growth backdrop, the dollar should cede leadership to more cyclically sensitive currencies, providing non-US equities with a relative tailwind.1 The narrowing of the growth differential between the US and the rest of the world should give international equities an additional boost. A revived growth outlook, and a cooling of trade tensions signaled by a signed Phase 1 China-US agreement, would ease some of the safe-haven demand for sovereign bonds, and help interest rates unwind some of the downward pull that dragged them lower across the first eight months of the year. The US equity downgrade is only a relative call, however; US Investment Strategy remains constructive on the absolute return outlook for US stocks. Other economies with a greater reliance on trade will benefit more from a global upswing than the US, which suffered less from the global slowdown than its peers. The S&P 500 has much more exposure to the rest of the world than the US economy, though, and its earnings would get a boost from accelerating global growth and a weaker dollar. At the same time that the fundamental picture is poised to improve, the wall of worry continues to renew itself, and this week we discuss concerns about M&A activity and small-cap stocks’ underperformance, which have come to the fore as Sino-American tensions have relaxed their grip on the collective investor psyche. Mergers And Animal Spirits Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) generated some attention-getting headlines last month. Just last Monday, nearly $60 billion of deals were struck: Charles Schwab purchased TD Ameritrade for $26 billion, LVMH bought jewelry icon Tiffany for $18 billion, Novartis paid nearly $10 billion for drugmaker Medicines Company, and Ebay sold StubHub for $4 billion. Earlier last month, Xerox launched a hostile bid for HP ($32 billion), and KKR reportedly discussed an acquisition of Walgreens that could top $70 billion. A Walgreens transaction is a long shot, as it would potentially be the largest leveraged buyout of all time, but it has set tongues wagging in investment banking and private equity circles and fingers wagging among observers with an inclination to be scolds. M&A overtures cannot be viewed as a pure proxy for animal spirits, but M&A activity has aligned closely with the business cycle over the past two full cycles. The value of completed transactions as a share of equity values and GDP has troughed soon after the recession ends and peaked just before the recession begins, both here and abroad (Chart 1). In early 2016, proportional M&A volumes approached the levels that marked a top in 2000 and 2007, but the signal turned out to be a head fake, at least in terms of the US business cycle. Today’s volumes do not appear to be a concern, especially when compared to equity market value, which has consistently outpaced M&A activity since the 2016 peaks. Chart 1Peaks In M&A Activity Coincide With Business Cycle Peaks, ... It makes intuitive sense that peaks and troughs, or surges and slowdowns, in M&A might provide some insight into corporate confidence. Insight into confidence might in turn offer a preview of capex and hiring activity. Chart 2... But M&A Isn't Predictive Otherwise The empirical record does not support the intuition, however, as non-residential fixed investment growth has not shown much of a relationship with M&A volume as a share of GDP (Chart 2, top panel). Since the crisis, M&A volume has oscillated around the steady climb in hiring intentions (Chart 2, middle panel) and job openings (Chart 2, bottom panel) without exhibiting a clear relationship. What Is Small-Cap Performance Saying? The S&P 500 has made thirteen new all-time highs, or about one every other day, since the last week of October. The S&P SmallCap 600, on the other hand, just narrowly topped its year-to-date high, and remains more than 9% from its all-time high, set at the end of August 2018. Small-caps are more volatile than large-caps and many investors treat relative small-cap performance as a proxy for overall risk aversion. When small-caps are outperforming, investors are presumed to be more willing to embrace risk; when they’re underperforming, investors are supposedly more prone to shun it, with implications for all equities. Small-cap indices are simply too jumpy to predict large-cap equity moves. The empirical record does not support the view that relative small-cap underperformance leads broader market downturns. Because small-cap market cycles tend to be more compressed than large-cap market cycles, there are many more of them. There have been seven complete S&P 500 market cycles since 1970 (Table 1), versus fifteen complete market cycles for the equal-weighted all-cap Value Line Index2 (Table 2). Simple logic holds that all fifteen small-cap events can’t be portents of seven large-cap events, and the S&P 500 has been largely indifferent to small-cap outperformance and underperformance over time (Chart 3). Table 1The S&P 500 Is On Its Eighth Bull Market Since 1970 … Table 2… While The Value Line Index Is On Its Sixteenth Chart 3Independent Events We do not believe that small-cap relative performance is a reliable indicator of investor risk tolerance/aversion, or a proxy for animal spirits. We have found that relative performance is best explained by more prosaic elements like sector composition, valuation and earnings discrepancies, domestic/global performance shifts and cyclical/defensive performance shifts. These elements have sent mixed signals as group so far this year, but sector composition is likely to support small-caps going forward if our constructive economic view pans out. Relative small-cap performance doesn't tell us anything about the S&P 500's future direction. Compositional Factors: The S&P SmallCap 600 Index is not just a mini-me version of the S&P 500 because the benchmarks’ sector composition often varies considerably. The SmallCap 600 currently has much heavier weightings than the S&P 500 in Industrials, Financials, Consumer Discretionaries and Real Estate, and much lighter weightings in Technology, Communication Services and Consumer Staples stocks (Table 3). The small-cap index has a greater share of early cyclicals than the S&P 500, and an equivalently smaller share of defensives, but that hasn’t mattered this year, as small-caps have underperformed large-caps in every sector but Health Care (Table 4). Small-cap underperformance in Energy, Communication Services, Staples, and Financials has been especially stark. Table 3Not Quite Apples To Apples Table 4Year-To-Date Sector Performance Valuation/Earnings Discrepancies: Disparities in index valuation may bear on small- and large-cap performance without revealing anything about underlying business or economic trends, or without providing much insight into investors’ broader appetites for risk. Relative valuation does not appear to have been much of a factor for small- and mid-cap stocks’ relative performance this year, as standardized relative multiples have stayed close to the mean (Chart 4). Both of the SMID indexes have experienced relative de-rating this year, but their underperformance is better explained by lagging earnings growth. According to Refinitiv/I/B/E/S, MidCap 400 and SmallCap 600 earnings are expected to decline by 7% and 19%, respectively, versus the S&P 500’s modest 1% contraction. Chart 4Relative Valuations Are In Line Domestic/Global Discrepancies: Smaller companies are less likely to derive significant portions of earnings and revenues from overseas, and multinationals tend to be mega-caps. The formerly decent correlation between small-cap relative performance and domestic-versus-global industry group performance has unraveled since the 2016 presidential election (Chart 5, bottom panel). It’s possible that investors bid too eagerly for small-caps on expected policy changes after the election and in early 2018, following the cut in the top marginal corporate income tax rate that stood to disproportionately benefit small-caps with effective tax rates equivalent to the top marginal rate.3 It is much easier to buy a small-cap index ETF than it is to assemble portfolios of domestically- and globally-exposed industry groups, which may explain why small-caps decoupled from domestic-versus-global industry groups in two pronounced spikes. A continued small-cap slide would be consistent with BCA’s sanguine global view. Small-caps' relative performance has decoupled from global-facing stocks' relative performance. Could tariffs be hurting them more than expected? Chart 5Small Caps May Not Be Immune To Global Pressures After All Cyclical/Defensive Discrepancies: Differences in exposure to cyclical and defensive sectors offer another perspective on differences in sector composition. The SmallCap 600 Index has just 60% of the S&P 500’s exposure to defensive sectors. Absolute small-cap performance has moved with cyclical-to-defensive performance this year (Chart 6, top panel), but the relative breakdown in small-cap performance that began when defensives took the lead failed to reverse when cyclicals recently revived (Chart 6, bottom panel). We expect cyclicals to outperform defensives in line with our constructive view on global growth, which should translate to a boost for relative small-cap performance. Chart 6Cyclicals Investment Implications The conventional wisdom that small-cap underperformance signals a broader equity downturn does not hold up to examination. Small- and mid-cap earnings have contracted considerably more than S&P 500 earnings, and SMID stocks have de-rated versus large-caps since the fourth quarter of last year, but it is not clear why either of those trends will continue this year. We suspect that SMID underperformance largely reflects a downward revision in expectations that ran a little too high in the wake of the tax cut and the assumption that small-caps would emerge relatively unscathed from new tariff barriers. Large-caps are more globally-oriented, but it’s possible that overweights in Industrials and Discretionaries render small-caps more vulnerable to increased tariff-related input costs. M&A volumes as a share of market cap or GDP have served as a much more reliable proxy for overheated animal spirits. Peaks and troughs in M&A have aligned closely with peaks and troughs in the last two completed business cycles. M&A headlines have revved up in the last month, but the volume of completed deals is not yet at worrisome levels. Our main takeaway from last week’s internal view meeting is that 2019’s worldwide easing of monetary conditions will manifest itself in a pickup in global activity in the first half of 2020. Our bond strategists expect that the Fed’s primary concern is getting inflation expectations up to a level consistent with its inflation target, and that it will strive to maintain policy settings that are perceived as accommodative until it gets the inflation expectations response it seeks. Unless signs of financial instability compel it to tighten policy to contain bubble-like excesses, they expect the Fed to remain on hold for nearly all of 2020. We concur, and therefore expect the monetary backdrop to remain conducive for risk asset outperformance at least into 2021. Investors should maintain risk-friendly positioning against that backdrop.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 All of BCA’s global recommendations are made from a common-currency perspective. 2 A complete market cycle encompasses a completed bull market (at least 20% closing trough to closing peak gain) and a completed bear market (at least 20% closing peak to closing trough decline). We use the Value Line Index as a small-cap proxy here because it has a 50-year history, unlike the Russell 2000 or SmallCap 600. 3 Multinationals’ effective tax rates are often reduced by their ability to shift income among tax jurisdictions.

Highlights The seemingly interminable discussions around the “phase one” deal touted by US and Chinese trade negotiators notwithstanding, base metals prices are primed for a rally. The bottoming in base metals prices indicates industrial activity, particularly in EM economies, will turn higher, which will lift aggregate demand. The signaling from base metals markets is consistent with our proprietary industrial activity models, including our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which continue to show industrial activity has bottomed and is turning up. Year-on-year growth in supply and demand of aluminum and copper – the largest components of the LMEX index – is diverging: Consumption is outpacing production, which is forcing inventories to draw hard. Any increase in demand will rally prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position at present and are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Feature Despite the seemingly interminable back-and-forth between US and Chinese negotiators working on “phase one” of the Sino-US trade deal, base metals prices are signaling a revival of global economic growth, particularly in EM economies, in 2020. This is consistent with the growth indications being picked up in our proprietary models and reflected in global PMIs. The proximate cause of this revival in economic activity is the global monetary accommodation systemically important central banks have been pursuing for the better part of 2019, and the likely implementation of the long-awaited “phase one” Sino-US trade deal. Fiscal policy space remains available for systematically important economies – e.g., China, Germany and the US – and we expect such stimulus to be deployed next year. Fundamentally, global base metals inventories continue to draw hard, as the rates of growth in consumption and production diverge. Any recovery in organic growth – particularly in EM demand – would spark a rally. Base Metals In The Role Of Leading Economic Indicators We use metals prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Base metals prices often are used as indicators of global economic activity, particularly EM nominal and real GDP growth (Chart of the Week). Indeed, US Federal Reserve Board economists recently noted base metals prices are “often viewed by policymakers and practitioners as early indicators of swings in economic activity and global risk sentiment.”1 These metals prices are more sensitive to changes in global growth than other commodities (e.g., oil, which has its own idiosyncratic factors driving the evolution of prices). For this reason, we use these prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Our research indicates base metals prices are more closely linked to EM activity than DM activity, which makes them especially useful to our analysis of commodity markets generally, particularly oil. This is true also of our proprietary models by construction – EM demand drives commodity demand. Together, the base metals prices and our models contain complementary information that is useful in gauging growth prospects, particularly for EM economies (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekBase Metals Often Function As Gauges of GDP Growth Chart 2Base Metals Prices, BCA's GIA Model Both Are Sensitive to EM Growth Prospects We’ve found base metals prices to be timely indicators of turning points in EM GDP cycles, similar to the Fed’s findings (Table 1). In particular, the LMEX, IMF Base Metals index, and high-grade copper prices lead nominal and real EM GDP by anywhere from one to three months. However, for the entire sample correlation, which goes from 1995 to present, our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index and Global Commodity Factor (GCF) have the highest correlation with nominal and real EM GDP. Table 1Correlation Between EM GDP And Indicators Of Global Activity Our proprietary indicators – GIA index, GCF, EM Import Volume Model (EMIV Model) – have been signaling a revival in commodity demand for several months (Chart 3). The model we’ve developed to track freight, similar to our EMIV Model, also is signaling a recovery in global trade (Chart 4).3 Chart 3BCA's Proprietary Models Also Closely Aligned with EM Growth Chart 4EM Import Volumes Closely Follow Freight Base Metals Stocks Drawing Hard Supply in the biggest components of the LMEX – copper and aluminum – is contracting, while demand is holding up or slightly growing. This is causing global stocks to draw hard, as incremental demand is met from inventory. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Global refined aluminum inventories have been drawing sharply as growth rates in production and consumption diverge (Chart 5). Global ali inventories now stand at 1.76mm MT, down 24% y/y. On average, global consumption has exceeded production by 7.2k MT this year. A similar set of fundamentals is forcing copper inventories to draw hard, as well, where consumption has exceeded production by 22.6k MT this year (Chart 6). Global copper inventories are down ~ 20% y/y, and continue to fall. Chart 5Ali Consumption Outpaces Production, Forcing Stocks To Draw Hard Chart 6Copper Stocks Draw Hard On Similar Fundamental Pressure The only thing preventing a sustained rally in these markets is organic demand growth, which the global accommodation by systematically important central banks is directed toward reviving. PBOC policymakers in China have drawn attention to their capacity for additional monetary stimulus, even though they have held off on goosing money and credit supply this year. A prolonged weakening of GDP growth in China likely would push policymakers to move to a more accommodative stance on monetary policy. Net, weak demand growth is offsetting upside price pressure as production contracts in key base metals markets. That said, EM demand ex-China for base metals likely will increase, if our economic activity gauges and prices are correct in the signals they are generating. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Expect Higher Base Metals Demand In 2020 Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well. We are expecting base metals consumption to move higher next year, given the uptick we are seeing in base metals markets and from our economic activity gauges, particularly our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which is a weighted combination of the individual models we use as a contemporaneous indicator (Chart 7).4 Chart 7Base Metals Demand Set To Recover in 2020 Chart 8Global Financial Easing Will Lift Base Metals Part of this will be led by improving Chinese demand, which accounts for more than 50% of base metals demand globally (Chart 8). We expect global financial conditions to remain supportive, and for total social financing in China to provide additional tailwinds to metal prices. This will keep aluminum demand in China stable-to-higher (Chart 9) along with copper demand (Chart 10). Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well.5 Chart 9Chinese Aluminum Consumption... Chart 10...And Copper Demand Will Recover Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. Bottom Line: Base metals prices and price indexes are telling a similar story to the gauges we’ve constructed to follow EM growth prospects, hence commodity demand prospects. Fundamentally, these markets continue to tighten, as supply growth remains significantly behind demand growth and stocks continue to draw hard. The y/y changes in the metals price indexes likely have bottomed and will be moving higher. Our GIA and GCF indicators concur. Taking the information contained in our proprietary indexes and base metals prices together drives our expectation for stronger base metals demand next year, which, given the state of supply growth and inventories, points to higher prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position and will await confirmation of a robust recovery in demand before moving it to a strategic position. For that reason, we are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Chart 11Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Also Works Against Base Metals Demand The same forces that are hindering a strong recovery in oil demand – chiefly the elevated level of global economic uncertainty, which keeps the USD well bid – also are at play in the base metals markets. USD strength keep the cost of base metals high in local-currency terms, which retards demand, and encourages increased supply at the margin, as the local-currency cost of production is suppressed (Chart 11). It will be difficult to go all-in on a commodity price rally until this uncertainty is resolved, or at least reduced.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Brent prices closed at one-month high on Tuesday, surpassing $64/bbl. We expect this trend to continue as demand – mainly from EM – picks up in the coming months, as signaled by our proprietary indicators. Next week will be critical for the 2020 oil market balance. OPEC’s Joint Technical Committee will meet on December 3, OPEC on December 5, and OPEC and non-OPEC countries – i.e. OPEC 2.0 – on December 6. The current market consensus seems to be that OPEC 2.0 will agree to maintain the current production curtailments for three additional months, which would take their deal to keep 1.2mm b/d off the market to the end of June. Non-complying countries – mainly Iraq – can be expected to encounter pressure to further reduce production in line with their quotas. In our global oil market balances, we assume OPEC 2.0 will extend the current quota until year-end 2020. Nonetheless, this could be announced gradually throughout the year. Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals moved higher on Tuesday following positive developments in the US-China trade talks. Top negotiators from both countries spoke by phone earlier this week and Trump signal its administration was in the “final throes of a very important deal.”6 We expect a ceasefire to be signed this year, which will revive sentiment at the margin. Moreover, copper and aluminum prices will be supported by rising EM GDP next year (see this week’s front section for details). Copper prices are up 2% since last Thursday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices held above our $1,450/oz stop-loss despite the risk-on sentiment fueled by encouraging discussions between the US’s and China’s top negotiators. For next year, we believe the Fed will remain accommodative and will not risk de-railing the recovery pre-emptively, even as inflation moves above target. This will support gold prices. The Fed will only tighten more aggressively once inflation breakeven rates are well anchored in the 2.3% to 2.5% range identified by our US Bond strategists. Appearing before the New York Association of Business Economics this week, Fed Governor Lael Brainard argued for a flexible average inflation target that would allow for a sustained period of inflation running above 2% to offset the last decade of inflation averaging far below the current 2% target.7 This is part of the undergoing review of how the Fed conducts monetary policy, led by Vice Chair Richard Clarida. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The slow corn harvest forced the USDA to delay the end of its weekly crop progress report. 84% of corn harvest was complete, below the five-year average of 96%. This season’s corn harvesting has been the slowest since 2009. Wheat rallied on Monday amid fund buying, with its most active contract for March delivery up almost 3%. The rally continued from last week when European wheat prices climbed over unfavorable weather conditions, particularly in France, where the condition of the grain was revised down to a four-year low. The soybean market has faced pressure over doubts a Sino-US trade deal will be concluded. China has turned to Brazil to lock in supplies. The January 2020 futures contract on the CME sank to its lowest level since September. Footnotes 1     In a recent study, The Fed researchers used the IMF’s Base Metals index as a leading indicator of GDP growth. The IMF’s index is highly correlated with the London Metal Exchange Index (LMEX) we use from time to time to assess base metals markets. However, the LMEX, unlike the IMF’s index, does not include iron ore, which can, at times, cause these indexes to diverge. Please see Caldara, Dario, Michele Cavallo, and Matteo Iacoviello (2016), Oil Price Elasticities and Oil Price Fluctuations, International Finance Discussion Papers 1173, published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2    We find two-way Granger-causality between EM GDP and the IMF’s base-metals price index, the LMEX index, and our Global Industrial Activity Index (GIA), Global Commodity Factor (GCF), and shipping rates proxy, which we discuss below. Close to 75% of the LMEX Index is accounted for by aluminum and copper. Aluminum account for 14% of the IMF index, while copper makes up 30% of the index. 3    The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity. These statistics are highly correlated with trade-related activity, which, since most of this involve trade in manufactured goods, is important to global industrial activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different real commodity prices. The EMIV model tracks EM import volumes which are reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which we update to current time using FX rates for trade-sensitive currencies, commodity prices and interest rates variables. We are also following shipping indexes, which are highly correlated with global trade volumes. 4    Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is a coincident indicator of commodity demand, comprised of our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models. 5    EM GDP ex-China is more correlated with base metals prices and our GIA index, while US GDP and IP is only slightly impacted by them. 6    Please see U.S.-China trade deal close, Trump says; negotiations continue published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com. 7    Please see Fed's Brainard calls for 'flexible' average inflation target published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights Global High-Yield: The widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Feature There’s Nothing To “Caa” Here The clouds of pessimism on global growth, and financial markets, continue to slowly dissipate. The global manufacturing PMI has clearly bottomed, our rising global leading economic indicator is signaling more upside for the first half of 2020, equity markets worldwide are grinding higher, volatility is subdued, while corporate credit spreads in the US and Europe remain generally tight. Yet within the corporate bond market, a peculiar dynamic has emerged. We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall Bloomberg Barclays US high-yield (HY) index now sits at 376bps. While this spread is relatively narrow from a longer-term perspective, investors may have become more discerning about credit risk. Lower-rated HY has dramatically underperformed higher-rated HY debt of late, with the US Caa-rated OAS now sitting at 985bps compared to Ba-rated spreads of 196bps (Chart of the Week). The divergence across credit tiers is unprecedented, in that Caa spreads are widening while Ba spreads are narrowing – typically, spreads move in tandem directionally, both in bull and bear markets for US junk bonds. The widening of US Caa-rated junk bond spreads has started to raise concerns that this is a “canary in the coal mine” signaling future financial stress among US corporate borrowers. Yet the same dynamic is occurring in euro area HY, with Caa-rated and Ba-rated spreads tracking the US on an almost tick-for-tick basis. In a report published yesterday, our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy investigated the history of Caa spread widenings dating back to 1996.1 They noted that Caa spread widening has typically been a good predictor of one-year-ahead negative excess returns for the overall US junk bond index. However, there has never been a period like today where Caa spreads have widened while overall HY spreads have remained stable. Chart of the WeekSome Odd Divergences In Global Credit We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy, for two main reasons: Chart 2Lower Energy Prices Hurt Lower Rated US HY 1) The widening is focused on Energy related debt The widening of US Caa-rated spreads in 2019 has occurred alongside a parallel increase in the spreads of Energy-related companies in the US junk bond universe (Chart 2). A similar trend played out during the 2014/15 HY bear phase, which was triggered by the collapse of world oil prices that ravaged the US shale oil industry which dominated the lower-rated tiers of the junk bond market. In 2019, oil prices have declined, although not as dramatically, and HY Energy spreads have widened but to nowhere near the levels seen five years ago. More importantly, non-Energy junk spreads remain very subdued and stable, unlike the case in 2014/15 (bottom panel). When looking at the 2019 year-to-date excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays US HY index, it is clear that the overall negative returns for the Caa-rated bucket have been driven by the lagging performance of Energy names (Chart 3). The rest of the market has generally been delivering solid excess returns. Chart 3Contribution To 2019 YTD US HY Excess Returns* 2) The widening has not been confirmed by signals from other reliable credit cycle indicators We believe that, from a top-down macro perspective, corporate credit performance in the US is influenced by three main factors: the state of US corporate health, the stance of the Fed’s monetary policy and the trend in lending standards for US banks. We have dubbed this our “Credit Checklist”, and we present a version of that checklist for US high-yield in Chart 4. Chart 4Conditions Not In Place For A Broad US HY Selloff Our “bottom-up” US HY Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) aggregates, for a sample set of US HY issuers, published financial ratios that are typically used to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers – measures like interest coverage, operating margins and leverage. The US HY CHM is currently at a “neutral” reading (2nd panel), unlike past periods where Caa-rated spreads widened sharply: during the early 2000s telecom bust, the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices. The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual. Turning to measures of the stance of US monetary policy, we look at both the slope of the US Treasury curve (2-year vs 10-year) and the gap between the real fed funds rate and the New York Fed’s estimate of the neutral “r-star” rate. Prior to the early 2000s and 2008 blowout in Caa spreads, the Fed had pushed the real funds rate into restrictive territory above r-star, and the Treasury curve subsequently inverted. That was not the case during the 2014/15 Caa widening, as the Fed was only beginning to transition away from its QE/zero-rate era at that time. Currently, the real funds rate is right at r-star, and the Treasury curve is very flat but not inverted, indicating a broadly neutral monetary policy stance. Finally, we look at data from the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey to evaluate lending standards for US banks. On that front, the latest reading on standards for commercial and industrial loans showed a very modest tightening in the third quarter of 2019, but the overall level remains broadly neutral – unlike the sharp tightening of conditions seen in the early 2000s and 2008 (and the modest tightening in 2014/15). The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual, rather than a sign of future stress in US credit markets. We even see a similar dynamic at work in the euro area. In Chart 5, we present a Credit Checklist for euro area HY, using the same indicators that go into our US HY Credit Checklist. The readings here are even more positive for corporate credit performance than in the US. Our euro area bottom-up HY CHM is showing no deterioration of euro area corporate health, the real ECB policy rate is well below the estimate of r-star, the German yield curve is not inverted and the ECB’s survey of euro area bank lending standards showed a modest easing in the third quarter. Just like in the US, the fundamental backdrop does not argue for a sustained period of euro area HY spread widening, making the latest move higher in euro area Caa spreads as unusual as the move in US Caa. We cannot even blame lower oil prices for the spread widening, as Energy represents only a tiny fraction of the euro area HY market, compared to the large weighting of Energy borrowers in the US junk bond universe. Chart 5Conditions Not In Place For A Broad European HY Selloff We suspect that the correlation between US and euro area HY spreads, by credit tier, has more to do with the increased correlation of trading within global credit markets. Or perhaps it is a sign of investors staying cautious and staying up in quality, even within the riskier HY market. Whatever the reason, we see little fundamental reason to expect the widening of Caa-rated spreads to leak into the broader high-yield market. In fact, if oil prices begin to move higher again, as our commodity strategists are expecting for 2020, that might create a tactical buying opportunity in Caa-rated junk bonds in both the US and euro area. In the meantime, we see no reason to change our recommended overweight stance on US and euro area HY corporate bonds, even with the widening of lower-rated spreads. Bottom Line: The recent widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: The RBA May Not Be Done Yet The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. We have maintained a recommended overweight investment stance on Australian government bonds since December 19, 2017. Since then, the yield on Bloomberg Barclays Australian Treasury index has declined by -140bps, sharply outperforming bonds in the other developed markets and ending Australia’s long-time status as a “high-yielding” developed economy bond market (Chart 6). The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. The central bank has already cut interest rates by 75bps this year, taking the Cash Rate down to a record low of 0.75%. At the November 5th monetary policy meeting, the RBA held off on additional easing but still delivered what was perceived by the market to be a dovish surprise, emphasizing persistently below-target inflation and potential downside risks stemming from the housing market. The door was kept wide open for further rate cuts, if necessary. RBA Governor Philip Lowe has even discussed the possibility that the RBA may have to cut rates to the zero bound and start buying assets via quantitative easing to try and restore inflation back to the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% target band. Chart 6Australian Bonds Have Outperformed Sharply   The RBA’s dovishness is justified, given sluggish economic growth and tepid inflation. Real GDP growth slowed sharply in the first half of 2019 to a meager 1.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). Consumer sentiment and business confidence remain depressed, having both declined since the start of the year. The former is being hit by weak house prices and sub-par income growth, while the latter is suffering under the weight of weaker demand from Australia’s most important trade partner, China. In addition, persistent drought conditions in much of the country have pushed up food prices and brought down incomes related to the farming sector. Chart 7Sluggish Australian Domestic Demand Chart 8From Boom To Bust In Australian Housing A bellwether for the Australian economy, the housing market, has not fared much better (Chart 8). Building approvals for new dwelling units have fallen almost 20% since September of last year, while house prices in the major cities have been contracting since the fourth quarter of 2017. Responding to easy financial conditions in Australia and the rest of the world, the standard variable mortgage rate has now fallen to a 60-year low. It remains to be seen how quickly the housing market will turn around and when that, in turn, will lift dwelling investment, but the RBA cuts in 2019 should give a bit of a lift to Australian housing in 2020. As in other developed markets, trade uncertainty and fears of a recession have made Australian firms more hesitant to invest. Real private business investment is now falling in year-over-year terms, even with the boost to the terms of trade (and corporate profits) from the increase in prices for Australia’s most important commodities seen in 2019 (Chart 9). That impact may be starting to fade, however. The price for iron ore – a major Australian commodity export – has already fallen 28% from the 2019 peak. In addition, Chinese iron ore imports from Australia are contracting in year-over-terms, even with Chinese growth starting to show signs of stabilization in response to stimulus measures implemented earlier this year. Those is an ominous signal for Australian growth, given the massive swing in net exports seen this year. Chart 9Terms Of Trade Turning Negative For Australian Capex Chart 10An Unsustainable Lift From Net Exports Driven by the persistent depreciation of the Australian dollar, and supportive terms of trade, the Australian trade balance has reached its highest value as a percent of nominal GDP (3.7%) since 1959, when quarterly data began (Chart 10). The surge has come almost entirely from the export side, occurring alongside the boost to commodity prices that was concentrated in iron ore, and looks both unsustainable and unrepeatable on a rate-of-change basis. Slowing Australian economic momentum has also impacted the labor market. Employment growth is slowing and the unemployment rate has ticked up to 5.3% from a cyclical low of 5% in February 2019 (Chart 11). The so-called “underemployment rate”, is a much higher 8.5%, indicating that there is still ample slack in the Australian labor market as workers are working fewer hours than they wish (and are hence, “underemployed”). The underemployment rate is negatively correlated to wage growth, suggesting that the modest upturn in the latter seen since the end of 2016 is likely to cool off (bottom panel). Chart 11Some Softening In The Australian Labor Market Chart 12Australian Inflation Remains Subdued The RBA has already warned that wage growth expectations may have become anchored at a lower level given the anemic growth over the past several years. That mirrors the trend seen in overall price inflation. Headline CPI inflation was only 1.6% in the third quarter of 2019, as was the “trimmed mean” CPI inflation rate that is favored by the RBA. Both are below the bottom end of the RBA’s target range of 2-3%, as are survey-based expectations of short-term inflation (Chart 12). The previously mentioned drought conditions have put some upward pressure on overall inflation via grocery food prices, but that is expected to be transitory. With depressed house prices and ongoing issues with spare capacity in the labor market, longer-term market-based inflation expectations, captured by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate, have dipped below the 2% level. The combination of weakening growth and soggy inflation poses a problem for the RBA, as it tries to use monetary policy tools to reverse those trends at a time when Australian banks have seen an unprecedented level of scrutiny of their lending practices. Australian banks have been under the harsh political spotlight after the government’s Royal Commission on misconduct in the financial industry released its findings back in February of this year. Many banks were exposed for serious violations, including money laundering and “improperly” selling financial products to households. Several top bank executives lost their jobs as a result, with the overall industry duly chastised and humbled.  Australian banks remain well capitalized, following the path of most developed market banks in response to the Basel III reforms, while non-performing loans remain modest. Yet the risk moving forward is that Australian banks become more prudent in their lending practices after the public “flogging” they received this year, which may impair the transmission mechanism from low RBA policy rates to increased loan growth - and, eventually, faster economic activity. Already, private credit growth has slowed sharply, with the sharpest declines coming for housing and business lending (Chart 13). Investment implications for Australian bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. Despite signs that the global economy is starting to bottom out after the 2019 downturn, the momentum in Australian economic growth and inflation remains tepid. This suggests that Australian sovereign debt is likely to continue outperforming global peers on a relative basis over the next 6-12 months. Our RBA Monitor continues to signal that more interest rate cuts from the RBA are needed. Yet the Australian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve now discounts only 19bps of rate cuts over the next year (Chart 14). This mirrors the trend seen in other developed interest rate markets, as investors have shifted to pricing out the dovish policy expectations as global growth starts to improve. Chart 13Weakening Loan Demand, But No Credit Crunch Chart 14Stay Overweight Australian Government Bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. We advise staying strategically overweight Australian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. Bottom Line: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights Building on a previous special report focused on the investable market, in this report we construct and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese domestic equity sector outperformance. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the predictors included in our model, our Li Keqiang leading indicator (based on monetary conditions, money, and credit growth) has been the most important. Our base case view argues in favor of domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, but recent sector performance suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus. Over the long-term, we argue that investors have a good reason to favor domestic defensives over cyclicals until the latter demonstrates meaningfully better earnings performance. Feature We examined China’s investable equity sector performance in detail in our October 30 Special Report,1 with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. In today’s report, we extend our approach to China’s A-share market. Our research focused on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the macroeconomic and equity market factors that we found to be important predictors, our Li Keqiang leading indicator was the most significant. This confirms that China’s domestic market is more sensitive to monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than its investable peer. We also note the sharp difference in the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives in the domestic market compared with the investable market, and what this means for investors over the coming 6-12 months. Finally, we argue that investors should maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance, and point to an existing position in our trade book for investors interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of domestic sector performance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report).2 The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market. Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models ##br##Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang (LKI) Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to three months in order to reduce the need to forecast. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, is detailed in Box I-1 of our October 30 Special Report (please see footnote 1). Key Drivers Of Sector Performance: Domestic Versus Investable Pages 11-22 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 11-22 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Following a review of our domestic equity sector outperformance models, differences in the results from those presented in our previous report can be organized into three distinct elements: 1) the breadth of macro & equity market factors in predicting sector performance, 2) the relative importance of our LKI leading indicator, and 3) the difference between domestic/investable cyclical versus defensive performance. The Breath Of Predictive Factors Chart I-3In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower Compared with the models for investible sector performance that we detailed in our previous report, our work modeling domestic equity sector performance highlights that the breadth of predictive factors is narrower, particularly among cyclical sectors (Chart I-3). Our model for domestic materials (shown on page 12) is one exception to this rule, but we found that our models for energy, industrial, and consumer discretionary relative performance were all focused on fewer predictors than is the case for the investable market. In addition, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The case of industrials is particularly notable: our model for investable industrials highlighted the importance of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices & earnings, and overbought and oversold technical conditions in explaining past periods of industrial sector outperformance. By contrast, our domestic industrials model is quite simple: the sector has been more likely to outperform, with a lag, when our BCA China Activity Index and LKI leading indicator have been rising, and underperform following periods of extreme overvaluation. One of the core conclusions of our previous report was that investors should view the relative performance of investable industrials versus consumer staples as a reflationary barometer, given the strong sensitivity of both sectors to tight monetary policy. We explained this sensitivity by pointing to the substantial difference in corporate health between the two sectors: industrial firms are heavily debt-laden and thus experience deteriorating operating performance and an environment of rising interest rates. In comparison, food and beverage firms appear to have the strongest balance sheets among the sub-sectors that we have examined, suggesting that they would benefit less from easier monetary conditions than firms in other industries. Our leading indicator for Chinese economic activity has been considerably more important in predicting domestic equity sector outperformance than in the investable market. However, these dynamics appear to be completely absent in influencing performance in China’s domestic equity market. Not only has domestic industrial sector relative performance not been negatively linked to periods of tight monetary policy, but our model for consumer staples (shown on page 15) highlights that periods of staples performance have been driven by two simple factors: the relative trend in staples EPS  (positive sign), and the trend in broad market EPS (negative sign). The Relative Importance Of Monetary Conditions, Money, And Credit Growth Chart I-4 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that our LKI leading indicator is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, rising economic activity, and oversold technical conditions. The ranking of results shown in Chart I-4 is fairly similar to those that we listed for the investable market, with two exceptions. First, for the domestic market, periods of tight monetary policy were considerably less important than in the investable market as an important predictor of relative sector performance. Instead, our LKI leading indicator was by far the most important predictor, which underscores a point that we have made in previous reports: domestic stocks appear to be much more sensitive to the trend in monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than for the investable market. This increased sensitivity has helped explain the difference in performance this year between the investable and domestic market, underscoring that the former has more catch-up potential than the latter in a trade truce scenario. Chart I-4Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Second, in the investable market, episodes of significant overvaluation had essentially no power to predict future episodes of equity market underperformance. But this factor was an important or very important contributor to our domestic industrials, health care, and tech models. This finding is consistent with our May 23 Special Report, which noted that value stocks have outperformed in China’s domestic equity market over the past five years and underperformed in the investable market (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Has Been A More Successful ##br##Factor In The Domestic Market   Major Differences In The Performance Of Cyclicals Versus Defensives The results of our models for domestic equity sector performance did not change the cyclical & defensive labels that we applied in our previous report. The signs of the predictors shown in the tables on pages 11-22 clearly highlight that the domestic energy, materials, industrials consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors, and that consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive. What is striking, however, is that there is a major difference in the relative performance of equally-weighted domestic cyclicals versus defensives compared with what has occurred in the investable market over the past decade. Chart I-6A and Chart I-6B illustrate the different relative performance trends, along with their corresponding trends in relative P/E and relative EPS. Whereas the relative performance of investable cyclicals versus defensives has had somewhat of a stable mean over the past decade, domestic cyclicals have badly underperformed since early-2011. The charts also make it clear that this underperformance has been driven by a downtrend in relative EPS, not due to trend differences in relative valuation. Chart I-6ACyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market... Chart I-6B...But Not So In The Domestic##br## Market Digging further, it appears that this discrepancy can be largely explained by the significant difference in performance between investable and domestic tech over the past decade (Chart I-7). Whereas the former has outperformed the overall investable index by roughly 4-5 times since 2010, the relative performance of the latter has only very modestly risen. In effect, Charts I-6 and I-7 highlight that Chinese cyclical sectors have been structurally impaired over the past decade and have only been “saved” in the investable market by massive outsized outperformance of the tech sector. The fact that investable tech sector performance itself has been largely driven by 2 extremely successful firms underscores how narrowly based the investible cyclical versus defensives performance trend has been. Chart I-7A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance Investment Conclusions There are three conclusions that investors can draw from our analysis. First, our research shows that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market. This does not mean that domestic sector performance is not significantly impacted by macro and top down equity market factors, but it suggests that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. As such, investors should be prepared to include episode-specific investigation of abnormal performance as a regular part of their domestic equity sector allocation decisions. Investors should favor domestic cyclicals over the coming year, with exposure focused on consumer discretionary and tech. Second, the fact that our LKI leading indicator is in an uptrend suggests that investors should favor domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, with a caveat. We have noted in several previous reports that our indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the slower pace of money and credit growth than during previous economic upswings suggests that the bar may be higher for some cyclical sectors to outperform. We would advise investors to watch closely over the coming 3-6 months for signs of a technical breakout in all cyclical sectors. But sector performance in Q1 of this year, when the overall A-share market rose sharply versus global stocks, suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus (Chart I-8). Within resources, we prefer the investable energy sector to its domestic peer, due to a sizeable valuation advantage. Chart I-8Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year As a third and final point, abstracting from our bullish outlook for select cyclical sectors over the coming year, Charts 6 and 7 clearly argue for investors to maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance. In the May 23 Special Report that we referred to above, we noted that an A-share portfolio formed of industry groups with above-median return on equity and below-median ex-post beta has significantly outperformed over the past decade. Table I-1 presents the current industry group weights of this portfolio, and shows that overweight exposure is concentrated in the health care, consumer staples, and real estate sectors (all of which are defensive), and a heavy underweight towards industrials. Table I-1Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* For clients who are interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market, we maintain a long position in this portfolio relative to the MSCI China A Onshore index in our trade book, and plan to continue to update the performance of the trade on a weekly basis. Energy Chart II-1 Table II-1 Similar to the investable energy sector, periods of domestic energy sector outperformance are strongly positively related to rising oil prices and rising headline inflation in China. We noted in our previous report that this is a behavioral relationship, rather than a fundamental one. Domestic energy stocks are negatively associated with rising broad market stock prices, unlike their investable peers. This largely reflects the fact that the relative performance of domestic energy stocks has been in a structural downtrend over the past decade. From 2010 to mid-2016, this decline was caused by a persistent underperformance in earnings. Since mid-2016, domestic energy sector EPS have been rising in relative terms, meaning that more recent underperformance has been due to multiple contractions. While not as relatively cheap as their investable peers, domestic energy stocks are heavily discounted versus the broad domestic market based on both the price/earnings ratio and the dividend yield. Consequently, it is possible that domestic energy stocks may at some point begin to outperform in a rising broad equity market environment. For now, our model argues for an underweight stance towards domestic energy due to the lack of a clear uptrend in oil prices. As a pure value play, investable energy stocks maintain a dividend yield of nearly 6.5%, and are thus more attractive than their domestic peers. Materials Chart II-2 Table II-2 Our model for the domestic materials highlights that the sector’s performance has been related to strengthening economic activity and strongly related to a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator. Among the equity market variables that we tested, materials outperformance has been positively associated with rising relative EPS, rising broad market EPS, and prior oversold technical conditions. Similarly, the investable materials sector, these results show that domestic materials are a strong play on accelerating Chinese economic activity. The factors included in our domestic materials sector model are similar to those included in our investable material, except that relative material earnings have also been a significant predictor of sector relative performance. In addition, the macro & equity market predictors included in our domestic materials model have done a better job of leading material sector performance. The odds of domestic materials outperformance rose twice above the 50% mark this year according to our model, without any corresponding improvement in relative stock prices. The spikes in the model occurred largely because domestic materials became significantly oversold; technical conditions for the sector have only twice been weaker over the past decade. This underscores that investors should be watching domestic materials closely in Q1 of next year for signs of a relative rebound. Industrials Chart II-3 Table II-3 The results of our model for domestic industrial sector outperformance are interesting, as they imply that the drivers of performance are different between the domestic and investable markets. In the investable index, we found that industrials were heavily sensitive to monetary policy, rising core inflation, relative sector earnings, and periods of rising broad market stock prices. Our domestic model is considerably simpler: industrials outperform, with a lag, when our activity index and Li Keqiang leading indicator are rising. Periods of strong overvaluation have also been significant in predicting future episodes of domestic industrial sector underperformance. It is not clear to us why the drivers of relative performance for domestic industrials have been different than in the investable equity index, But the good news is that the relative simplicity of the model makes the investment decision making process for domestic industrials considerably easier. Today, domestic industrials are significantly undervalued, and our Li Keqiang leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend. This suggests that domestic industrials are likely to begin outperforming at some point in early-2020 following a bottoming in Chinese economic activity, unless policymakers are quick to tighten once activity begins to improve (which would be contrary to our expectations). Consumer Discretionary Chart II-4 Table II-4 Our domestic consumer discretionary model highlights that the sector’s relative performance is positively associated with a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to its investable peers, domestic consumer discretionary stocks are cyclical, and positive relationship with core inflation may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. Unlike investable consumer discretionary, the domestic consumer discretionary has not been meaningfully impacted by the December 2018 changes to the global industry classification standard. Hence, our model does not exclude the internet & direct marketing retail sector as we did in our previous report on investable sectors. For now, our model suggests that the domestic consumer discretionary sector is likely to continue to underperform, given decelerating core inflation and the lack of a clear uptrend in the broad domestic equity index. However, as a cyclical sector, we will be watching closely for an upside breakout in domestic consumer discretionary performance in the first quarter as a signal to increase exposure to the sector. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Table II-5 Our domestic consumer staples model is significantly different than that shown in our previous report for investable staples. This reflects sizeable differences in investable/domestic staples relative performance over the past decade, particularly from mid-2015 to late-2017 (where domestic staples outperformed significantly and investable staples languished). Of the two predictors found to be significant in explaining historical periods of domestic staples performance, a negative relationship with the trend in broad market EPS has been the most important. This underscores that staples are defensive sector. The trend in staples relative earnings has closely followed in importance, showing that the tremendous outperformance in domestic consumer staples over the past several years has, at least in part, been driven by fundamentals. Still, domestic consumer staples are currently priced at 34x earnings per share, compared with 15x for the overall domestic market. While our model currently argues for continued staples outperformance, the risk of a valuation mean reversion next year, against the backdrop of an improving economy, is above average. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should be closely monitoring domestic staples for signs of waning earnings momentum and/or a major technical breakdown as potential signals to reduce domestic staples exposure. Health Care Chart II-6 Table II-6 Over the past decade, periods of domestic health care outperformance have been negatively associated with rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Oversold technical conditions and periods of overvaluation have also helped predict future episodes of health care relative performance. These factors clearly point to the defensive nature of domestic health care, similar to health care stocks in the investable index. However, one clear difference between investable and domestic health care is that the former appears to have leading properties and the latter does not. We noted in our previous report that periods of investable health care underperformance appeared to lead, on average, our BCA Activity Index, periods of rising core inflation, and uptrends in the broad investable index. By contrast, domestic health care lags the Activity Index and core inflation by just over a year, and also lags the trend in broad market EPS. Our model points to further health care outperformance, but we would expect domestic health care stocks to underperform at some point next year following an improvement in economic activity and a resumed uptrend in broad domestic EPS. Financials Chart II-7 Table II-7 Our outperformance probability model for domestic financials highlights that the sector is countercyclical: periods of outperformance have been negatively related to our LKI leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to the case of the investable index and unlike the case globally, financials are clearly defensive. Investable financials have exhibited atypical performance this year according to the model presented in our previous report. By contrast, domestic financials have performed in line with what our model has suggested: our LKI leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the relative performance of domestic financials has trended flat-to-down since late-2018. Barring a major shift by the PBoC towards a hawkish stance in the coming year (which we do not expect), our base case view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic financials are likely to continue to underperform. Banks Chart II-8 Table II-8 Our model for domestic banks is similar to that of financials, with some important differences. In addition to being sensitive to our LKI leading indicator, domestic bank performance is negatively related to our Activity Index. Oversold technical conditions have also been quite important in predicting future episodes of domestic bank outperformance. The model is currently forecasting domestic bank underperformance, although it was late in predicting the selloff in bank stocks that began late last year. Similar to the case for domestic financials, our baseline view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic bank are likely to continue to underperform over the coming year. Information Technology Chart II-9 Table II-9 Our model for the domestic technology sector is different than that of investable tech, which reflects the vast difference in performance between the two sectors. While the relative performance of domestic tech has trended sideways over the past decade, investable tech stock prices have risen fourfold relative to the broad investable index. This difference is largely accounted for by the absence of the BAT stocks (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) from the domestic market. Similar to investable tech, domestic technology stocks are negatively related to tight monetary policy, and positively linked with a pro-cyclical economic variable (a rising LKI leading indicator). However, strangely, domestic tech has been strongly and negatively related to rising headline inflation, a finding with no clear fundamental basis. The model has been less successful in predicting domestic tech performance over the past year than in the past, which appears to be linked to the inclusion of headline inflation in the model. Rising headline inflation has been clearly associated with three major episodes of domestic tech underperformance since 2010, but over the past year domestic tech has outperformed as headline inflation accelerated. For now we would advise investors to focus on the other factors in the model: the lack of overvaluation, and our view that policy will remain easy on a measured basis, supports an overweight stance towards domestic tech over the coming year. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Table II-10 Our domestic telecom services relative performance model highlights that the sector is defensive like its investable peer, but the factors driving performance are somewhat different. The only similarity between the two models is that periods of outperformance are negatively related to rising broad market stocks prices for both investable and domestic telecom services, with domestic telecom stocks responding with a lag. Among the macro factors included in the model, periods of domestic telecom services outperformance are negatively and coincidently related to our LKI leading indicator, and positively related to tight monetary policy (with a slight lead). Oversold technical conditions have also proven to help predict future episodes of outperformance. The model failed to predict a brief period of outperformance in mid-2018, but has generally accurately predicted underperformance of domestic telecom stocks since early-2017. Barring a collapse in the US/China trade talks or considerably weaker near-term economic conditions than we expect, domestic telecom services will likely continue to underperform until the specter of tighter monetary policy emerges. This is unlikely to occur until the middle of 2020, at the earliest. Utilities Chart II-11 Table II-11 Overall, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The model shows that the performance of domestic utilities is negatively related to rising core inflation (with a lag) and rising broad market EPS, but these relationships are not particularly strong. We noted in our June 19 Special Report that domestic utilities ranked highly on the impact that relative EPS had on predicting relative stock prices , yet relative sector earnings did not register as a significant predictor in our model. This apparent discrepancy is resolved by differences in the time horizon between these two approaches. The analysis that we presented in our June 19 Special Report examined the relationship between earnings and stock prices over the entire sample period (2011-2018), meaning that it examined the predictive power of earnings over the long-term. The models built in this report have focused strongly on explaining periods of outperformance over a 6-12 month time horizon, there have been enough deviations in the trend between the relative performance of utilities and relative utilities earnings that the relationship between the two was not sufficiently strong to show up in the model. In other words, the long-term link between utilities relative earnings and stock prices is strong, but the short-term link is fairly weak. Real Estate Chart II-12 Table II-12 Similar to investable real estate, our model shows that domestic real estate is a counter-cyclical sector in that it is negatively related to periods of rising economic activity, a rising LKI leading indicator, tight monetary policy, and rising core inflation. Overbought technical conditions have also aided in predicting future episodes of domestic real estate underperformance. Our model for domestic real estate stocks has performed quite well on average, but its predictive success since late-2017 has been mixed. This period of atypical underperformance has coincided with a considerably weaker rebound in residential floor space sold than has occurred in previous recoveries in the real estate market. This suggests that domestic real estate stocks are more susceptible to trends in housing sales than their investable peers (which appear to be mostly sensitive to rising house prices). We noted in our November 6 Weekly Report that floor space sold is picking up , but it still remains weak when compared with history. This, in combination with our view that the Chinese economy will improve over the coming year, suggests that investors should avoid domestic real estate exposure relative to the overall domestic equity market. Footnotes 1  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated October 30, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see China Investment Strategy "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Equity Sector Earnings: Predictability, Cyclicality, And Relevance," dated June 19, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated November 6, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations