Valuations

Highlights EM/JPY carry trades represent an important "canary in the coal mine" for the global economy that investors need to monitor very closely. They are currently sitting at a key resistance. A breakout above these levels would suggest that global growth will only strengthen, a move down would point to a deceleration in EM and global industrial activity. If EM/JPY carry trades indeed suffer, the key reasons are likely to be the combined onslaught of Chinese policy tightening and DM removal of monetary accommodation. While still not a base case, this breakdown would affect commodity currencies, the AUD in particular, most severely. Scandies would also suffer but the JPY and CHF would be much stronger than we currently anticipate. The ECB is unlikely to match the Fed next year, thus rate differentials will move against EUR/USD. GBP is still stuck in its post-Brexit range. It is likely to weaken anew toward its lower bound once the upper bound is hit during the coming weeks. Feature Chart I-1EM/JPY Carry Trades: ##br##A Canary To Monitor EM/JPY Carry Trades: A Canary To Monitor EM/JPY Carry Trades: A Canary To Monitor A "canary in the coal mine" for the global economy, EM / JPY crosses, have hit what has been their ceiling for the past ten years, and have begun to roll over (Chart I-1). We believe that carry trades are a key component to global liquidity that historically provide important signals for global industrial activity and EM assets. The weakness in EM/JPY carry trades is in the early innings, but further deterioration would raise dark flags heading into 2018. On the other hand, if EM/JPY carry trades manage to break out of their historical ceiling, the likelihood that the global industrial cycle accelerates further and EM assets strengthen will only grow. Therefore, EM/JPY carry trades need to be both monitored and understood. In this report, we examine one of the two key dynamics affecting these EM carry trade returns: Chinese policy and EM growth dynamics. In another report later this month, we will examine the other key factor: changes in DM monetary policy. Why Do Carry Trades Matter? In a carry trade, funds are borrowed from nations where they are plentiful and cheap - countries like Japan, with high current account surpluses, plenty of foreign assets and low interest rates. Then, these funds are lent to countries experiencing savings shortfalls, but where prospective returns are perceived to be high. These countries tend to have higher growth, current account deficits and higher interest rates. Through this activity, the funding currencies depreciate, and the high-carry currencies appreciate. Chart I-2After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, ##br##Global IP Weakens After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, Global IP Weakens After Carry Trades Lose Momentum, Global IP Weakens This transfer of funds supports global economic activity, as it facilitates a more efficient allocation of capital: Carry trades distribute liquidity to the faster-growing corners of the global economy where investment opportunities are plentiful. In the process, this liquidity further supports economic activity, profit growth and asset returns in those attractive markets. A virtuous loop ensues: As asset and currency returns in the high-carry nations remain elevated, further liquidity finds its way into these economies, which supports additional economic and profit growth. All that said, the virtuous loop can quickly mutate into a vicious downward spiral. If returns in the economies that need the borrowed foreign liquidity disappoint, liquidity can quickly find its way out of these nations. This outflow of funds not only hurts the exchange rate of the high-returns economies, it creates a dearth of liquidity in their domestic markets, which hurts domestic asset returns, profits and growth. This invites further outflows, further currency depreciation, and further economic pain. As Chart I-2 illustrates, when EM carry currencies outperform the yen, this tends to support global industrial activity. However, when EM carry currencies weaken relative to the yen, this tends to lead to a sharp deceleration in global growth by an average of three months. What is surprising is the reliability of the signals, especially when picking episodes of decelerating growth. We posit that this relationship works because of three factors. On one hand, EM are where most of the global capex happens (Chart I-3). Capital goods are the key driver of both global industrial production and global trade. Moreover, EM excluding China still needs foreign capital, as they are expected to run a combined current account deficit of US$300 billion in 2018. Thus, industrial activity is greatly influenced by the cost of financing of EM economies. On the other hand, Japan is still the greatest creditor nation in the world, with a net international investment position (NIIP) of US$3 trillion (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM Are Where Capex Happens EM Are Where Capex Happens EM Are Where Capex Happens Chart I-4Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor Japan Is The World's Biggest Creditor As a result of these dynamics, when EM currencies underperform the yen, it is a symptom that a key source of liquidity is leaving EM economies, and that global industrial activity is set to suffer. Chart I-5EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade EMU PMIs Follow The EM/JPY Carry Trade Unsurprisingly, the performance of EM currencies vis-à-vis the yen also tends to lead dynamics for euro area industrial growth. As Chart I-5 illustrates, the euro area manufacturing PMI is a function of the performance of this supercharged carry trade. The European economy and its manufacturing sector in particular are very exposed to the EM business cycle. This relationship is a confirmation of the validity of the link between EM carry trades and global growth. Bottom Line: EM/JPY carry trades provide a reliable leading signal on global industrial activity. It is because carry trades are a key mechanism of redistributing global liquidity - taking savings from countries where they are oversupplied, and bringing them to countries where they are needed. EM countries are where the marginal capex in the global economy takes place today. Hence, a deterioration in carry trades' returns signals a deterioration of liquidity conditions in the economies that matter most for the global industrial cycle. It is noteworthy that EM/JPY carry trades have recently begun to lose steam. What Lies behind the Weakness in EM/JPY carry Trades? Chinese Policy! What could explains the recent slowdown in EM carry trades? The yen does not seem to be the culprit, as USD/JPY continues to follow the path charted by U.S 10-year yields this year. Instead, we posit that the source of the weakness is Chinese dynamics, the other key driver of EM returns beyond global liquidity conditions. Chinese policymakers have been curtailing their support to the domestic economy this year. Fiscal spending had decelerated massively, and Chinese monetary conditions have been on a tightening path since the end of 2016 (Chart I-6). Moreover, the administrative and regulatory tightening of the shadow banking system is also beginning to leave its mark. Small financial institutions have not been borrowing as aggressively as in recent years. Historically, this leads to a slowdown in the Chinese credit impulse (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese##br## Policy Has Been Tightened Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese Policy Has Been Tightened Key Risk To Chinese Credit Growth Chinese Policy Has Been Tightened Chart I-7The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy##br## Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary The Chinese Economy Depends On Policy Because Excess Savings Are Deflationary This is especially important as China is very reliant on policy support. As Chart I-7 shows, fiscal spending and credit creation contributed nearly twice as much to Chinese GDP as exports. This is because the Chinese economy's private savings exceed investments by 5% of GDP. If government spending or the lending machine slows, these excess savings are not used, creating deficient demand which imparts a deep deflationary influence on China and the global economy. We are already seeing early signs that the removal of stimulus is beginning to bite. The diffusion index of Chinese house prices, a key leading indicator of prices themselves, has fallen below the 50% line. Since Chinese real estate construction tends to lag prices, a slowdown in this sector is likely to emerge (Chart 8). Additionally, the slowdown in the leading economic indicator also highlights the risks to China's industrial activity as measured by the Keqiang Index (Chart I-8, bottom panel). The implications for EM are straightforward. EM economies outside of China have exhibited little domestic momentum, with poor credit growth of 5.5% and retail sales growth of 1.1%. Thus, a slowdown in Chinese monetary conditions could do what it historically does: lead to a slowdown in EM industrial production that will reverberate throughout the world (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Policy Is ##br##Biting Policy Is Biting Policy Is Biting Chart I-9EM Economies Don't Respond ##br##Well When China Tightens EM Economies Don't Respond Well When China Tightens EM Economies Don't Respond Well When China Tightens Bottom Line: The crucial factor that could explain why our favorite canary in the coal mine has begun to lose momentum is most likely to be tightening Chinese policy. China is dependent on policy actions to allocate its vast amount of savings. The tightening that began this year is already causing some symptoms to pop up in the Chinese economy. Since China has been the key driver of growth in other EM economies, these dynamics could begin to weigh on EM returns. EM/JPY carry trades will be the canary in the coal mine to judge whether or not these risks begin to weigh on global growth. Other Considerations And Some Implications Positioning considerations could exacerbate the negative impulse emanating from Chinese policy. To begin with, investors are not positioned for this. Not only are risk reversals in EM currencies still pricing in a very benign outcome, short interest in popular EM bond plays remain very low. Thus, the risk of a sharp repositioning in EM plays is high; in fact, it is much higher than for much-maligned assets like the supposedly over-loved S&P 500 (Chart I-10). Japanese investors have been heavily investing outside of their country, and since 2016, EM markets have been the recipients of these portfolio flows. But as Chart I-11 shows, these Japanese flows seem to have been chasing momentum into EM. Thus, if EM assets begin to suffer from a tightening of policy in China, the Japanese flows could reverse, causing a drying out of liquidity conditions in EM and exacerbating the pain already induced by China. Chart I-10Investors Are Oblivious ##br##To EM Risks Investors Are Oblivious To EM Risks Investors Are Oblivious To EM Risks Chart I-11Japanese Investors Are ##br##Chasing EM Momentum Japanese Investors Are Chasing EM Momentum Japanese Investors Are Chasing EM Momentum DM monetary policy and inflation dynamics also can play a key role. Carry trades have historically been a play on low volatility in capital markets. An environment of improving growth, low inflation surprises, and easy monetary policy has been key to support this low-volatility state. However, BCA believes that U.S. inflation is set to surprise to the upside, which will contribute to a tighter Federal Reserve. The European Central Bank will begin tapering its asset purchases and the Bank of Japan has ramped up its hawkishness despite the absence of inflation in Japan. This is likely to contribute to an increase in volatility that should prove especially harmful for carry trades in the FX space. This should tighten global liquidity conditions, especially in emerging markets. We will explore this angle in more detail in an upcoming report. Chart I-12EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD EM/JPY Carry Informs EUR/USD In terms of investment implications, if EM carry trades were to break down in the near future, this would represent a major risk to the views espoused in the BCA Outlook and the investment recommendations associated with it. Most obviously, it would have an immediate negative impact on commodity currencies, since it would point to tightening liquidity and financial conditions in EM economies that will impact global industrial activity. The expensive AUD would be the currency most likely to suffer in this environment. The Scandinavian currencies would also suffer against the euro. Scandinavian economies have been highly levered to EM growth, and historically the SEK and the NOK have been greatly affected by EM spreads and commodity prices.1 The dovish bend of the Norges Bank and the Riksbank would only strengthen these negative impulses. EUR/USD would also likely suffer. As we argued two weeks ago, in the past 12 months, the euro has not behaved as a risk-off currency. In fact, quite the contrary, the euro has rallied alongside traditional EM plays, as the euro area has benefited from the positive economic impulse emanating from EM economies.2 Moreover, historically, EUR/USD has weakened when EM/JPY canaries have depreciated (Chart I-12). Finally, the yen would obviously enjoy such an unwinding of carry trades. We are currently negative the yen on U.S. bond yield dynamics. However, an underperformance of carry trades would prompt much short covering in the JPY as well as repatriation flows into Japan. If the EM canaries weaken further. We will be forced to change our stance on the JPY. Bottom Line: Investors are not positioned for any meaningful weakness in EM/JPY carries, and Japanese flows could move in reverse in a heartbeat. DM policy too is becoming a risk for these carry plays. China's tightening is thus coming at a terrible time for these carry trades. If canaries were to weaken, the AUD would bear the brunt of the pain among G10 currencies. The NOK and the SEK would also underperform a euro that would be falling against the USD. The yen would likely be able to rally in this environment. EUR/USD: Focus On The Western Shores Of The Atlantic Last week, data from Europe once again confirmed that growth in the euro area is stellar. Meanwhile, rate expectations declined in the U.S. as the Fed minutes displayed an FOMC increasingly concerned with the conundrum of a very tight labor market and weak inflation. EUR/USD rallied by 1%. But what really drove the rally in EUR/USD this year? It first and foremost reflected a massive repricing in relative rate expectations between the euro area and the U.S. However, most of this repricing was caused by a decline in the U.S. terminal rate, not an upward adjustment in the European policy end-point (Chart I-13). Chart I-13EUR/USD: All About Falling ##br##U.S. Terminal Rates EUR/USD: All About Falling U.S. Terminal Rates EUR/USD: All About Falling U.S. Terminal Rates Chart I-14Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced##br## Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 Most Major Euro Area Economies Experienced Little Inflationary Pressures In 2017 U.S terminal rates have fallen because the market doesn't believe the Fed's interest rate forecast, as core PCE has collapsed by nearly 45 basis points despite a U.S. economy at full employment. Meanwhile, long-term rate expectations in the euro area have remained flat because core inflation did not move much in the major euro area economies (Chart I-14). Going forward, the U.S. terminal rate is likely to move higher against that of the euro area. U.S. inflation is set to accelerate versus the euro area as financial conditions in Europe have tightened massively versus the U.S. since early 2016, a factor we have highlighted in the past.3 The strength in the U.S. economy is also considerable, and would argue that since the U.S. is more advanced in the business cycle than the euro area, this strength is more likely to generate inflationary pressures in the U.S. than in the euro area (Chart I-15). Moreover, U.S. tax cuts are looking increasingly likely in 2018, which will only add fuel to the U.S. fire. We continue to expect the Fed to follow its "dots," generating a policy outcome well in excess of what is currently priced into the OIS curve. If our base-case scenario for the Fed unfolds, for interest rate differentials to stay constant, the EONIA rate would need to be at 1% by the end of 2020 (Chart I-16). In our view, this is highly unlikely, and we expect rate differentials to move in favor of the USD. Chart I-15Europe Is Strong, ##br##But So Is The U.S. Europe Is Strong, But So Is The U.S. Europe Is Strong, But So Is The U.S. Chart I-16Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To ##br##Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver Fed Funds Rate Scenarios ECB Rates Will Have To Rise Much More To Match What The Fed Will Deliver An EONIA rate of 1% by the end of 2020 will not only defy what the ECB is currently forecasting, it will also be the highest rates since Trichet committed his infamous 2011 policy mistake of hiking rates. In order for European rates to be that high by that date, global growth will have to still be stellar. If this is the case, U.S. rates are likely to be even higher than what the Fed dots are currently implying. This means that based on our expectations for global growth, U.S. inflation and European inflation, the most likely path for rate differentials is that they widen in favor of the U.S. as the Fed still is in a better position to increase rates than the ECB. This expected widening in spreads between the U.S. and the euro area will favor a move in EUR/USD toward 1.10 by the middle of 2018. An adverse move in EM liquidity conditions only adds credence to these dynamics as it will affect European growth more than it will affect U.S. growth. Moreover, safe-haven flows associated with EM weakness would only add to global demand for the USD. Bottom Line: EUR/USD rallied in line with changes in relative terminal rates in 2018. However, this did not reflect an upgrade to the expected terminal rate in the euro area; it mostly reflected a downgrade to the U.S. terminal rate. We do anticipate this downgrade in the expected U.S. terminal rate to reverse course, especially when compared to the euro area. U.S. growth will accelerate further and U.S. inflation will outpace that of the euro area. In an environment where the Fed hikes in line with its "dots," the EONIA rate will not be able to follow, which will put downward pressure on EUR/USD. GBP/USD: Divorce-Bill Rally? This week, the U.K. agreed that its share of liabilities to the EU is around EUR100 billion, which would mean a net payment of around EUR50 billion. The GBP rallied massively in response to this news as markets interpreted this as a sign that negotiations on future trade relationships would start. The pound is very cheap on a PPP basis, and is likely to generate attractive returns on a long-term time horizon. However, Brexit is far from being over. Nagging questions regarding the Irish border remain, and the EU clearly has the upper hand in the negotiations. Moreover, Brexit would hurt both British trade and British potential growth. While abandoning Brexit down the road would help the GBP, this would happen around much political turmoil and result in a likely Corbyn government. When we compare all these positives and negatives, at the current juncture, it is highly unlikely that GBP/USD and EUR/GBP will escape their post-June 2016 trading range. In the short term, EUR/GBP is likely to hit 0.84, and cable, 1.37. We would use moves to such levels to sell the pound on a tactical basis. A move below the post Brexit lows is also highly unlikely as long as the stalemate continues. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market", dated September 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off?", dated November 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Best Of Possible Worlds?", dated October 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was positive this week: Annualized GDP growth came in at 3.3%, above the expected 3.2%; The PCE price deflator grew at a 1.6% annual rate, above the expected 1.5%, while the core PCE deflator stayed in line with expectations at 1.4%; Initial jobless claims were lower than expected at 238,000; However, the dollar was only up against the CAD and the NZD, while down against all other G10 currencies as the nomination of Marvin Goodfriend as a member of the FOMC was interpreted as a potential dovish move by the markets. The U.S. 10-year yield was up 4 basis points on higher inflation expectations. U.S. growth is now beginning to outperform Germany's 3.2% annualized GDP growth which should help translate into higher inflation relative to the euro area next year, which will shift upside risk in the favor of the dollar. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 It's Not My Cross To Bear - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 European data was mixed: German CPI was strong, with the headline measure growing at 1.8%, and the harmonized index also at 1.8%; German retail sales contracted at an annual rate of 1.4%; The number of unemployed people in Germany declined by 18,000 yet the unemployment rate stayed flat at 5.6%; European unemployment decreased to 8.8% from 8.9%; Euro area inflation increased by less than expected at 1.5% on an annual basis. Despite this mixed data, the euro was up 0.6% against the dollar on Thursday. Certain European metrics such as Industrial Confidence are also at all-time highs, levels at which a reversal is increasingly likely. Robust U.S. growth and higher inflation could serve as an indicator that the tide is about to turn in the favor of the greenback as the Fed resumes its hiking cycle. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Temporary Short-Term Rates - November 10, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Nikkei Manufacturing PMI outperformed expectations, coming in at 53.8. Meanwhile, large retailers sales growth also outperformed expectations, coming at -0.7%. Nevertheless, this was a decline from last month's 1.9% expansion. Industrial production growth surprised to the downside, coming in at 5.9%. Finally housing starts also underperformed expectations, coming in at -4.8% and declining even more from last month's -2.9% reading. On Sunday, the BoJ unexpectedly shifted to a less dovish stance, as they hinted that their yield curve control program might be watered down next year. This change in rhetoric could limit the JPY's downside. In fact, the risk growing risk that EM carry trades could begin to crack down even raises the probability that a yen rally unfolds. In this environment trades like short AUD/JPY and short NZD/JPY would benefit greatly. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Temporary Short-Term Rates - November 10, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been negative Consumer credit underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.451 billion pounds, and declining from the previous month's number. Moreover, mortgage approvals also underperformed expectations, coming in at 64,575. This number was also decline from last month's reading. GBP/USD has appreciated by almost 1% this week, as the United Kingdom and the European Union seem to have agreed that the cost to the U.K. for leaving the EU will be 50 billion euro. Overall, it is unclear whether this breakthrough in the negotiations will be positive or negative for the pound, as many details are yet to be defined. We continue to be negative on cable on the short term, as we expect rate differentials to favor the U.S. over the U.K. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Data for Australia was mixed: Private sector credit grew at a 5.3% annual pace, albeit slower than the previous 5.4% figure; Building permits increased sharply by 18.4% annually; Private capital expenditure grew in line with expectations at 1%; Chinese Manufacturing PMI was strong, coming in at 51.8 - stronger than the previous 51.6 and the expected 51.4; Stronger Chinese data buoyed the AUD, however, the Aussie is still weighed down by low wages and a dovish RBA stance. The recent outperformance of the yen versus high carry currencies could be foreshadowing a growth-negative event, especially as Chinese authorities are tightening policy. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 On Tuesday, the RBNZ announced that they will ease mortgage lending restrictions, as it expects policies by the new government to dampen the housing market. After January 1st, banks will be allowed to provide more low-deposit home loans to owner occupiers. Moreover the down payment required to obtain a mortgage will also decline. This announcement by the RBNZ goes in line with our view that the new populist government, will curb immigration, and thus curb pressures in the kiwi economy. Overall we remain bearish on the NZD against the U.S. dollar and against the yen, as we expect global growth to slow down momentarily by the end of the year, as China continues to tighten monetary policy. However, we remain bearish on AUD/NZD as the AUD would suffer more than the NZD in this environment. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada was decent: Industrial product prices are growing at a 1% monthly pace, higher than the expected 0.5% pace; Raw materials Index increased by 3.8% in October, higher than the previous 0.2% contraction, pointing to higher inflation; The current account deficit grew to CAD -19.53 bn, better than the expected CAD -19.50 bn. However, the CAD has displayed some weakness recently following Governor Poloz's comments about financial stability within the economy. These fragilities mostly involve household debt and the housing market, which continue to be carefully monitored by the BoC. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Gross domestic Product growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2%. This measure also increased form a growth rate of 0.5% the previous quarter. Moreover, the KOF leading indicator also surprised to the upside, coming in at 110.3. Industrial production yearly growth also continued to increase, coming in at 5.5% However real retail sales growth underperformed expectations substantially, contracting at a 3% pace, after a 0.5% growth in September. EUR/CHF has appreciated by nearly 0.8% this week. Overall we continue to believe that Swiss inflation is still too weak for the SNB to stop intervening in the franc. We will continue to monitor the Swiss economy and global economy for inflationary pressures, to get an idea when the SNB might shift its monetary stance. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been negative: Retail sales growth underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.2%. Moreover Norway's credit indicator also underperformed coming in at 5.7%. USD/NOK has rallied by roughly 2% this week, as the NOK has experienced a dramatic sell off across the board. This sell off has been caused by the decline in oil prices that we have experienced this week. This is partly because positioning in oil seems to be over stretched, thus a tactical correction in oil prices is expected. Overall, regardless of the outlook for oil prices, we continue to be bullish on USD/NOK, as this cross will mostly trade on rate differentials between Norway and the U.S. rather than on oil prices. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Data out of Sweden was disappointing: Retail sales growth slowed to 0.1% monthly and 2.6% annually, compared to the expected 0.2% and 3.4% rates, respectively; The trade balance went into negative territory, coming in at SEK -3.1 bn, compared to the previous SEK 3.2 bn; Annual GDP growth in Q3 was only 2.9% compared to the expected 3.5%. The Q2 data point was also revised downwards from 4% to 2.7%. While quarterly growth was in line with expectations at 0.8%, it still weakened from the previous quarterly growth of 1.2% - which was also revised down from 1.7%. The Riksbank will take these data points into account in their next meeting in two weeks and is likely to stay dovish especially as Stefan Ingves has been re-appointed as governor, adding downward pressure on the krona against the dollar. Report Links: The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through EM and commodities in 2018. Granted the ongoing policy tightening in China will likely dampen money growth further, the only way mainland nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. Assigning equal probabilities to various scenarios of velocity of money, the outcome is as follows: one-third probability of robust nominal growth (continuation of the rally in China-related plays) and two-third odds of a non-trivial slowdown in nominal growth with negative ramifications for China-related plays. Hence, we reiterate our negative stance on EM risk assets Feature The key question for emerging markets (EM) in 2018 is whether a slowdown in Chinese money growth will translate into a meaningful growth deceleration in this economy, and in turn produce a reversal in EM risk assets. This week we address the above question in detail elaborating on what could make China's business cycle defy the slowdown in its monetary aggregates and how investors should approach such uncertainty. Before this, we review the status of financial markets going into 2018. Priced To Perfection Or A New Paradigm? Several financial markets are at extremes. Our chart on the history of financial market manias reveals that some parts of technology/new concept stocks may be entering uncharted territory (Chart I-1). Tencent's share price, for instance, has surged 11-fold since January 2010. Chart I-1History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade This is roughly on par with the prior manias' average 10-year gains. As this chart indicates, the manias of previous decades run wild until the turn of the decade. It is impossible to know whether technology/new concept stocks will peak in 2018 or run for another two years. Regardless whether or not the mania in tech/new concept stocks endures up until 2020, some sort of mean reversion in their share prices is likely next year. This has relevance to EM because the magnitude of the EM equity rally in 2017 has been enormously boosted by four large tech/concept stocks in Asia. Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. market suggests that equity valuations are reaching their 2000 overvaluation levels (Chart I-2, top panel). The difference between our measure and Shiller's measure of CAPE is that Shiller's CAPE is derived by dividing share prices by the 10-year moving average of EPS in real terms (deflated by consumer price inflation). Our measure is calculated by dividing equity prices by the time trend in real EPS (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Our CAPE measure assumes that in the long run, U.S. EPS in real terms will revert to its time trend. Meanwhile, the Shiller CAPE is based on the assumption that real EPS will revert to its 10-year mean. Hence, the assumptions behind our CAPE model are quite reasonable if not preferable to those of Shiller's P/E. Remarkably, the U.S. (Wilshire 5000) market cap-to-GDP ratio is close to its 2000 peak (Chart I-3). With respect to EM equity valuations, the non-financial P/E ratio is at its highest level in the past 15 years (Chart I-4). EM banks have low multiples and seem "cheap" because many of them have not provisioned for NPLs. Hence, their profits and book values are artificially inflated. In short, excluding financials, EM stocks are not cheap at all, neither in absolute terms nor relative to DM bourses. Chart I-2A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation Chart I-3The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak Chart I-4EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap Such elevated DM & EM stock market valuations might be justified by currently low global long-term bond yields. Yet, if and when long-term bond yields rise, multiples will likely shrink. The latter will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices, as multiples are disproportionately and negatively linked to interest rates - especially when interest rates are low - but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 As a result, a small rise in long-term bond yields will lead to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Despite very high equity valuations, U.S. advisors and traders are extremely bullish on American stocks. Their sentiment measures are at all time and 11-year highs, respectively. So are copper traders on red metal prices (Chart I-5). The mirror image of the strong and steady rally in global stocks is record-low implied volatility. The aggregate financial markets' implied volatility index is at a multi-year low (Chart I-6). Finally, yields on junk (high-yield) EM corporate and sovereign bonds are at all-time lows (Chart I-7). They are priced for perfection. Chart I-5Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Chart I-6Aggregate Global Financial Markets ##br##Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Chart I-7EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low Are we in a new paradigm, or are we witnessing financial market extremes that are unsustainable? In regard to the timing, can these dynamics last throughout 2018 or at least the first half of next year, or will they reverse in the coming months? We have less conviction on the durability of the U.S. equity rally, but our bet is that EM risk assets will roll over in absolute terms and begin underperforming their DM peers very soon. What could cause such a reversal in EM risk assets? China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through emerging markets and commodities. China: "Financial Stability" Priority Entails Tighter Policy The Chinese authorities are facing unprecedented challenges: The outstanding value of broad money in China (measured in U.S. dollars) is now larger than the combined U.S. and euro area broad money supply (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China As a share of its own GDP, broad money in China is much higher compared to any other nation in history (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In brief, there is too much money in China and most of it - $21 trillion out of $29 trillion - has been created by the banking system since early 2009. We maintain that the enormous overhang of money and credit in China represents major excess/imbalances and has nothing to do with the nation's high savings rate.2 Rather, it is an outcome of animal spirits running wild among bankers and borrowers over the past nine years. Easy money often flows into real estate and China has not been an exception. Needless to say, property prices are hyped and expensive relative to household income. Policy tightening amid lingering excesses and imbalances makes us negative on China's growth outlook. In a nutshell, we place more weight on tightening when there are excesses in the system, and downplay the importance of tightening in a healthy system without excesses. Importantly, excessive money creation seems to finally be pushing inflation higher. Consumer price services and core consumer price inflation rates are on a rising trajectory (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). As a result, banks' deposit rates in real terms (deflated by core CPI) have plunged into negative territory for the first time in the past 12 years (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Remarkably, the People's Bank of China's existing $3 trillion of international reserves is sufficient to "back up" only 13% and 11% of official M2 and our measure of M3, respectively (Chart I-10). If Chinese households and companies decide to convert 10-15% of their deposits into foreign currency and the PBoC takes the other side of the trade, its reserves will be exhausted. Chart I-9China: Inflation Is Rising And ##br##Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart I-10China: Low Coverage Of ##br##Money Supply By FX Reserves bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 Therefore, reining money and credit expansion is of paramount importance to China's long-term financial and economic stability. "Financial stability" has become the key policy priority. "Financial stability" is policymakers' code word for containing and curbing financial imbalances and bubbles. Having experienced the equity bubble bust in 2015, policymakers are determined to preclude another bubble formation and its subsequent bust. Consequently, the ongoing tightening campaign will not be reversed in the near term unless damage to the economy becomes substantial and visible. By the time the authorities and investors are able to identify such damage in the real economy, China-related plays in financial markets will be down substantially. Chart I-11China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve Faced with significant excesses in money, leverage and property markets, the Chinese authorities have been tightening - and have reinforced their policy stance following the Party's Congress in October. There is triple tightening currently ongoing in China: 1. Liquidity tightening: Money market rates have climbed, and onshore corporate bond yields are rising (Chart I-11, top panel). Remarkably, the yield curve is flat, pointing to weaker growth ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). 2. Regulatory tightening: The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, and is reining banks' involvement in shadow banking activities. In addition, financial regulators are trying to remove the government's implicit "put" from the financial system, and thereby curb speculative and irresponsible investment behavior. Finally, many local governments are tightening investors' participation in the real estate market. 3. Anti-corruption campaign is embracing the financial institutions: The powerful anti-corruption commission is planning to dispatch groups of inspectors to examine financial institutions' activities. This could dampen animal spirits among bankers and shadow banking organizations. The Outlook: The "Knowns"... In China, broad money growth has already slumped to an all-time low (Chart I-12). The money as well as the credit plus fiscal spending impulses both point to a considerable slowdown in the mainland's industrial cycle and overall economic activity (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Broad Money ##br##Growth Is At All-Time Low bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 Chart I-13China: Money And Credit & ##br##Fiscal Impulses Are Negative bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 The slowdown is not limited to money growth; there are a few real business cycle indicators that are already weakening. For example, the growth rate of property floor space sold and started has slumped to zero (Chart I-14). Electricity output and aggregate freight volume growth have both decisively rolled over (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again Chart I-15China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown That said, based on the past correlation between money and credit impulses on the one hand and the business cycle on the other, China's economy should have slowed much more, and its negative impact on the rest of the world should have already been felt (Chart I-13, on page 9). This has been the key pillar of our view on EM, but it has not yet transpired. Is it possible that the relationship between money/credit impulses and the business cycle has broken down? If so, why? And how should investors handle such uncertainty? Bottom Line: China's ongoing policy tightening will ensure that money and credit impulses remain negative for some time. Can the country's industrial sectors de-couple from its past tight correlation with money and credit? ...And The "Unknowns" By definition, the only way to sustain nominal economic growth in the face of a decelerating money supply is if the velocity of money increases. This is true for any economy. Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money Provided China's policy tightening will likely further dampen money growth, the only way nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. This is the main risk to our view and strategy. Chart I-16 portrays all three variables. Chart I-16China: Money, Nominal GDP ##br##And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money Even though the velocity of money has fallen structurally over the past nine years (Chart I-16, bottom panel), it has risen marginally in 2017, allowing the mainland's nominal economic growth to hold up despite a considerable relapse in money supply growth. Notably, this has been the reason why our view has not worked this year. What is the velocity of money, and how can we forecast its fluctuations and, importantly, the magnitude of its variations? The velocity of money is one of the least understood concepts in economic theory. The velocity of money is anything but stable. In our opinion, the velocity of money reflects animal spirits of households and businesses as well as government spending decisions. Forecasting animal spirits and the magnitude of their variations is not very a reliable exercise. In a nutshell, the banking system (commercial banks and the central bank) creates money via expanding its balance sheet - making loans to or acquiring assets from non-banks. However, commercial banks have little direct influence on the velocity of money. The latter is shaped by non-banks' decisions to spend or not (i.e., save). Significantly, non-banks' spending and saving decisions do not alter the amount of money in the system. Yet they directly impact the velocity of money. The banking system creates money, and non-banks churn money (make it circulate). At any level of money supply, a rising number of transactions will boost nominal output, and vice versa. Further, there is a great deal of complexity in the interaction between money supply and its velocity. Both are sometimes independent, i.e. they do not influence one another, but in some other cases one affects the other. For example, with the ongoing triple tightening in China and less money being originated by the banking system, will households and businesses increase or decrease their spending? Our bias is that they will not increase spending. This is especially true for the corporate sector, which has record-high leverage and where access to funding has been tightening. It is also possible that rising velocity will lead to more money creation as more spending leads to higher loan demand and banks accommodate it - i.e., originating more loans/money. These examples corroborate that money supply and the velocity of money are not always independent of each other. On the whole, it is almost impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude of changes in velocity of money. In the same vein, it is difficult to forecast animal spirit dynamics in any economy. Chart I-17U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money ##br##Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money One recent example where nominal GDP has decoupled from broad money growth is the U.S. Chart I-17 demonstrates that in the past 12 months, U.S. nominal GDP growth has firmed up even though broad money (M2) growth has slumped. This decoupling can only be explained by a spike in the velocity of M2. In other words, soaring confidence and animal spirits among U.S. households and businesses have boosted their willingness to spend, even as the banking system has created less money and credit growth has slowed considerably over the past 12 months. Going back to China, how should investors consider such uncertainty in changes in the velocity of money? Investing is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Hence, an investment process is about assigning probabilities to various scenarios. Provided the velocity of money is impossible to forecast, we assign equal probabilities to each of the following scenarios for China in 2018 (Figure I-1): One-third odds that the velocity of money rises more than the decline in broad money growth, producing robust nominal GDP growth; One-third probability that the velocity of money stays broadly flat - the outcome being meaningful deceleration in nominal GDP growth; A one-third chance that the velocity of money declines - the result being a severe growth slump. Figure I-1How Investors Can Consider Uncertainty Related To Velocity Of Money Questions For Emerging Markets Questions For Emerging Markets In short, a positive outcome on China-related plays has a one-third probability of playing out, while a negative outcome carries a two-thirds chance. This is why we continue to maintain our negative view on EM and commodities. Commodities Our view on commodities and commodity plays is by and large shaped by our view on China's capital spending. Given the credit plus fiscal spending impulse is already very weak, the path of least resistance for capital expenditures is down. Besides, the government is clamping down on local governments' off-balance-sheet borrowing and spending (via Local Government Financing Vehicles). A deceleration in capital expenditures in general and construction (both infrastructure and property development) in particular is bearish for industrial metals (Chart I-18). Money and credit impulses herald a major downturn in Chinese imports values and volumes (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Industrial Metals / Copper Are At Risk bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 Chart I-19China Will Be A Drag On Its Suppliers bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 As to China's commodities output reductions, last week we published a Special Report3 on China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal. The report concludes the following: The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. Importantly, the mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity in order to replace almost entirely obsolete capacity. The combination of demand slowdown and modest production recovery will weigh on non-oil raw materials. As for oil, the picture is much more complicated. Oil prices have been climbing in reaction to declining OECD inventories as well as on expectations of an extension to oil output cuts into 2018. One essential piece of missing information in the bullish oil narrative is China's oil inventories. In recent years, China has been importing more crude oil than its consumption trend justifies. Specifically, the sum of its net imports and domestic output of crude oil has exceeded the amount of refined processed oil. This difference between the sum of net imports and production of crude oil and processed crude oil constitutes our proxy for the net change of crude oil inventories. Chart I-20 shows that our proxy for mainland crude oil inventories has risen sharply in recent years. This includes both the nation's strategic oil reserves as well as commercial inventories. There is no reliable data on the former. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the country's commercial crude oil inventories. Chart I-20China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories Nevertheless, whether crude oil inventories have risen due to a build-up of strategic petroleum reserves or commercial reserves, the fact remains that crude oil inventories in China have surged and appear to be reaching the size of OECD total crude and liquid inventories (Chart I-20). In short, China has been a stabilizing force for the oil market over the past three years by buying more than it consumes. Without such excess purchases from China, oil prices would likely have been much weaker. Going forward, the pace of Chinese purchases of crude oil will likely slow due to several factors: (a) China prefers buying commodities on dips, especially when it is for strategic inventory building. With crude oil prices having rallied to around $60, the authorities might reduce their purchases temporarily, creating an air pocket for prices, and then accelerate their purchases at lower prices; (b) Commercial purchases of oil will likely decelerate due to tighter money/credit, possibly high inventories and a general slowdown in industrial demand for fuel. Bottom Line: Raw materials and oil prices4 are at risk from China and overly bullish investor sentiment. Beyond Commodities The slowdown in China will impact not only commodities but also non-commodity shipments to the mainland (Chart I-21). In fact, 47% of the nation's imports are commodities and raw materials and 45% are industrial/capital goods - i.e., China's imports are heavily exposed to investment expenditures, not consumer spending. This is why money/credit impulses correlate so well with this country's imports. Consistently, China's broad money (M3) impulse leads EM corporate profit growth by 12 months - and currently heralds a major EPS downtrend (Chart I-22). In addition, aggregate EM narrow money (M1) growth also points to a material slump in EM EPS (Chart I-23). Chart I-21China Is A Risk To ##br##Non-Commodity Economies Too bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 Chart I-22Downside Risk To EM EPS bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 The only EM countries that are not materially exposed to China and commodities are Turkey and India. The former is a basket case on its own. Indian stocks are expensive and will have a difficult time rallying in absolute terms when the EM equity benchmark relapses. As for Korea and Taiwan, their largest export destination is not advanced economies but China. China accounts for 25% of Korea's exports and 28% of Taiwan's. This compares to a combined 22% of total Korean exports and 20% of total Taiwanese exports going to the U.S. and EU combined Can robust growth in the U.S. and EU derail the growth slowdown in China when capital spending slows? This is very unlikely, in our view. Chart I-24 portends that China's shipments to the U.S. and EU account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP, while capital spending and credit origination constitute 45% and 25% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-23EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS Chart I-24What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? A final word on tech stocks. EM's four large-cap tech stocks (Tencent, Ali-Baba, Samsung and TSMC) have gone exponential and are extremely overbought. At this juncture, any strong opinion on tech stocks is not warranted because they can sell off or continue advancing for no fundamental reason. We have been recommending an overweight position in tech stocks, and continue recommending overweighting them, especially Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies. As for Tencent and Alibaba, these are concept stocks, and as a top-down house we have little expertise to judge whether or not they are expensive. These are bottom-up calls. Investment Strategy EM Stocks: Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM, and absolute-return investors should stay put. Our overweights are Taiwan, China, Korean tech stocks, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Chart I-25EM Currencies: A Canary In ##br##Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? Stay short a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs (or our currency overweights) are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Continue underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. The mix of weaker EM/China growth, lower commodities prices and EM currency depreciation bode ill for already very tight EM credit spreads (Chart I-25). Within the sovereign credit space, our underweights are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and Malaysia and our overweights are Russia, Argentina and low beta defensive credits. The main risk to EM local currency bonds is EM currency depreciation. With foreign ownership of EM domestic bonds at all-time highs, exchange rate depreciation could trigger non-trivial selling pressure. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, China, India, Argentina and Central Europe. Other high-conviction market-neutral recommendations: Long U.S. banks / short EM banks. Long U.S. homebuilders / short Chinese property developers. Long the Russian ruble / short oil. Long the Chilean peso / short copper. Long Big Five state-owned Chinese banks / short small- and medium-sized banks. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, given that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model, a one percentage point change in interest rates from a low level can have a significant impact on the fair value P/E ratio. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, link available on page 22. 4 This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and is different from BCA's house view on commodities. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Feature When things get ultra-small, the laws that describe the universe change radically. Classical physics breaks down and we have to turn to quantum physics to explain behaviour that seems strange and counterintuitive. In this short Special Report, we would like to extend the quantum principle into the financial world. When interest rates get ultra-low, the laws that describe the behaviour of financial markets also change radically. Classical financial theory breaks down and we have to turn to what we will call the quantum theory of finance. Figure I-1AThe Quantum Theory Of Physics The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance Figure I-2BThe Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance Some Interest Rates Are Not Allowed Somebody once said the test of a good theory is that you should be able to write it on the front of a T-shirt. What would the T-shirt for the quantum theory of physics say? Probably this: "For a physical system, energies take discrete values and some energies are not allowed." What would the T-shirt for the quantum theory of finance say? Probably this (Figure I-1): "For a financial system, interest rates take discrete values, and some interest rates are not allowed." At large scales, the granularity that defines the energy of all physical system and the interest rates in a financial system is not apparent. Allowable values seem a continuum, and all values are allowed. Chart I-1A Promise To Keep The Policy Interest Rates##br## Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Interest Rates Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Interest Rates Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields But at ultra-small scales for both energy and interest rates, the granularity of the values becomes very apparent and this granularity becomes the dominant driver of physical systems and, we would argue, financial systems too. Policy interest rates do not have to take discrete values, but in practice they do move in steps. More importantly, some policy interest rates are not allowed. Policymakers accept that there exists a 'lower bound' to interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. Hence, this lower bound marks the limit of allowable interest rates. When policy interest rates approach this lower bound, central banks can turn to a second strategy: they can promise to keep rates at this lower bound for an extended period of time. Thereby they can pull down long-term interest rates towards the lower bound too (Chart I-1). To do this, they must convince the market that their promise is genuine. Enter quantitative easing (QE). In the words of ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet, "the credibility of promises to follow a certain course for policy rates in the future is enhanced by asset purchases." QE is nothing more than "a signalling channel which reinforces the credibility of forward guidance on (ultra-low) policy rates." Once bond yields approach ultra-low levels, we begin to see some of the strange effects of the quantum theory of finance. When bond yields cannot fall much further, they can only stabilize or rise, leaving the bond investor with a highly asymmetric payoff (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3) - technically known as negative skew. Chart I-2When Bond Yields Become Ultra-Low, Potential Losses Become Larger Than Potential Gains When Bond Yields Become Ultra-Low, Potential Losses Become Larger Than Potential Gains When Bond Yields Become Ultra-Low, Potential Losses Become Larger Than Potential Gains Chart I-3Bonds Become Much More Risky At Ultra-Low Yields The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance Put simply, a distribution with negative skew produces values that usually turn out to be slightly higher than the mean and rarely, values substantially lower than the mean (Figure I-2). For financial returns negative skew means frequent small gains and infrequent large losses. The opposite is true for positive skew. Figure I-2Distributions With Negative And Positive Skew The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance This brings us to an important point. Empirical and theoretical evidence now proves that investors are not concerned about small fluctuations around an investment's mean return. Instead, they are concerned about large and sudden losses. Hence, the classical use of volatility1 σ as a standard measure of risk is wrong.2 The truth is that risk premiums are a compensation for holding assets that provide positive cash flows but may occasionally suffer very large losses, erasing a large proportion of wealth. In other words, assets with negative skew. Hope And Fear Move In Quanta Too There is compelling theoretical evidence linking risk premiums to negative skew. It comes from a branch of behavioural finance developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, called prospect theory. In their seminal 1979 paper in Econometrica,3 Kahneman and Tversky proposed that "choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of (classical) utility theory." Contrary to classical utility theory, people do not think in terms of final wealth (utility). In practice, people think in terms of gains and losses. And within these gains and losses, people tend to overweight low probability events by very large amounts - contributing to the attractiveness of both gambling and insurance. In prospect theory, the value of any gain or loss is multiplied by a 'decision weight'. Decision weights measure the impact on the investor of a specific prospect. Prospect theory finds that people tend to ascribe large decision weights to low probability events. Why? Remarkably, Kahneman and Tversky found the answer comes from quantum theory (what they called a quantal effect). "There is a limit to how small a decision weight can be attached to an event, if it is given any weight at all. Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted." Just like the energies of a physical system, or policy interest rates, the feelings of hope and fear occur in quanta and not in a continuum. You move stepwise from 'no hope' to 'some hope' to 'a lot of hope'. You move stepwise from 'no fear' to 'some fear' to 'a lot of fear'. Furthermore, the step from no hope to some hope and the step from some fear to no fear are especially large. You significantly overpay for a lottery ticket versus your expected gain because it takes you from no hope to some hope of winning a life-changing fortune. Likewise, you overpay for the insurance on your home versus your expected loss because it takes you from some fear to no fear of a ruinous loss. In exactly the same way, investment risk premiums are the return compensation for holding assets that may occasionally suffer ruinous losses - in other words, investments that exhibit negative skew (Table I-1 and Chart I-4). Table I-1At Low Bond Yields, Bonds Have ##br## Extreme Negative Skew The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance Chart I-4Bonds Become Much More Risky##br## At Ultra-Low Yields The Quantum Theory Of Finance The Quantum Theory Of Finance Applying The Quantum Theory To Markets So now let's pull together what the quantum theory of finance tells us: A lower bound to interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - defines the 'quantum limit' of allowable interest rates. When bond yields approach this lower bound, prospective returns from bonds suffer strong negative skew, meaning the prospect of a rare but ruinous loss. The quantum step from 'no fear' to 'some fear' means that negative skew requires a risk premium. Therefore, at low bond yields the valuation relationship between bonds and equities changes radically. Given that equity returns always possess negative skew, we can say that at low bond yields, bond risk becomes equity-like. So the excess return demanded on equities relative to bonds - the equity risk premium - should compress, or indeed fully disappear (Chart I-5). This means that at low bond yields equity prospective returns should become bond-like. Justifying much richer equity valuations today. Chart I-5At Low Bond Yields, The Excess Prospective Return On Equities Over Bonds Disappears At Low Bond Yields, The Excess Prospective Return On Equities Over Bonds Disappears At Low Bond Yields, The Excess Prospective Return On Equities Over Bonds Disappears However, the conditionality on the negative skew of bonds is crucial. The negative skew on a 10-year bond starts to fade when the bond yield is at 2% and completely disappears at 3%, at which point the equity risk premium must fully re-emerge. Removing the justification for the richer equity valuations. Markets tend to move en masse, so we infer that the rich valuation of equity markets would be at risk of correction if a mainstream 10-year bond yield broke well north of 2.5%. At current yields, the 10-year bond closest to the 2.5%-3% 'red zone' is the U.S. T-bond. And a breach into the 'high 2s' would trigger us to de-risk our portfolio. However, the flight to investment havens that would follow a sell-off in risk assets would also curtail the rise in bond yields. No mainstream bond yield can realistically rise beyond 3% - and stay there - in the foreseeable future. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Root mean squared 2 Please see Quantitative Finance, Risk premia: asymmetric tail risks and excess returns, by Y. Lemperiere et al. 3 Please see Econometrica Volume 47 Number 2 March 1979, Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.

Dear Client, Today we are sending you a two-part Special Report prepared by my colleague Billy Zicheng Huang of our Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy team, entitled “A Sector Guide To A-shares”. Part I of the report was published in September, and emphasized the key takeaways from MSCI’s decision to include A-shares in the MSCI EM index beginning in June 2018. More importantly, it provided a comprehensive analysis of the financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples sectors. Part II of the report was published at the end of October, and provided an analysis of the remaining sectors not included in Part I. The reports underscore that while the top-down impact of MSCI’s decision is limited, it is significant in terms of expanding potential alpha from security selection. I trust that you will find this report to be useful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports Part I of the Special Report discussed the market impact of MSCI's decision to include A-shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, followed by a comprehensive analysis of the four most investment-relevant sectors with corresponding company calls in each sector. In the second part of the Special Report, the EMES team will analyze the remaining sectors, and provide investment recommendations. We will publish an Investment Case by the end of this year, highlighting our best sector picks from Part I and Part II of the Special Reports to construct an A-share portfolio. A Recap In the first part of our A-shares special report, the EMES team discussed the key takeaways from A-shares' inclusion in the MSCI EM index and concluded that, despite a limited near-term impact on the market from a passive investment standpoint, the MSCI's decision will provide an expansion of the investable universe for active EM investors, and more opportunities to allocate assets and generate alpha.1 Moreover, we looked at the four sectors most relevant for investors - financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples - analyzing valuations, profitability, leverage, and the growth outlook. In this special report, we will continue our journey through the remaining sectors: energy, healthcare, IT, materials, real estate, and utilities. Please note that only one company, Dr.Peng Telecom & Media (CH 600804), will be added to telecoms, and will not result in material changes to the sector. Thus we omitted analysis of this sector. Energy Seven companies from the energy sector will be included into the MSCI EM index, including six from the oil & gas industry. The equally weighted basket of the seven A-share energy companies has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 26.2%, and by 19.8% over a one-year period (Table 1). With the Chinese government's mandate to cut excess capacity, capex growth in the energy sector will continue to be weak, which will weigh on the growth outlook for the sector. Image In terms of valuation, stripping out two dual-listed names that are already in the MSCI EM Index (Sinopec and PetroChina - please see Appendix I for the full list), Lu'an Environmental and Xishan Coal & Electric Power are trading at significantly cheaper valuations than their peers. On the other end of the spectrum, Guanghui Energy and Wintime Energy's P/Es have expensive valuations. Looking at profitability, low P/E names tend to have high ROEs, while Guanghui Energy suffers from the weakest ROE (Charts 1A & 1B). From a profitability-versus-valuation perspective, Lu'an Environmental offers a superior risk-reward profile, while Guanghui Energy has the least favorable risk-reward profile (Chart 1C). Image Image Image Wintime and Lu'an reported the strongest operating margins, while Offshore Oil Engineering has the weakest margin among peers (Chart 1D). On leverage, Offshore Oil Engineering has the lowest debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio, mainly because its core business is energy equipment and service rather than oil & gas exploration. All energy producers are highly leveraged, with Wintime and Guanghui topping the list. On free cash flow yield, Lu'an leads the table, while both Guanghui and Wintime have negative yields which, together with high leverage, is a negative combination (Charts 1E, 1F, 1G). Image Image Image Image The A-share Energy companies have a dividend yield of less than 2%, with Offshore Oil Engineering enjoying the highest yield among peers, while Xishan Coal & Electric Power has the lowest yield (Chart 1H). Screening the earnings forecasts, all companies' EPS are expected to growth by more than 10%, led by Offshore Oil Engineering and Guanghui Energy (Chart 1I). Image Image Taking all the factors into consideration, we suggest investors should be cautious on the energy sector, and should be especially cautious about betting on the likelihood of Guanghui Energy's turnaround. The company registered surprising positive bottom-line growth in 1H17, but this was mainly due to a low base in 2016. The commencement of its new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Jiangsu Province will not help much to lift sales volumes or margins, given little LNG price recovery and growing competition from well-positioned larger players such as Kunlun and CNOOC. Healthcare There are 13 companies in the A-share healthcare sector. Stocks in the sector have a heavy tilt towards pharmaceutical producers. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 1.8%, and outperformed by 0.9% over a one-year period (Table 2). On an absolute return basis performance was resilient across various time horizons. The EMES team has been bullish on healthcare sector on a long-term investment horizon, with overweight calls on Fosun Pharma (2196 HK) from among the current MSCI EM constituents.2 We prefer companies with innovative drug R&D pipelines, which will more likely take advantage of the new China FDA rule encouraging biopharmaceutical innovation. Image Shanghai Pharma and Fosun Pharma are excluded from our analysis, as their H-listed shares are already in the MSCI EM index. Examining valuations, on a trailing P/E basis we favor Sanjiu Medical and Dong-E-E-Jiao. By contrast, Hengrui Medicine and Guizhou Bailing look expensive (Chart 2A). Looking at the profitability side, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao have the strongest ROE, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan Pharma lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 2B). In summary, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao will likely outperform, based on a valuation-versus-profitability comparison (Chart 2C). Image Image Image Furthermore, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao also lead by operating margin, with relatively safe leverage levels at the same time (Chart 2D). On the other hand, Jointown suffers from the highest debt level, the only one with debt-to-equity surpassing 100%. In terms of free cash flow, Sanjiu Medical and Salubris have the most attractive FCF yield, while Jointown and Tasly, both companies with the highest debt levels, also display a worryingly negative FCF yield (Charts 2E, 2F, 2G). Salubris and Baiyun Shan dominate the dividend yield rank (Chart 2H). Image Image Image Image Concerning the earnings outlook, Huadong Medicine and Kangmei are expected to see fast bottom-line growth in 2018, driven by robust antibiotic and cardiovascular sales respectively, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan are likely to fall behind the industry average (Chart 2I). Image Image In summary, we prefer Salubris Pharma among the A-share healthcare basket, supported by its stronger fundamentals and the bullish outlook on innovative drug R&D and sales in China, in which Salubris Pharma is specialized. IT 14 names from the IT sector will be added to the MSCI EM index. The equally weighted basket has outperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 22.3%, and outperformed by 23.3% over a one-year period (Table 3), with most stocks performing strongly across various investment horizons. We believe the A-share IT basket provides investors with attractive opportunities in the investable universe given that it is less expensive than its H-share counterpart. The inclusion will also dilute the weight of IT sector ADRs, such as Alibaba and Sina Weibo, in the index. Please note that Protruly Vision Tech has been suspended from trading due to legal issues, with no further detail released by the court. Stripping out ZTE because of its H-share listing already in the MSCI EM index, there are 12 names left. Image Regarding valuations, most companies are trading at a below-50 trailing P/E, with the exceptions of Hundsun Tech and iFlytek, both of which are above 150x, while Aisino and BOE are relatively undervalued compared to other names in the sector. It is worth mentioning that Hundsun is 100% owned by Zhejiang Finance Credit Network Technology, a company 99% owned by Alibaba. From a profitability perspective, Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech have the highest ROE, while Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour lie at the other end of the spectrum (Charts 3A & 3B). Taking these two factors into consideration, we highlight Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech as the most attractive based on their risk-reward profile (Chart 3C). Image Image Image When looking at the income statement, Sanan Optoelectronics displays robust operating margins, with 2345 Network following suit. By contrast, Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour report the most disappointing margins (Chart 3D). On the positive side, Hundsun Tech has virtually zero debt on the balance sheet, while Dongxu Optoelectronic is more than 80% leveraged. Meanwhile, only four companies register positive FCF yields. Taking both metrics into account, Aisino can most easily service its debt with free cash flow (Charts 3E, 3F, 3G). By dividend yield, Aisino and Hikvision rank top (Chart 3H). Image Image Image Image With respect to forward EPS growth, iFlytek and Hundsun Tech are expected to see the fastest bottom-line expansion, while Aisino's and BOE Tech's bottom lines will increase at the slowest pace (Chart 3I). Image Image Based on our criteria, we like video surveillance manufacturers Hikvision and Dahua Tech for their robust fundamentals and reasonable valuations. In particular, Hikvision is likely to have the largest market cap among A-share tech companies newly included in the MSCI indexes. Materials Currently only seven Chinese companies from the materials sector are included into the MSCI EM Index. After the inclusion, some 26 more companies will be added, substantially expanding the investable universe. Two subsectors will most likely draw investors' attention due to the significant exposure increase: metals & mining, and chemicals. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 2%, but outperformed by 4.6% over a one-year period (Table 4). We exclude five names, which are already in the current MSCI EM index: Sinopec Shanghai Petrochem, Anhui Conch Cement, Aluminum Corp of China, Jiangxi Copper, and Zijin Mining. Among the other companies, we have been underweight Maanshan Iron & Steel (H-share listing) and Aluminum Corp of China (H-share listing) in our China Materials trade, and overweight Tianqi Lithium in the lithium supply chain trade. Image Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel have attractive valuations, with trailing P/Es below 15. On the other end of this scale, China Northern Rare Earth and Baotou Steel appear very expensive (Chart 4A). On profitability, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium top the ROE rank, while Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Baotou Steel sit at the bottom (Chart 4B). Screening the risk-reward profile, it is noticeable that chemicals normally demonstrate a better ROE vs. P/E metric than companies from the metals & mining industry. Specifically, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium are the most attractive, while Jindiucheng Molybdenum is the least attractive (Chart 4C). Image Image Image In terms of operations, Tianqi Lithium reported the strongest operating margin, followed by Junzheng, while Hainan Rubber and Jinduicheng Molybdenum are the only companies that registered negative operating margins (Chart 4D). Looking at the balance sheet, Jinduicheng Molybdenum has the healthiest leverage, while Hesteel shows the most worrisome leverage. Moreover, it has the lowest FCF yield. In terms of FCF yield versus leverage, Kingenta offers the best tradeoff, while Hesteel is the least attractive (Charts 4E, 4F, 4G). Furthermore, dividend yield favors Longsheng and disfavors Northern Rare Earth (Chart 4H). Image Image Image Image In terms of projected EPS growth, Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Shandong Gold Mining have the strongest outlook for next year, while Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel are likely to report profit declines (Chart 4I). Image Image In summary, apart from Maanshan Iron & Steel, Hainan Rubber is a good candidate for the underweight basket due to its relatively expensive valuation, negative margin and FCF yield. Moreover, its focus on the rubber business diversifies the portfolio risk from metal & mining-concentrated underweight exposure. China Molybdenum, with its above-average risk-reward profile, moderately strong operations and financial position, as well as robust growth outlook, is a good candidate for the overweight basket of our lithium supply trade to replace Ganfeng Lithium. The company has a strong market presence in Congo, where over 60% of cobalt is mined. Real Estate Some 14 developers will be added to the existing MSCI EM index. Among the top 10 Chinese developers, measured by contracted sales and floor space sold, existing MSCI EM constituents account for six, while the A-share list will add two (Poly Real Estate and China Fortune Land). In the environment of property market tightening in China, primary land supply has remained stagnant. The government is unlikely to ease the supply restrictions in the near-term, especially in the residential land space. In this vein, we believe large market players will be better-positioned in this market, due to their bargaining power. Also, developers with heavy exposure to commercial property will be less affected by policy uncertainty than their residential counterparts. Looking at historical performance, the equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 20.5%, and by 17.1% over a one-year period (Table 5). Image Xinhu Zhongbao and Financial Street are trading at the cheapest valuations, while Zhejiang China Commodities and China Fortune Land seem to be slightly overpriced compared to peers. The ROE for Xinhu Zhongbao is remarkable, while Zhangjiang High-tech Park is the only company with ROE under 10% (Charts 5A, 5B). Taking both dimensions into account, Xinhu Zhongbao and Gemdale display an attractive risk-reward profile (Chart 5C). Image Image Image Looking at operational metrics, Zhejiang China Commodities and Financial Street enjoy the highest margin, while Xinhu Zhongbao and Tahoe lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 5D). Due to the nature of business, leverage is high across the sector. In particular, Oceanwide and Tahoe have a high debt-to-equity ratio, while Zhejiang China Commodities and Gemdale have a more prudent capital structure. Furthermore, FCF yields vary a lot across companies, with Financial Street and Xinhu Zhongbao on the positive end, and Tahoe and Oceanwide on the negative. Financial Street also beats other developers in terms of cash generation for debt payment (Charts 5E, 5F, 5G). Image Image Image Image Gemdale and Risesun have the highest dividend yield, while Tahoe and Zhejiang China Commodities have the lowest (Chart 5H). Image Regarding the full-year 2018 expectations, Financial Street and Zhejiang China Commodities have a robust growth outlook with respect to funds from operations (FFO) and EPS respectively, while Gemdale is likely to see sluggish growth on both metrics (Charts 5I & 5J). In summary, we believe Financial Street Holding is likely to outperform in the real estate sector, given its appealing risk-reward profile, decent dividend yield, superior cash flow yield and operating margin, reasonable debt ratio, and robust FFO growth. Its large-scale and commercial property exposure is expected to be more immune to policy tightening in China. Image Image Utilities Some 12 utility companies will be added to the existing MSCI EM index, most of which are in power generation and renewables. EMES published in July an investment case on China utilities, underlining our preference toward companies with a focus on the environment and clean power, in line with the Chinese government's emphasis in the 13th five-year plan.3 In the A-share basket, we highlight Yangtze Power, the hydro power large cap, National Nuclear, as its name suggests the state-owned nuclear power operator, and Beijing Capital, the water utility provider. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 19.2%, and by 14.2% over a one-year period (Table 6). Image Huaneng Power is excluded from our analysis, as its H-share is already in the MSCI EM Index. Screening valuations, the trailing P/E factor favors Shenery and Chuantou Energy. By contrast, Huadian Power and Beijing Capital look expensive (Chart 6A). On profitability, Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy have the strongest ROE, while Huadian Power and Shenzhen Energy fall far behind the average (Chart 6B). Based on valuation versus profitability, Chuantou Energy, Yangtze Power, and SDIC Power will likely outperform (Chart 6C). Image Image Image Yangtze Power and SDIC Power have remarkably high operating margins, while Shenery and Beijing Capital are at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 6D). Concerning leverage, most large-scale players such as Datang International Power and National Nuclear Power are highly leveraged. By contrast, low leveraged players, such as Hubei Energy and Shenergy, tend to have small market caps of around US$ 5 bn. In terms of FCF yield, we highlight Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy, while we are cautious on Shenzhen Energy and National Nuclear Power due to their deeply negative yields. In summary, we like Chuantou Energy, Yangzte Power, Zheneng Electric, and Shenergy with respect to FCF yield versus leverage, which also coincides with dividend yield rank (Charts 6E, 6F, 6G, 6H). Image Image Image Image Finally, Huadian Power and Datang are expected to show the fastest bottom-line growth next year, while Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy are likely to see limited earnings expansion (Chart 6I). Image Image Therefore, within utilities sector, we expect Yangtze Power to outperform in the long term, supported by its appealing risk-reward profile, margin expansion, and debt service ability. We also like the fact that the company's dominant strength of hydropower is the Yangtze River Delta. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "A Sector Guide To A-shares - Part I ", dated September 19, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "China Healthcare, Getting Healthier", dated August 9, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "Budding Green Equities In China", dated July 11, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com Appendix - I Image Appendix - II Overweight Company Profile Image Image Image Image Underweight Company Profile Image Image

Dear Client, Today we are sending you a two-part Special Report prepared by my colleague Billy Zicheng Huang of our Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy team, entitled “A Sector Guide To A-shares”. Part I of the report was published in September, and emphasized the key takeaways from MSCI’s decision to include A-shares in the MSCI EM index beginning in June 2018. More importantly, it provided a comprehensive analysis of the financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples sectors. Part II of the report was published at the end of October, and provided an analysis of the remaining sectors not included in Part I. The reports underscore that while the top-down impact of MSCI’s decision is limited, it is significant in terms of expanding potential alpha from security selection. I trust that you will find this report to be useful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports The EMES team will be publishing a series of Special Reports in the coming weeks, analyzing sector dynamics and company highlights of Chinese A shares that MSCI has decided to include in the MSCI EM index from next June. In the first part of our report, we emphasize the key takeaways from A-shares' inclusion, followed by a comprehensive analysis of the four sectors that investors will probably most focus on. The second part of our report to be released in the coming weeks will analyze the remaining sectors. MSCI's decision to include Chinese A shares will likely have only a limited near-term impact on the market from a passive investment perspective. A 5% inclusion factor will not cause significant changes to the current sector weightings of the MSCI EM index or the MSCI China index. The symbolic effect - that global investors are becoming more confident in the Chinese market's efficiency and transparency - is likely to have a larger impact. From an active investment perspective, however, an expansion of the investable universe will give investors with EM mandates more opportunities to allocate assets and generate alpha. Impact Is Limited On A Macro Perspective... On June 20, MSCI announced its decision to include Chinese A shares in the MSCI EM index and the MSCI ACWI index on a gradual basis starting from June 2018.1 The inclusion process will be finalized in two steps following the May semi-annual index review and August quarterly review in 2018, at a 5% inclusion factor. Full inclusion of the remaining A-share universe is expected to take place gradually over five to 10 years. After three previous proposals of an A-shares inclusion having been rejected by investors surveyed by MSCI, the successful start of the inclusion process signifies that the A-share market is gaining broad support from institutional investors. This follows the Chinese government's and regulators' focus on improving market accessibility via stock connect programs (Hong Kong-Shanghai connect, and Hong Kong-Shenzhen connect) as well as improving market liquidity via loosening requirements for index-linked financial instruments. Further steps regarding capital movement and better reporting standards are expected to be implemented in due course. influence of the inclusion is minimal from a broad market perspective. As is planned, 222 A-share companies will be added to the MSCI EM index, accounting for a pro-forma weight of only 0.73% of the MSCI EM index, or 2.5% of the MSCI China index (Charts 1A and 1B). A shares will boost China's weight in the MSCI EM by approximately only 1%, given the 5% inclusion factor. Sector-wise, it will not substantially move the current weights of each sector either. Company wise, all selected stocks are large caps, with 43 being "A" and "H" dual-listed companies already included in the current MSCI EM index, mostly concentrated in the financials, industrials and materials sectors (see Appendix I). This means the inclusions are unlikely to make any meaningful contribution to index performance in the upcoming year. Similarly, capital inflows from passive fund trackers are expected to be negligible, only marginally adding to the trading income of the Hong Kong Exchange through the northbound stock connect program. refore, we believe the impact from an investor perspective is more symbolic, confirming a positive outlook on market transparency and corporate governance. Image Image ...But Significant In Stock Selection Despite immaterial near-term market impact, the 222 A-share large-cap stocks will expand the investable universe, providing active investors with plenty of opportunities to extract alpha. In particular, compared to the current weights of the 11 sectors, industrials, financials, consumer staples, materials, healthcare, utilities, and real estate would see weight expansion, while IT, telecom, energy, and consumer discretionary would see weight contraction (Table 1). Image Newly added stocks mainly come from the financial and industrial sectors, with the name count by far outpacing other sectors. Given an overall larger market cap, these two sectors will experience the most substantial incremental weight boost under the full inclusion scenario. However, this does not mean sectors with fewer companies to be added are negligible. Instead, liquidity in these sectors is expected to improve significantly, with specific stocks drawing strong interest from investors. Since the launch of BCA's EMES service, we have made several calls on A-share stocks as out-of-benchmark plays, including Yutong Bus (600066 CH) and Tianqi Lithium (002466 CH) from our best-performing trade, overweight the lithium supply chain. In this vein, in this Special Report we will identify and analyze four sectors that we believe are most investment-relevant. A second Special Report examining the remaining sectors will follow in the coming weeks. Financials Some 50 companies from the financials sector will be included in the MSCI EM index, with a strong tilt toward brokerage firms (27). The rest will be split between banks (19) and insurers (4). Banks The equally weighted basket of 19 A-share banks has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 13.4%, and underperformed by 11.6% over a one-year period (Table 2). In absolute return terms, however, performance has been resilient across various time horizons. It is worth mentioning that the "big five banks" are all listed in both mainland China and Hong Kong. Therefore, investors will focus more on joint-stock banks and regional banks in the A-share universe, which makes analysis on shadow banking activities within the earnings profile crucial. Image In terms of valuation, stripping out dual-listed banks that already exist in the MSCI EM index, Huaxia Bank and CITIC Bank are trading below their book values, displaying relatively cheap valuations. Looking at profitability, three regional banks top the earnings profile: Bank of Guiyang, Bank of Ningbo, and Bank of Nanjing, while the two "cheapest" banks, Huaxia and CITIC, display the lowest ROE (Charts 2A & 2B). From a profitability versus valuation perspective, companies such as Huaxia Bank, Industrial Bank, Bank of Beijing and Pudong Development Bank offer a superior risk-reward profile (Chart 3). Image Image Image Bank of Guiyang and Ping An Bank report the highest net interest margins, but pay a relatively low dividend yield. On the other hand, Industrial Bank and Bank of Beijing have the lowest net interest margins, but relatively high dividend yields (Charts 4A & 4B). Image Image In terms of asset quality, Bank of Nanjing and Bank of Ningbo report the lowest NPL ratios, both under 1%, while Pudong Development Bank and Ping An Bank are at the top of the table. Meanwhile, Bank of Nanjing and Bank of Guiyang show the most robust loan growth, while Bank of Shanghai and Huaxia Bank suffer from the most sluggish loan growth (Charts 5A & 5B). Therefore, on a two-dimensional measure, we prefer Bank of Nanjing, and Bank of Guiyang (Chart 6). Image Image Image Screening the earnings forecast, Bank of Guiyang and Bank of Ningbo are expected to see the fastest growth in two years, while CITIC Bank and Ping An Bank will see the slowest growth (Chart 7). Image Diversified Financials The equally-weighted basket of 27 diversified financial companies has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 26.5%, and by 27.8% over a one-year period (Table 3). Currently there are only nine diversified financial companies in the MSCI EM, with seven securities companies and two state-owned asset management companies specializing in distressed asset management. As mentioned, the inclusion of A shares will not improve brokerage fees dramatically in the near term, but this milestone event could trigger a positive outlook on market sentiment, especially for the broad A-share market, where the dominant players are retail investors. This could explain the subsector's resilient performance over the past three months. Therefore, it is reasonable to be bullish on diversified financials, with the largest securities names expecting a revenue boost in the longer term. Some pure A-share names include Shenwan Hongyuan, Guosen, and Avic Capital. Image Similar to banks, after stripping out dual-listed names already included in MSCI EM (CITIC, Everbright, GF, Haitong, and Huatai), Northeast Securities and Guotai Junan Securities have the cheapest valuations, while Anxin Trust seems to be the overpriced compared to its peers. Accordingly, its ROE is remarkable (Charts 8A & 8B). Taking both dimensions into account, Guotai Junan Securities and Northeast Securities display attractive risk-reward profile (Chart 9). Image Image Image Looking at the top line, performances diverge across various securities companies. Pacific and Guoyuan generate the highest net interest margin, while Orient and Northeast suffer from serious top-line contraction (Chart 10A). Meanwhile, Guoyuan and Anxin score the highest dividend yield, exceeding 2%, while Sinolink pays less than a 0.5% dividend yield (Chart 10B). Image Image Looking at the earnings forecast, Western Securities, AVIC Capital and Sealand Securities are expected to see the strongest bottom-line growth in 2018, while local securities companies Shanxi and Huaan rank at the bottom of the spectrum (Chart 11). Image Insurance The following four insurers are already constituents of the MSCI EM index: China Life, China Pacific, New China Life and Ping An. The equally weighted basket has outperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 12.4%, and outperformed by 21.2% over a one-year period (Table 4). We will not analyze the subsector in much detail, given none of them are pure A-share companies. As such, market impact from the inclusion will not be material. EMES has been overweight Ping An's H shares since August 9, 2016.2 Image Industrials There are 44 companies in the industrials sector, the second-largest name count after financials. This sector is also expected to make the greatest impact on sector weights, assuming full A-shares inclusion. Stocks in the sector are split between airlines, national defense, machinery, construction and transportation. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 20.5%, and by 22.8% over a one-year period (Table 5). We believe increasing construction activity boosted by the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative will drive sales growth of construction equipment, while disputes in the South China Sea, India, Tibet and Xinjiang autonomous districts will continue to boost the defense industry. Image Air China, Southern Airline, China Communications Construction, China Railway Construction, China Railway Group, China State Construction Engineering, CRRC, Weichai Power, and COSCO are excluded from our analysis, as their H-listed shares are already in the MSCI EM index. Looking at valuations, the trailing P/E varies significantly across companies. Defense stocks in general are more expensive compared to other industries. By contrast, Daqin Railway stands on the lowest end of the P/E ranking, while electrical equipment companies normally display lower valuations (Chart 12A). Looking at the profitability side, Yutong Bus, one of our overweight calls, leads the ROE ranking, while Zoomlion lies on the lowest end by registering a net loss (Chart 12B). In summary, Yutong Bus, Chint Electrics, Gold Mantis and Beijing Orient Landscape will likely outperform, based on a valuation versus profitability profile comparison (Chart 13). Image Image Image Furthermore, the EV/EBITDA forecast for 2017 coincides with our overweight call on national defense stocks. It is worth noting that Eastern Airline would likely see unsatisfactory growth in terms of firm value (Chart 14A). Shanghai International Airport, Tus-sound Environment and Beijing Landscape rank as the top three measured by operating margin, while XCMG Construction Machine displays a negative margin, despite excavator sales in China surging year over year (Chart 14B). In terms of dividend and free cash flow, Yutong Bus and Zoomlion score highest on dividend yield, and Sany Heavy Industry, Daqin Railway, and XCMG secure highest free cash flow yield. On the other hand, Sany and other (check) defense stocks generate the least in dividend yields, and more than half of the companies post negative free cash flow yield (Charts 14C & 14D). Investors should be cautious on airline companies with negative free cash flow, such as Eastern Airline and Hainan Airline. Image Image Image Image Looking at leverage, Shanghai International Airport and AECC Aero-engine Control have the lowest debt-to-equity ratio, while Power Construction and China Eastern Airline are highly leveraged (Chart 14E). Image Last but not least, looking at expected growth profile, XCMG is forecast to see the highest bottom-line growth, driven by growing demand for excavators, while China Eastern Airline and Zoomlion are expected to suffer from negative growth (Chart 15). Image Consumer Discretionary Some 26 names from the consumer discretionary sector will be added to the MSCI EM index. Stripping out Fuyao Glass, BYD, Guangzhou Auto, and Haier, which are already included in the index, there are still six automakers and auto components manufacturers to be included. This should provide investors with enough investable stocks for an auto industry play. Furthermore, six A-share media companies will be added to the index over a one-year period (Table 6). Sector performance has been overall disappointing, with some exceptions being CITIC Guoan Information, Chinese Universe Publishing, Wanxiang Qianchao and China International Travel. Image Regarding valuations, CITIC Guoan Information, Suning Commerce and Alpha Group are the most expensive, with trailing P/Es surging above 50, while two automakers (SAIC and Huayu) along with a travel agency (Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town) are relatively undervalued in the sector. From a profitability perspective, Robam Appliances and Midea Group generate solid ROE, while CITIC Guoan Information and Sunning Commerce dominate the other end of the spectrum (Charts 16A & 16B). Taking these two factors into consideration, we highlight Robam Appliances, Midea Group, and Xinhua Media as the most attractive (Chart 17) based on a risk/reward profile. Investors should be cautious on Suning Commerce, not only from a fundamental perspective but also because its acquisition of Inter Milan is unlikely to generate synergy amid the Chinese government's tightening of rules on overseas M&A in the entertainment and leisure industries. Image Image Image Looking at the income statement, Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town displays robust operating performance, matching its high valuation. Robam Appliances and China South Publishing follow suit. By contrast, Suning Commerce suffers from negative margins (Chart 18A). When comparing free cash flow, Midea Group and China South Publishing register the highest yield, while Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town, Gran Automotive Service, and CITIC Guoan Information have negative yields (Chart 18B). Meanwhile, autos and auto components manufacturers enjoy the highest dividend yields, such as SAIC Motor, Huayu Automotive System, Weifu High-Tech, and Grand Automotive Service (Chart 18C). Image Image Image With respect to leverage, the media industry normally displays the lowest D/E ratio, seen in firms such as China Film, Xinhua Media and China South Publishing. On the other hand, auto and auto component manufacturers as well as large retailers are highly leveraged (Chart 18D). Image Based on our criteria, Guoan Information and Robam Appliances are expected to see the fastest bottom-line growth, while Xinhua Media, Wanxiang Qiaochao, and Xinjiekou Dept.'s bottom lines would remain stagnant (Chart 19). Image Consumer Staples Currently only nine Chinese consumer staples constituents are included in the MSCI EM Index. After the inclusion, 14 more companies will be added, substantially expanding the investable universe. Two subsectors will most likely draw investors' attention: food producers such as Yili and Henan Shuanghui, as well as beverage producers, especially premium liquor producers such as Moutai, Wuliangye Yibin and Yanghe Brewery. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 19.6%, and by 11% over a one-year period (Table 7). The sector has not deviated much from the EM benchmark across the selected time horizon. In particular, premium liquor manufacturers have been the main contributor to overall sector performance. Their sales are expected to experience a seasonal peak in September and October during the Chinese mid-autumn festival and National Day. Both Wuliangye Yibin and Moutai announced robust top-line and bottom-line growth in their second-quarter financial results, largely beating market expectations. Image Stripping out the one dual-listed name already in the MSCI EM index (Tsingtao Brewery), Changyu Pioneer, New Hope Liuhe, and Shuanghui display attractive valuations, with trailing P/Es under 20. On the other end of the metrics, Yonghui Superstores, and Luzhou Laojiao are the most expensive (Chart 20A). Examining profitability measures, Shuanghui and Moutai top the ROE rank, while Bailian Group and Yonghui Superstores sit at the bottom of the rank (Chart 20B). Looking at risk/reward profile, it is noticeable that Shuanghui, Yili and Yanghe Brewery are well positioned (Chart 21). Image Image Image In terms of operations, premium liquor makers reported overall strong operating margins, led by Moutai and Yanghe Brewery, while Bailian Group and New Hope Liuhe stand at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 22A). Looking at the capex-to-sales ratio, Wuliangye and Shuanghui score the best measures, driven by strong sales with less capex. While Changyu Pioneer demonstrates a much higher ratio compared to all peers (Chart 22B), this can be partially explained by its high capex requirement, as it is the only wine maker in the sector. Nonetheless, we believe its top line is expected to be under downward pressure as the wine market in China becomes increasingly competitive, and as premium products from France, Australia, and the U.S. gain easier market access through not only traditional in-store sales but also authorized e-commerce platforms like JD.com. Similarly, free cash flow measure also indicates that Changyu Pioneer is the only liquor player that suffers from negative yield (Chart 22C). Image Image Image In terms of financial position, with the exception of COFCO Tunhe Sugar, all companies in the sector display reasonable levels of leverage (Chart 22D). Image Looking at top-line growth, sales forecasts in FY2017 are more in favor of Moutai, Dabeinong Technology, and Luzhou Laojiao, but less in favor of Bailian Group, Shuanghui, and Changyu Pioneer (Chart 23A). Moreover, when looking at bottom-line growth two years out, Luzhou Laojiao and Yonghui Superstores score the highest rankings, while Changyu Pioneer and Shuanghui are at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 23B). Image Image In summary, among food producers, we are inclined to overweight Shuanghui. Among beverage producers, we like Yanghe Brewery, and Wuliangye, but are avoiding Changyu Pioneer. What's Next? We will highlight the following sectors in part 2 of our Special Report: Materials, energy, IT, telecoms, healthcare, and real estate. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com Appendix - I Image Appendix - II Overweight Company Profile Image Image Image Image Underweight Company Profile Image Image 1 For the full MSCI press release, please visit: https://www.msci.com/eqb/pressreleases/archive/2017_Market_Classification_Announcement_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf 2 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy - Investment case "China Healthcare, Getting Healthier", dated August 9, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Clients frequently ask us what long-term returns they should assume when constructing strategic portfolios. In this report, we use a range of methodologies to arrive at reasonable return assumptions for bonds, equities, alternative assets, and currencies on a 10-15 year investment horizon. We conclude that global bonds are likely to return around 1.5% in nominal terms (compared to 5.3% over the past 20 years), and global equities 4.6% (compared to 6.1%). Alternative assets look rather more attractive with, for example, private equity projected to return 9% and real estate 7.1%. Nonetheless, the typical pension fund portfolio, consisting of 50% equities, 30% fixed income, and 20% alts, will be unable to achieve its return target (still typically 7% or higher). Feature Pension plan sponsors and wealth managers need realistic assumptions about the likely returns from different assets in order to construct strategic portfolios, for example when calculating the efficient frontier using a mean-variance optimizer (MVO). Using historical data is the simplest way to do this, but can be very misleading: for example, global bonds have delivered an annual nominal return of 5.3% over the past 20 years but, with bond yields currently so low, it is almost mathematically impossible for them to return anything close to that over coming years (our estimate for future returns is 1.5%). This Special Report is our attempt to produce long-run return assumptions for strategic portfolios, something that GAA clients frequently ask us for. We want to emphasize that these are reasonable assumptions, not forecasts. The value of forecasting the world economy over the next decade or more is questionable. Consider if we had carried out this exercise in 2002: how likely is it that we would have predicted the rise and fall of emerging markets, the U.S. housing crisis, and the subsequent "secular stagnation"? Our analysis, therefore, is mostly based on the philosophy that long-run historical relationships (for example, credit spreads, or the excess return of small cap stocks) are fairly constant, and that most variables (profit margins, valuation, productivity) mean revert over the long term. Our time horizon is 10-15 years. We chose this - rather than the five or seven years that is perhaps more common in such analyses - because it is closer to the investment horizon of pension funds and most individual investors. It also allows us to avoid making a call on where we are currently in the cycle, and how long the next recession and expansion will last. It is likely we are close to the peak of the current economic expansion and equity bull market (the "X" on Chart 1): choosing a shorter time horizon would mean making judgements about the timing of the cycle. Conceptually, we prefer to forecast the trend line on the chart. Chart 1Stylized Trend Versus Cyclical Movements What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Our assumptions are inevitably approximate. In many cases (particularly for equity returns), we use multiple methodologies and take the average result. Does it matter that the estimation error of our assumptions is likely to be large? Most academic evidence finds not.1 The reason is that, for closely correlated assets, errors in the return estimates (and therefore the optimal weights in a portfolio) will not greatly affect a portfolio's risk and return; while, for assets that are very different, errors in the estimates will not have much effect on the optimal portfolio weights. Rough estimates, therefore, are sufficient for portfolio construction purposes. In any case, using common-sense projections is better than unrealistic historical averages, and investors do need some assumptions to work with when constructing portfolios. How To Forecast Economic Growth A key input (especially when considering earnings growth, which is one factor driving equity returns) is the likely rate of economic growth in various countries and regions over our time horizon. Our simplified way of deriving this is to assume that GDP growth is a factor of (1) demographics (specifically, the growth in the population of working age), and (2) productivity growth. (We assume that capital intensity is steady.) For the demographic assumptions, we use the United Nations' median forecast of the annual growth in population aged 25-64 between 2015 and 2030 (Table 1). Productivity growth is harder to estimate. Productivity has been poor in recent years compared to history (Chart 2). There is significant uncertainty about whether this is caused by cyclical factors (the Great Recession, for example) or structural factors (the end of positive effects from the IT revolution etc.), and whether a potential new wave of technology (artificial intelligence, self-driving vehicles) will raise productivity in future. Table 1Demographic Assumptions What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 2Productivity Growth Productivity Growth Productivity Growth Our approach is to assume that productivity in the U.S. will return to its 40-year average, and that productivity growth in the main European economies will be 50 bp lower than the U.S. and in Japan 80 bp lower (in line with recent averages). The estimate is harder for emerging markets, so we use two scenarios: one in which structural reforms, particularly in China, bring productivity growth back up to the average of the past 10 years, 3.5%; and a second scenario in which governments fail to reform, and therefore productivity growth continues to fall to only 1%. For inflation, we assume that central banks over the long-term largely achieve their current inflation goals. The results of our assumptions for GDP growth are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the summary of our results: the 10-15 year return assumptions for all the assets in our analysis. We also show historic returns and volatility for comparison (for the past 20 years, where data is available). Below, we describe in detail how we arrived at these numbers. Table 2GDP Growth Assumptions What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Table 3BCA Assumed Returns What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? All our results are shown in nominal terms and in local currencies. While strictly speaking, it might be theoretically better to estimate real returns, in practice most investors and advisers tend to work on a nominal basis. Moreover, since we have made assumptions for inflation in each region, it is simple to translate our nominal returns into real ones. There is also a trade-off between inflation and currency movements (and interest rates). At the end of the report, we consider the impact of relative inflation rates on currency returns, allowing investors to work the returns back into their own currencies. 1. Fixed income We start from a base that is known: the return on long-term government bonds. If an investor today buys a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, his or her annual nominal return over the next 10 years will almost certainly be 2.3% (today's yield). The only uncertainties come from (1) reinvesting coupons at the future rate of interest, but the impact of this is small, and (2) the (presumably minimal) risk of a U.S. government default. Of course, investors do not own just 10-year bonds, and indeed the average duration of U.S. Treasuries is currently 5.7 years. But changes in interest rates make relatively little difference to future returns: a rise in interest rates causes a capital loss but a higher yield on rolled-over positions after bonds mature (though, admittedly, the convexity effect is greater when rates are low, as they are now). Even if interest rates were to double over the next decade, the return from U.S. Treasuries would fall only to around 1.5% and, if interest rates fell to 0%, the return would be only about 3%. Moreover, the effect diminishes over time as more bonds are redeemed at par. Empirically, we can see that there is a strong correlation between starting yield on 10-year bonds and long-term returns from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 3). Chart 3Government Bond Returns Driven By The Starting Yield What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? For our cash assumption, we first calculate a proxy for the current cash yield using the average spread between 10-year government bonds and three-month bills over a long-run history (using data from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton which goes back to 1900 and covers a range of countries, Table 4).2 While it is true that the yield curve steepens and flatten along with the cycle, the average yield curve shape should be a good proxy for long-term future expected returns. Of course, this assumes that the term premium comes back. It may not if bonds now are a good hedge against recession risk. However, we also need to take into account that interest rates and inflation are likely to change over the next 10-15 years. We assume that both will rise to an equilibrium level over that time. Our assumption is that central banks will get close to hitting their inflation targets (in the U.S., 2% on PCE inflation, which translates into 2.5% on CPI; in Europe, "around but below 2%"; and in Japan, 2%). For the equilibrium real rate, we take BCA's current estimate (Chart 4) and assume a small rise over the next decade as some of the after-effects of the Great Recession and secular stagnation wear off: to 0.4% in the U.S., -0.1% in the euro area, and -0.2% in Japan. Table 4Historic Spread Government Bonds To Bills (1900-2016) What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 4Current Equilibrium Real Rates Current Equilibrium Real Rates Current Equilibrium Real Rates Our calculation of the return from cash over the 10-15 year horizon is based on a steady rise from the current cash return to that implied by the inflation and equilibrium real rate assumptions (Table 5). Table 5Calculation Of Assumption For Cash Return What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? For other fixed-income instruments, we make the following assumptions: Government bonds. We assume that the spread between 10-year and 7-year bonds and 3-month bills will be similar to the historical average (Chart 5), and calculate the return from the government bond index based on this and our estimate for 10-year returns, adjusted by the duration of outstanding bonds in the index: 5.7 years for the U.S., 7.1 for Europe and 8.6 for Japan. For U.S. investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, we take the average spread, default rate, and recovery rate in history (Table 6). Obviously, spreads and default rates, especially for high-yield bonds, also jump around massively over the cycle (Chart 6), but we think it is reasonable to assume in our long-term projections that they revert to the mean. Reliable data for European and Japanese credit has a short history but, over the past 10 years, spreads and default rates have been similar to the U.S., so we use the U.S. assumptions for these markets too. Chart 5Yield Curves Yield Curves Yield Curves Table 6U.S. Corporate Credit Assumptions What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 6Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Government-related bonds and securitized bonds (MBS, ABS etc.) are an important part of the Barclay's Aggregate Bond indexes: in the U.S., for example, securitized bonds comprise 31% of the index, and government-related ones 7%; in Europe, the weights are 8% and 17% respectively. For our projections of government-related bonds, we assume historic average spreads will continue (Table 7). For securitized bonds, we assume that the historic average spread in the U.S. will continue, and will be the same in Europe and Japan (where historic data is less readily available). Inflation-linked bonds. We assume that the average real yield of the past 10 years, 0%, will continue in future (Chart 7). Table 7Spreads Over Government Bonds What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 7Real Yield On U.S. TIPs Real Yield On U.S. TIPs Real Yield On U.S. TIPs 2. Equities There are a number of ways to think about forward equity returns, all with a high degree of uncertainty. These could be based on starting valuations (but which valuation measure to use?); related to likely earnings growth in future years (hard to forecast); or based on a reversion to the mean of valuations and profits. We decided to take a range of different measures, and average the results. In practice, the results are similar, except for emerging markets (see below for more on EM). Table 8 summarizes the equity return calculations. Table 8Equity Return Calculations AVERAGE EQUITY What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? The thinking behind the six measures we use is as follows. Equity risk premium (ERP). The most obvious methodology: historically, over the long run equities have returned more than government bonds. But which risk premium to use? Dimson, Marsh and Staunton's work includes the excess performance of equities over bonds since 1900 for a range of countries (Table 9). We decided not to choose a different ERP for each developed region, as the historical data would suggest, since it is difficult to argue that the U.S. is likely to be riskier in future than Europe and since, for parts of this history, Japan and the U.S. were essentially emerging markets. We, therefore, take a rounded average of world ERP over the past 116 years, 3.5%. For emerging markets, we multiply this by the average beta of EM relative to global equities over the past 30 years, 1.2, to give an ERP of 4.2%. Growth model. Think of a Gordon Growth Model, which defines the return from equities as the starting dividend yield plus future earnings growth (strictly speaking, dividend growth; we are assuming that the payout ratio will stay constant). We need to make a couple of adjustments to this. First, earnings growth has historically been correlated to nominal GDP growth but has lagged it - in the U.S. by 1.5 percentage points in the period 1918-2016 - although, since 1981, earnings have grown significantly faster than GDP (Chart 8). For the future, we assume that the long-run lag returns. Second, we need to add share buybacks to the dividend yield since, in some countries, such as the U.S., for tax reasons companies prefer to buy back shares rather than increase dividends. However, we should do this on a net basis since equity holders are penalized by companies that issue new shares. In the U.S. net equity withdrawal has been 0.3% over the past 10 years, but in both Europe and Japan, annual net new equity issuance has averaged 1.6% (Chart 9). In EM, the dilution has been even more extreme, averaging 6% over the past 10 years (and much more over the past 25 years). We subtract this dilution from future returns. Table 9Equity Excess Return Over Bonds What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 8U.S. EPS Growth Versus Nominal GDP Growth What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 9Net Equity Issuance Net Equity Issuance Net Equity Issuance Growth plus reversion to the mean. This takes the Gordon Growth Model but adds to it an assumption that PE multiples and profit margins revert to the historical mean. We again use dividend yield adjusted by net equity issuance. We assume that the current trailing PE and profit margin revert to the average since 1980 (see Table 8 above for the data) over the next 10 years. In the U.S., PE and margins are currently somewhat higher than history, but this is less the case in Europe or Japan (Charts 10 and 11). Additionally, assuming that the mean reversion happens over 10 years means that the effect on annual returns is not especially large, even for the U.S. Chart 10Net Profit Margin Net Profit Margin Net Profit Margin Chart 11Trailing PE History Trailing PE History Trailing PE History Earnings yield (EY). The simplest of the three valuation measures we use, the assumption is that companies reward shareholders either by paying them a dividend this year, or by reinvesting retained earnings to pay dividends in future. If you assume (admittedly a rash assumption) that the future return on investment will be similar to the current return on investment, it should be immaterial how the company pays out to shareholders. Therefore, the trailing earnings yield (1/PE ratio) should be a good proxy for future returns. Empirically, the relationship between earnings yield and 10-year future returns has been quite strong (Chart 12). However, returns have been somewhat higher on average than the EY would indicate (between 1900 and 2006, 9.7% versus an average EY of 7.5%) mainly because of rising PE multiples since 1980 (Chart 13). We think it unlikely that valuations will continue to rise, and so the EY should be a reasonable guide to future returns. Chart 12Earnings Yield And 10-Year Future Returns What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Chart 13Trailing Price/Earnings Multiple S&P500 What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Shiller PE. The cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE, or Shiller PE) - the current share price divided by the 10 year average of historic inflation-adjusted earnings - has historically had a good correlation with future long-term returns (Chart 14). A regression model of this indicates that the current Shiller PE points to long-run forward returns for the U.S. of 4.9%, for Japan 3.6%, Europe 8.5% and EM 10.8%. Valuation composite. The Shiller PE has some flaws, for example in using a fixed 10-year period for earnings when the length of cycles varies. It has not necessarily mean-reverted in history (perhaps because of long-term trends in interest rates, which it doesn't take into account). It may be more reasonable, then, to use a mixture of different valuation metrics. BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator has had a good correlation with long-run future returns (Chart 15).3 A regression model of this indicator against 15-year returns currently points to returns from the U.S. of 5.2%, Europe of 4.1%, Japan 5.1% and EM 11.0%. Small-cap stocks. We take the 2.4% excess annual return of small cap stocks over large caps in the U.S. for 1926-2016, as calculated by Dimson, Marsh & Staunton. Chart 14Shiller PE Versus ##br##15-Year Equity Return Shiller PE Versus 15-Year Equity Return Shiller PE Versus 15-Year Equity Return Chart 15Composite Valuation Measure Versus ##br##Long-Run Future Returns Composite Valuation Measure Versus Long-Run Future Returns Composite Valuation Measure Versus Long-Run Future Returns Emerging Markets The return assumption for emerging market equity returns has a much higher degree of uncertainty. On our three valuation measures, EM equities look attractive: the average return expectation of the three valuation indicators points to an annual return of 9.4%. However, the growth outlook is murky: as described above, a wave of structural reform in emerging markets, especially China, would be necessary to keep productivity - and, therefore, earnings growth - up, in order for returns to be as good as the current valuation level suggests. Another worry is the degree of equity dilution: it has averaged 6% a year over the past 10 years, and is unlikely to fall much unless corporate governance improves significantly. The range of expected returns derived from our various methodologies, therefore, varies from -1% to +11% a year. Moreover, as described in the currency section below, investors should expect a depreciation in some EM currencies over the next decade, which will also eat into returns. However, due to the influence of China, where the currency is projected to appreciate almost 2% a year against the USD, the EM equity index will see an overall boost to USD-based returns due to the currency effect. 3. Alternative Assets We consider the likely future returns for nine of the 10 alternative assets that Global Asset Allocation regularly covers (we omit wine, which is hard to value on the basis of fundamental macro factors and, anyway, is owned by few institutional investors).4 Alts are harder to forecast than public securities since data is less easily available (and may be only quarterly and based on estimated values), and since some alternative assets have not existed in their current form for very long (venture capital, for example). Moreover, alternative assets tend to have non-normal returns with skewed distributions. Table 10 shows the historical returns and volatility of the nine alternative asset classes both over the longest period for which we have data, and since 1997, when we have data for all of them. Table 10Returns And Volatility For Alternative Assets What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? We, therefore, take a more ad hoc approach, projecting each asset class differently. Generally, we assume that future returns will look similar to historical ones. Specifically, the assumptions we use are as follows. Hedge funds. We assume a return of cash + 3.5%. Hedge fund returns have trended down over time (Chart 16), as more entrants have arbitraged away alpha. We choose to use the average return over cash of the past 10 years, 3.5% (net of fees). It is unlikely that hedge funds returns will rise back anywhere close to earlier levels, for example that of the 1990s when they returned cash +14%. Chart 16Hedge Fund Historic Returns Hedge Fund Historic Returns Hedge Fund Historic Returns U.S. Direct real estate. We find reasonably good results (R2 = 24%) from regressing U.S. nominal GDP growth against real estate returns. The regression equation is 1.25 x nominal GDP growth + 1.9%. Conceptually, this probably represents a cap rate plus growth of capital values slightly higher than economic growth due to supply shortages in certain key locations. We project real estate to return 7.2% annually. One risk to this assumption, however, is that commercial real estate prices are already above the previous peak from 2007; high valuations may dampen future returns. U.S. REITs. We find only weak correlations with direct real estate investment, although REITs have outperformed real estate over time (perhaps because of the inbuilt leverage of REITs). Over time, REITs have become increasingly correlated with equities. We, therefore, use a regression against U.S. equity returns (R2 = 42%), with REIT returns 0.49 x equity returns + 7.7%. This indicates 10.1% annual return from REITs in the long run. U.S. Private equity (PE). In the past, returns from private equity have been 5 or 6 percentage points higher than from public equities. This is most likely due to their higher leverage, bias towards small-cap companies, and stronger shareholder control over the companies they invest in; it can also be thought of as an illiquidity premium. However, it seems likely that excess returns will be lower in future given the bigger size of the PE industry now and relatively high valuations currently. Moreover, the PE industry currently has almost USD 1 Trn in dry power (uninvested capital), a sign that investment opportunities are limited. We assume, therefore, a slightly lower premium over public equities in future of 4 ppts. This results in a total annual return of 9.5%. U.S. Venture capital (VC). Historically (using data since 1986) VC returns have been 0.6 ppts higher than for PE (probably representing a premium for greater risk and smaller size of the companies invested in). We assume 0.5 ppt higher return in future. This leads to a return assumption of 10%. U.S. Structured products. As discussed in the fixed income section above, we use the 20-year average spread over the aggregate bond index of 0.7 ppt. Total assumed return, therefore, is 3.3%. U.S. Farmland. The value of farmland has risen by an average of 4.4% a year since 1920, a period which included five agricultural cycles. We assume that the value of land will continue to rise at the same rate. We think this is a reasonable assumption since, although nominal GDP growth in the U.S. may be lower in future than in the past, global demand for food is likely to continue to grow rapidly. The total return from investment in farm land, using a regression, produces: growth of farm land value x 1.81 + 0.64% = 8.6%. Chart 17Long-Term Commodity Prices Long-Term Commodity Prices Long-Term Commodity Prices U.S. Timberland is more defensive than farmland since trees can be stored "on the stump" and don't need to be harvested each year in the way that crops do even when prices are unattractive. Historically, timberland has returned about 1 ppt less a year than farmland, and we assume that this will continue. Commodities move in long-run cycles, with a commodity super-cycle of around 10 years, in which prices rise by 3-4x, followed by a bear market of 20 or 30 years in which they fall or stagnate (Chart 17). This is driven by a build-up of excess supply, because of the capex done during the super-cycle, and often by a structural shift on the demand side too. We see no reason why this pattern should change, with China's re-engineering of its economy away from dependence on infrastructure spending likely to be a particularly important factor over the next decade. We assume that commodity prices will, over the current bear market (now about five years old), fall by the same amount and over the same number of years as the average of previous bear markets since the 19th century. This means they have 16% further to fall over 200 months, giving a return of -1% a year. 4. Currencies Most investors are unable or unwilling to fully hedge currency exposure over very long periods. So, a consideration of how returns from different countries' assets might be affected by relative currency movements over the next 10-15 years is an important element in calculating likely returns. Fortunately, for developed market currencies at least, there is a simple, and historically fairly reliable, way to make assumptions of currency movements: reversion to purchasing power parity. As shown in Chart 18, major currencies have fairly consistently reverted to their PPP over the long run. So we can forecast likely future currency movements as a combination of 1) how far away the currency is currently from PPP against the U.S. dollar, and 2) the likely change in the PPP over the period. The latter we calculate from the IMF's forecasts of relative consumer inflation between each country and the U.S. (the IMF makes this forecast only for the next five years, but we assume that the differential continues at the same rate after 2022). Table 11 shows that most major currencies are expected to rise against the U.S. dollar over the coming decade or so. Except for Australia, they are likely to have slightly lower inflation. And - again with the exception of Australia - they all look a little undervalued currently relative to the USD. Table 11Assumed Annual Change Versus U.S. Dollar Over Next 10-15 Years What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? Unfortunately, this approach does not work for EM currencies. They have historically traded at a level consistently well below PPP. This is mainly because, while tradable goods prices tend to be driven by international prices movements and relative unit labor costs, local services prices (which cannot be arbitraged across borders) do not. Also, inflation in emerging markets has historically been much higher than in the U.S. (Chart 19), meaning that their PPP has shifted significantly lower over time. However, China's inflation is now not dissimilar to that of the U.S. (the IMF forecasts it will be only 50 basis points a year higher over the coming five years). And China has shown some tendency for the currency to move towards PPP - 20 years ago the RMB was 190% below PPP; now it is "only" 97% below. Chart 18Reversion To PPP Reversion To PPP Reversion To PPP Chart 19U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation We, therefore, take an alternative approach to estimating currency returns for EM economies. We run a regression analysis of the annual change in each country's exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar against its CPI inflation relative to the U.S. We find mostly acceptable r-squared scores (ranging from 57% for Turkey to 1% for Taiwan). For most countries, the intercept is positive (suggesting the currency is trending over time towards PPP) and the coefficient for CPI is, as expected, negative (Table 12). Table 12Calculations For EM Currency Moves What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect? A number of EM currencies, on this analysis, would be expected to depreciate against the U.S. dollar over coming years, including Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. But, weighting the countries by their weights in the MSCI ACWI index, on average the EM universe would be expected to see a currency appreciation against the U.S. dollar of around 2% a year. This is largely due to the influence of China, which has a 29% weight in the EM index. This would be a much better result than the past 10 years when, for example, the Brazilian real has depreciated by 12% a year, the Indonesian rupiah by 16% and the Turkish lira by 37%. This could be because the IMF forecasts of future inflation (4.9% for India, 4.5% for Brazil and 4.1% for Russia), are too optimistic. They are certainly much better than these countries have achieved in the past 10 years (8.0% in India, 6.2% in Brazil, and 9.2% in Russia). Conclusion Arriving at assumptions for future returns is as much an art as a science. Our analysis is based principally on the concept that the future will be similar to long-term history (but not necessarily to the history of the past 30 years, which in many ways were abnormal for financial markets with, for example, a continuous decline in interest rates and inflation). Obviously, therefore, a very different macro environment over the next 10-15 years (for example, one in which inflation spiked, or secular stagnation deepened) would produce a very different results for economic growth and interest rates. However, it will be clear from our analysis that a great deal of the long-term return for equities and bonds is derived from the valuation at the start. Given that current valuations in almost all asset classes are expensive relative to history, this implies that future portfolio returns will be poor compared to recent, and long-term, history. Based on our return assumptions, a typical global portfolio (with 50% equities, 30% bonds, and 20% alternatives) will produce a nominal return of only 4.1% a year over the next decade or so, and a similar U.S. portfolio only 4.6%. This compares to 6.3% and 7.0% over the past 20 years. For pension funds which assume an 7.5% or 8% annual return (as many in the U.S. do), or individual investors planning their retirement on the basis of, say, a 5% annual real return, that outcome would come as a nasty shock. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For the best summary of the evidence on this, please see A Practitioner's Guide To Asset Allocation, by William Kinlaw, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington, Wiley 2017. 2 Please see Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2017 by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, February 2017 3 BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator comprises, for the U.S.: market value of equities / non-financial gross value added adjusted for foreign revenues, trailing PE, Shiller PE, and price to sales. And for other regions: divided yield, market Cap/GDP, trailing PE, price to book, forward PE, price to cash flow, price to sales, and enterprise value/total assets. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Alternative Assets: More Important Than Ever", dated 11 March 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Appendix Correlation Matrix What Returns Can You Expect? What Returns Can You Expect?

Highlights There are a number of cracks emerging in global risk assets. Not only have U.S. junk bond prices recently posted sharp declines, but a number of economic and financial market developments within EM also warrant investors' close attention. In particular: Feature The EM manufacturing PMI has rolled over at relatively low levels, despite continued strength in advanced economies' manufacturing PMI (Chart 1). Importantly, the trend in relative manufacturing PMIs heralds EM equity underperformance against DM bourses (Chart 2). Chart 1EM Manufacturing: Rolling Over EM Manufacturing: Rolling Over EM Manufacturing: Rolling Over Chart 2EM Stocks To Underperform DM Stocks EM Stocks To Underperform DM Stocks EM Stocks To Underperform DM Stocks The Shanghai Container Freight Index has relapsed in recent months. This index has been a good indicator for EM/Asian export volumes (Chart 3, top panel). That said, DRAM semiconductor prices continue to surge (Chart 3, bottom panel). DRAM prices have jumped five-fold in less than two years, justifying the massive rally in semiconductors' stock prices. It is hard to know how long and how far the ascent in DRAM prices will continue. Nevertheless, our hunch is that non-technology exports in Asia will slow down, regardless of what happens in the global technology sector. Consistently, we expect EM non-technology stocks to relapse sooner than later, even as tech stocks remain a wild card. Global and EM tech stocks rallied exponentially and appear to be in a mania phase that could make any reasonable assessment and investment strategy off-mark. Weighing the pros and cons, we continue to recommend overweighting the tech sector within the EM universe, even as the outlook for their absolute performance remains highly uncertain. Within EM tech, we favor semi stocks (Samsung and TSMC) versus internet and social media stocks. The sheer magnitude of the EM equity rally has been driven by a few names such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, Samsung and TSMC. Their combined market cap as a share of the overall MSCI EM equity index has risen to 19%. Remarkably, the equal-weighted MSCI EM stock index has massively underperformed the market cap-weighted MSCI EM equity index (Chart 4, top panel). In contrast, the same measure for DM equities has held up much better (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asian/EM Exports At Risk Asian/EM Exports At Risk Asian/EM Exports At Risk Chart 4A Perspective On Internal Equity Dynamics: EM And DM A Perspective On Internal Equity Dynamics: EM And DM A Perspective On Internal Equity Dynamics: EM And DM EM stock prices have been firm so far despite the rebound in the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 5). As the greenback continues to advance, odds are that EM share prices will dive, as occurred in 2014 and 2015. In China, the effects of triple tightening - the liquidity squeeze by the central bank, the regulatory clampdown on banks and shadow banking by the Banking Regulatory Commission, and the anti-corruption drive that is targeting the financial industry - are gaining momentum. Onshore corporate bond yields and credit spreads over government bonds have risen further since the end of the most recent Party Congress. One of the reasons why policymakers are tightening is to rein in the enormous excesses prevalent in the credit, money and property markets that have developed in recent years. Given that advanced economies have now recovered, the Chinese authorities feel more confident to tighten domestically. Finally, while less recognized by the investment community, inflationary pressures have been rising in China. Although still at 2.25%, core consumer price inflation is clearly trending up, warranting a policy response (Chart 6, top panel). This is especially true given that real deposit rates - deflated by core consumer price inflation - have plummeted into negative territory (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5U.S. Dollar Rebound = EM Pullback U.S. Dollar Rebound = EM Pullback U.S. Dollar Rebound = EM Pullback Chart 6China: Beware Of Rising Inflation China: Beware Of Rising Inflation China: Beware Of Rising Inflation Consistent with tightening, China's official broad money growth has decelerated to an all-time low (Chart 7, top panel). In the meantime, narrow money (M1) growth is falling rapidly. Remarkably, M1 growth has been correlated with Chinese H-share prices (Chart 7, bottom panel). We have extensively documented in past reports1 that China's money and credit impulses are good leading indicators of the mainland's business cycle. The current readings of these indicators signal considerable growth deceleration. In addition, general (central and local) government spending growth has already slowed a lot (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Broad Money Growth Is At Record Low China: Broad Money Growth Is At Record Low China: Broad Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart 8China: Aggregate Fiscal Spending Growth Is Also Weak China: Aggregate Fiscal Spending Growth Is Also Weak China: Aggregate Fiscal Spending Growth Is Also Weak The fundamentally weakest EM currencies such as the South African rand and the Turkish lira have already broken down. Some others have so far been only marginally weak. A chain, however, typically cracks at its weakest link. Hence, it makes sense that the selloff has begun with the fundamentally weakest currencies. We expect other EM currencies to follow. Currency depreciation in EM will undermine returns for foreign investors, and the latter will become marginal sellers in both EM equity markets and local currency bonds. Meanwhile, EM currency depreciation and potentially falling commodities prices will trigger credit spread widening in EM sovereign and corporate bonds. Investment Positioning Global equity portfolios should continue underweighting EM versus DM. The risk-reward profile for EM stocks' absolute performance is extremely unfavorable. We continue to recommend underweighting EM credit markets relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. Our strongest conviction shorts are a basket of the following currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. This will erode EM returns for European investors, and temporarily halt or reverse capital inflows into EM. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, India, Argentina2 and Central Europe. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions From The Road", dated September 20, 2017. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Argentina: A Genuine Bull Market", dated October 25, 2017. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights A Quick Primer: Convertible bonds have a risk/reward profile that falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds. The key difference is that convertible bonds are less exposed to credit spreads than junk bonds and more exposed to the equity market. Performance Vs. Junk: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. The Value Proposition: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Feature From time to time we are asked whether convertible bonds have a place in U.S. fixed income portfolios, and this is the question we consider in today's Special Report. Being a hybrid credit/equity investment, it is clear that convertibles are a fairly high-risk proposition for U.S. bond funds. In fact, we find that the historical risk/reward profile of the sector falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated High-Yield corporate debt (Chart 1). So while not for every investor, we do find compelling reasons for why, in the current macro environment, U.S. bond funds should consider replacing some high-yield debt with an allocation to convertible bonds. Chart 1Fixed Income Universe - Risk Vs. Return* (1990s To Present) A Place For Convertibles A Place For Convertibles This report proceeds as follows. The first section provides a quick primer on convertible bonds, with a focus on the risk factors that drive the sector's performance. The second section takes a look at the historical performance of convertibles in different macro environments. The last section considers valuation in the sector. A Quick Primer Convertible bonds are much like traditional corporate bonds in that they pay periodic fixed coupons and have a maturity date. However, convertibles also give bondholders the option to convert the bond into a pre-specified number of shares of common stock. Investors obviously pay a premium for this option but have the potential to realize large gains if the firm's stock price rises. Convertibles are typically issued by smaller firms with low credit ratings. Fifty percent of the face value of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Convertibles index comes from small-cap and mid-cap firms. In addition, 58% of the Convertibles index face value comes from non-rated firms. For comparison, only 0.22% of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield bond index is un-rated. Technology firms make up 35% of the Convertibles index, which should not be surprising since the convertibles market appeals to small issuers with large financing demands who may have limited access to traditional debt and equity markets. The Convertibles index also has a large concentration in Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals (19%) and Financials (15%). In contrast, the largest sectors in the High-Yield bond index are Communications (20%), Consumer Cyclicals (15%) and Energy (14%). Chart 2Convertible Bond Value Illustrated A Place For Convertibles A Place For Convertibles The value of a convertible bond is illustrated in Chart 2. This chart shows how the price of a convertible bond (the line labeled "Convertible Bond Value Curve") evolves relative to the firm's stock price (shown on the x-axis). It also helps define a few key terms: Parity: Also called the "conversion value" of the security. This represents the value of the security if the conversion option is exercised. It is the 45 degree line passing through the origin of Chart 2. Conversion Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its parity value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying the firm's equity. It can be thought of as the cost of downside protection for an equity investor. Chart 2 shows that this cost is larger when the firm's equity price is low. Investment Value: Also called the "bond floor". This is the value of the security if the conversion option is never exercised. It is the thick dashed line in Chart 2. Investment Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its investment value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying a corporate bond. It can be thought of as the cost a convertible bond investor must pay to get potential equity exposure. Chart 2 shows that this cost is greater when the firm's stock price is high. We can use the concepts of conversion premium and investment premium to define three types of convertible bonds. A convertible bond is called "credit sensitive" when its underlying stock price is low. This type of convertible bond is valued very similarly to a corporate bond because there is only a low chance that the conversion option will be exercised. It therefore has a large conversion premium and a small investment premium. Conversely, an "equity sensitive" convertible bond is valued similarly to an equity. This is a convertible bond with an elevated underlying stock price, one that would make it beneficial to exercise the conversion option. These securities have high investment premiums and very low conversion premiums. "Balanced" convertible bonds fall between the other two categories. The stock price has not quite reached the value that makes the conversion option attractive, but it is close enough that the security trades at a significant investment premium. Risk Factors & Performance Drivers Based on the historical risk/reward relationship shown in Chart 1, it is clear that if convertible bonds should be included in U.S. fixed income portfolios it is in place of B-rated and Caa-rated junk bonds. We must therefore consider what factors determine the relative performance between high-yield bonds and convertibles. Chart 3Risk Decomposition, 1999-Present A Place For Convertibles A Place For Convertibles To do that we performed regressions of monthly total returns for both an index of convertible bonds and an index of B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds on three risk factors: Interest rate risk: proxied by the yield on the Treasury Master index Credit risk: proxied by the change in the high-yield bond spread Equity risk: proxied by monthly returns from the S&P 600 The top panel of Chart 3 shows the betas from the regressions. It shows that junk bonds have greater sensitivity to interest rate risk and credit risk, but are less sensitive to equity risk. However, to perform a complete risk attribution we need to consider both the sensitivity of returns to each risk factor and the volatilities of the risk factors themselves. The second panel of Chart 3 shows the variance of each of the three risk factors and the covariance between each pair of risk factors. With that information we are able to calculate the exposure of both junk bond and convertible bond returns to each risk factor by multiplying the squared beta by the variance of each risk factor.1 The results of this complete risk accounting are presented in the bottom panel of Chart 3. It shows that both convertible bond and junk bond total returns have small exposures to interest rate risk, with junk bonds having a somewhat larger exposure. However, the big difference between the two assets is that junk bond returns are mostly determined by credit risk while convertible bond returns are mostly determined by equity risk. This means that we can boil the decision of whether to invest in junk bonds or convertible bonds down to the question of whether junk spreads are likely to outperform equities. It is this question that we address in the next section. Convertible Bond Performance: Equities Vs. Credit Chart 4 shows that the history of relative total returns between convertible and high-yield bonds has gone through five distinct phases since the early 1990s. Chart 4Five Phases Of Convertible Bond Performance Five Phases Of Convertible Bond Performance Five Phases Of Convertible Bond Performance In the first phase, which culminated in the 1999/2000 tech boom, convertibles significantly outperformed junk. This is because junk spreads widened while equities performed exceptionally well. The fact that convertible bonds were a popular financing choice for small-cap tech companies also helped the sector's returns in 1999. The second phase, between 2000 and 2005, was characterized by falling Treasury yields and tighter credit spreads. Equities also performed well during this period, but not by enough to offset the impact of falling yields and tighter spreads. Junk bonds outperformed convertibles. Convertibles then outperformed junk from 2005 until the peak of the stock market in 2007. Junk spreads widened prior to the peak in the stock market, and this caused convertibles to outperform junk. Junk outperformed convertibles from 2007 until the mid-2012 trough in Treasury yields. This period was somewhat unique in that both equities and junk spreads were relatively flat. It was the greater impact of falling Treasury yields on junk bonds that drove the relative performance. Finally, convertibles have outperformed sharply since 2012, due to much higher equity prices. Junk spreads are also tighter but did experience a large widening in 2014/15. Higher Treasury yields during this time have also favored convertibles over junk. The Outlook For Convertibles The above framework gives us a way to qualitatively assess whether convertibles are likely to outperform junk going forward. First, with the Fed likely still not passed the mid-point of its rate hike cycle, Treasury yields will probably continue to rise. This will favor convertible bonds over junk bonds. Second, we have previously shown that junk bond spreads are fast approaching historically tight levels.2 In fact, we can calculate that B-rated junk spreads can only tighten another 180 bps before reaching all-time expensive valuations and Caa-rated spreads can only tighten another 375 bps. This represents only four months and five months of average monthly spread tightening, respectively. Further, junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets. The 2008 and 2002 bear markets being the most obvious examples (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). If this pattern is repeated it will help convertibles outperform junk in the late stages of the current recovery. On the equity side, although valuations are also expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low enough for the Fed to maintain an accommodative policy stance. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service also thinks that small cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months.3 As discussed above, convertible bonds are mostly issued by small cap firms. Our Cyclical Capitalization Indicator is above the zero line, indicating a favorable macro environment for small caps, and our valuation indicator shows that small caps are relatively cheap (Chart 5). However, arguably more important is that small caps remain a strong high-beta equity play (Chart 5, bottom panel). As long as the equity bull market is maintained, then small caps should outperform. One final factor that should drive the relative outperformance of small cap equities is the potential for Congress to pass tax legislation in the first half of next year. The relative small cap trade has been strongly correlated with other trades that are likely to benefit from proposed tax legislation and right now the market is probably assigning too low a probability to the chance that such legislation will pass (Chart 6). The biggest near-term risk for convertible bond returns relative to junk stems from the Technology sector. Chart 7 shows that divergences in performance between convertible bond sectors and high-yield bond sectors tend to be short lived. It also shows that Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months. It is almost certain that convertible Technology bonds are due for a period of underperformance, much like what happened to Healthcare & Pharmaceutical convertibles in 2014/15 (Chart 7, bottom panel). Given the size of the convertible Technology sector, any period of sector-specific underperformance would also exert a meaningful drag on the overall index. Chart 5Small Caps Poised For Outperformance Small Caps Poised For Outperformance Small Caps Poised For Outperformance Chart 6The Trump Trades Are Back On The Trump Trades Are Back On The Trump Trades Are Back On Chart 7Tax Cuts Will Help Small Caps Tax Cuts Will Help Small Caps Tax Cuts Will Help Small Caps In general, traditional late-cycle dynamics - rising Treasury yields and junk spreads widening before equities sell off - should favor convertible bonds over junk between now and the end of the economic recovery. We expect this will also be the case in the current cycle, although the recent outperformance in the technology sector makes us cautious in the near-term. The best strategy is probably to replace some low-rated high-yield bonds with convertibles, while avoiding the technology sector, and then subbing out even more junk for convertibles once Technology convertibles have come back down to earth. Bottom Line: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. This pattern will likely be repeated in the current cycle, although lofty valuations in the Technology sector make us cautious in the near-term. The Value Proposition The final question worth considering is whether convertible bonds appear fairly valued relative to history and investment alternatives. Specifically, we consider valuation from three different perspectives: Are equities fairly valued relative to high-yield bonds? If equities are cheap relative to high-yield bonds then it is reasonable to expect that convertible bonds are also cheap. Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to equities? Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to themselves? To answer the first question we use the BCA S&P 500 Valuation Indicator as our measure of equity valuation (Chart 8, top panel) and the 12-month high-yield breakeven spread as our measure of junk bond valuation (Chart 8, bottom panel). Both indicators are at relatively expensive levels. According to our chosen valuation metrics, equity valuation was only more expensive than it is today during the late 1990s tech boom, but in that period it reached much more expensive levels before changing course. In contrast, there have been several periods when junk breakeven spreads have been tighter, but even the all-time low is not that far below current levels. To create a true relative value indicator we standardized both our equity valuation indicator and the 12-month breakeven junk spread, and then subtracted one from the other. The result is shown in the middle panel of Chart 9 and it suggests that equities look a tad cheap compared to junk. However, relative valuation is nowhere near an extreme, and a more reasonable conclusion would be that equities and junk bonds appear fairly valued relative to each other. Chart 8Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation I Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation I Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation I Chart 9Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation II Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation II Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation II To answer the second question, whether convertible bonds look cheap relative to equities, we compare the parity (or conversion value) of the Convertible Bond index to our equity valuation indicator. The parity of the Convertible index is shown in the middle panel of Chart 8, and it shows that convertible bonds are quite expensive, but not as expensive as they were between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, our equity valuation indicator is at its most expensive levels of the current cycle. Once again, we standardize both our equity valuation indicator and the Convertible Bond index parity and take the difference. The result is shown in the bottom panel of Chart 9, and unsurprisingly, it suggests that convertible bonds appear relatively cheap compared to equities. To answer the final question, how convertibles are valued relative to themselves, we turn to Charts 10 and 11. Chart 10 shows the conversion premium of the Convertible Bond index relative to its parity. In essence, this chart shows how much extra an investor is being charged for convertible bonds relative to a similar equity portfolio. For a given parity level, a low conversion premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, and vice-versa. At the moment, Chart 10 shows that the index conversion premium is almost exactly in line with its expected value given the level of parity. Chart 10Conversion Premium Vs. Parity A Place For Convertibles A Place For Convertibles Chart 11Investment Premium Vs. Parity A Place For Convertibles A Place For Convertibles Chart 11 shows the Convertible Bond index's investment premium relative to parity. This chart shows how much extra an investor must pay for convertible bonds relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. Once again, a low investment premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, but at the moment the investment premium appears quite elevated. For the given parity level, investors are paying a bit too much for convertibles relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. In summary, while convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, on balance, there is not much of a pure valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. We do not think that valuation will be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus junk. Bottom Line: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Alex Wang, CFA, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 We also use beta weights to attribute the covariance risk to each individual risk factor and calculate the unexplained risk as the variance of the bond returns less the risk exposure from each of our three factors. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Small Cap Surge", dated October 9, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Chart 1Fed Must Fall Behind The Curve Fed Must Fall Behind The Curve Fed Must Fall Behind The Curve Jerome Powell will assume the Fed Chairmanship at a critical juncture for monetary policy. Core PCE inflation is still well below the Fed's 2% target, and yet, the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is a mere 71 bps (Chart 1). Such a flat yield curve alongside such low inflation suggests that the market believes the Fed will tighten the yield curve into inversion before inflation even regains the Fed's target. That would be an unprecedented policy mistake that the new Chairman will seek to avoid at all costs. This means either inflation will soon rise, justifying the FOMC's median rate hike projections, or inflation will stay low and the Fed will be forced to take a dovish turn. Either way the Fed must "fall behind the curve" and start chasing inflation higher. The act of falling behind the inflation curve means that long-maturity TIPS breakevens are likely to widen, the yield curve will steepen and the policy back-drop will stay accommodative for spread product. We recommend positioning for all three of these outcomes. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 52 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 288 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month, and now sits at 97 bps. Two weeks ago we noted that there is simply not much room for investment grade corporate spreads to tighten.1 Looking at 12-month breakeven spreads shown as a percentile rank relative to history, we see that A-rated paper has only been more expensive than it is today 7% of the time. Baa-rated paper has been more expensive only 9% of the time (Chart 2).2 Further, we calculate that at current duration levels Baa-rated option-adjusted spreads can only tighten another 36 bps before the sector is more expensive than it has ever been. Similarly, A-rated spreads can tighten another 14 bps, Aa-rated spreads another 17 bps and Aaa-rated spreads another 7 bps. All this to say that corporate bonds are essentially a carry trade at this stage of the cycle. The important question is how much longer we can pick up the carry before a period of significant spread widening. With low inflation keeping monetary policy accommodative and accelerating profit growth putting downward pressure on leverage (bottom 2 panels), the carry trade appears safe for now (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Into The Fire Into The Fire Table 3B Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Into The Fire Into The Fire High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 51 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 580 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 9 bps on the month, and currently sits at 339 bps. Based on our current forecast for default losses we calculate that, if junk spreads remain flat, high-yield excess returns will be 230 bps for the next 12 months. If spreads tighten by 100 bps we should expect excess returns of 606 bps, and if spreads widen by 100 bps we should expect excess returns of -145 bps (Chart 3). Given that the OAS for the high-yield index can only tighten another 139 bps before it reaches all-time expensive valuations, 606 bps is a fairly optimistic excess return projection. But equally, with inflation pressures still muted and monetary policy still accommodative, more than 100 bps of spread widening is also unlikely. Our base case forecast is that high-yield excess returns will be between 2% and 5% (annualized) on a 6-12 month investment horizon.3 In a recent report we noted that high-yield generally looks more attractive than investment grade after adjusting for differences in spread volatility between the two sectors.4 Specifically, we calculate that it will take 39 days of average spread tightening before B-rated bonds reach all-time expensive levels. The same calculation shows it will take 19 days for A-rated debt. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 31 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread was roughly flat on the month, as was the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). Last month we upgraded Agency MBS from underweight to neutral, noting that OAS have become significantly more attractive during the past year, particularly relative to corporate credit (Chart 4). The spread widening likely resulted from the market pricing-in the impact of the Fed's balance sheet run-off. Now that the run-off has begun, and its future pace has been well telegraphed, its impact has probably also been fully priced. While OAS is the correct measure of MBS carry because it adjusts for expected losses due to prepayments, it is the change in the nominal spread that determines capital gains and losses. With that in mind, it is difficult to see a catalyst for significantly wider nominal MBS spreads on a 6-12 month horizon. The two factors that correlate most closely with nominal MBS spreads - credit spreads and mortgage refinancings - are likely to stay depressed (bottom panel). Higher mortgage rates would obviously prevent refinancings from rising. But we showed in a recent report that even if rates move lower the coupon and age distribution of outstanding mortgages has made refi activity much less sensitive to rates than in the past.5 Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 193 bps. Sovereign bonds underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 5 bps on the month. Foreign and Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 2 bps and 9 bps, respectively. Supranationals outperformed by 4 bps. The underperformance in Sovereigns was concentrated in Mexican debt, which sold off as the White House took a hard line on NAFTA negotiations. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 62 bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 367 bps (Chart 5). Excess returns for Local Authority debt - mostly taxable municipal debt and USD-denominated Canadian provincial debt - have exceeded excess returns from Baa-rated corporate debt so far this year, despite the sector's average credit rating of Aa3/A1. In a recent report we looked at whether USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt is an attractive alternative to U.S. high-yield corporates.6 We observed that hard currency EM sovereigns and similarly rated U.S. corporate bonds offer almost exactly the same breakeven spread, and also that EM Sovereigns have been getting comparatively cheaper since early last year. Further, we observed that periods when EM Sovereigns outperform U.S. corporates tend to coincide with falling U.S. rate hike expectations, as measured by our 24-month fed funds discounter. At present, our 24-month discounter is at 74 bps, meaning the market expects less than three Fed hikes during the next two years. We anticipate a better opportunity to move into EM Sovereigns once U.S. rate hike expectations have adjusted higher. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 43 basis points in October (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Munis have outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 251 bps, year-to-date. The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio edged down in October and currently sits at 87%, still extremely tight relative to its post-crisis trading range. M/T yield ratios look much more attractive at the long-end of the curve (Chart 6), and we continue to recommend that investors extend maturity within their municipal bond allocations. Congress released its first draft of proposed tax legislation last week, and while it will certainly undergo some changes in the coming months, it appears as though it will not be very negative for municipal bondholders. Crucially, the top marginal personal tax rate remains unchanged at 39.6% and demand for munis should benefit from the removal of other deductions. A reduction of the corporate tax rate to 20% remains a risk, but that will likely be revised higher as the bill is re-written. Fundamentally, state & local government health improved sharply in Q3, with net borrowing likely falling to $157 billion from $211 billion in Q2, assuming that corporate tax revenues are unchanged (Chart 6).7 The rate of growth in state & local tax revenues now exceeds expenditures and that should put further downward pressure on borrowing in the coming quarters. However, a decline in state & local government borrowing is already reflected in historically tight M/T yield ratios. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in October alongside a sharp move higher in the expected pace of Fed rate hikes (Chart 7). The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 8 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps. The upward adjustment in rate hike expectations benefited our recommendation to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. That trade is now 13 bps in the money since it was initiated on July 10. Further, the July 2018 contract is still discounting fewer than two rate hikes between now and next July. If two more hikes are delivered by July our trade will earn an additional 5 bps. If three more hikes are delivered it will earn an additional 31 bps. In a recent report we discussed why the Fed must soon "fall behind the curve" on inflation and allow the yield curve to steepen.8 Essentially, unless the Fed starts to chase inflation higher it will soon invert the yield curve without having met its inflation goal. That would be a severe policy mistake. This means that either inflation must start to rise, or the Fed must slow its pace of rate hikes. Both scenarios lead to a steeper yield curve. We continue to position for a steeper curve via a long position in the 5-year bullet versus a short position in the 2/10 barbell. At the moment our model shows the 5-year bullet trading roughly in-line with its fair value, or alternatively that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for an unchanged 2/10 slope on a 6-month horizon.9 TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 33 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -99 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 4 bps on the month but, at 1.86%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. As was pointed out on the front page of this report, the Fed must "fall behind the curve" on inflation if it wants to avoid a policy mistake. Our expectation is that this will occur because inflation will move higher in the coming months. The 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE has already bounced off its lows (Chart 8) and pipeline measures of inflation are soaring (panels 3 & 4). However, even if inflation remains stubbornly low, we think any downside in long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates will prove fleeting. We are approaching an inflection point where if inflation does not rise the Fed will have to adopt a much more dovish policy stance. This should limit any downside in long-dated breakevens. As long as the Fed can maintain interest rates low enough for realized inflation to eventually recover to its target, then we anticipate that long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that occurs. According to our model, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently trading in-line with other financial market variables - oil, the trade-weighted dollar and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (panel 2). ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 81 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 71 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed the benchmark by 32 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 176 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 5 bps in October and, at 33 bps, it remains well below its average pre-crisis trading range. We continue to favor credit cards over auto loans within Aaa-rated ABS, despite the modest additional spread pick-up available in autos (Chart 9). The main reason is that auto loan net losses have been trending steadily higher for several years while credit card charge-offs are still depressed (panel 4). However, even the credit card space is starting to see rising delinquency rates, albeit off a low base, and banks are tightening lending standards on both auto loans and cards (bottom panel). We expect that tight labor markets and solid income growth will prevent a surge in consumer delinquencies, but these are nonetheless troubling signals that bear monitoring. From a valuation perspective, with the 33 bps OAS offered from Aaa-rated Consumer ABS now only slightly higher than the 29 bps offered by Agency Residential MBS, we advocate a neutral allocation to consumer ABS. Further increases in delinquencies could warrant an eventual downgrade, stay tuned. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 71 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 182 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened sharply in October, from 74 bps to 65 bps. At current levels it is now one standard deviation below its pre-crisis average (Chart 10). With spreads at such low levels in an environment of tightening commercial real estate (CRE) lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, we view the risk/reward trade-off in non-Agency CMBS as quite unfavorable. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 96 bps. The index OAS for Agency CMBS tightened 6 bps on the month but, at 46 bps, the sector continues to offer an attractive spread pick-up relative to other low-risk spread product. The Aaa-rated consumer ABS OAS is only 33 bps, and the OAS on conventional 30-year Agency MBS is a mere 29 bps. Such an attractive spread pick-up in a sector that benefits from Agency backing is probably worth grabbing. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.69% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.67%. The Global Manufacturing PMI increased to 53.5 in October, its highest level in six-and-a-half years. Bullish sentiment toward the dollar also edged higher, but not by enough to prevent the fair value reading from our 2-factor Treasury model from climbing. Last month's fair value reading was 2.65%. The U.S. and Eurozone PMIs continued to trend up, while the Chinese PMI held flat. The Japanese PMI ticked down from 52.9 to 52.8. Most importantly, of the 36 countries we track 34 now have PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line. The global economic recovery has become incredibly broad based, a bearish development for U.S. Treasury yields. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.33%. 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We use breakeven spreads to adjust for the changing duration of the index over time. We calculate the 12-month breakeven spread as option-adjusted spread divided by duration. We ignore the impact of convexity. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade", dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Yet Another Update", dated October 10, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade", dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 For further details on our model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

A capex revival is underway, powered by exceptionally strong business and consumer sentiment, the breadth of which covers virtually all developed economies. This global capex upcycle should underpin top-line growth and margin expansion for the industrial conglomerates index, whose product and geographic diversification ensures exposure to the global upswing. However, the index has underperformed the broad market, dragged down by heavyweight GE and its specific headwinds. Further, the index's highest exposure sectors (namely aerospace, health care equipment, energy equipment & services and utilities) are mostly weighted negatively in our overall sector view. Adding it up, the negatives offset the positives and, in the context of fair valuations, we expect the S&P industrial conglomerates index to perform in line with the overall market. We are initiating coverage with a neutral rating. The key theme that has been driving our investment thesis in U.S. Equity Strategy in the past quarter has been accelerating global industrial production and trade, with a corresponding rotation out of defensive and into cyclical stocks. We have been adjusting our portfolio accordingly and it now has a deep cyclical bent with leverage to a burgeoning capex cycle. Enticing Macro Outlook Industrial conglomerates capitalize on most of these themes: they are globally-oriented and capex-driven, and leading indicators of final demand suggest that earnings should accelerate in the near-term. Capex Upcycle On the domestic front, regional Fed surveys of domestic capex intentions and the ISM manufacturing survey are hitting modern highs; both have been excellent indicators of a capex upcycle and the signal is unambiguously positive (Chart 1). Our Capex Indicator also corroborates this message. Durable goods orders have already surged and inventories have reverted to a more normal level, coming out of the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession (Chart 2). This implies increasingly resilient pricing power from a demand-driven capital goods upcycle. Further, the capital goods cycle has significant room to run as new orders remain well below the 2013-2014 levels. Chart 1Exceptionally Strong Sentiment... Exceptionally Strong Sentiment… Exceptionally Strong Sentiment… Chart 2...Is Already Reflected In A Capex Upcycle …Is Already Reflected In A Capex Upcycle …Is Already Reflected In A Capex Upcycle Chart 3Capital Goods Demand Is Globally Synchronous Capital Goods Demand Is Globally Synchronous Capital Goods Demand Is Globally Synchronous The global picture echoes the domestic, with the global manufacturing PMI surging to a six-year high. The global strength is remarkably broad: all 46 of the economies tracked by the OECD are expected to see gains in 2017, a first since the GFC, and the BCA global leading economic indicator is signaling all-clear (Chart 3). U.S. Dollar Reflation The greenback's slide in 2017 should further boost global demand for domestic exports. In fact, given the diversity of industries served by the industrial conglomerates and the relatively high proportion of foreign sales (Table 1), the U.S. dollar is the single largest driver of both sales and earnings (Chart 4). Due to the lagged impact on results from the currency, industrial conglomerates margins should benefit from translation gains in the next two quarters, regardless of where the U.S. dollar moves. Table 1Conglomerates More Global Than Industrial Peers Industrial Conglomerates: Rebooting Industrial Conglomerates: Rebooting Chart 4U.S. Dollar Drives Conglomerate Profits U.S. Dollar Drives Conglomerate Profits U.S. Dollar Drives Conglomerate Profits But GE Weighs On The Index With the enormously supportive demand environment in mind, one could safely assume that the globally integrated niche industrial conglomerates index has been a strong performer in 2017. That would be true were it not for index heavyweight (and laggard) General Electric. Excluding GE from this index, industrial conglomerates have outperformed the S&P 500 by 20% since the start of the year (Chart 5). However, GE represents 40% of the index (Chart 5) and its current transformation continues to weigh heavily on its share price and, hence, the index at large. The new CEO, who took over earlier this month, has stated that "everything is on the table" as part of a $20 billion target for divestitures over the coming two years. The current fear among investors is that GE will need to reduce its dividend to preserve enough liquidity to continue growing despite the fairly synchronous storm in its end-markets. In March, 2009, GE's share price reached its modern nadir, a level not seen since the recession of the early 1990's, a week following its dividend cut announcement. While hardly analogous to GE today (recall that a cash crisis at GE Capital threatened to bankrupt the entire firm), the risk of a dividend cut will keep GE's share price suppressed, and likely hold the overall index hostage. Payout ratios in the industrial conglomerates index reflect GE's cash flow woes and have now surpassed the pre-dividend cut level during the GFC (Chart 6). This largely reflects cash contraction, combined with an unwillingness to even halt dividend growth. Regardless, GE investors clearly anticipate the new CEO will reduce the dividend, having pushed the yield to its highest level since the last dividend cut (Chart 6). Chart 5GE Still Dominates The Index GE Still Dominates The Index GE Still Dominates The Index Chart 6A Dividend Cut Looks To Be In The Cards A Dividend Cut Looks To Be In The Cards A Dividend Cut Looks To Be In The Cards Soft End-Markets Backdrop From the mid-1990's until 2007, the narrative of the S&P industrial conglomerates index was the rise and fall of GE Capital, as evidenced by the index' price. In 2015, the now largely complete sale of the majority of GE Capital was announced, realigning the company as an industrial manufacturer. Accordingly, analyzing the key end-market industries that the S&P industrial conglomerates cater to is in order: aerospace, healthcare, oil & gas and utilities. Chart 7Aerospace Profits Look Set To Fall Aerospace Profits Look Set To Fall Aerospace Profits Look Set To Fall Chart 8Health Care Equipment Pricing Collapsing Health Care Equipment Pricing Collapsing Health Care Equipment Pricing Collapsing Aerospace (Underweight recommendation) - We downgraded the BCA aerospace index to underweight at the end of 2015, corresponding fairly closely to the peak of the aerospace orders cycle (Chart 7). Since then, orders have fallen by half reflecting a downturn in the commercial aerospace cycle. While shipments have been falling, the decline has been much less precipitous as manufacturers have been running down backlogs. Historically, maintenance has buffered aerospace profits, repair and consumables activity, though weak current pricing power suggests that this may prove less sustainable than in previous cycles. Both GE & HON share extensive exposure to aerospace demand as it represented 23% and 38% of 2016 revenues, respectively. Health Care Equipment (Neutral recommendation) - We reduced our recommendation to neutral earlier this year as weaker demand no longer supported the thesis of an earnings-led outperformance. Since then the industry's outlook has not improved as demand has downshifted and pricing has cooled substantially; orders and production both crested last year and pricing power has contracted relative to overall since December 2016 (Chart 8). This bodes ill for medical equipment margins. Health care equipment represented 16% and 18% of GE & MMM 2016 revenues, respectively. Energy Equipment & Services (Overweight recommendation) - Energy Equipment & Services is our only overweight recommended sector relevant to the industrial conglomerates analysis. We upgraded in late 2016 (and doubled down on June 2) based on three key factors: troughing rig counts, cresting global oil inventories and falling production growth. Two of these factors have come to fruition: the global rig count bottomed in 2015, and has staged its best recovery since 2009 (Chart 9) and the growth in total OECD oil stocks is moderating rapidly with recent large storage draws. The key missing ingredient has been pricing power, which should eventually turn up if rig counts prove resilient. Energy equipment & services represented 11% of GE's 2016 revenues. Utilities (Underweight recommendation) - As previously noted, a key macro theme in U.S. Equity Strategy is accelerating global industrial production and trade. Utilities tend to move in the opposite direction of that theme given their safe haven status (top panel, Chart 10). Combined with falling domestic electricity production and capacity utilization, and rising turbine & generator inventories, the industry's outlook is bleak (middle & bottom panels, Chart 10). GE's Power segment is one of the world's largest gas and steam turbine manufacturers and delivered 24% of 2016 revenues. Investment Recommendation A roaring, globally synchronous capital goods upcycle should mostly keep sales and profits buoyant in this industrials subsector. However, high concentration in one stock, which is experiencing a greater than normal amount of flux, adds significant specific risk. Further, we are less optimistic about the key industries served by the industrial conglomerates than we are for the economy at large, implying more opportunity for outperformance from other, more focused, S&P industrials peers. If valuations were particularly compelling they could provide a cushion to any profit mishap, but this is not the case. Our Valuation Indicator is in the neutral zone and, while our Technical Indicator is in oversold territory, it has shown an ability to remain at these levels for prolonged periods (Chart 11). Chart 9Energy Services Is A Bright Spot Energy Services Is A Bright Spot Energy Services Is A Bright Spot Chart 10Utilities Are In A Deep Cyclical Decline Utilities Are In A Deep Cyclical Decline Utilities Are In A Deep Cyclical Decline Chart 11Valuations Are Not Compelling Valuations Are Not Compelling Valuations Are Not Compelling Bottom Line: Netting it out, we think the S&P industrial conglomerates index should perform broadly in line with the overall market. Accordingly, we are initiating coverage with a neutral rating. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INDCX - GE, MMM, HON, ROP. Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com