Vietnam

Vietnamese stocks can remain shaky for a few more months. But they have cheapened considerably, and equity portfolios with longer terms investment horizon should overweight them in EM, Emerging Asia and Frontier Market portfolios.

Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance ​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Highlights The bull run in Vietnamese stocks is due for a pause as the weakness in overall EM markets spreads to this bourse.  Household consumption will stay constrained as new COVID-19 cases remain high and fiscal and monetary stimulus remain absent. Social distancing measures and related supply disruptions have hobbled labor-intensive manufacturing and exports thereof. Vietnam is facing saturation or stagnation in two of its major exports: electronics and phones. The country needs to find a new high value-added export sector to which to transition to maintain large trade surpluses. Vietnam’s longer-term structural outlook remains bright. The country is set to gain further global export market share due to strong productivity gains and competitive unit labor costs.  Absolute-return investors should book profits on their Vietnamese holdings for now and wait for a better entry point. Asset allocators, however, should continue to overweight this bourse in overall EM, emerging Asia or frontier market equity portfolios. Feature Vietnamese stocks have surged to new highs in absolute terms and have outperformed their frontier and emerging market peers since spring 2020 (Chart 1). Can the bull run continue into the new year? We advise caution. Vietnamese stocks may be in for a period of weakness in absolute terms. The reason is a negative outlook on EM markets: a drop in EM stock prices is typically followed by one in Vietnamese stock prices (Chart 2).   Chart 2Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Weakness In EM Markets Typically Spreads To Vietnamese Stocks Too Chart 1The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause The Bull Run In Vietnamese Stocks May Be Due For A Pause   In addition, Vietnam’s exports, the mainstay of this market, are likely to face some headwinds in the months ahead. Absolute-return investors therefore would do well to book profits now and wait for a better entry point to this bourse later in the year. That said, the longer-term outlook of this economy remains bright, and that will help boost this market beyond any near-term jitters. Robust fundamentals should also ensure continued outperformance relative to overall EM stocks. We recommend that investors stay overweight Vietnam in EM and emerging Asian equity portfolios. Battered Consumption The surge in daily new cases since August last year forced Vietnam to implement stringent lockdowns and social distancing measures. A consequence of these measures was a free fall in Vietnam’s household consumption. Both retail sales and car sales plummeted to levels not seen since 2016 before recovering recently (Chart 3). This caused the economy to shrink by over 6% in real terms in the third quarter last year – the first-ever contraction in decades. Now, with the new, highly infectious Omicron variant spreading fast, the number of daily new cases and deaths remains stubbornly high – despite many of the lockdown measures still in place (Chart 4). It is therefore far from clear when normal economic activity will resume. Incidentally, 57% of Vietnamese people have been fully vaccinated so far. Chart 4Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Rising Omicron Cases May Hobble Economic Activity Again Chart 3The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption The Surge In The Delta Variant Last Year Severely Hurt Vietnamese Household Consumption   Notably, despite the weak economy, there has not been any meaningful policy stimulus in recent months. Fiscal policy has remained very tight. Government spending, excluding interest and principal payments, has contracted by 4.5%. The 2022 budget proposals envisage only a 2% rise in total nominal fiscal expenditure. The central bank, for its part, has also not announced any new easing measures in the recent past. Lacking fiscal and monetary support, domestic consumption and therefore overall growth will remain somewhat constrained going forward. Supply Disruptions While domestic consumption is a concern, a more investor-relevant issue in Vietnam is the pandemic’s negative impact on the country’s manufacturing/export sector. This is because, unlike household consumption, manufacturing activity and manufacturing exports have a strong bearing on the country’s stock prices. The reason is that developing market stocks in general are driven by global trade cycles. And since Vietnam’s total trade amounts to almost twice as much as the country’s GDP, the ebbs and flows in the former have an outsized impact on the domestic economy, and by extension, on the stock market (Chart 5). The surge in new cases since August created severe hindrances in the manufacturing/export sector supply chains and labor availability. In the clothing and textile industry, almost a third of the sector’s three million employees quit jobs, or stayed away from work with or without pay, as per Vietnam Textile & Apparel Association, an industry body.1The lack of labor coupled with bottlenecks in logistics have led to a sharp drop in Vietnam’s textile and garment exports (Chart 6, top panel).  Chart 6Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Garment Exports Are Badly Hit, While Phone Exports Are Facing Stagnation Chart 5Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth Vietnamese Stocks Are Highly Leveraged To Export Growth   Due to hobbled production, manufacturing inventories have piled up (Chart 7). It is estimated that most of this large inventory is comprised of raw materials and intermediate goods. If so, that will discourage local raw material/intermediate goods production in the months to come. Chart 7The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up The Pandemic Is Hampering Shipments While Inventories Are Piling Up In sum, it’s far from clear that a rapid revival in manufacturing production and exports is in the cards amid the ongoing Omicron surge. This will remain a headwind for Vietnamese stock prices. Exports Outlook Despite the setback in the textile sector, the country’s overall exports held up quite well last year. That’s because the slack was more than made up by the booming computer and electronics exports. This is thanks to the massive demand surge in those goods in past two years due to the global work-from-home phenomenon (Chart 6, top panel). However, going forward, odds are that global demand for these items will abate as saturation sets in. This will slow the growth rate in Vietnam’s computer and electronic exports. Incidentally, Vietnam’s single largest export items, phones and spare parts, are also showing signs of stagnation. In absolute dollar terms, they have been flattish since early 2018. Phone production volumes have remained at the same level as in 2015 (Chart 6, bottom panel). With mobile phone penetration in all major economies is already quite high, phone exports certainly cannot propel Vietnam’s exports as strongly as in the past decade. If this is the case, it can have a meaningful negative impact not only on Vietnam’s exports, but also on its trade balance, and by extension, its current account balance. The reason for this is that phones and spare parts have probably been the most value-added item among Vietnamese exports. The difference between the export revenues they earned and the import cost of the components has been much higher and has risen more sharply than in any other major export items (Chart 8, top and middle panels). This helped the country rack up rising trade surpluses. In the absence of net export revenues from phones and spare parts, Vietnam’s trade and current account balance would be deeply negative (Chart 8, bottom panel). Given that phones are no longer the sunrise sector worldwide, the country needs to find and move to some other high value-added sector to maintain its wide trade surplus. As of now, it’s not clear that this is happening. In the past two years, the number of newly approved manufacturing FDI projects have fallen to decade-low levels. The dollar value of approved manufacturing FDI projects has also fallen in tandem (Chart 9, top panel). In fact, overall FDI approvals have also fallen – suggesting actual FDI inflows might weaken in the months ahead (Chart 9, bottom panel). Chart 8Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Net Phone Exports Had Been Crucial To Vietnam's Large Trade Surpluses Chart 9FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months FDI Inflows Into Vietnam Might Recede In The Coming Months   Until Vietnam finds a new high value-added export sector to which to transition, its stagnating phone and electronics exports mean that overall export growth is set to take a breather. Finally, one external tailwind for Vietnam since 2018 has been the trade war between the US and China. Because the two largest economies put various tariff and non-tariff barriers on each other, it allowed Vietnam to double its share of imports to the US in just three years (Chart 10). Vietnamese exports also clearly benefit when the dong weakens vis-à-vis the Chinese yuan. The fact that the Chinese authorities have allowed the yuan to be one of the strongest currencies over the past year has helped Vietnamese exports. In the future, however, decelerating growth in China may prompt the PBOC to seek a weaker yuan. If so, that could be another headwind to Vietnamese exports (Chart 11).       Chart 11The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports The Tailwind From A Weak Dong Versus The Chinese Yuan May Diminish This Year, Hurting Exports Chart 10Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War Vietnamese Exports Benefitted Immensely From The US-China Trade War   In sum, Vietnamese exports could well see a period of weakness in the coming months. That is usually a harbinger of weaker Vietnamese stock prices in absolute terms (Chart 5, above). Structurally Sound Despite our near-term cautious outlook on Vietnamese stocks, we have a positive view on the country’s structural prospects. The country’s fundamentals remain robust and that will help propel this market beyond any near-term weakness: Vietnam has boosted capital spending in the past few years to reach an impressive 32% of GDP, among the highest in the developing world (Chart 12, top panel). This has helped raise the economy’s productive capacity. Consistently, Vietnam’s labor productivity gains have been superior to most developing countries (Chart 12, bottom panel). The country’s wage growth has been relatively lower than those of China and Bangladesh, its two main export competitors (Chart 13, top panel). Chart 12Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Vietnam's Capital Spending And Labor Productivity Remains Among The Highest In EM Chart 13Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Competitive Unit Labor Costs Are Helping Vietnam Rapidly Grab Global Market Share Stronger productivity gains coupled with relatively muted wage growth is helping keep Vietnamese unit labor costs lower than its competitors. This is boosting its competitiveness; and not only helping grab an ever higher global market share, but also doing so at a faster clip than even China and Bangladesh (Chart 13, bottom panel). The country is also well placed to take advantage of its competitive unit labor costs. It has entered into a number of free trade agreements (FTA) with many countries and regions, the latest of which is the RCEP agreement – comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – which kicked in this January. These FTAs have eliminated export import tariffs for hundreds of items. Vietnam is likely to be a major beneficiary of these treaties in the medium to long term, given its rising competitiveness.  Given the already available infrastructure and labor and its competitive edge in manufacturing, Vietnam is also set to be the major recipient of the firms relocating away from China. This will further boost its longer-term prospects as exports will continue to generate solid income growth. Overall, real income per capita in Vietnam will continue rising at a rapid rate, outpacing that of most emerging economies. Investment Conclusions Chart 14Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not Attractive Now Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not attractive Now Vietnamese Stock Valuations Are Not attractive Now Since the country’s exports will likely decelerate in the coming months, its share prices will also likely correct. In addition, the ongoing sell-off in EM risk assets has further to run, as explained in our last report, EM: A Perfect Storm. This is a harbinger of weaker Vietnamese stock prices. What’s more, a sell-off in EM risk assets is often associated with a considerable decline in capital inflows into Vietnam – as was the case in 2015 and 2018. Those periods were negative for Vietnamese stocks as well.  Finally, valuations are not attractive either. Trailing P/E and P/Book ratios of Vietnamese stocks are much higher (21 and 3.6, respectively) compared to those of EM (14 and 1.9) and frontier market (15.5 and 2.3) stocks (Chart 14). Putting it all together, absolute-return investors should book profits on their Vietnam holdings and wait for a better entry point. Asset allocators, however, should continue to maintain their overweight positions on Vietnamese stocks, in EM, emerging Asia or frontier market equity portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please refer to “Vietnam garment exports hit hard by labor shortage, disrupted supply chains, and swelled freight fares” on Textile Today Bangladesh.

Like many EM bourses, Vietnamese stocks have plunged 35% over the past two months in US dollar terms. How should investors now position themselves with regard to Vietnamese equities, in both absolute and relative terms? In absolute terms, there are near-term risks to Vietnamese equities: Vietnam’s economy is highly dependent on exports, which amount to more than 100% of the country’s GDP. The deepening global recession entails that overseas demand for Vietnamese exports will be decimated. Chart II-1 illustrates how share prices often swing along with export cycles. Customers from the US and EU, which together account for 40% of Vietnamese exports, have been cancelling their orders. In addition, the number of visitor arrivals has already dropped significantly, and tourism revenue – which amounts to about 14% of GDP – will continue to contract (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Chart II-2Tourism Has Crashed Tourism Has Crashed Tourism Has Crashed   Nevertheless, we expect Vietnamese stocks to outperform the EM benchmark, in USD terms, both cyclically and structurally. First, Vietnam has solid macro fundamentals. The country’s annualized trade surplus has ballooned, reaching $12 billion in March (Chart II-3). Even as exports contract, the current account balance is unlikely to turn negative. Notably, Vietnam imports many of the materials required to produce its exported goods. As such, its imports will shrink along with its exports, which will support its current account balance. Meanwhile, the year-on-year growth of domestic nominal retail sales of goods has slowed down, but remains at 8% as of March, which is quite remarkable (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Chart II-4Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract   Second, the government has announced a sizable policy stimulus package. On March 16, the State Bank of Vietnam cut its policy rate by 50bps, from 4% to 3.5%, and its refinancing rate by 100bps, from 6% to 5%. On April 3, Vietnam's Ministry of Finance passed a fiscal stimulus package worth VND180 trillion (equal to US$7.64 billion, or 2.9% of its GDP). Third, Vietnam has contained the COVID-19 outbreak better than many other countries. With aggressive testing and isolation, the country has so far limited the infection rate to only three out of one million citizens, and reported zero deaths. This reduces the probability that Vietnam will be forced to adopt severe confinement measures that would derail its economy. This nation’s success also contrasts with the difficulties that many emerging and frontier economies are having in their struggle with COVID-19 containment.  Fourth, the country remains quite competitive in global trade. For some time, multinational companies have been moving their supply chains to Vietnam in order to take advantage of its cheap and productive labor, inexpensive land and supportive government policies. As a result, Vietnamese exports have been outpacing those of China across many industries (Chart II-5). Given the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China is likely to persist over many years, more manufacturing will shift from China to Vietnam. Investment Recommendations In absolute terms, we believe Vietnamese stocks are still at risk. Stock prices falling to their 2016 low is possible over the coming weeks and months, which corresponds to a 10-15% downslide from current levels (Chart II-6, top panel). Chart II-5Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Chart II-6Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance   Relative to the EM equity benchmark, however, we continue overweighting Vietnam equities, both cyclically and structurally. Technically, this bourse’s relative performance has declined to a major support line and it could be bottoming at current levels (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Please note that we are publishing an analysis on Vietnam below. The unprecedented depth of this recession entails that many businesses will likely be operating below their break-evens for a while, even after the confinement measures are eased. Consequently, the process of bottoming in this bear market will be drawn out, and share prices will gyrate substantially in the interim. Elevated foreign currency debt levels among some EM corporations, plunging revenues and local currency depreciation combine for a perfect storm in EM corporate credit. Continue underweighting EM stocks and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Take profits on the long EM currency volatility trade. Feature If history is any guide, the speed of the rebound in global equities is more consistent with a bear market rally than the beginning of a new bull market. Typically, for a new durable bull market to emerge after a vicious bear market, a consolidation period or a base-building phase is needed. As of now, share prices have not formed such a base. Playing bear market rallies is all about timing, in which fundamental analysis is not useful. Rebounds die as abruptly as they begin. Hence, it is all about chasing momentum on either side. The unprecedented depth of this recession heralds that many businesses will likely be operating below their break-evens for a while, even after the confinement measures are eased. We closed our absolute short position in EM equities on March 19 but we have continued shorting EM currencies versus the US dollar. Even though EM share prices have become cheap based on their cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart I-1), valuation is not a good timing tool. This is especially true for this structural valuation indicator. Chart I-1EM Equities Are As Cheap As In Previous Bottoms EM Equities Are As Cheap As In Previous Bottoms EM Equities Are Cheap According To The Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio EM Equities Are As Cheap As In Previous Bottoms EM Equities Are Cheap According To The Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio Why The Rebound? After the massive selloff, investor sentiment on risk assets in general, and cyclicals specifically, has become very depressed. In particular: Sentiment of traders and investment advisors on US stocks has plummeted (Chart I-2). That said, net long positions in US equity futures are still above their 2016 and 2011 lows, as we noted last week. Traders’ sentiment on cyclical currencies such as the CAD and AUD as well as on copper and oil has dropped to their previous lows (Chart I-3).  Chart I-2Investor Sentiment On US Equities Is Poor Investor Sentiment On US Equities Is Poor Investor Sentiment On US Equities Is Poor Chart I-3Investor Sentiment On Copper And Oil Is Depressed Investor Sentiment On Copper And Oil Are Depressed Investor Sentiment On Copper And Oil Are Depressed   Consistently, net long positions of investors in both copper and oil have been trimmed substantially (Chart I-4A and I-4B). Chart I-4AInvestors’ Net Long Positions In Copper... Investors Net Long Positions In Copper... Investors Net Long Positions In Copper... Chart I-4B…And Oil ...And Oil ...And Oil   On the whole, it should not be surprising that after having become very oversold, risk assets rebounded in the past two weeks. Nevertheless, depressed investor sentiment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a major bear market bottom. As illustrated in Chart I-3, sentiment on oil and copper was extremely depressed in late 2014. Yet with the exception of brief rebounds, both oil and copper prices continued to plunge for about a year before bottoming in January 2016. The necessary and sufficient condition for a durable bottom in global cyclical assets is an improvement in global demand. Chart I-5The S&P 500 And VIX In The Last Two Bear Markets The S&P 500 And VIX In The Last Two Bear Markets The S&P 500 And VIX In The Last Two Bear Markets Given the US and Europe are still in strict confinement and the Chinese economy remains quite weak (please see our more detailed discussion on this below), the global recession is still deepening. Further, while the enormous amounts of stimulus injected by policymakers is certainly positive, it is not yet clear whether these efforts are sufficient to entirely offset the collapse in the level of economic activity and its second round effects. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have probably contained the acute phase of the financial market crisis by buying financial assets and providing credit to the real economy. Odds are that the VIX and other volatility measures will not retest their recent highs. However, this does not mean that risk assets cannot retest their lows or make fresh ones. For example, in the previous 2001-2002 and 2008 bear markets, the S&P 500 re-tested its low in early 2003 and made a deeper trough in early 2009 even though the VIX drifted lower (Chart I-5). Finally, as we discuss below, a unique feature of this recession makes it unlikely that a definite equity market bottom has been established so quickly. How This Recession Is Distinct From an investor viewpoint, this global recession stands out from others in a particularly distinct way: In an average recession, nominal output levels do not contract. In the US, since 1960 it was only during 2008 that the level of nominal GDP contracted (Chart I-6). Presently, we are experiencing the gravest collapse in nominal output/sales since the 1930s – much worse than what transpired in 2008. Chart I-6US Nominal GDP And Corporate Profits Growth US Nominal GDP And Corporate Profits Growth US Nominal GDP And Corporate Profits Growth When a company’s sales shrink, a critical threshold for sustainability is the level of its revenues relative to its break-even point. The latter is the level of sales where total revenue is equal to total cost – i.e., where profits are nil. Break-even points have ramifications for share prices and the shape of a potential recovery. In an average recession, break-even points for the majority of companies are not breached – i.e., they remain profitable. As a result, a moderate and sequential revival in sales boosts profits, often exponentially. Share prices react positively to even modest sequential growth. Besides, when profits are expanding, managers and owners of these businesses are often quick to augment their capital spending and hiring. A marginal and sequential recovery from this very low point is not sufficient to produce a durable bull market for stocks or corporate credit. When a company’s sales drop below its break-even level, a moderate sequential recovery in sales could be insufficient to make the company profitable. In such a case, the share price may not rally vigorously unless they had priced in a much worse outcome – i.e., a bankruptcy. Crucially, a moderate sequential revival in activity may not lead to more capital spending and hiring. Given US and global nominal GDP are presently contracting at an unprecedented double-digit pace, the revenue of a majority of companies has fallen below costs – i.e., they are presently operating below their break-evens (experiencing losses). This makes this recession distinct from others. On the whole, the loosening of confinement measures and the resumption of business operations may not be sufficient reasons to turn bullish on equities. So long as a company operates below its break-even, its share price may not rally much in response to marginal sequential growth. In short, the pace of recovery will be crucial. Yet, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to these dynamics. Such uncertainty also warrants a high equity risk premium. A U-shaped recovery is most likely, but the latter assumes that many companies will be operating with losses for some time. Consequently, odds are that the process of bottoming in this bear market will be drawn out, and share prices will gyrate substantially in the interim. Taking Pulse Of The Global Economy In our March 19 report, we argued that this global recession is much worse than the one in 2008. High-frequency data are confirming our view: The weekly US economic index from the New York Fed has plunged more than it did in 2008 (Chart I-7). Capital spending plans have been shelved around the world. Odds are many businesses will be operating below their break-evens even after confinement measures are eased. Therefore, they will not rush to invest in new capacity and equipment, or rush to hire. China is a case in point. Commodities prices on the mainland remain in a downtrend, despite the resumption of business activity (Chart I-8). This is a sign of lingering weakness in construction/capital spending. Chart I-7An Unprecedented Plunge In Economic Activity An Unprecedented Plunge In Economic Activity An Unprecedented Plunge In Economic Activity Chart I-8Commodities Prices In China Are Drifting Lower Commodities Prices In China Are Drifting Lower Commodities Prices In China Are Drifting Lower   The world’s oil consumption is presently probably down by more than 35%.  According to INRIX, US car traffic last week was 47% below its level in late February before the confinement measures were introduced. Plus, airline travel has literally ground to a halt worldwide. In China’s major cities, traffic during rush hour is re-approaching its pre-pandemic levels. However, automobile congestion data from TomTom shows that in the afternoons and evenings, traffic remains well below where it was before the lockdown. This reveals that people go to work, spend most of their time at the office, and then quickly return home. They do not go out during lunch time or in the evenings. Hence, we infer that China’s service sector remains in recession.  Chart I-9EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Nominal Growth Was Very Weak Before The Pandemic EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Nominal Growth Was Very Weak Before The Pandemic EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Nominal Growth Was Very Weak Before The Pandemic  The Chinese manufacturing and service PMI indexes registered 51 and 47 respectively in March, revealing that their economic recoveries are very subdued. As per our discussion above, we suspect revenues for many businesses in February dropped below break-even levels. The fact that only about a half of both manufacturing and service sector companies said their March activity improved from February is rather underwhelming. EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan nominal GDP and core consumer price inflation were at very low levels before the pandemic (Chart I-9). The ongoing plunge in economic activity will produce the worst nominal output recession for many developing economies. Consequently, corporate profits of companies exposed to domestic demand will crash in local currency terms. Bottom Line: The unprecedented depth of this recession heralds that many businesses will likely be operating below their break-evens for a while, even after the confinement measures are eased. Thus, a marginal and sequential recovery from this very low point is not sufficient to produce a durable bull market for stocks or corporate credit. Credit Markets Hold The Key Solvency concerns for companies become acute and doubt about their debt sustainability persist when their revenues drop below their break-evens. Thus, a marginal improvement in revenue – as lockdowns worldwide are relaxed – may not suffice to produce a material tightening in EM corporate credit spreads. Playing bear market rallies is all about timing, in which fundamental analysis is not useful. Rebounds die as abruptly as they begin. Interestingly, equity markets often take their cues from credit markets. Chart I-10 demonstrates that EM US dollar corporate bond yields (inverted on the chart) correlate with equity prices. This chart unambiguously expounds that what matters for EM share prices is not US Treasurys yields but rather their own borrowing costs in US dollars. Chart I-10EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields And Stock Prices EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields And Stock Prices EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields And Stock Prices Presently, there are no substantive signs that US dollar borrowing costs for EM companies or sovereigns are declining. Chart I-11 illustrates that investment and high-yield corporate bond yields for aggregate EM and emerging Asia remain elevated. Remarkably, bank bond yields in overall EM and emerging Asia have not eased much (Chart I-12). The latter is crucial as banks’ external high borrowing costs will dampen their appetite to originate credit domestically. Chart I-11EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields EM US Dollar Corporate Bond Yields Chart I-12EM Banks US Dollar Bond Yields EM Banks US Dollar Bond Yields EM Banks US Dollar Bond Yields Chart I-13EM Credit Spreads, Currencies And Commodities EM Credit Spreads, Currencies And Commodities EM Credit Spreads, Currencies And Commodities In turn, the direction of EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads is contingent on EM exchange rates and commodities prices, as demonstrated in Chart I-13. Credit spreads are shown inverted in both panels of this chart. We remain negative on both EM currencies and commodities prices, and argue for a cautious approach to EM credit markets.  Bottom Line: Elevated foreign currency debt levels among some EM corporations, plunging revenues and local currency depreciation combine for a perfect storm in EM corporate credit. To make matters worse, this asset class as well as EM sovereign credit were extremely overbought before this selloff. Therefore, there could be more outflows from these markets as adverse fundamentals persist.  Investment Strategy And Positions We continue to recommend underweighting EM stocks and credit versus their DM counterparts. Importantly, the EM equity index has been underperforming the global equity benchmark in the recent rebound (Chart I-14). Aggressive policy stimulus in the US and Europe have improved investor sentiment towards their credit and equity markets. Yet, the Chinese stimulus has so far been less aggressive than in the past. This will weigh on the growth outlook for emerging Asia and Latin America. The outlook for oil prices is currently a coin toss. Price volatility will remain enormous and it is not worth betting on either the long or short side of crude. Apart from oil, industrial metal prices remain at risk due to subdued demand from China. In general, this is consistent with lower EM currencies (Chart I-15).   Chart I-14Continue Underweighting EM Stocks Versus The Global Benchmark Continue Underweighting EM Stocks Versus The Global Benchmark Continue Underweighting EM Stocks Versus The Global Benchmark Chart I-15EM Currencies Correlate With Industrial Metals Prices EM Currencies Correlate With Industrial Metals Prices EM Currencies Correlate With Industrial Metals Prices Chart I-16Book Profits On Long EM Currency Volatility Trade Book Profits On Long EM Currency Volatility Trade Book Profits On Long EM Currency Volatility Trade In accordance with our discussion above that the most acute phase of this crisis might be over, we are booking profits on our long EM currency volatility trade. We recommended this trade on January 23, 2020 and the JP Morgan EM currency implied volatility measure has risen from 6% to 12% (Chart I-16). While EM currencies could still sell off, we doubt this volatility measure will make a new high. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Vietnamese Stocks: Stay Overweight Like many EM bourses, Vietnamese stocks have plunged 35% over the past two months in US dollar terms. How should investors now position themselves with regard to Vietnamese equities, in both absolute and relative terms? In absolute terms, there are near-term risks to Vietnamese equities: Vietnam’s economy is highly dependent on exports, which amount to more than 100% of the country’s GDP. The deepening global recession entails that overseas demand for Vietnamese exports will be decimated. Chart II-1 illustrates how share prices often swing along with export cycles. Customers from the US and EU, which together account for 40% of Vietnamese exports, have been cancelling their orders. In addition, the number of visitor arrivals has already dropped significantly, and tourism revenue – which amounts to about 14% of GDP – will continue to contract (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Vietnamese Stocks: Risks Are External Chart II-2Tourism Has Crashed Tourism Has Crashed Tourism Has Crashed   Nevertheless, we expect Vietnamese stocks to outperform the EM benchmark, in USD terms, both cyclically and structurally. First, Vietnam has solid macro fundamentals. The country’s annualized trade surplus has ballooned, reaching $12 billion in March (Chart II-3). Even as exports contract, the current account balance is unlikely to turn negative. Notably, Vietnam imports many of the materials required to produce its exported goods. As such, its imports will shrink along with its exports, which will support its current account balance. Meanwhile, the year-on-year growth of domestic nominal retail sales of goods has slowed down, but remains at 8% as of March, which is quite remarkable (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Vietnam Has Large Trade Surplus Chart II-4Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract Consumer Spending To Slow But Not Contract   Second, the government has announced a sizable policy stimulus package. On March 16, the State Bank of Vietnam cut its policy rate by 50bps, from 4% to 3.5%, and its refinancing rate by 100bps, from 6% to 5%. On April 3, Vietnam's Ministry of Finance passed a fiscal stimulus package worth VND180 trillion (equal to US$7.64 billion, or 2.9% of its GDP). Third, Vietnam has contained the COVID-19 outbreak better than many other countries. With aggressive testing and isolation, the country has so far limited the infection rate to only three out of one million citizens, and reported zero deaths. This reduces the probability that Vietnam will be forced to adopt severe confinement measures that would derail its economy. This nation’s success also contrasts with the difficulties that many emerging and frontier economies are having in their struggle with COVID-19 containment.  We continue to overweight Vietnamese stocks relative to EM due to healthy fundamentals, attractive valuations, a large current account balance and a successful economic and health response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Fourth, the country remains quite competitive in global trade. For some time, multinational companies have been moving their supply chains to Vietnam in order to take advantage of its cheap and productive labor, inexpensive land and supportive government policies. As a result, Vietnamese exports have been outpacing those of China across many industries (Chart II-5). Given the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China is likely to persist over many years, more manufacturing will shift from China to Vietnam. Investment Recommendations In absolute terms, we believe Vietnamese stocks are still at risk. Stock prices falling to their 2016 low is possible over the coming weeks and months, which corresponds to a 10-15% downslide from current levels (Chart II-6, top panel). Chart II-5Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Vietnam Continues Gaining Export Market Share Chart II-6Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance Vietnamese Stocks: Absolute & Relative Performance   Relative to the EM equity benchmark, however, we continue overweighting Vietnam equities, both cyclically and structurally. Technically, this bourse’s relative performance has declined to a major support line and it could be bottoming at current levels (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Our negative call on Vietnamese stocks since last May has turned out well.1 The significant deceleration in export growth alongside the selloff in broader emerging markets has generated a double-digit drop in Vietnamese stock prices over the past 12 months (Chart II-1, top panel). Looking forward, a new upturn in Vietnamese equities is in the making. The structural outlook for Vietnam is strong and improving. Investors should overweight Vietnamese stocks within an EM equity portfolio (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Shifting Supply Chain For some time, companies in China have been moving their supply chain to Vietnam due to its cheap labor, inexpensive land and supportive policies. The geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and China that began last year has served to accelerate this process. The U.S. and China may soon reach a trade deal. This will give Chinese manufacturers and multinational companies more time to prepare for their relocation, but it will not stop the ongoing supply chain shift. Both multinationals and Chinese producers would prefer to have alternative supply chains that are not exposed to a potential re-escalation in geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China in the years to come.2 Chart II-2 shows that Chinese companies have nearly tripled their foreign direct investment in Vietnam over the past nine months. Chart II-1Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Chart II-2Accelerating Supply Chain Shift Accelerating Supply Chain Shift Accelerating Supply Chain Shift   The surge in relocations from the mainland has boosted land prices and wages in Vietnam significantly. For example, the rental price of industrial land at Giang Dien industrial park on a long-term lease of up to 50 years has risen as much as 50% to US$90 per square meter last October from US$60-70 a year ago. The relocations have occurred not only for low-value-added companies such as textile and footwear makers, but also for high-value-add companies like electronics assembly producers. According to the Chairman of Shenzhen-Vietnam Industrial Park, most of the companies that established factories in the park last year have been focused on light processing such as electronic assembly. Chart II-3 shows that U.S. imports from Vietnam have been much stronger than those from China and the rest of the world. This may be the result of both the accelerated supply chain shift last year and the structural competitiveness of Vietnamese goods. Vietnam continues to take market share from China in global markets such as footwear, garments and electronics (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Chart II-4Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China In fact, rising FDIs have already led to a growth rebound in imports among foreign invested enterprises (FIE), heralding an export growth acceleration in the months ahead (Chart II-5). FIEs import most of the input materials they need to manufacture their goods, which are then exported overseas. This is why this segment’s imports lead export growth.   Escaping A Global Slowdown In Smartphone Demand The biggest contributor to Vietnam’s current account and trade surplus has been the smartphone sector (Chart II-6). However, the ongoing downturn in global smartphone shipments may not affect Vietnam due to the latter’s gains in the global smartphone production and assembly market share: Chart II-5Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration Chart II-6Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus   Vietnam mobile phone output (mostly Samsung smartphones) fell only slightly (1.2%) last year when Samsung smartphone shipments contracted by 8% (Chart II-7). This reflected Vietnam’s strong competitiveness relative to the other five countries where Samsung smartphones are manufactured: China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea. Over half of Samsung smartphones were produced in Vietnam last year. Last December, Samsung closed its Chinese Tianjin plant. Without any additional production reductions in other plants, total Samsung capacity will be cut by about 7%. This further lowers the odds of a considerable production cut in Vietnam in the case of a further drop in global smartphone demand. Other Encouraging Signs Many other positive signs have emerged that point to a cyclical upturn ahead for Vietnam: Retail sales growth has been accelerating, and automobile sales have reached new highs, suggesting strong domestic demand (Chart II-8). Despite declining visitor arrivals, the country’s tourism revenue still grew at a robust 10% pace last year. In 2019, the country is expecting a 15% year-on-year growth in visitor arrivals. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which came into force for Vietnam in January, and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), which will take effect later this year, will be highly beneficial to the Vietnamese economy. Both headline and core inflation are low. The country’s foreign reserves also jumped by 14% over the past 12 months to a record high of US$63.5 billion, equivalent to 26% of GDP. Chart II-7Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Chart II-8Strong Domestic Demand Strong Domestic Demand Strong Domestic Demand   Investment Recommendations We recommend buying Vietnamese equities on dips. Dedicated equity investors should overweight Vietnam in an EM equity portfolio: The Vietnamese property market is booming on surging income growth and low interest rates. The real estate sector accounts for 45% of the MSCI Vietnam Index and 28% of the VN All-Share Index. According to CBRE Vietnam, there was a sharp rise in overseas investors in Vietnamese real estate in 2018, particularly from China. The real estate services firm reported that Chinese customers accounted for 44% of total transactions in the first nine months of 2018. In 2017, there was a 21% year-on-year increase in Chinese buyers. Buoyant household income growth is positive for consumer staples stocks, which accounts for 34% of the MSCI Vietnam Index and 8% of the VN All-Shares Index. Vietnamese corporate earnings will outpace broader EM EPS, warranting equity market outperformance (Chart II-9). Vietnam's inclusion into some influential EM equity indices would significantly boost interest from foreign investors (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Chart II-10Rising Interest From Foreign Investors Rising Interest From Foreign Investors Rising Interest From Foreign Investors   Technically, it seems the correction in Vietnamese stocks is late, and that the equity market will resume its upturn sooner rather than later.   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy ellenj@bcaresearch.com   1 Please see Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report titled “Vietnamese Equities: Take A Step Back For Now, ” dated May 15, 2018. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report titled “China-U.S. Trade: A Structural Deal?” dated March 6, 2019. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Foreign investors have been rushing into Indian equities in anticipation of a Modi win. While Modi’s chances are reasonable, he may not win an outright majority. Keep tactically underweighting Indian stocks for now. The structural outlook for Vietnam is strong and improving. A bottom in Vietnamese equities is in the making. Investors should overweight Vietnamese stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Feature Indian Equities: A Window Of Risk Remains Foreign investors have been rushing into Indian equities in anticipation of a win by current Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the upcoming general elections. As a result, Indian stocks have been outperforming the EM benchmark. Nevertheless, a window of risk for the Indian bourse remains. While Modi’s chances of winning the elections are reasonable, he and his party – the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP – may not win an outright majority in the lower house, as occurred in May 2014. While Modi’s chances of winning the elections are reasonable, he and his party – the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP – may not win an outright majority in the lower house, as occurred in May 2014. The basis for Modi not being able to win an outright majority is that rural area incomes have weakened substantially due to falling food prices (Chart I-1). Corroborating this distress in rural areas, stock prices of rural-exposed companies have massively underperformed urban-exposed ones (Chart I-2). Chart I-1India's Food Prices Have Been Falling Despite Low Rainfall India's Food Prices Have Been Falling Despite Low Rainfall India's Food Prices Have Been Falling Despite Low Rainfall Chart I-2Rural-Exposed Stocks Have Massively Underperformed Urban Stocks Rural-Exposed Stocks Have Massively Underperformed Urban Stocks Rural-Exposed Stocks Have Massively Underperformed Urban Stocks   Even though both monetary and fiscal policies are easing, these macro policies always work with a time lag and will not improve domestic growth before the elections. A BJP-led minority-government will force Modi to increasingly rely on his allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. The prime minister will then be forced to frequently offer concessions, watering down his reform agenda. The BJP’s allies in the NDA coalition are not necessarily as market-friendly. This is why we believe such an outcome would upset Indian financial markets after its most recent outperformance. Meanwhile, rural demand weakness has spilled over into the broader Indian economy. Passenger car sales, as well as sales of two- and three-wheelers are on the verge of contraction, and growth in tractor sales is falling sharply (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Indian Cyclical Growth Is Decelerating Indian Cyclical Growth Is Decelerating Indian Cyclical Growth Is Decelerating Chart I-4Indian EPS Growth Will Likely Contract Indian EPS Growth Will Likely Contract Indian EPS Growth Will Likely Contract Moreover, the bottom panel of Chart I-3 illustrates that the production of intermediate goods is contracting and manufacturing production is decelerating. Worryingly, the domestic growth slowdown has stalled EPS growth for the overall market, and net profit margins are falling (Chart I-4). The large-cap equity index has so far disregarded poor earnings performance, which magnifies the risk to Indian stocks if the BJP fails to win a majority government. Notably, small-cap stocks have failed to advance much and have not corroborated the rally in large-caps (Chart I-5). India’s stock market breadth is also poor, which is a bad omen for the sustainability of the current rally (Chart I-6). Chart I-5India Small Cap Stock Are Not Confirming The Rally India Small Cap Stock Are Not Confirming The Rally India Small Cap Stock Are Not Confirming The Rally Chart I-6India's Stock Market Breadth Is Poor India's Stock Market Breadth Is Poor India's Stock Market Breadth Is Poor   Finally, rising oil prices will negatively impact India’s trade balance dynamics (Chart I-7, top panel). The stock market’s relative performance has diverged from the recent rise in oil prices – an unsustainable trend (Chart I-7, bottom panel).           Investment Recommendations Chart I-7Higher Oil Prices Are Not Discounted By Indian Equities Higher Oil Prices Are Not Discounted By Indian Equities Higher Oil Prices Are Not Discounted By Indian Equities The Indian economy will remain weak over the next several months, which places Modi’s majority re-election bid at risk. Beyond the elections, fiscal and monetary easing will kick in and boost cyclical growth in the second half of the year. Food prices are also beginning to pick up due to below average rainfall (Chart I-1, page 1). The latter will revive rural income and by extension spending. We recommend tactically underweighting Indian stocks for now. A better entry point to upgrade will likely emerge in the next few months as euphoria surrounding the upcoming elections comes to an end and a growth slowdown is finally priced in. For fixed-income investors, we recommend continuing to bet on yield-curve steepening. A dovish central bank will cut interest rates and keep them low. This, along with fiscal easing, will revive growth later this year. A growth recovery and rising food inflation will lift the long end of the yield curve.   Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com   Vietnam: Structural Tailwinds Getting Stronger; Buy On A Dip Our negative call on Vietnamese stocks since last May has turned out well.1 The significant deceleration in export growth alongside the selloff in broader emerging markets has generated a double-digit drop in Vietnamese stock prices over the past 12 months (Chart II-1, top panel). Chart II-1Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Vietnamese Equities: An Upturn Is Ahead Looking forward, a new upturn in Vietnamese equities is in the making. The structural outlook for Vietnam is strong and improving. Investors should overweight Vietnamese stocks within an EM equity portfolio (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Shifting Supply Chain For some time, companies in China have been moving their supply chain to Vietnam due to its cheap labor, inexpensive land and supportive policies. The geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and China that began last year has served to accelerate this process. The U.S. and China may soon reach a trade deal. This will give Chinese manufacturers and multinational companies more time to prepare for their relocation, but it will not stop the ongoing supply chain shift. Both multinationals and Chinese producers would prefer to have alternative supply chains that are not exposed to a potential re-escalation in geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China in the years to come.2 Chart II-2 shows that Chinese companies have nearly tripled their foreign direct investment in Vietnam over the past nine months. The surge in relocations from the mainland has boosted land prices and wages in Vietnam significantly. For example, the rental price of industrial land at Giang Dien industrial park on a long-term lease of up to 50 years has risen as much as 50% to US$90 per square meter last October from US$60-70 a year ago. The relocations have occurred not only for low-value-added companies such as textile and footwear makers, but also for high-value-add companies like electronics assembly producers. According to the Chairman of Shenzhen-Vietnam Industrial Park, most of the companies that established factories in the park last year have been focused on light processing such as electronic assembly. Chart II-2Accelerating Supply Chain Shift Accelerating Supply Chain Shift Accelerating Supply Chain Shift Chart II-3Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Strong U.S. Imports From Vietnam Chart II-3 shows that U.S. imports from Vietnam have been much stronger than those from China and the rest of the world. This may be the result of both the accelerated supply chain shift last year and the structural competitiveness of Vietnamese goods. Vietnam continues to take market share from China in global markets such as footwear, garments and electronics (Chart II-4). Both multinationals and Chinese producers would prefer to have alternative supply chains that are not exposed to a potential re-escalation in geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China in the years to come. In fact, rising FDIs have already led to a growth rebound in imports among foreign invested enterprises (FIE), heralding an export growth acceleration in the months ahead (Chart II-5). FIEs import most of the input materials they need to manufacture their goods, which are then exported overseas. This is why this segment’s imports lead export growth. Chart II-4Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China Vietnam: Taking More Market Share From China Chart II-5Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration Rising FIE Imports Herald Export Growth Acceleration   Escaping A Global Slowdown In Smartphone Demand The biggest contributor to Vietnam’s current account and trade surplus has been the smartphone sector (Chart II-6). However, the ongoing downturn in global smartphone shipments may not affect Vietnam due to the latter’s gains in the global smartphone production and assembly market share: Vietnam mobile phone output (mostly Samsung smartphones) fell only slightly (1.2%) last year when Samsung smartphone shipments contracted by 8% (Chart II-7). This reflected Vietnam’s strong competitiveness relative to the other five countries where Samsung smartphones are manufactured: China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea. Over half of Samsung smartphones were produced in Vietnam last year. Chart II-6Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus Phone Sector: The Biggest Driver Of Vietnamese Trade Surplus Chart II-7Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Vietnam May Withstand Well In A Global Smartphone Demand Slowdown Last December, Samsung closed its Chinese Tianjin plant. Without any additional production reductions in other plants, total Samsung capacity will be cut by about 7%. This further lowers the odds of a considerable production cut in Vietnam in the case of a further drop in global smartphone demand. Other Encouraging Signs Many other positive signs have emerged that point to a cyclical upturn ahead for Vietnam: Chart II-8Strong Domestic Demand Strong Domestic Demand Strong Domestic Demand Retail sales growth has been accelerating, and automobile sales have reached new highs, suggesting strong domestic demand (Chart II-8). Despite declining visitor arrivals, the country’s tourism revenue still grew at a robust 10% pace last year. In 2019, the country is expecting a 15% year-on-year growth in visitor arrivals. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which came into force for Vietnam in January, and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), which will take effect later this year, will be highly beneficial to the Vietnamese economy. Both headline and core inflation are low. The country’s foreign reserves also jumped by 14% over the past 12 months to a record high of US$63.5 billion, equivalent to 26% of GDP. Investment Recommendations We recommend buying Vietnamese equities on dips. Dedicated equity investors should overweight Vietnam in an EM equity portfolio: The Vietnamese property market is booming on surging income growth and low interest rates. The real estate sector accounts for 45% of the MSCI Vietnam Index and 28% of the VN All-Share Index. According to CBRE Vietnam, there was a sharp rise in overseas investors in Vietnamese real estate in 2018, particularly from China. The real estate services firm reported that Chinese customers accounted for 44% of total transactions in the first nine months of 2018. In 2017, there was a 21% year-on-year increase in Chinese buyers. Buoyant household income growth is positive for consumer staples stocks, which accounts for 34% of the MSCI Vietnam Index and 8% of the VN All-Shares Index. Buoyant household income growth is positive for consumer staples stocks, which accounts for 34% of the MSCI Vietnam Index and 8% of the VN All-Shares Index. Vietnamese corporate earnings will outpace broader EM EPS, warranting equity market outperformance (Chart II-9). Vietnam's inclusion into some influential EM equity indices would significantly boost interest from foreign investors (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Vietnamese Corporate Earnings Growth: Better Than EM Chart II-10Rising Interest From Foreign Investors Rising Interest From Foreign Investors Rising Interest From Foreign Investors   Technically, it seems the correction in Vietnamese stocks is late, and that the equity market will resume its upturn sooner rather than later.   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report titled “Vietnamese Equities: Take A Step Back For Now, ” dated May 15, 2018. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report titled “China-U.S. Trade: A Structural Deal?” dated March 6, 2019. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a-Lago honeymoon with Xi Jinping is over; Tactically, go long South Korean consumers / short Taiwanese exporters. Feature Geopolitical risk is shifting to the Asia Pacific region - and the increasing use of economic sanctions is evidence of the trend. Korean stocks have rallied sharply since the leadership change from December 2016 through May of this year (Chart 1). The impeachment rally was entirely expected after a year of domestic political turmoil.1 The election is also eventually expected to decrease Korean geopolitical risks - the country's new President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, aims to patch up relations with China and revive diplomacy with North Korea.2 Chart 1South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over A key barometer of Moon's success will be whether he convinces China to remove economic sanctions imposed since last summer as punishment for his predecessor's agreement to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Moon has suspended the system's deployment in a nod to China.3 South Korea is thus the latest example of an important trend in the region: China's successful use of "economic statecraft" to pressure wayward neighbors into closer alignment with its interests. Since 2014, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have each sought in different ways to reorient their foreign policies toward China, either to court Chinese assistance or get relief from Chinese pressure. Judging by our research below, the rewards are palpable, and a sign of Beijing's rising global influence. Because U.S.-China tensions are rising structurally, we see these country-by-country shifts toward China not as a decisive loss for the U.S. alliance but rather as the latest phase in a long game of tug-of-war that will intensify in the coming years.4 Hence the trend of unilateral economic sanctions will continue. Who is next on China's hit list? How will the U.S. respond? What countries are most and least likely to be affected? And what are the market implications? China's Economic Statecraft The United States launched a "pivot to Asia" strategy under the Obama administration to reassert American primacy in Asia Pacific and address the emerging challenge from China. The U.S.'s Asian partners largely welcomed this shift. Over the preceding decade, they had struggled with China's emergence as a military and strategic superior. The most prominent flashpoints came in the East and South China Seas. Beijing's newfound naval and air power caused regional anxiety. As the allies invited a larger U.S. role, Beijing began to assert its sovereignty claims over disputed waters and rocks, most ambitiously by creating artificial islands in the South China Sea and fortifying them with military capabilities. In three notable periods since the Great Recession, China's tensions with its neighbors have splashed over into the economic realm, prompting Beijing to impose punitive measures: Chart 2Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Chart 3Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Japan 2010-2012: In 2010, China and Japan clashed as the former challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. In the September-November 2010 clash, China notoriously cut off exports of rare earths to Japan.5 A greater clash occurred from July-November 2012. Chinese people rose up in large-scale protests, damaging Japanese and other foreign property and assets. Impact: The growth of Japanese exports to China slowed noticeably between the 2010 and 2012 clashes, underperforming both that of China's neighbors and Europe (Chart 2). In particular, Chinese consumers stopped buying as many Japanese cars and switched to other brands (Chart 3). Chinese investment in Japan, which is generally very small, fell sharply in the year after the major 2012 clash, by contrast with the global trend (Chart 4). Chinese tourism to Japan also fell sharply after both incidents, though only for a short period of time (Chart 5). Chart 4...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... Chart 5...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere Philippines 2012-2016: Tensions between China and the Philippines over the contested Spratly Islands and other rocks in the South China Sea have a long history. The latest round began in the mid-2000s, and the two countries have skirmished many times since then, including in a major showdown at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that required the intercession of the United States to be resolved. The pressure intensified after January 2013, when the Philippines brought a high-profile case against China's maritime-territorial claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The U.S. and the Philippines upped the ante in April 2014 by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the court dealt a humiliating blow to China's maritime-territorial claims in July 2016, but a bigger confrontation was avoided because of what had happened in the remarkable May 2016 Philippine elections, which put China-friendly populist President Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on July 1. Impact: China tightened phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas during the 2012 crisis and Philippine exports to China underperformed those of its neighbors after the onset of diplomatic crisis in 2013 (Chart 6). Nevertheless, the overall impact on headline exports is debatable. Tourism suffered straightforwardly both after the 2012 showdown at sea and after the new U.S.-Philippines military deal in 2014 (Chart 7). As with Japan, the impact was temporary. Chart 6Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Chart 7Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Vietnam 2011-14: China's quarrels with Vietnam go back millennia, but in recent years have centered on the South China Sea. As with the Philippines, frictions began rising in the mid-2000s and flared up after the global financial crisis. In the summer of 2012, Vietnam and China engaged in a dispute over new laws encompassing their territorial claims. In May 2014, the two countries fought a highly unorthodox sea-battle near the Paracel Islands. Anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout Vietnam, prompting China to restrict travel.6 Impact: It is not clear that China imposed trade measures against Vietnam - export growth was plummeting in 2012 because of China's nominal GDP slowdown as well - but certainly exports skyrocketed after the two sides began tothaw diplomatic relations in August 2014 (Chart 8).7 Direct investment from China into Vietnam fell in 2014, even as that from the rest of the world rose. Chinese tourism to Vietnam shrank in the aftermath. Chart 8Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade The above incidents complement a growing body of academic research demonstrating China's use of unilateral economic sanctions and their trade and market impacts.8 Bottom Line: China has employed unilateral, informal, and discrete economic sanctions and has encouraged or condoned citizen boycotts and popular activism against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states since at least the early 2000s. Moreover, three international confrontations since 2010 suggest that China's foreign policy is growing bolder - it is not afraid to throw its economic weight around to get what it wants politically or to deter countries from challenging its interests. How Significant Is China's Wrath? Both our evidence and the scholarly literature reveal that China-inflicted economic damage tends to be temporary and sometimes ambiguous from a macro-perspective.9 For instance, if there were negative trade effects of Vietnam's 2014 clash with China, they were overwhelmed by Vietnam's rising share of China's market in the following years (Chart 9). And, as hinted above, Chinese sanctions on Philippine banana exports in 2012 can be overstated according to close inspection of the data.10 Nevertheless, since 2016, three new episodes have reinforced the fact that China's punitive measures are a significant trend with potentially serious consequences for Asian economies: Taiwan 2016: Taiwanese politics have shifted away from mainland China in recent years. The "Sunflower Protests" of 2014 marked a shift in popular opinion away from the government's program of ever-deeper economic integration with the mainland. Local elections later that year set the stage for a sweeping victory by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), taking both the presidency and, for the first time, the legislature, in January 2016.11 Tsai is a proponent of eventual Taiwanese independence and dissents from key diplomatic agreements with the mainland, the "One China Policy" and "1992 Consensus." Within six months of the election Beijing had cut off diplomatic communication. Impact: The number of mainland visitors has nosedived, by contrast with global trends (Chart 10). Taiwan's exports and access to China's market are arguably weaker than they would otherwise be. Given the historic cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the strong export growth in the immediate aftermath of that deal, it is curious that exports have been so weak since 2014 (Chart 11). Chart 9China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam Chart 10Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Chart 11So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? South Korea 2016-17: China and South Korea are on the cusp of improving relations after a year of Beijing-imposed sanctions. The former government of President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in December 2016 and removed from office in March this year, moved rapidly with the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile defense system on South Korean soil while her government was collapsing, so as to make it a fait accompli for her likely left-leaning (and more China-friendly) successor. Her government agreed to the deployment in July 2016 and since then China has exacted substantial economic costs via Korean exports and Chinese tourism.12 The new President Moon Jae-in is now calling on China to remove these sanctions, while initiating an "environmental review" that will delay deployment of THAAD, possibly permanently. Impact: South Korean exports to China have underperformed the regional trend throughout the downfall of the Park regime and its last-minute alliance-building measures with both the U.S. and Japan (Chart 12). South Korea has also lost market share in China since agreeing to host THAAD in July 2016 (Chart 13). Furthermore, Korean car sales on the mainland have deviated markedly both from their long-term historical trend and from Japan's contemporary sales (Chart 14), the inverse of what occurred in 2012 (see Chart 3 above). Chinese tourism to South Korea has sharply declined. Chart 12China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports Chart 13China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Chart 14Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump North Korea 2016-17: Ironically, China brought sanctions against both Koreas last year - the South for THAAD, the North for its unprecedented slate of missile and nuclear tests. These provoked the United States into pressuring China via "secondary sanctions." Impact: China's sanctions on the North - which include a potentially severe ban on coal imports - are limited so far, according to the headline trade data, as China is wary of destabilizing the hermit kingdom (Chart 15). But if China does grant President Trump's request and increase the economic pressure on North Korea, it will be no less of a sign of a greater willingness to utilize economic statecraft, especially given that the North is China's only formal ally. Other countries will not fail to see the implications should they, like either Korea, cross Beijing's interests. Bottom Line: Doubts about China's new foreign policy "assertiveness" are overstated. China is increasing its unilateral use of economic levers to pressure political regimes in its neighborhood, including major EMs like Taiwan and South Korea over the past year. Korean President Moon Jae-in's rise to power is likely to produce better Sino-Korean relations, but neither it nor Taiwan is out of the woods yet, according to the data. Moreover, the rest of the region may be cautious before accepting new U.S. military deployments or contravening China's demands in other ways. The Asian "Pivot To China" Over the past two years, several Asian states have begun to vacillate toward China, not because they fear American abandonment but because the U.S. "pivot" gave them so much security reassurance that it threatened to provoke conflict with China - essentially risking a new Cold War. They live on the frontlines and wanted to discourage this escalation. At the same time, the growth slump in China/EM in 2014 - followed by China's renewed stimulus in 2015 - encouraged these states to improve business with China. Thailand began to shift in 2014, when a military junta took power in a coup and sought external support. China's partnership did not come with strings attached, as opposed to that of the U.S., with its demands about democracy and civil rights.13 The rewards of this foreign policy shift are palpable (Chart 16). China signed some big investment deals and improved strategic cooperation through arms sales. It did the same with Malaysia for similar reasons.14 China's "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) economic development initiative provided ample opportunities for expanding ties. Chart 15No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet Chart 16China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta The year 2016 was a major turning point. Three of China's neighbors - two of which U.S. allies - underwent domestic political transitions ushering in more favorable policies toward China: Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communist Party held its twelfth National Congress in January 2016. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a pro-market reformer from the capitalist south, failed to secure the position of general secretary of the party and retired. The incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong retained his seat, and oversaw the promotion of key followers, strengthening Vietnam's pro-China faction. Since then Trong has visited President Xi in Beijing and signed a joint communique on improving strategic relations. As mentioned above, Vietnamese exports to China have exploded since tensions subsided in 2014. South Korea: In April 2016, South Korean legislative elections saw the left-leaning Democratic Party win a plurality of seats, setting the stage for the 2017 election discussed above, when Korea officially moved in a more China-friendly direction under President Moon. The Philippines: In May 2016, the Philippines elected Duterte, a firebrand southern populist who declared that the Philippines would "separate" itself from the U.S. and ally with Russia and China. Though Duterte has already modified his anti-American stance - as we expected - he is courting Chinese trade and investment at the expense of the Philippines' sovereignty concerns.15 Trump's election contributed to this regional trend. By suggesting a desire for the U.S. to stop playing defender of last resort in the region, Trump reinforced the need for allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to go their own way. And by canceling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump forced Malaysia and Vietnam to make amends with China, while vindicating those (like Thailand and Indonesia) that had remained aloof. Bottom Line: Having brandished its sticks, China is now offering carrots to states that recognize its growing regional influence. These do not have to be express measures, given that China is stimulating its economy and increasing outbound investment for its own reasons. All China need do is refrain from denying access to its market and investment funds. Whom Will China Sanction Next? Geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula remains elevated given that North Korea remains in "provocation mode" and Trump has prioritized the issue. However, we expect that Moon will cooperate with China enough to give a boost to South Korean exports and China-exposed companies and sectors. With South Korea's shifting policy, Beijing has a major opportunity to demonstrate the positive economic rewards of pro-China foreign policy. If a new round of international negotiations gets under way and North Korean risk subsides for a time (our baseline view),16 then East Asian governments will turn to other interests. We see two key places of potential confrontation over the next 12-24 months: Taiwan is the top candidate for Chinese sanctions going forward. The cross-strait relationship is fraught and susceptible to tempests. The ruling DPP lacks domestic political constraints, which could be conducive to policy mistakes. Moreover, Trump has signaled his intention to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan, which could cause problems. China is likely to oppose the new $1.4 billion package of U.S. arms more actively than in the past, given its greater global heft. Trump's initial threat of altering the One China Policy has not been forgotten. In terms of timing, China may not want to give a tailwind to the DPP by acting overly aggressive ahead of the 2018 local elections, which are crucial for the opposition Kuomintang's attempt to revive in time for the 2020 presidential vote. But this is not a hard constraint on Beijing's imposing sanctions before then. Japan is the second-likeliest target of Chinese economic pressure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is up for re-election no later than December 2018 and is becoming more vulnerable as he shifts emphasis from pocketbook issues to Japan's national security.17 Needless to say, the revival of the military is the part of Abe's agenda that Beijing most opposes. China would like to see Abe weakened, or voted out, and would especially like to see Abe's proposed constitutional revisions fail in the popular referendum slated for 2020. China would not want to strengthen Abe by provoking Japanese nationalism. But if Abe is losing support, and Beijing calculates that the Japanese public is starting to view Abe and his constitutional revisions as too provocative and destabilizing, then a well-timed diplomatic crisis with economic sanctions may be in order.18 Next in line are Hong Kong and Singapore, though Beijing has already largely gotten its way in recent disputes with the two city-states.19 Other possibilities on the horizon: The eventual return to a fractious civilian government in Thailand, or improved U.S.-Thai relations, could spoil China's infrastructure plans and sour its willingness to support an otherwise lackluster Thai economy. Also, a surprise victory by the opposition in Malaysian general elections (either this year or next) could see the recent rapprochement with China falter. The latter would be cyclical tensions, whereas suppressed structural tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines could boil back up to the surface fairly quickly at any time and provoke Chinese retaliation. Bottom Line: The most likely targets of Chinese economic sanctions in the near future are Taiwan and Japan. South Korea could remain a target if events should force Moon to abandon his policy agenda, though we see this as unlikely. Hong Kong and Singapore also remain in the danger zone, as do Vietnam and the Philippines in the long run. Investment Implications Cyclical and structural macro trends drive exports and investment trends in Asia Pacific. The biggest immediate risk to EM Asian economies stems not from Chinese sanctions - given that most of these economies have adjusted their policies to appease China to some extent - but from China's economic policy uncertainty, which remains at very elevated levels (Chart 17). It was after this uncertainty surged in 2015 that China's neighbors took on a more accommodating stance with a focus on economic cooperation rather than strategic balancing. Chart 17Chinese Economic Policy Uncertainty Still Asia's Biggest Risk Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Currently Chinese economic policy uncertainty is hooking back up as a result of the decision by state authorities to intensify their financial crackdown - the so-called "deleveraging campaign." BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out that China's slowing fiscal and credit impulse will drag down both Chinese import volumes and emerging market corporate earnings in the coming months (Chart 18). Already commodity prices and commodity currencies have dropped off, heralding a broader slowdown in global trade as a result of China's policy tightening. This trend will overwhelm the effect of almost any new geopolitical spats or sanctions. The same can be said for Chinese investment as for Chinese trade. Over the past couple of decades, China has emerged as one of the world's leading sources of direct investment (Chart 19). This is a secular trend. Thus while foreign relations have affected China's investment patterns - most recently in giving the Philippines a boost under Duterte - the general trend of rising Chinese investment abroad will continue regardless of temporary quarrels. This is particularly true in light of China's efforts to energize OBOR. Chart 18China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading Chart 19China's Emergence As Major Global Investor Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? The key question is how will China's political favor or disfavor impact neighboring economies on the margin, in relative terms, on a sectoral basis, or in the short term? The evidence above feeds into several trends in relative equity performance: China fights either Japan or Korea: Going long Korea / short Japan would have paid off throughout the major Sino-Japanese tensions 2010-12, and would have paid off again during the South Korean impeachment rally (Chart 20). Of course, geopolitics is only one factor. But even Japan's economic shift in 2012 (Abenomics) is part of the geopolitical dynamic. Chart 20China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea Chart 21Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's loss is Japan's gain: China's measures against Japanese exporters from 2010-12 coincided with a period of intense cross-strait economic integration that benefited Taiwanese exporters. Then Japan adopted Abenomics and dialed down tensions with China, and Taiwan underwent a pro-independence turn, provoking Beijing's displeasure (Chart 21). If one of these countries ends up quarreling with China in the near future, as we expect, the other country's exporters may reap the benefit. If relations worsen with both, South Korea stands to gain. Favor EM reformers: Vietnamese and Philippine equities outperformed EM from 2011-16 despite heightened tensions in the South China Sea (Chart 22). During this time, we recommended an overweight position on both countries relative to EM, even though we took the maritime tensions very seriously, because we favored EM reformers and both countries were undertaking structural reforms.20 Later, in May 2016, we downgraded the Philippines to neutral, expecting a loss of reform momentum after Duterte's election. The Philippines has notably underperformed the EM equity benchmark since that time.21 The "One China Policy": We closed out our "long One China Policy" trade on June 14 as a result of China's persistence in its crackdown on the banks, which we see as very risky.22 However, we may reinitiate the trade in the future, as Hong Kong and Taiwan remain vulnerable both to the slowdown in globalization and to Beijing's sanctions over deepening political differences (Chart 23). Chart 22Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Chart 23The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade From Sunshine to Moonshine: South Korea's Moon Jae-in has substantial political capital and we expect that he will succeed in boosting growth, wages, and the social security net, all of which will be bullish for South Korean consumer stocks. Yet we remain wary of the fact that North Korea is not yet falling into line with new negotiations. A way to hedge is to go long the South Korean consumer relative to Taiwanese exporters (Chart 24), which will live under the shadow of Beijing's disfavor at least until the 2020 elections, if not beyond. Taiwan has also allowed its currency to appreciate notably against the USD since Trump's post-election phone call with President Tsai, which is negative for Taiwanese exporters. Chart 24Go Long Korean Consumer /##br## Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter China's sanctions are essentially a "slap on the wrist" in economic terms. But sometimes they reflect deeper structural tensions, and thus they may foreshadow far more damaging clashes down the road that could have longer term consequences, just as the Sino-Japanese incident of 2012 demonstrated. That is all the more reason to hedge one's bets on Taiwan today. These sanctions are bound to recur and will provide investors with trading opportunities, if not long-term investment themes. It will pay to capitalize quickly at the outset of any serious increase in tensions going forward. As a final word, the Trump administration's recent moves to impose economic penalties on China - namely through "secondary sanctions" due to North Korea, but also through potential trade tariffs and/or penalties related to human trafficking and human rights - highlight the fact that the use of unilateral sanctions is not limited to China. Geopolitical risk is rising in Asia as a result of actions on both sides of the Pacific. Sino-American antagonism in particular poses the greatest geopolitical danger to global markets, as we have frequently emphasized.23 And as Trump's domestic agenda struggles he will seek to get tougher on China, as he promised to his populist base on the campaign trail. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis in the region, we recommend the same mix of safe-haven assets that we have recommended in the past: U.S. treasuries, Swiss bonds, JGBs, and gold.24 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our longstanding investment theme of rising geopolitical risk in East Asia, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, and Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Market Equity Sector and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" dated June 27, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Moon is walking a tight rope in relation to the United States. During his visit to Washington on June 29, he assured Congressman Paul Ryan among others that he did not necessarily intend to reverse the THAAD agreement as a whole. That would depend on the outcome of the environmental review and due legal process in South Korea as well as on whether North Korea's behavior makes the missile defense system necessary. Please see Kim Ji-eun, "In US Congress, Pres. Moon Highlights Democratic Values Of Alliance With US," The Hankyoreh, July 1, 2017, available at English.hani.co.kr. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Jeffrey R. Dundon, "Triggers of Chinese Economic Coercion," Naval Postgraduate School, September, 2014, available at calhoun.nps.edu. 6 For a very conservative estimate of China's actions during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, please see Angela Poh, "The Myth Of Chinese Sanctions Over South China Sea Disputes," Washington Quarterly 40:1 (2017), pp. 143-165. 7 Please see "Vietnam Party official heads to China to defuse tensions," Thanh Nien Daily, August 25, 2014, available at www.thanhniennews.com. 8 Please see Faqin Lin, Cui Hu, and Andreas Fuchs, "How Do Firms Respond To Political Tensions? The Heterogeneity Of The Dalai Lama Effect On Trade," University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 628, August 2016, available at papers.ssrn.com. This study improves upon earlier ones, notably Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying A Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect On International Trade," Journal Of International Economics 91 (2013), pp 164-77. See also Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, "State Control And The Effects Of Foreign Relations On Bilateral Trade," October 16, 2016, MPRA Paper No. 74597, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74597/ ; Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, and Yonglei Wang, "Hurting Without Hitting: The Economic Cost of Political Tension," Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 14-484 (July 2015), available at econpapers.repec.org; Raymond Fisman, Yasushi Hamao, and Yongxiang Wang, "Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations," NBER Working Paper 20089 (May 2014) available at www.nber.org; Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:6 (2016), pp. 980-1007. 9 The "Dalai Lama effect," in which countries that host a visit from the Dalai Lama suffer Chinese trade retaliation, has been revised downward over the years - the trade costs are only statistically significant in the second quarter after the visit. Please see "How Do Firms Respond," cited in footnote 8. 10 See "Myth Of Chinese Sanctions," cited in footnote 6. Chinese sanctions on Norwegian salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 also fall under this category. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Lee Ho-Jeong, "Thaad may lead to $7.5B in economic losses in 2017," Joongang Daily, May 4, 2017, available at www.joongangdaily.com. 13 Please see Ian Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations With China And America: More Beijing, Less Washington," Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia 20 (2015). 14 Malaysia began to move closer to China after its 2013 election, which initiated a period of political turbulence and scandal. This trend, along with economic slowdown, prompted the ruling coalition to turn to Beijing for support. 15 He is also, as current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), assisting China's negotiations toward settling a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea. This is not likely to be a binding agreement - China will not voluntarily reverse its strategic maritime-territorial gains - but it could dampen tensions for a time in the region and encourage better relations between China and Southeast Asia. For the 2016 Asian pivot to China discussed above, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The LDP's dramatic defeat in Tokyo's local elections on July 2 is the first tangible sign that the constitutional agenda, Abe's corruption scandals, and the emergence of a competing political leader, Yuriko Koike, are taking a toll on the LDP. 18 Also, Beijing may at any point rotate its maritime assertiveness back to the East China Sea, where tensions with Japan have quieted since 2013-14. Further, Beijing will want to exploit worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, and drive a wedge between Japan and Russia as they attempt a historic diplomatic thaw. 19 Beijing is attempting to steal a march on these states, especially in finance, while putting pressure on them to avoid activities that undermine Beijing's regional influence. So far there is only small evidence that tensions have affected trade. First, Hong Kong saw a drop in tourists and a block on cultural exports amid the Umbrella Protests of 2014. China's central government has acted aggressively over the past year to suppress Hong Kong agitation, by excluding rebel lawmakers from office and by drawing a "red line" against undermining Chinese sovereignty. Yet agitation will persist because of the frustration of local political forces and the youth, both of which resent the mainland's increasing heavy-handedness. Meanwhile, China and Singapore are in the process this month of improving relations after the November-January spat relating to Singapore-Taiwanese military ties. But China's encroachment on Singapore's traditional advantages - finance, oil refining, freedom of navigation, strong military relations with the U.S. and Taiwan, political stability - is likely to continue. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, "Geopolitical Risk: A Golden Opportunity?" dated July 9, 2014, and "In Need Of Global Political Recapitalization," dated June 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Buy Vietnamese Stocks," dated July 17, 2015, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk," dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a-Lago honeymoon with Xi Jinping is over; Tactically, go long South Korean consumers / short Taiwanese exporters. Feature Geopolitical risk is shifting to the Asia Pacific region - and the increasing use of economic sanctions is evidence of the trend. Korean stocks have rallied sharply since the leadership change from December 2016 through May of this year (Chart 1). The impeachment rally was entirely expected after a year of domestic political turmoil.1 The election is also eventually expected to decrease Korean geopolitical risks - the country's new President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, aims to patch up relations with China and revive diplomacy with North Korea.2 Chart 1South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over South Korean Impeachment Rally Over A key barometer of Moon's success will be whether he convinces China to remove economic sanctions imposed since last summer as punishment for his predecessor's agreement to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Moon has suspended the system's deployment in a nod to China.3 South Korea is thus the latest example of an important trend in the region: China's successful use of "economic statecraft" to pressure wayward neighbors into closer alignment with its interests. Since 2014, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have each sought in different ways to reorient their foreign policies toward China, either to court Chinese assistance or get relief from Chinese pressure. Judging by our research below, the rewards are palpable, and a sign of Beijing's rising global influence. Because U.S.-China tensions are rising structurally, we see these country-by-country shifts toward China not as a decisive loss for the U.S. alliance but rather as the latest phase in a long game of tug-of-war that will intensify in the coming years.4 Hence the trend of unilateral economic sanctions will continue. Who is next on China's hit list? How will the U.S. respond? What countries are most and least likely to be affected? And what are the market implications? China's Economic Statecraft The United States launched a "pivot to Asia" strategy under the Obama administration to reassert American primacy in Asia Pacific and address the emerging challenge from China. The U.S.'s Asian partners largely welcomed this shift. Over the preceding decade, they had struggled with China's emergence as a military and strategic superior. The most prominent flashpoints came in the East and South China Seas. Beijing's newfound naval and air power caused regional anxiety. As the allies invited a larger U.S. role, Beijing began to assert its sovereignty claims over disputed waters and rocks, most ambitiously by creating artificial islands in the South China Sea and fortifying them with military capabilities. In three notable periods since the Great Recession, China's tensions with its neighbors have splashed over into the economic realm, prompting Beijing to impose punitive measures: Chart 2Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Japan's 2012 Clash With China Chart 3Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Japan 2010-2012: In 2010, China and Japan clashed as the former challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. In the September-November 2010 clash, China notoriously cut off exports of rare earths to Japan.5 A greater clash occurred from July-November 2012. Chinese people rose up in large-scale protests, damaging Japanese and other foreign property and assets. Impact: The growth of Japanese exports to China slowed noticeably between the 2010 and 2012 clashes, underperforming both that of China's neighbors and Europe (Chart 2). In particular, Chinese consumers stopped buying as many Japanese cars and switched to other brands (Chart 3). Chinese investment in Japan, which is generally very small, fell sharply in the year after the major 2012 clash, by contrast with the global trend (Chart 4). Chinese tourism to Japan also fell sharply after both incidents, though only for a short period of time (Chart 5). Chart 4...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... ...And Cut Investments In Japan... Chart 5...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere ...While Tourists Went Elsewhere Philippines 2012-2016: Tensions between China and the Philippines over the contested Spratly Islands and other rocks in the South China Sea have a long history. The latest round began in the mid-2000s, and the two countries have skirmished many times since then, including in a major showdown at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that required the intercession of the United States to be resolved. The pressure intensified after January 2013, when the Philippines brought a high-profile case against China's maritime-territorial claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The U.S. and the Philippines upped the ante in April 2014 by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the court dealt a humiliating blow to China's maritime-territorial claims in July 2016, but a bigger confrontation was avoided because of what had happened in the remarkable May 2016 Philippine elections, which put China-friendly populist President Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on July 1. Impact: China tightened phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas during the 2012 crisis and Philippine exports to China underperformed those of its neighbors after the onset of diplomatic crisis in 2013 (Chart 6). Nevertheless, the overall impact on headline exports is debatable. Tourism suffered straightforwardly both after the 2012 showdown at sea and after the new U.S.-Philippines military deal in 2014 (Chart 7). As with Japan, the impact was temporary. Chart 6Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Chart 7Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Vietnam 2011-14: China's quarrels with Vietnam go back millennia, but in recent years have centered on the South China Sea. As with the Philippines, frictions began rising in the mid-2000s and flared up after the global financial crisis. In the summer of 2012, Vietnam and China engaged in a dispute over new laws encompassing their territorial claims. In May 2014, the two countries fought a highly unorthodox sea-battle near the Paracel Islands. Anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout Vietnam, prompting China to restrict travel.6 Impact: It is not clear that China imposed trade measures against Vietnam - export growth was plummeting in 2012 because of China's nominal GDP slowdown as well - but certainly exports skyrocketed after the two sides began tothaw diplomatic relations in August 2014 (Chart 8).7 Direct investment from China into Vietnam fell in 2014, even as that from the rest of the world rose. Chinese tourism to Vietnam shrank in the aftermath. Chart 8Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade Vietnam Reboots China Trade The above incidents complement a growing body of academic research demonstrating China's use of unilateral economic sanctions and their trade and market impacts.8 Bottom Line: China has employed unilateral, informal, and discrete economic sanctions and has encouraged or condoned citizen boycotts and popular activism against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states since at least the early 2000s. Moreover, three international confrontations since 2010 suggest that China's foreign policy is growing bolder - it is not afraid to throw its economic weight around to get what it wants politically or to deter countries from challenging its interests. How Significant Is China's Wrath? Both our evidence and the scholarly literature reveal that China-inflicted economic damage tends to be temporary and sometimes ambiguous from a macro-perspective.9 For instance, if there were negative trade effects of Vietnam's 2014 clash with China, they were overwhelmed by Vietnam's rising share of China's market in the following years (Chart 9). And, as hinted above, Chinese sanctions on Philippine banana exports in 2012 can be overstated according to close inspection of the data.10 Nevertheless, since 2016, three new episodes have reinforced the fact that China's punitive measures are a significant trend with potentially serious consequences for Asian economies: Taiwan 2016: Taiwanese politics have shifted away from mainland China in recent years. The "Sunflower Protests" of 2014 marked a shift in popular opinion away from the government's program of ever-deeper economic integration with the mainland. Local elections later that year set the stage for a sweeping victory by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), taking both the presidency and, for the first time, the legislature, in January 2016.11 Tsai is a proponent of eventual Taiwanese independence and dissents from key diplomatic agreements with the mainland, the "One China Policy" and "1992 Consensus." Within six months of the election Beijing had cut off diplomatic communication. Impact: The number of mainland visitors has nosedived, by contrast with global trends (Chart 10). Taiwan's exports and access to China's market are arguably weaker than they would otherwise be. Given the historic cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the strong export growth in the immediate aftermath of that deal, it is curious that exports have been so weak since 2014 (Chart 11). Chart 9China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam Chart 10Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Chart 11So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? South Korea 2016-17: China and South Korea are on the cusp of improving relations after a year of Beijing-imposed sanctions. The former government of President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in December 2016 and removed from office in March this year, moved rapidly with the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile defense system on South Korean soil while her government was collapsing, so as to make it a fait accompli for her likely left-leaning (and more China-friendly) successor. Her government agreed to the deployment in July 2016 and since then China has exacted substantial economic costs via Korean exports and Chinese tourism.12 The new President Moon Jae-in is now calling on China to remove these sanctions, while initiating an "environmental review" that will delay deployment of THAAD, possibly permanently. Impact: South Korean exports to China have underperformed the regional trend throughout the downfall of the Park regime and its last-minute alliance-building measures with both the U.S. and Japan (Chart 12). South Korea has also lost market share in China since agreeing to host THAAD in July 2016 (Chart 13). Furthermore, Korean car sales on the mainland have deviated markedly both from their long-term historical trend and from Japan's contemporary sales (Chart 14), the inverse of what occurred in 2012 (see Chart 3 above). Chinese tourism to South Korea has sharply declined. Chart 12China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports China Cools On Korean Imports Chart 13China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Chart 14Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump North Korea 2016-17: Ironically, China brought sanctions against both Koreas last year - the South for THAAD, the North for its unprecedented slate of missile and nuclear tests. These provoked the United States into pressuring China via "secondary sanctions." Impact: China's sanctions on the North - which include a potentially severe ban on coal imports - are limited so far, according to the headline trade data, as China is wary of destabilizing the hermit kingdom (Chart 15). But if China does grant President Trump's request and increase the economic pressure on North Korea, it will be no less of a sign of a greater willingness to utilize economic statecraft, especially given that the North is China's only formal ally. Other countries will not fail to see the implications should they, like either Korea, cross Beijing's interests. Bottom Line: Doubts about China's new foreign policy "assertiveness" are overstated. China is increasing its unilateral use of economic levers to pressure political regimes in its neighborhood, including major EMs like Taiwan and South Korea over the past year. Korean President Moon Jae-in's rise to power is likely to produce better Sino-Korean relations, but neither it nor Taiwan is out of the woods yet, according to the data. Moreover, the rest of the region may be cautious before accepting new U.S. military deployments or contravening China's demands in other ways. The Asian "Pivot To China" Over the past two years, several Asian states have begun to vacillate toward China, not because they fear American abandonment but because the U.S. "pivot" gave them so much security reassurance that it threatened to provoke conflict with China - essentially risking a new Cold War. They live on the frontlines and wanted to discourage this escalation. At the same time, the growth slump in China/EM in 2014 - followed by China's renewed stimulus in 2015 - encouraged these states to improve business with China. Thailand began to shift in 2014, when a military junta took power in a coup and sought external support. China's partnership did not come with strings attached, as opposed to that of the U.S., with its demands about democracy and civil rights.13 The rewards of this foreign policy shift are palpable (Chart 16). China signed some big investment deals and improved strategic cooperation through arms sales. It did the same with Malaysia for similar reasons.14 China's "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) economic development initiative provided ample opportunities for expanding ties. Chart 15No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet Chart 16China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta China Opens Doors To Thai Junta The year 2016 was a major turning point. Three of China's neighbors - two of which U.S. allies - underwent domestic political transitions ushering in more favorable policies toward China: Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communist Party held its twelfth National Congress in January 2016. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a pro-market reformer from the capitalist south, failed to secure the position of general secretary of the party and retired. The incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong retained his seat, and oversaw the promotion of key followers, strengthening Vietnam's pro-China faction. Since then Trong has visited President Xi in Beijing and signed a joint communique on improving strategic relations. As mentioned above, Vietnamese exports to China have exploded since tensions subsided in 2014. South Korea: In April 2016, South Korean legislative elections saw the left-leaning Democratic Party win a plurality of seats, setting the stage for the 2017 election discussed above, when Korea officially moved in a more China-friendly direction under President Moon. The Philippines: In May 2016, the Philippines elected Duterte, a firebrand southern populist who declared that the Philippines would "separate" itself from the U.S. and ally with Russia and China. Though Duterte has already modified his anti-American stance - as we expected - he is courting Chinese trade and investment at the expense of the Philippines' sovereignty concerns.15 Trump's election contributed to this regional trend. By suggesting a desire for the U.S. to stop playing defender of last resort in the region, Trump reinforced the need for allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to go their own way. And by canceling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump forced Malaysia and Vietnam to make amends with China, while vindicating those (like Thailand and Indonesia) that had remained aloof. Bottom Line: Having brandished its sticks, China is now offering carrots to states that recognize its growing regional influence. These do not have to be express measures, given that China is stimulating its economy and increasing outbound investment for its own reasons. All China need do is refrain from denying access to its market and investment funds. Whom Will China Sanction Next? Geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula remains elevated given that North Korea remains in "provocation mode" and Trump has prioritized the issue. However, we expect that Moon will cooperate with China enough to give a boost to South Korean exports and China-exposed companies and sectors. With South Korea's shifting policy, Beijing has a major opportunity to demonstrate the positive economic rewards of pro-China foreign policy. If a new round of international negotiations gets under way and North Korean risk subsides for a time (our baseline view),16 then East Asian governments will turn to other interests. We see two key places of potential confrontation over the next 12-24 months: Taiwan is the top candidate for Chinese sanctions going forward. The cross-strait relationship is fraught and susceptible to tempests. The ruling DPP lacks domestic political constraints, which could be conducive to policy mistakes. Moreover, Trump has signaled his intention to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan, which could cause problems. China is likely to oppose the new $1.4 billion package of U.S. arms more actively than in the past, given its greater global heft. Trump's initial threat of altering the One China Policy has not been forgotten. In terms of timing, China may not want to give a tailwind to the DPP by acting overly aggressive ahead of the 2018 local elections, which are crucial for the opposition Kuomintang's attempt to revive in time for the 2020 presidential vote. But this is not a hard constraint on Beijing's imposing sanctions before then. Japan is the second-likeliest target of Chinese economic pressure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is up for re-election no later than December 2018 and is becoming more vulnerable as he shifts emphasis from pocketbook issues to Japan's national security.17 Needless to say, the revival of the military is the part of Abe's agenda that Beijing most opposes. China would like to see Abe weakened, or voted out, and would especially like to see Abe's proposed constitutional revisions fail in the popular referendum slated for 2020. China would not want to strengthen Abe by provoking Japanese nationalism. But if Abe is losing support, and Beijing calculates that the Japanese public is starting to view Abe and his constitutional revisions as too provocative and destabilizing, then a well-timed diplomatic crisis with economic sanctions may be in order.18 Next in line are Hong Kong and Singapore, though Beijing has already largely gotten its way in recent disputes with the two city-states.19 Other possibilities on the horizon: The eventual return to a fractious civilian government in Thailand, or improved U.S.-Thai relations, could spoil China's infrastructure plans and sour its willingness to support an otherwise lackluster Thai economy. Also, a surprise victory by the opposition in Malaysian general elections (either this year or next) could see the recent rapprochement with China falter. The latter would be cyclical tensions, whereas suppressed structural tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines could boil back up to the surface fairly quickly at any time and provoke Chinese retaliation. Bottom Line: The most likely targets of Chinese economic sanctions in the near future are Taiwan and Japan. South Korea could remain a target if events should force Moon to abandon his policy agenda, though we see this as unlikely. Hong Kong and Singapore also remain in the danger zone, as do Vietnam and the Philippines in the long run. Investment Implications Cyclical and structural macro trends drive exports and investment trends in Asia Pacific. The biggest immediate risk to EM Asian economies stems not from Chinese sanctions - given that most of these economies have adjusted their policies to appease China to some extent - but from China's economic policy uncertainty, which remains at very elevated levels (Chart 17). It was after this uncertainty surged in 2015 that China's neighbors took on a more accommodating stance with a focus on economic cooperation rather than strategic balancing. Chart 17Chinese Economic Policy Uncertainty Still Asia's Biggest Risk Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Currently Chinese economic policy uncertainty is hooking back up as a result of the decision by state authorities to intensify their financial crackdown - the so-called "deleveraging campaign." BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out that China's slowing fiscal and credit impulse will drag down both Chinese import volumes and emerging market corporate earnings in the coming months (Chart 18). Already commodity prices and commodity currencies have dropped off, heralding a broader slowdown in global trade as a result of China's policy tightening. This trend will overwhelm the effect of almost any new geopolitical spats or sanctions. The same can be said for Chinese investment as for Chinese trade. Over the past couple of decades, China has emerged as one of the world's leading sources of direct investment (Chart 19). This is a secular trend. Thus while foreign relations have affected China's investment patterns - most recently in giving the Philippines a boost under Duterte - the general trend of rising Chinese investment abroad will continue regardless of temporary quarrels. This is particularly true in light of China's efforts to energize OBOR. Chart 18China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading China: Stimulus Fading Chart 19China's Emergence As Major Global Investor Does It Pay To Pivot To China? Does It Pay To Pivot To China? The key question is how will China's political favor or disfavor impact neighboring economies on the margin, in relative terms, on a sectoral basis, or in the short term? The evidence above feeds into several trends in relative equity performance: China fights either Japan or Korea: Going long Korea / short Japan would have paid off throughout the major Sino-Japanese tensions 2010-12, and would have paid off again during the South Korean impeachment rally (Chart 20). Of course, geopolitics is only one factor. But even Japan's economic shift in 2012 (Abenomics) is part of the geopolitical dynamic. Chart 20China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea China Fights Either Japan Or Korea Chart 21Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's loss is Japan's gain: China's measures against Japanese exporters from 2010-12 coincided with a period of intense cross-strait economic integration that benefited Taiwanese exporters. Then Japan adopted Abenomics and dialed down tensions with China, and Taiwan underwent a pro-independence turn, provoking Beijing's displeasure (Chart 21). If one of these countries ends up quarreling with China in the near future, as we expect, the other country's exporters may reap the benefit. If relations worsen with both, South Korea stands to gain. Favor EM reformers: Vietnamese and Philippine equities outperformed EM from 2011-16 despite heightened tensions in the South China Sea (Chart 22). During this time, we recommended an overweight position on both countries relative to EM, even though we took the maritime tensions very seriously, because we favored EM reformers and both countries were undertaking structural reforms.20 Later, in May 2016, we downgraded the Philippines to neutral, expecting a loss of reform momentum after Duterte's election. The Philippines has notably underperformed the EM equity benchmark since that time.21 The "One China Policy": We closed out our "long One China Policy" trade on June 14 as a result of China's persistence in its crackdown on the banks, which we see as very risky.22 However, we may reinitiate the trade in the future, as Hong Kong and Taiwan remain vulnerable both to the slowdown in globalization and to Beijing's sanctions over deepening political differences (Chart 23). Chart 22Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Chart 23The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade The 'One China Policy' As A Trade From Sunshine to Moonshine: South Korea's Moon Jae-in has substantial political capital and we expect that he will succeed in boosting growth, wages, and the social security net, all of which will be bullish for South Korean consumer stocks. Yet we remain wary of the fact that North Korea is not yet falling into line with new negotiations. A way to hedge is to go long the South Korean consumer relative to Taiwanese exporters (Chart 24), which will live under the shadow of Beijing's disfavor at least until the 2020 elections, if not beyond. Taiwan has also allowed its currency to appreciate notably against the USD since Trump's post-election phone call with President Tsai, which is negative for Taiwanese exporters. Chart 24Go Long Korean Consumer /##br## Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter Go Long Korean Consumer / Short Taiwanese Exporter China's sanctions are essentially a "slap on the wrist" in economic terms. But sometimes they reflect deeper structural tensions, and thus they may foreshadow far more damaging clashes down the road that could have longer term consequences, just as the Sino-Japanese incident of 2012 demonstrated. That is all the more reason to hedge one's bets on Taiwan today. These sanctions are bound to recur and will provide investors with trading opportunities, if not long-term investment themes. It will pay to capitalize quickly at the outset of any serious increase in tensions going forward. As a final word, the Trump administration's recent moves to impose economic penalties on China - namely through "secondary sanctions" due to North Korea, but also through potential trade tariffs and/or penalties related to human trafficking and human rights - highlight the fact that the use of unilateral sanctions is not limited to China. Geopolitical risk is rising in Asia as a result of actions on both sides of the Pacific. Sino-American antagonism in particular poses the greatest geopolitical danger to global markets, as we have frequently emphasized.23 And as Trump's domestic agenda struggles he will seek to get tougher on China, as he promised to his populist base on the campaign trail. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis in the region, we recommend the same mix of safe-haven assets that we have recommended in the past: U.S. treasuries, Swiss bonds, JGBs, and gold.24 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our longstanding investment theme of rising geopolitical risk in East Asia, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, and Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Market Equity Sector and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" dated June 27, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Moon is walking a tight rope in relation to the United States. During his visit to Washington on June 29, he assured Congressman Paul Ryan among others that he did not necessarily intend to reverse the THAAD agreement as a whole. That would depend on the outcome of the environmental review and due legal process in South Korea as well as on whether North Korea's behavior makes the missile defense system necessary. Please see Kim Ji-eun, "In US Congress, Pres. Moon Highlights Democratic Values Of Alliance With US," The Hankyoreh, July 1, 2017, available at English.hani.co.kr. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Jeffrey R. Dundon, "Triggers of Chinese Economic Coercion," Naval Postgraduate School, September, 2014, available at calhoun.nps.edu. 6 For a very conservative estimate of China's actions during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, please see Angela Poh, "The Myth Of Chinese Sanctions Over South China Sea Disputes," Washington Quarterly 40:1 (2017), pp. 143-165. 7 Please see "Vietnam Party official heads to China to defuse tensions," Thanh Nien Daily, August 25, 2014, available at www.thanhniennews.com. 8 Please see Faqin Lin, Cui Hu, and Andreas Fuchs, "How Do Firms Respond To Political Tensions? The Heterogeneity Of The Dalai Lama Effect On Trade," University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 628, August 2016, available at papers.ssrn.com. This study improves upon earlier ones, notably Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying A Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect On International Trade," Journal Of International Economics 91 (2013), pp 164-77. See also Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, "State Control And The Effects Of Foreign Relations On Bilateral Trade," October 16, 2016, MPRA Paper No. 74597, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74597/ ; Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, and Yonglei Wang, "Hurting Without Hitting: The Economic Cost of Political Tension," Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 14-484 (July 2015), available at econpapers.repec.org; Raymond Fisman, Yasushi Hamao, and Yongxiang Wang, "Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations," NBER Working Paper 20089 (May 2014) available at www.nber.org; Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:6 (2016), pp. 980-1007. 9 The "Dalai Lama effect," in which countries that host a visit from the Dalai Lama suffer Chinese trade retaliation, has been revised downward over the years - the trade costs are only statistically significant in the second quarter after the visit. Please see "How Do Firms Respond," cited in footnote 8. 10 See "Myth Of Chinese Sanctions," cited in footnote 6. Chinese sanctions on Norwegian salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 also fall under this category. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Lee Ho-Jeong, "Thaad may lead to $7.5B in economic losses in 2017," Joongang Daily, May 4, 2017, available at www.joongangdaily.com. 13 Please see Ian Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations With China And America: More Beijing, Less Washington," Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia 20 (2015). 14 Malaysia began to move closer to China after its 2013 election, which initiated a period of political turbulence and scandal. This trend, along with economic slowdown, prompted the ruling coalition to turn to Beijing for support. 15 He is also, as current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), assisting China's negotiations toward settling a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea. This is not likely to be a binding agreement - China will not voluntarily reverse its strategic maritime-territorial gains - but it could dampen tensions for a time in the region and encourage better relations between China and Southeast Asia. For the 2016 Asian pivot to China discussed above, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The LDP's dramatic defeat in Tokyo's local elections on July 2 is the first tangible sign that the constitutional agenda, Abe's corruption scandals, and the emergence of a competing political leader, Yuriko Koike, are taking a toll on the LDP. 18 Also, Beijing may at any point rotate its maritime assertiveness back to the East China Sea, where tensions with Japan have quieted since 2013-14. Further, Beijing will want to exploit worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, and drive a wedge between Japan and Russia as they attempt a historic diplomatic thaw. 19 Beijing is attempting to steal a march on these states, especially in finance, while putting pressure on them to avoid activities that undermine Beijing's regional influence. So far there is only small evidence that tensions have affected trade. First, Hong Kong saw a drop in tourists and a block on cultural exports amid the Umbrella Protests of 2014. China's central government has acted aggressively over the past year to suppress Hong Kong agitation, by excluding rebel lawmakers from office and by drawing a "red line" against undermining Chinese sovereignty. Yet agitation will persist because of the frustration of local political forces and the youth, both of which resent the mainland's increasing heavy-handedness. Meanwhile, China and Singapore are in the process this month of improving relations after the November-January spat relating to Singapore-Taiwanese military ties. But China's encroachment on Singapore's traditional advantages - finance, oil refining, freedom of navigation, strong military relations with the U.S. and Taiwan, political stability - is likely to continue. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, "Geopolitical Risk: A Golden Opportunity?" dated July 9, 2014, and "In Need Of Global Political Recapitalization," dated June 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Buy Vietnamese Stocks," dated July 17, 2015, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk," dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com.