War/Conflict

Highlights Iran responded with missile attacks on Iraqi military bases hosting US troops in retaliation for the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force. The post-attack messaging from Iran and the US suggests neither side wants to escalate to a full-on war footing. Global policy uncertainty will remain elevated, which will keep a bid under safe-haven investments – particularly gold and the USD, as it did last year (Chart of the Week). With the Fed expected to remain accommodative, we expect the USD to weaken this year. However, safe-haven demand for the USD will temper that weakening, which will keep the rate of growth in EM economies below potential this year. Commodity demand growth, therefore, will be lower than it otherwise would be. Oil markets remain taut. We expect additional tightening in these markets, as global monetary stimulus revives demand and oil production remains constrained. We remain long 2H20 Brent vs. short 2H21 Brent, in anticipation these fundamentals will push global inventories lower and steepen the backwardation in forward curves. Our trade recommendations open at year-end and closed in 2019 posted an average gain of 48%. Oil recommendations open at year-end and closed in 2019 were up 64% on average. Feature Following the funeral of Quds Force Commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s military responded with missile attacks on Iraqi facilities housing American troops on Wednesday. The Iranian attacks were presaged by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who called for a “direct and proportional attack” against the US by Iranian military forces following the assassination of Soleimani ordered by US President Donald Trump. The Iranian supreme leader’s declaration was highly unusual, as his government typically uses its proxies around the Middle East to carry out military and clandestine operations.1 Oil price jumped ~ 4% in extremely heavy trading after the assassination was reported January 3. This was followed by additional gains of ~ 3%, when trading resumed Monday.  Prices have since given back these gains, as markets continue to anticipate the next iteration of this confrontation. Chart of the WeekHigher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Higher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Higher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Although both sides say they are trying to avoid a kinetic engagement, additional policy uncertainty is being heaped on markets as the New Year opens. This occurs just as it appeared a small respite in the Sino-US trade war was in the offing; trade negotiators from both sides are scheduled to sign “phase one” of a trade deal next week in Washington.2 Policy Uncertainty Will Remain Elevated Geopolitical and economic uncertainty worldwide will remain elevated, keeping a bid under the traditional safe havens – particularly the USD and gold. Even as political leaders work on containing conflicts – e.g., Gulf Arab states’ diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions with Iran, following the failure of the US to retaliate in the wake of attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in September; the phase-one deal in the Sino-US trade war – many of the drivers fueling policy uncertainty remain in place.3 Popular discontent with the political status quo is a global political force. It can be seen in the increasing popularity and election of left- and right-wing populists, and in riots in societies that were considered economically and politically placid – e.g., Chile and Hong Kong. Growing discord within NATO; continued tension in Latin America, the Middle East and South China Sea; increasing civil unrest in India; rising debt levels in systematically important economies provide almost daily reminders the post-Cold War political and economic order – also referred to as the Washington Consensus favoring free trade and democracy – is eroding.4 As populists continue in their attempts to dismantle the Washington Consensus, markets will continue to signal their anxiety via gold and USD demand. The coincident rallies of the broad trade-weighted USD and gold are unusual but are emblematic of this uncertainty, as the bottom panel of the Chart of the Week illustrates – gold typically rallies when the USD and real rates weaken. Oil Markets Remain On High Alert In the immediate aftermath of the Soleimani assassination, the oil market’s attention was drawn to the ever-present threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In the immediate aftermath of the Soleimani assassination, the oil market’s attention was drawn to the ever-present threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with Arabian Sea. Some 20% of global oil supply transits the strait daily, most of it bound for Asia (Chart 2). Iran has repeatedly declared it would shut down the Strait in response to threats from the US and its Gulf allies. This is a low-probability risk – even if the strait was closed, we expect traffic would quickly be restored – but it is non-trivial in our estimation.5 A closure that threatened to exceed even a week likely would spike prices through $100/bbl. Chart 2Asia Is Prime Destination For Gulf Crude And Condensates Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut A direct attack that shuts the Strait of Hormuz also would threaten a large share of OPEC’s spare capacity of ~ 2.3mm b/d (Chart 3). Most of this is in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In order to provide export capacity in the event of a closure of the strait, last year the Kingdom accelerated its expansion of the 750-mile East-West pipeline, which terminates at the Red Sea port of Yanbu. This was expected to lift the pipeline's capacity to 7mm b/d from 6mm b/d by October 2019.6 Loading the huge number of vessels at maximum pipeline throughput at Yanbu likely would present logistical challenges of its own, given the low volumes exported from there presently. In addition, Argus notes the pipeline suffered drone attacks originating from Yemen in May of last year. Lastly, to further complicate matters, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden Indian Ocean also is quite narrow in places, which presents a natural point of disruption. Chart 3OPEC Spare Capacity Threatened If Straits Of Hormuz Are Shut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut In addition to OPEC’s spare capacity and KSA’s Red Sea outlet, the US can mobilize its 640mm-barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to supply the market with ~ 2mm b/d of crude.7 In addition, member states of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) maintain close to 3 billion barrels of crude and product inventories that could be drawn down in the event of an emergency (Chart 4). China’s SPR is estimated at ~ 800mm b/d – covering ~ 80 days of consumption – but the rate at which it can be delivered to the market is unknown.8 Chart 4OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower Investment Implications Of Unknown Unknowns At present, the known unknowns – i.e., risks – do not appear to be galloping higher, based on the recent performance of crude oil and gold options’ implied volatilities. At present, the known unknowns – i.e., risks – do not appear to be galloping higher, based on the recent performance of crude oil and gold options’ implied volatilities (Chart 5). But uncertainty – i.e., the unknown unknowns, which are impossible to model – are expanding, in our estimation. In this environment, we are inclined to remain long 2H20 Brent futures vs short 2H21 in expectation that any event affecting shipments of crude through the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb will quickly result in inventory drawdowns, which will be reflected in a steeper backwardation – i.e., the 2H20 Brent futures will trade at a higher premium to 2H21 futures (Chart 6). We recommended this position December 12, 2019, and it was up 78.9% as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 5Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Chart 6Expect Backwardation To Steepen Expect Backwardation To Steepen Expect Backwardation To Steepen Recap Of 2019 Recommendations Our commodity recommendations – across all markets – returned 48% on average last year. Oil positions still open at year-end and closed during 2019 led the performance, averaging a 64% gain (Tables 1 and 2). By comparison, the S&P GSCI commodity index was up 17.63% last year. Table 1Overall Recommendations Returned 47.5% Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Table 2Oil Recommendations Led Performance Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut We are leaving the positions we ended the year with open. We are leaving the positions we ended the year with open (Table 3). Absent a war – or even a skirmish – we continue to expect OPEC 2.0’s production restraint will tighten physical markets and force inventories lower resulting in steeper Brent forward curves – i.e., Brent backwardation increasing meaningfully. We remain long the S&P GSCI, given its heavy energy weighting and expected outperformance as the backwardation of crude oil forward curves continues. In addition, we remain long gold, silver and platinum as portfolio hedges. We still also remain long December 2020 high-grade iron ore (65% Fe) vs. short December benchmark iron ore (62% Fe), expecting a revival of industrial commodity demand in China and EM this year. Table 3Year-End 2019 Positions Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Khamenei Wants to Put Iran’s Stamp on Reprisal for U.S. Killing of Top General published by the New York Times January 6 and updated on January 7, 2020. 2     Unlike risk – the known unknowns that can be gauged using probability measures – uncertainty (unknown unknowns) defies measurement.  However, discussions and mentions of it can be tracked in newspapers as journalists and pundits hold forth on “uncertainty.”  We track uncertainty using the monthly Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index, which is constructed by tracking references to economic uncertainty in newspapers published in 20 economies representing 80% of global GDP on an FX-weighted basis.  See also The Stock Market: Beyond Risk Lies Uncertainty published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis July 1, 2002. 3    Please see Saudi envoy arrives in Washington amid fear of U.S.-Iran war published by axios.com January 6, 2020. 4     Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution draws attention to this transformation in The Jungle Grows Back, an extended essay published in 2018 by Alfred A. Knopf arguing in favor of the Washington Consensus.  See also the photo essay Photos: The Year in Protests published by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on December 17, 2019. 5     A non-trivial risk, in our estimation, is one in which the odds of a highly unfavorable outcome are approximately 1 in 6, the same odds as Russian roulette, with all of its dire connotations. 6     Please see Saudi Aramco fast-tracks East-West pipeline expansion published by Argus Media August 5, 2019. 7     Please see US SPR release in response to Abqaiq, Khurais attacks likely not imminent: analysts published by S+P Global Platts September 15, 2019, following the attacks on KSA’s facilities. 8     Please see RPT-COLUMN-Bearish signal for crude as China closes in on filling oil storage: Russell published by reuters.com September 23, 2019. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut

Highlights The US and Iran are not rushing into a full-scale war for the moment – and yet the bull market in US-Iran tensions will continue for at least the next 2-3 years (Chart 1). This means that while global risk assets can take a breather from Iran geopolitical risk – if not other risks to the heady rally – the breather is not a fundamental resolution and Iran will remain market-relevant in 2020. A Reprieve … Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions On January 8 President Donald Trump spoke at the White House in response to a barrage of missiles fired by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at bases with US troops in al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq. Trump remarked that Iran “appears to be standing down,” judging by the fact that the missile strikes did not kill American citizens – Trump’s explicit red line – or cause any significant casualties or damage. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif claimed that Iran’s strikes “concluded proportionate measures” in response to the US killing of Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad on January 3, which itself followed unrest at the US embassy in Baghdad and American strikes on Iran-backed Iraqi militias (Map 1). Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave ambivalent comments, saying military operations were not in themselves sufficient but that Iran must focus on removing the US presence from the region. Map 1US And Iran Sparring Across The Region A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions President Trump’s speech was transparently a campaign speech, not a war speech. He did not imply in any way that the US military would retaliate to the missile strikes, but said Americans should be “grateful and happy” that Iran did a “good thing” for the world by refraining from drawing American blood. Instead Trump focused on Iran’s nuclear program, denouncing the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPA). He implored the parties of that agreement – the UK, Germany, France, Russia, and China – to join him in negotiating a new deal to replace it. The goal of the new negotiations would be to prevent Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon and to halt its sponsorship of regional militants in exchange for economic development and opening up to the outside world. He called for NATO to take a more active role in the Middle East and he highlighted the US’s shared interest with Iran in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The takeaway is that the Trump administration is not pursuing regime change but rather nuclear non-proliferation and a change in Iran’s regional behavior. The administration has often said as much, but the assassination of Soleimani escalated tensions and called into question Trump’s intentions. Financial markets will cheer the successful reestablishment of US deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, as it makes Iran less likely to retaliate to US pressure in ways that lead to a major military confrontation. The near-term risk of a massive oil supply shock will decline. Oil prices have already fallen back to where they stood before Soleimani’s death. … Amid A Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Yet the saga does not end here. Iran’s ineffectual military strike could have been a feint, or Iran could follow up with more consequential retaliation later. Chart 2US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East Iran has the ability to dial up its nuclear program step by step, sponsor regional attacks with plausible deniability, and foment regional unrest in important oil-producing countries. It can do these things in ways that do not clearly cross America’s red lines but still cause market-relevant tensions or disrupt oil supply. After all, Iran is still under punitive sanctions and desirous of demoralizing the US to hasten its departure from the region. So far Iran has not irreversibly abandoned its nuclear commitments or crossed any red lines regarding levels of uranium enrichment, but we fully expect it to threaten to do so and use its nuclear program to build up negotiating leverage. We doubt any serious US-Iran negotiations will take shape until 2021 at the earliest – and any negotiations could fail and lead to another, more serious round of military exchanges. This means that today’s reprieve may be tomorrow’s negative surprise for the markets. The fundamental basis for this bull market in US-Iran tensions is that the US is seeking to withdraw its strategic commitment to the region to counter China (Chart 2), yet Iran is filling the power vacuum and could conceivably create a regional empire (Map 2). President Trump will not want to appear to have been chased out of Iraq in an election year, even if he is in favor of strategic deleveraging, but Iran may try to do exactly that. Iran will also try to solidify its influence among those left exposed by the US’s deleveraging, namely in Iraq. Map 2Iran's Strategic 'Land Bridge' To The Mediterranean A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions Chart 3A Succession Crisis Looms A Succession Crisis Looms A Succession Crisis Looms Moreover President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal sowed deep distrust between the US and Iran and discredited the reformist faction in Tehran, which faces a tough election in February. This makes it difficult for the two countries to find a new equilibrium anytime soon. The Iranian regime is at a crossroads. It has a large and restless youth population (Chart 3), an economy under crippling sanctions, and faces a leadership succession in the coming years that brings enormous uncertainties about economic policy and regime survival. At the same time, President Trump is a historically unpopular president who is being impeached and believes that showing a strong hand against terrorism – under which the US classifies Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as well as the Islamic State – is an important key to being re-elected in November. Terrorism and immigration are in fact the two clearest issues that got him elected (Chart 4). Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for his reelection. US-Iran tensions will persist at least until the US election is settled and likely beyond. The result is a cyclical increase in tensions between the two countries that will persist at least until after the US election is settled. The Iranians are loathe to reward President Trump for his tactics – it would be better for Tehran if Washington changed parties again. After November, the US and Iran will recalibrate. Ultimately, in the coming years, either President Trump will get a new deal, or a new Democratic administration will reinitiate diplomacy to update the JCPA, or “maximum pressure” tactics will persist and increase the odds of a major military conflict. There is room for many negative surprises in this time frame as the US and Iran jockey for better positioning. The writing on the wall is that the United States is deleveraging and this creates a transition period in which regional instability will rise. Even within 2020 the current de-escalation could prove short-lived. The US president has enormous leeway in foreign policy and even the economic constraint is limited. The US economy is less oil intensive and less dependent on imports for its energy, while households have ample savings and spend less of their disposable income on energy. While this may ultimately serve as a basis for withdrawing from the Middle East, it also enables the US president to take greater risks in the region. Even within 2020 the current de-escalation could prove short-lived. The Iranians would have to create and maintain an oil supply shock the size of the September attack in Saudi Arabia for four months in order to ensure that American voters would feel the negative impact at the gas station by the time of the election. Chart 5 illustrates this point by simulating a 5.7 million barrel-per-day oil outage for different time periods. The chart overstates the impact on gasoline prices because it does not take into account the inevitable release of global strategic petroleum reserves. In other words, Trump may believe he has a sufficient buffer for the economy – and he clearly believes saber-rattling is worth the risk amid impeachment and election campaigning. Chart 4Trump Benefits From Fighting Iran-Backed Militants A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions Chart 5Gasoline Price Cushion Could Embolden Trump A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions   Investment Conclusions Chart 6Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade The past month’s events have reached a crisis point and are tentatively de-escalating. We are booking gains on our tactical long Brent crude trade and our long emerging market energy producers trade (Chart 6). We are not changing our constructive view on China stimulus, commodities, and the global business cycle. Following BCA Research’s commodity strategists, we recommend going long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 on the expectation that production will remain constrained, inventories will fall, and prices will backwardate further. The underlying US-Iran conflict will persist and create volatility in oil markets in 2020 and beyond. We also remain on guard for ways in which the Iran dynamic could affect Trump’s reelection odds and hence US policy and the markets over the coming year.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com  

Feature One of BCA Research’s key geopolitical views since May 2019, outlined recently in our 2020 Outlook, is rapidly materializing: a dramatic escalation in the US-Iran conflict. On January 3 the United States successfully conducted a drone strike against a convoy carrying two high-level targets near the Baghdad International Airport. These were Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and his key Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. The former, Soleimani, was Iran’s most influential military and intelligence leader, and one of its most powerful leaders overall. He was the head of the formidable Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the staunchest military wing of the regime at home and abroad. The latter target, al-Muhandes, was the head of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah militia and the broader coalition of pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This coalition was partly responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then it has sought to consolidate Iranian influence in Iraq, pushing back against Iraqi Sunnis and Shia nationalists, and their allies in the US and Persian Gulf. Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions The US assassinations follow a significant increase in Iranian and Iran-backed militant attacks against US allies in the Middle East this year. These stem from a breakdown in the US-Iran diplomatic detente that was enshrined in the 2015 nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump revoked this agreement in 2018 and in May 2019 imposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and economy — initiating a “bull market” in US-Iran strategic tensions (Chart 1). Recent events show a clear path of strategic escalation — even in the wake of a summer of “fire and fury” and the extraordinary Iran-backed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery in September. Widespread popular unrest has dissolved the Iraqi government, creating intense competition between Iraqi nationalists, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and Iran’s proxies, led by al-Muhandes and the PMF. This unrest marked a significant challenge to Iran’s sphere of influence and necessitated an Iranian backlash. For instance, al-Sadr’s enemies attacked his headquarters with a drone in early December. Meanwhile Kataib Hezbollah launched a spate of rocket strikes against US and Iraqi bases that culminated in the death of an American contractor near Kirkuk on December 28 — crossing an American red line. The US retaliated with damaging air strikes against Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria on December 29, prompting a PMF blockade of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31. While this was a limited blockade, the US has now retaliated by assassinating Soleimani and al-Muhandes, taking the conflict to a new level. There is every reason to expect tensions to escalate further in the new year. First, the Iranian regime is under severe economic stress due to the US sanctions and broader global slowdown (Charts 2A&B). Domestic protests have erupted in recent years, while the regime struggles with economic isolation, a restless youth population, and a looming succession when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eventually steps down. This is an existential struggle for the regime, while President Trump may only be in office for 12 months. Public opinion polls show that the Iranian populace blames the government for economic mismanagement, and yet that the renewed conflict with the US under the Trump administration is shifting the blame to US sanctions (Chart 3). Hence the regime will continue to distract the populace by resisting Trump’s pressure tactics. Chart 2ARegime Survival ... Regime Survival... Regime Survival... Chart 2B... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge     Chart 3US Conflict Distracts From Domestic Woes Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? This tendency will be reinforced by the death of Soleimani, which heightens the regime’s vulnerability while rallying domestic support due to Soleimani’s popularity as a leader (Chart 4). The regime is looking to its survival over the long run. It would be a remarkable shift in policy for Tehran to enter negotiations with Trump, since it would then risk vindicating his “maximum pressure” doctrine, possibly helping him secure a second term in office. Chart 4Hard-Line Soleimani Was Popular (Reformist President Rouhani Is Not) Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Meanwhile President Trump’s circumstances are apparently urging him to double down on his aggressive foreign policy against Iran. First, while he will not be removed from office by a Republican Senate, his impeachment trial threatens to mar his re-election chances. This is a prime motivation to pursue foreign policy objectives to distract the public and seek policy wins. Chart 5Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Second, the Trump administration may feel emboldened by the rise of US shale oil production and decline in US oil import dependency (Chart 5). Simulations we published in our December 6 Strategic Outlook show that Iran would have to sustain an oil supply cutoff as large as the Abqaiq attack for four months in order to drive gasoline prices high enough to harm the US economy as a whole. This buffer may have convinced Trump he has plenty of room for maneuver in confronting Iran. Third, Trump undoubtedly feels the need to maintain the credibility of his threats against Iran, North Korea, and other nations given his impeachment, widely known electoral and economic vulnerability, and his recent capitulation to China in the trade war. The clear threat by Iran to create a humiliating US embassy crisis in Baghdad likely struck a nerve in the White House, reviving memories of Saigon under Gerald Ford, Tehran under Jimmy Carter, and Benghazi under Barack Obama. By taking the offensive, President Trump has reinforced the red line against the death of American citizens or attacks on US assets. Nevertheless he now runs the risk of driving Iran into further escalation rather than negotiation. Iran is not yet likely to court a full-scale American attack by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. It is more likely to retaliate via regional proxy attacks, including cutting off oil production, pipelines, and shipping — at a time of its choosing. If Trump’s pressure tactics succeed, it will advance its nuclear program rather than staging large-scale attacks. Investment Conclusions Iraqi instability will worsen as a result of the past month’s events, bringing 3.5 million barrels of daily oil production under a higher probability of disruption than when we first flagged this risk. Supply disruptions there or elsewhere in the region would hasten the drawdown in global inventories and backwardation of prices occurring due to the revival in global demand on China stimulus and OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Continued oil volatility, as in 2018-19, should be expected, but the risk for now lies to the upside as Middle East tensions could cause an overshoot. We remain long Brent crude and overweight energy sector equities. Second, the US election — and hence US domestic and foreign policy over the next five years — could hang in the balance if the Iran conflict escalates to broader and more open hostilities as we expect. President Trump is favored for re-election. Yet we have contended since 2018 that the revocation of the Iran nuclear deal was a grave geopolitical decision that could jeopardize Trump’s economy and hence re-election — and that remains the case. Chart 6Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump was elected in part because he is viewed as strong on terrorism, and the confrontation with Iran and its proxies will reinforce that reputation in the short run. Iranian attacks will also boost Trump’s approval rating, other things being equal. However, much can change by November. Jimmy Carter’s election troubles with Iran point to a serious risk to Trump, as the initial surge in patriotic support could turn sour over time if unemployment rises as a result of any oil shocks (Chart 6). Even George Bush Jr saw a dramatic fall in approval, from a much higher base than Trump, despite foreign policy conditions that were more transparently favorable to him in 2004 than any conflict with Iran will be to Trump in 2020. Trump has campaigned against Middle Eastern wars to a war-weary public, so the rally around the flag effect will not necessarily play to his favor in the final count. It is too soon to speculate about these matters — our view remains unchanged — but the Iran conflict is now much more likely to be a major factor in the US election and Iran is certainly capable of frustrating US presidents. This reinforces our base case that Trump is only slightly favored to win. Moreover his foreign policy conflicts — in Asia as well as the Middle East — ensure that global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated despite dropping off from the highs reached last year amid the trade war. We remain long pure play global defense stocks on a cyclical and secular basis. We see gold as the appropriate hedge given our expectation that the trade ceasefire and China stimulus will reinforce a global growth recovery despite Middle Eastern turmoil. Higher oil prices push up inflation expectations and limit any benefit to government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Feature One of BCA Research’s key geopolitical views since May 2019, outlined recently in our 2020 Outlook, is rapidly materializing: a dramatic escalation in the US-Iran conflict. On January 3 the United States successfully conducted a drone strike against a convoy carrying two high-level targets near the Baghdad International Airport. These were Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and his key Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes. The former, Soleimani, was Iran’s most influential military and intelligence leader, and one of its most powerful leaders overall. He was the head of the formidable Quds Force, the overseas arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the staunchest military wing of the regime at home and abroad. The latter target, al-Muhandes, was the head of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah militia and the broader coalition of pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This coalition was partly responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Since then it has sought to consolidate Iranian influence in Iraq, pushing back against Iraqi Sunnis and Shia nationalists, and their allies in the US and Persian Gulf. Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions The US assassinations follow a significant increase in Iranian and Iran-backed militant attacks against US allies in the Middle East this year. These stem from a breakdown in the US-Iran diplomatic detente that was enshrined in the 2015 nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump revoked this agreement in 2018 and in May 2019 imposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and economy — initiating a “bull market” in US-Iran strategic tensions (Chart 1). Recent events show a clear path of strategic escalation — even in the wake of a summer of “fire and fury” and the extraordinary Iran-backed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery in September. Widespread popular unrest has dissolved the Iraqi government, creating intense competition between Iraqi nationalists, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and Iran’s proxies, led by al-Muhandes and the PMF. This unrest marked a significant challenge to Iran’s sphere of influence and necessitated an Iranian backlash. For instance, al-Sadr’s enemies attacked his headquarters with a drone in early December. Meanwhile Kataib Hezbollah launched a spate of rocket strikes against US and Iraqi bases that culminated in the death of an American contractor near Kirkuk on December 28 — crossing an American red line. The US retaliated with damaging air strikes against Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria on December 29, prompting a PMF blockade of the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31. While this was a limited blockade, the US has now retaliated by assassinating Soleimani and al-Muhandes, taking the conflict to a new level. There is every reason to expect tensions to escalate further in the new year. First, the Iranian regime is under severe economic stress due to the US sanctions and broader global slowdown (Charts 2A&B). Domestic protests have erupted in recent years, while the regime struggles with economic isolation, a restless youth population, and a looming succession when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei eventually steps down. This is an existential struggle for the regime, while President Trump may only be in office for 12 months. Public opinion polls show that the Iranian populace blames the government for economic mismanagement, and yet that the renewed conflict with the US under the Trump administration is shifting the blame to US sanctions (Chart 3). Hence the regime will continue to distract the populace by resisting Trump’s pressure tactics. Chart 2ARegime Survival ... Regime Survival... Regime Survival... Chart 2B... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge ... An Existential Challenge     Chart 3US Conflict Distracts From Domestic Woes Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? This tendency will be reinforced by the death of Soleimani, which heightens the regime’s vulnerability while rallying domestic support due to Soleimani’s popularity as a leader (Chart 4). The regime is looking to its survival over the long run. It would be a remarkable shift in policy for Tehran to enter negotiations with Trump, since it would then risk vindicating his “maximum pressure” doctrine, possibly helping him secure a second term in office. Chart 4Hard-Line Soleimani Was Popular (Reformist President Rouhani Is Not) Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Trump And Iran: Will Maximum Pressure Work? Meanwhile President Trump’s circumstances are apparently urging him to double down on his aggressive foreign policy against Iran. First, while he will not be removed from office by a Republican Senate, his impeachment trial threatens to mar his re-election chances. This is a prime motivation to pursue foreign policy objectives to distract the public and seek policy wins. Chart 5Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Falling Oil Import Dependency Emboldens US Second, the Trump administration may feel emboldened by the rise of US shale oil production and decline in US oil import dependency (Chart 5). Simulations we published in our December 6 Strategic Outlook show that Iran would have to sustain an oil supply cutoff as large as the Abqaiq attack for four months in order to drive gasoline prices high enough to harm the US economy as a whole. This buffer may have convinced Trump he has plenty of room for maneuver in confronting Iran. Third, Trump undoubtedly feels the need to maintain the credibility of his threats against Iran, North Korea, and other nations given his impeachment, widely known electoral and economic vulnerability, and his recent capitulation to China in the trade war. The clear threat by Iran to create a humiliating US embassy crisis in Baghdad likely struck a nerve in the White House, reviving memories of Saigon under Gerald Ford, Tehran under Jimmy Carter, and Benghazi under Barack Obama. By taking the offensive, President Trump has reinforced the red line against the death of American citizens or attacks on US assets. Nevertheless he now runs the risk of driving Iran into further escalation rather than negotiation. Iran is not yet likely to court a full-scale American attack by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. It is more likely to retaliate via regional proxy attacks, including cutting off oil production, pipelines, and shipping — at a time of its choosing. If Trump’s pressure tactics succeed, it will advance its nuclear program rather than staging large-scale attacks. Investment Conclusions Iraqi instability will worsen as a result of the past month’s events, bringing 3.5 million barrels of daily oil production under a higher probability of disruption than when we first flagged this risk. Supply disruptions there or elsewhere in the region would hasten the drawdown in global inventories and backwardation of prices occurring due to the revival in global demand on China stimulus and OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Continued oil volatility, as in 2018-19, should be expected, but the risk for now lies to the upside as Middle East tensions could cause an overshoot. We remain long Brent crude and overweight energy sector equities. Second, the US election — and hence US domestic and foreign policy over the next five years — could hang in the balance if the Iran conflict escalates to broader and more open hostilities as we expect. President Trump is favored for re-election. Yet we have contended since 2018 that the revocation of the Iran nuclear deal was a grave geopolitical decision that could jeopardize Trump’s economy and hence re-election — and that remains the case. Chart 6Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump 'Maximum Pressure' A Gamble In 2020 Trump was elected in part because he is viewed as strong on terrorism, and the confrontation with Iran and its proxies will reinforce that reputation in the short run. Iranian attacks will also boost Trump’s approval rating, other things being equal. However, much can change by November. Jimmy Carter’s election troubles with Iran point to a serious risk to Trump, as the initial surge in patriotic support could turn sour over time if unemployment rises as a result of any oil shocks (Chart 6). Even George Bush Jr saw a dramatic fall in approval, from a much higher base than Trump, despite foreign policy conditions that were more transparently favorable to him in 2004 than any conflict with Iran will be to Trump in 2020. Trump has campaigned against Middle Eastern wars to a war-weary public, so the rally around the flag effect will not necessarily play to his favor in the final count. It is too soon to speculate about these matters — our view remains unchanged — but the Iran conflict is now much more likely to be a major factor in the US election and Iran is certainly capable of frustrating US presidents. This reinforces our base case that Trump is only slightly favored to win. Moreover his foreign policy conflicts — in Asia as well as the Middle East — ensure that global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated despite dropping off from the highs reached last year amid the trade war. We remain long pure play global defense stocks on a cyclical and secular basis. We see gold as the appropriate hedge given our expectation that the trade ceasefire and China stimulus will reinforce a global growth recovery despite Middle Eastern turmoil. Higher oil prices push up inflation expectations and limit any benefit to government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Saudi Aramco likely will IPO 1-2% of the company next month on its local bourse; retail investors reportedly will get up to 0.5%. The IPO will value Aramco within a range estimated at less than $1 trillion to more than $2 trillion. China’s interest in Aramco goes back almost four years to when the IPO was first proffered. It reflects an economic and geopolitical calculus encompassing more than an equity claim on the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. Investing in Aramco gives it a stake in producing oil it desperately needs at home – as its imports from KSA attest – and supports its goal of filling some of the power vacuum left by the US pivot away from the Middle East (Chart of the Week). For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), stronger ties with China will ground its Asian marketing efforts, and deepen China’s stake in the unimpeded flow of its exports. With tensions in the Gulf remaining high, this is crucial. In addition to the mutuality of KSA’s and China’s interests, “patriotic participation” by Saudi investors will help push Aramco’s valuation close to $2 trillion. A post-IPO let-down – not unusual by any stretch – is likely. Feature Chart of the WeekChina’s Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge China's Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge China's Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge Dear Client, This week, BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy explore the Saudi Aramco IPO scheduled for next month and its larger implications for the global economy. In keeping with our tradition, we take a multidimensional approach – financial, economic and geopolitical – consistent with our unique analytical endowment. We trust you will find this report’s approach and analysis useful in shaping your convictions. Matt Gertken and Bob Ryan The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is in an all-out sprint to diversify its economy away from a near-total dependence on oil exports by 2030 (Chart 2). Time is short. The IPO of Saudi Aramco is the sine qua non of this effort, as it will fund the investment required to effect this transformation’s ambitious goals (Table 1, Chart 3). Investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities is attractive to China. Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Chart 2Breaking Oil Dependency... Breaking Oil Dependency... Breaking Oil Dependency... China is engaged in an all-out effort to become self-sufficient in oil and gas production, given the vulnerabilities in its hydrocarbon-supply chain.1 Chart 3...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 ...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 ...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 Local oil-industry executives doubt this is even remotely attainable, which is one reason we believe investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities via the Aramco IPO is so hugely attractive to China. It helps explain why policymakers sanctioned an investment of up to $10 billion in the IPO by various state-owned enterprises and funds.2 Given our expectation the IPO will value Aramco closer to $2 trillion than not, a 1-2% float would amount to between $20-$40 billion, meaning China – via its state-owned Silk Road Fund, Sinopec Group and China Investment Corp., et al – could account for as much as a quarter of the IPO if it prices out as we expect, and these state-owned investors pony up the full $10 billion being discussed in the press.3 Aramco’s Red Herring Released November 9, the Aramco Red Herring is as interesting for what it includes as what it leaves out.4 In the first six months of this year, Aramco production amounted to 13.2mm b/d of oil equivalent, 10.0mm b/d of which was crude oil and condensates. This was down slightly from the 13.6mm b/d of oil equivalent produced last year. The company notes that in 2016-18, it accounted for 12.5% of global crude output, and that its proved liquids reserves were “approximately five times larger than the combined proved liquids reserves of the Five Major IOCs,” or independent oil companies. Aramco’s 3.1mm b/d of refining capacity makes it the fourth largest integrated refiner in the world. In 2018, Aramco’s free cash flow amounted to almost $86 billion. Net income last year was $111 billion, more than the combined profits of the next six largest oil companies in the world (Chart 4). For its first year as a public company, Aramco has indicated it will pay an annual dividend of $75 billion. Investors will not know how that translates to a dividend yield until the actual number of shares floated is known. Chart 4Aramco Profitability Is Huge Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Chart 5Aramco Absorbs Most Of OPEC 2.0’s Production Cuts, Outside Iran, Venezuela Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China The Red Herring foresees a compound annual growth rate in demand for the Kingdom’s oil, condensate and natural-gas liquids output of 0.9% p.a. between 2015 and 2025. Demand growth is expected to level off some time around 2035. In this baseline scenario, Aramco sees itself gaining market share globally over this period. In an alternative scenario, the company notes that if there is “a more rapid transition away from fossil fuels,” which sees demand for its hydrocarbons starting to decline in the late 2020s, “the Kingdom’s share of global supply is also expected to increase through 2050.” Saudi Arabia and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, the producer coalition formed at the end of 2016 to manage global oil supply growth, following a market-share war launched by OPEC in 2014. The coalition has an agreement in place to keep 1.2mm b/d of production off the market until the end of 1Q20. The Kingdom, via Aramco, has been shouldering the lion’s share of OPEC 2.0’s production restraint, outside of Iran and Venezuela, which have seen their production and exports slide due to US sanctions (Chart 5). On Wednesday, KSA informed OPEC (the original Cartel) the IPO of Aramco would not affect its commitments under the OPEC 2.0 deal.5 The IPO Will Bring KSA And China Closer China has been keen to invest in Aramco since the IPO was first floated almost four years ago. This reflects an economic and a geopolitical calculus encompassing more than simply securing an equity claim in the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. An Aramco investment gives China a stake in producing oil it critically needs at home. China’s oil demand has been growing while its domestic production has been stagnating for the most part, despite the new-found emphasis on becoming self-sufficient. This is reflected in surging imports – totaling just over 10mm b/d in September, an 11% increase over August levels. China’s oil demand is expected to grow ~ 3.5% this year and next, averaging ~ 14.8mm b/d. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) estimates China’s oil demand will peak in 2030 at 16.5mm b/d.6 China’s vulnerability to oil imports – caused by its rising import dependency and US maritime supremacy – has prompted President Xi to order increased exploration and production domestically. The trade war and US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela – two long-time crude-oil suppliers to China – drove this point home: Imports from Iran fell 46% y/y in the January – September period to 357k b/d, while imports from Venezuela fell 15% to 306k b/d.7 For its part, KSA views China as one of its primary growth markets, as its Red Herring attests. It will be investing in additional refining capacity there and view the market as key to its petchems growth. “The Company’s strategy is to continue increasing its in-Kingdom refining capability and expand its strategically integrated downstream business in high-growth economies, such as China, India and Southeast Asia, while maintaining its current participation in material demand centers, such as the United States, and countries that rely on importing crude oil, such as Japan and South Korea.” Both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement. Net, both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement, which the IPO will foster. It is not inconceivable representatives from Chinese state-owned or –affiliated entities could sit on Aramco’s board, which would provide even “greater assurance over its crude oil and refined product supplies going forward,” as we noted in a Special Report published in November 2017.8 This is a critical concern for China, with domestic production stagnating and demand for crude oil, refined products and petchems increasing. Evolution Of China’s Middle East Role While China’s involvement in the Middle East has steadily been growing in energy, trade and investment generally, it has espoused “a vision of a multipolar order in the Middle East based on non-interference in, and partnerships with, other states – one in which the country will promote stability through ‘developmental peace’ rather than the Western notion of ‘democratic peace’,” according to a recent paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations.9 China’s growing interest in the Middle East is fundamentally supportive of the Gulf Arab reform agendas. But geopolitical risk is still elevated in this region (Chart 6), especially over the one- to three-year time frame. This is primarily due to the far-from-settled conflicts between the US and China and the US and Iran. First take the US-China conflict as it pertains to the Middle East. As China’s economy has boomed, so has its import dependency. Over the past two decades Beijing's reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil has ballooned (Chart 7). The result is a deep strategic vulnerability for China. Economic and political stability depend on sea lanes that are, from China’s perspective, implicitly threatened by the United States and its allied maritime powers. Chart 6Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Chart 7Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Hence Beijing has devoted ever greater efforts over the past two decades to building a blue-water navy charged with securing its “lifeline” running from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to China’s hungry coastal cities (Map 1). This naval development is a disruptive process, as the US, Japan, Australia and others are seeking to maintain control of the Indo-Pacific seas along with China’s rivals like India. Map 1The Belt And Road Program Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Until recently, Beijing proceeded carefully in order not to galvanize efforts to oppose its growing influence. It has only timidly begun establishing forward military bases abroad — namely in Djibouti, Africa — and its activity at key civilian ports such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, is developing only gradually. The creation of a new “maritime Silk Road” is a long, drawn-out affair. However, slowly but surely Beijing aims to lessen its vulnerability to the US at strategic chokepoints like Malacca and the Persian Gulf. The US and allies will respond — and this will generate geopolitical risk. Thus naval conflict is a persistent “Black Swan” risk. China’s chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region. Second comes the US-Iran conflict as it pertains to China. In response to US sanctions against Iran, China has had to increase its oil imports from Arab Gulf states. Beijing — inherently a continental power — is seeking overland routes of trade and investment to acquire Siberian, central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources, which cannot be interdicted by the US. Hence the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Still Limits China’s Middle East Options The BRI is the umbrella term for a process that began in the 2000s. China recycles its large current account surpluses into land and resources in the rest of Asia so as to maximize supply lines and diversify its savings away from US Treasurys (Chart 8). This is also a way for Beijing to export its industrial overcapacity, particularly in construction. This BRI process faces an important limitation in that Beijing’s current account surpluses have drastically declined (Chart 9). Even so, this decline will result in greater concentration on strategic targets. The Middle East is vital both because its energy could someday be accessed overland and because it could serve as an export market in itself. It could also become a way-station for greater trade to Europe and all of Eurasia. Chart 8China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys Chart 9China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments The instability of BRI countries delays China’s plans for regional investment, construction, transportation, and logistics. And China lacks the appetite for overseas political and military intervention necessary to shape the domestic environment in the relevant countries — especially given that the US remains the dominant power. China’s limited agency in Iraq is case in point. It is even severely limited in allied countries like Pakistan. And it has rocky relations with some of the key regional powers, such as Turkey. Chart 10 Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Aramco’s IPO: The Tie That Binds KSA And China Yet the chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region and specifically its conflict with Iran. US foreign policy keeps Iran isolated and frequently forces China to impose sanctions. Since the Trump administration imposed “maximum pressure” on Iran, in May 2019, Beijing has drastically reduced oil imports and withdrawn from the $5 billion South Pars natural gas project (Chart 10). This was partly prompted by Washington’s use of secondary sanctions that threatened to cripple China’s leading tech companies for violating Iranian sanctions. Iran’s inability to open up to the outside world prevents China from fully executing its broader overland strategy. China is not yet capable of confronting Washington over Iran. The 2020 US election is therefore a critical juncture — the re-election of the Trump administration would likely prolong the current conflict with Iran. It is unlikely to lead to full-scale war, but that scenario cannot be fully ruled out given Trump’s lack of constraints in a second term. Whereas a new Democratic administration would almost certainly return to the Obama administration policy of détente with Iran, aimed at containing the country’s nuclear program in exchange for economic opening. Either way, Beijing faces a multi-year period in which it must prepare for US pressure on the high seas and possibly also in Iran. GCC’s Attraction To China The above considerations provide a clear reason for Beijing to deepen its relations with the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These states are increasingly attracted to China not only as an energy customer and investor but also as a provider of high-tech goods, arms, and telecom equipment that is necessary for their productivity and useful for their surveillance and repression of domestic dissent. Deepening its trade relationship with KSA via a meaningful equity position in Aramco would present the perfect opportunity for China to take a meaningful step toward establishing the yuan as a global reserve currency. If KSA and the other GCC states begin accepting yuan as payment for their oil and products, and they begin spending their yuan on Chinese-made goods and services, two-way trade could expand significantly and rapidly. The RMB doesn’t have to be fully convertible to USD or euros for that to happen. Such a yuan-trading bloc would encompass oil and refined products, natural gas and liquids, and goods and services made in the GCC and China. This bilateral trade would provide a base from which to build out the yuan as a global reserve currency. This would neither be a forced evolution nor a hurried one. It would naturally evolve, which would ensure its durability. The US may attempt to prevent China from gaining influence in this way, but that would require a concerted effort. And such an effort is not likely to develop until 2021 or 2022 at the earliest. It will depend on the US election outcome, the 2020-24 administration’s foreign policy, and US-China negotiations. Hence China’s evolving role is positive for its supply security as well as for the reform agendas of the Gulf Arab states as they attempt to shift away from oil dependency. The problem is that China cannot ultimately guarantee the stability of the Arab states while they reform. China and Europe are energy importers that require stability in the Mideast, while Russia and increasingly the US are energy producers that can take actions to destabilize the region — the US by partially withdrawing, Russia by reinserting itself. Chart 11US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East True, the US still broadly shares with China the desire for stable oil prices — but its growing energy independence gives it the ability to reduce its commitments, upset the status quo, and create power vacuums that are detrimental to stability until a new regional equilibrium is established. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have demonstrated this erratic tendency (Chart 11). Russia has gotten closer to China, but it also is regaining strategic influence in the Middle East and has an interest in keeping the region divided and unpredictable. This is advantageous for an oil exporter outside the region with direct overland access to the Chinese market, but not advantageous for China. The above situation encapsulates the Geopolitical Strategy theme of multipolarity, or great power competition. The Middle East is in transition and the US strategic deleveraging ensures there will not be a stable order in the near term. Chinese investment can increase the region’s economic diversification, productivity, and potential GDP. But China’s financial limitations, US foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and the region’s chronic instability will jeopardize those positive effects. Bottom Line: China’s influence in the Middle East is growing, particularly with the Gulf Arab states. However, this process exists within the context of competition with a number of other powers, ensuring that the Gulf Arab states still face extreme uncertainty and instability in attempting to reform. The US election is a critical juncture for US policy toward Iran and hence for the Mideast and China. While the US conflict with China will wax and wane across future administrations, the 2020 election will determine whether the US conflict with Iran gets better or worse in the next 1 – 3 years. Ultimately, we would expect the US to focus on pressuring China. But its latent strength in the Middle East is a tool for doing so. China’s growing role in the region will not ensure stability.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1High Anxiety: The Trade War and China’s Oil and Gas Supply Security, by Dr. Erica Downs, provides an excellent analysis of President Xi Jinping’s all-out drive to make China self-sufficient in oil and gas. It was published by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy November 12, 2019. The drive toward oil and gas self-sufficiency is described in local media as a war, as Dr. Downs notes: “In August 2018, (China National Petroleum Corp.) leaders met to discuss Xi’s directive and agreed to launch a ‘major offensive war’ on domestic exploration and development to enhance national energy security.” 2 Please see Chinese state firms mull up to US$10 billion investment in Saudi oil giant Aramco’s IPO published by the South China Morning Post November 7, 2019. The article also notes the Russian Direct Investment Fund also is considering taking a stake in the IPO. 3 $2.27 trillion is the upper end of a range generated by Bank of America. Please see Some banks dealing with Saudi Aramco IPO say company may be worth $1.5 trillion or even less, published by The Japan Times November 4, 2019, for additional estimates from banks involved in the deal. 4 The company’s 658-page prospectus also details business risks including terrorism, the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, and market-related financial risks. Not included is the size of the float – presumably that will be sized based on bids received – and how much of it will be allocated to individuals vs. institutions, who will be bidding for shares from November 17th to the 28th, and from the 17th to Dec. 4, respectively, when the issue is expected to price. The shares could be trading on December 11, 2019, on the Saudi stock Exchange, the Tadawul. No mention is made of a listing on an international exchange – e.g., London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, New York. 5 Please see OPEC says Saudi gave assurances Aramco IPO won’t affect commitment to group deals published November 13, 2019, by uk.reuters.com. 6 Please see Glimpses of China’s energy future, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in September 2019. The Institute summarized CNPC’s 2050 outlook to derive these estimates. 7 Please see footnote 1 above. 8 Please see ضد الواسطة , an Arabic phrase meaning “Against Wasta,” a practice that roughly translates as reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. This Special Report was published November 16, 2017, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see China’s Great Game In The Middle East, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations in October. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift Iron Ore, Steel Prices Set To Lift

Highlights The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. Feature There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.1 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”2 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”3 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.4 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative November 2019 November 2019 In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus November 2019 November 2019 Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World November 2019 November 2019 However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.5 The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.6 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.7 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World November 2019 November 2019 Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.8 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”9 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”10 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”11 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.12 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.13 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... November 2019 November 2019 Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI November 2019 November 2019   Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade November 2019 November 2019 A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Footnotes 1   Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 2   Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3   See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017).  4  The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 5   Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 6   We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own.  7   See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8   Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 9   See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10   Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11   Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 12  Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia.  13  See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.

Highlights Declining uncertainty over policy, stabilizing growth in China and improvements in international liquidity, all will allow global economic activity to pick up in the months ahead. A weak dollar will reinforce this positive economic outlook; investors should favor pro-cyclical currencies such as the AUD, NZD and SEK. Bond yields will rise and stocks will outperform bonds on a 12- to 18-month basis. Cyclical stocks are more attractive than defensives. European stocks will outperform U.S. equities and European financials will shine. Copper is a promising buy; stay long the silver-to-gold ratio. Feature The outlook for risk assets and bond yields hinges on global economic activity. The S&P 500 has hit a new high, but our BCA Equity Scorecard Indicator remains non-committal towards stocks (Chart I-1). If global economic activity improves, the Scorecard will begin to flash a clear buy signal, but if growth deteriorates, the indicator will point towards sell. Chart I-1Stocks Could Go Either Way Stocks Could Go Either Way Stocks Could Go Either Way Cautious optimism is in order. Politics, China, liquidity conditions and the dollar collectively will determine the global economic outlook. The liquidity backdrop has significantly improved, political uncertainty should recede and China will morph from a headwind to a modest tailwind. A weak dollar will indicate that the world is healing, and also will ease global financial conditions which will facilitate economic strength. We remain committed to a positive stance on equities on a 12- to 18-month horizon, and recommend below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Cyclicals should outperform defensives, European banks offer an attractive tactical buying opportunity and European equities will outperform their U.S. counterparts. Heightened Risks… Chart I-2Risks To The Economy And Stocks Risks To The Economy And Stocks Risks To The Economy And Stocks Many domestic indicators overstate the intrinsic fragility in the U.S. The Duncan LEI, which is the ratio of consumer durable spending and residential and business investment to final sales, has flattened. Therefore, the S&P 500 looks vulnerable and real GDP may contract (Chart I-2). CEO confidence and small business capex intentions warn of a looming retrenchment in household income (Chart I-2, bottom two panels). If consumer spending weakens, then a recession will be unavoidable. As worrisome as these indicators may be, we previously discussed that the major debt imbalances that often precede U.S. recessions are absent,1 the rebound in housing starts and homebuilding confidence is inconsistent with a restrictive monetary stance,2 and pipeline inflationary pressures are absent.3 Instead, business confidence and the Duncan LEI have been eroded by heightened political uncertainty and weak global manufacturing and trade. … Meet Receding Policy Uncertainty … The two biggest sources of policy uncertainty affecting markets, the Sino-U.S. trade war and Brexit, are diminishing. However, the U.S. election will continue to lurk in the background. Chart I-3Weaker Brexit Support = No Hard Brexit Support Weaker Brexit Support = No Hard Brexit Support Weaker Brexit Support = No Hard Brexit Support Brexit Westminster and Britain’s Supreme Court have rebuked U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s threat of a “No-Deal” Brexit. Moreover, parliamentary support for his latest plan, which essentially keeps Northern Ireland’s economy within the EU, indicates that the probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit has collapsed to less than 5%. This assessment is reinforced by the delay of Brexit to January 31, 2020. An election is scheduled for December 12 and the chance of a new referendum to vet the deal is escalating. According to Matt Gertken, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist, an election does not increase the risk of a hard Brexit. Meanwhile, support for Brexit is near its lowest point since the June 2016 referendum (Chart I-3). Thus, a new plebiscite would not favor a “No Deal” Brexit. Sino-U.S. Trade War Chart I-4Why The Trade-War Ceasefire? Why The Trade-War Ceasefire? Why The Trade-War Ceasefire? The trade war truce will also greatly diminish economic uncertainty. Uncertainty created by the China-U.S. conflict accentuated the collapse in business confidence and capex intentions. The “phase one deal” announced earlier this month will likely materialize. The White House’s tactical retreat on trade is tied to U.S. President Donald Trump’s desire for a second term. He cannot risk inflicting further economic pain on his base of constituents.  Weekly earnings are decreasing for workers in swing states located in the industrial rust belt, especially in those areas that Trump carried in 2016 (Chart I-4). Those swing states are most affected by the slowdown in the global manufacturing and trade sectors. Beijing is also motivated to agree to truce due to its soft economy and deflationary pressures. An easing in trade uncertainty will be positive for the domestic economy. China’s willingness to replace Carrie Lam, the embattled Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and to withdraw the extradition bill at the heart of the protests confirms its eagerness to come to an agreement with the U.S. China’s readiness to make a deal is also made evident by its increasing imports of U.S. agricultural products (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Ultimately, the U.S. will not implement tariffs in December on $160 billion of Chinese shipments. Consequently, investors and businesses should become less concerned about the chances of a worsening trade war. Moreover, chances are growing of a decrease (but not a complete annulation) of the previously imposed U.S. tariffs on China. … And A Q1 2020 Acceleration In Global Growth Global economic activity will improve in Q1 2020 because the drag from China will dissipate and global liquidity conditions will improve. Many activity indicators increasingly reflect these fundamental supports. China China’s economy has reached a new low point: Q3 annual GDP growth is at a 27-year low of 6%, capital spending is weak, industrial production and profits show little life, the labor market is soft, and imports and exports continue to contract. However, a turn in policy has materialized, which will protect the domestic economy. Moreover, this summer’s Politburo and State Council statements showed an increased willingness to reflate the economy. The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. Credit creation has stabilized and monetary conditions have eased (Chart I-5). Faced with producer price inflation of -1.2% and employment PMIs of 47.3 and 48.2 in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively, authorities have allowed the credit impulse to improve to 26% of GDP from a low of 23.8%. In accordance with this new policy direction, the drag from the shadow banking system’s contraction will slow considerably, thanks to a stabilization in both the growth rate of deposits of non-depository financial institutions and the issuance of bonds by small financial institutions. Additionally, the emission of local government bonds will accelerate. Beijing has also meaningfully eased fiscal policy, which is its preferred reflationary tool. Policymakers have cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP in the past two years. The marginal propensity of households to consume is trying to bottom (Chart I-5, bottom). If history is a guide, the acceleration in the rate of change of public-sector capex will fuel this turnaround in China’s marginal propensity to consume, and push up BCA’s China Activity Indicator (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Overlooked Chinese Improvements Overlooked Chinese Improvements Overlooked Chinese Improvements Chart I-6Public Investment Matters Public Investment Matters Public Investment Matters   Chart I-7A Bottom In Chinese Exports Growth? A Bottom In Chinese Exports Growth? A Bottom In Chinese Exports Growth? China’s economy is unlikely to bounce back as violently as in 2009, 2012 or 2016. Authorities are much more circumspect in their use of credit to reflate the economy than they were previously. Moreover, the regulatory environment will prevent a boom in the shadow banking system. Nonetheless, the fiscal push and the end of the decline in aggregate credit growth will allow the Chinese economy to stabilize and maybe pick up a bit. Therefore, China will move from a large headwind to a slight tailwind for global activity (Chart I-7, top panel). Mounting public capex also points toward a modest global recovery (Chart I-7, middle panel). Finally, the upturn in our Chinese reflation indicator, which incorporates both fiscal and monetary policy, points to a re-acceleration in U.S. capex intentions (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Global Liquidity Global liquidity conditions continue to improve and the global economy should soon respond within normal policy lags. 95% of central banks are loosening policy, which normally leads to an escalation in global activity (Chart I-8). The dominant central banks (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan) will not tighten anytime soon. Inflation expectations in the U.S., the euro area and Japan stand at 1.9%, 1.1%, and 0.2%, respectively, well below levels consistent with a 2% inflation target. Moreover, U.S. core CPI has been perky, but both the ISM and the performance of transportation equities relative to utilities indicate that a deceleration in inflation is imminent (Chart I-9). Salaries are not yet inflationary either because U.S. real wages are growing in line with productivity (Chart I-9, bottom panel). In the euro area and Japan, realized core inflation remains at 1.0% and 0.5%, respectively, and supports the dovish message emanating from inflation expectations. Chart I-8Easier Global Policy Is Important Easier Global Policy Is Important Easier Global Policy Is Important Chart I-9If Inflation Peaks, The U.S. Economy Will Breath A Sigh Of Relief If Inflation Peaks, The U.S. Economy Will Breath A Sigh Of Relief If Inflation Peaks, The U.S. Economy Will Breath A Sigh Of Relief     Liquidity indicators are reflecting this accommodative policy setting. The growth of U.S. and European bank deposits has reaccelerated from 2.5% to 6%, a development linked to the exit of a soft patch (Chart I-10). Moreover, BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator is still moving higher and flashing a resurgence in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), the ISM Manufacturing Index, commodity prices, and EM export prices (Chart I-11). Finally, U.S. and global excess money reinforce the message of BCA’s U.S. Financial liquidity Indicator (Chart I-12). Chart I-10Deposits Suggest The Worst Of The Slowdown Is Behind Us Deposits Suggest The Worst Of The Slowdown Is Behind Us Deposits Suggest The Worst Of The Slowdown Is Behind Us Chart I-11Continued Pick-Up In Financial Liquidity Continued Pick-Up In Financial Liquidity Continued Pick-Up In Financial Liquidity       The Fed will add to the supply of global liquidity by tackling the repo market’s seize-up. Depleting excess reserves and mounting financing needs among primary dealers resulted in the September surge in the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). The Fed announced three weeks ago it would buy $60 billion per month of T-Bills and T-Notes, which will lead to a climbing stock of excess reserves. Higher excess reserves create a weaker dollar, stronger EM currencies and firming global PMIs (Chart I-13). Ultimately, EM currency strength eases EM financial conditions, which supports global growth (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Excess Liquidity Is Accelerating Excess Liquidity Is Accelerating Excess Liquidity Is Accelerating Chart I-13U.S. Excess Reserves Will Grow Again U.S. Excess Reserves Will Grow Again U.S. Excess Reserves Will Grow Again   Borrowing activity in Advanced Economies is showing signs of life. Bank credit is already responding to the drop in global yields, and global corporate bond issuance in September 2019 rose to $434 billion. In the U.S., new issues of corporate bonds have also reaccelerated (Chart I-14). Global Growth Indicators Crucial indicators of global economic activity are picking up on this improving fundamental backdrop. The list includes: A sharp takeoff in the annualized three-month rate of change of capital goods orders in the U.S., the Eurozone and Japan (Chart I-15, top panel). Improvement in this indicator precedes progress in the annual growth rate of orders and in capex itself. Chart I-14Borrowers Are Responding To Easier Financial Conditions Borrowers Are Responding To Easier Financial Conditions Borrowers Are Responding To Easier Financial Conditions Chart I-15Some Green Shoots Are Coming Through Some Green Shoots Are Coming Through Some Green Shoots Are Coming Through Chart I-16Positive Market Signals Positive Market Signals Positive Market Signals A significant upturn in the Philly Fed, Empire State, and Richmond Fed manufacturing surveys for October, which sends a positive signal for the ISM Manufacturing Index (Chart I-15, second panel). Moreover, the new orders and employment components of these surveys indicate that cyclical sectors of the economy will recover and the recent deterioration in employment conditions will be fleeting. A rebound in BCA’s EM economic diffusion index, which incorporates 23 variables. Such an increase usually precedes inflections in global industrial production (Chart I-15, bottom panel). An acceleration – both in absolute and relative terms - in the annual appreciation of Taiwanese stocks. A strong and outperforming Taiwanese equity market is a harbinger of firmer PMIs (Chart I-16, top two panels). A solid performance of EM carry trades financed in yen, European luxury equities, and the relative performance of global semiconductors, materials and industrial stocks, which signal stronger global PMIs (Chart I-16, bottom three panels). Bottom Line: The global economy will accelerate in Q1 2020. A melting probability of a “No-Deal” Brexit and a truce in the Sino-U.S. trade war will allow global uncertainty to recede. Concurrently, China’s economic slowdown is ending and global liquidity conditions are improving. The Dollar As The Arbiter Of Growth Chart I-17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency The dollar faces potent headwinds. The greenback is a countercyclical currency; a business cycle upswing and a weak USD go hand in hand (Chart I-17). The tightness of this relationship results from a powerful feedback loop: weak growth boosts the dollar, but the dollar’s strength foments additional economic slowdown. Global liquidity and activity indicators signal a weaker dollar because they point toward an economic recovery. BCA’s U.S. Financial Liquidity Index, which foresaw a deceleration in the greenback’s rate of appreciation, is calling for an outright depreciation (Chart I-18, top panel). The expanding holdings of securities on U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheets (a key measure of liquidity) corroborates this message. According to a model based on the U.S., Eurozone, Japanese and Chinese broad money supply, the USD should significantly depreciate in the coming 12 months (Chart I-18, third panel). Finally, our EM Economic Diffusion Index validates pressures on the greenback, especially against commodity currencies (Chart I-18, bottom two panels). Chart I-18Liquidity And Growth Indicators Point To A Weaker Dollar Liquidity And Growth Indicators Point To A Weaker Dollar Liquidity And Growth Indicators Point To A Weaker Dollar Growth differentials support this picture. Late last year, the stimulating effect of President Trump’s tax cuts allowed the U.S. to temporarily diverge from a weak global economy, but the U.S. manufacturing sector is now succumbing to the global slowdown. Once global growth snaps back, the U.S. is likely to lag behind as fiscal policy is becoming more stimulative outside the U.S. than in the U.S. Based on historical delays, this will continue to hurt the dollar (Chart I-19, top panel). Finally, the European economy generally outperforms the U.S. when China reflates, especially if Beijing’s push lifts the growth rate of M1 relative to M2, a proxy for China’s aggregate marginal propensity to consume (Chart I-20). Europe’s greater cyclicality reflects is larger exposure to both trade and manufacturing compared with the U.S. Chart I-19A Global Growth Convergence Will Hurt The Dollar A Global Growth Convergence Will Hurt The Dollar A Global Growth Convergence Will Hurt The Dollar Chart I-20European Growth To Rise Vis-A-Vis The U.S. European Growth To Rise Vis-A-Vis The U.S. European Growth To Rise Vis-A-Vis The U.S.   The greenback is expensive and technically vulnerable, which compounds its cyclical risk. The trade-weighted dollar is at a 25% premium to its purchasing power parity equilibrium (PPP), an overvaluation comparable to its 1985 and 2002 peaks. Moreover, our Composite Technical Indicator is overextended and has formed a negative divergence with the price of the dollar (see page 54, Section III). Finally, speculators are massively long the U.S. Dollar Index (DXY). Balance-of-payment flows also flash a significant downside in the dollar (Chart I-21). The U.S. current account deficit stands at 2.5% of GDP, but it is widening in response to the dollar’s overvaluation and the White House’s expansive fiscal policy. Since 2011, foreign direct investments (FDI) have been the main driver of the dollar’s gyrations. Last year, net FDI surged in response to profit repatriations encouraged by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, while portfolio flows stayed in neutral territory. This regulatory change had a one-off impact and FDI will begin to dry out. Therefore, financing the widening current account deficit will become harder. Finally, after years in the red, net portfolio flows into Europe have turned positive (Chart I-21, bottom panel). The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. In this context, interest rate differentials are noteworthy. The two-year spread in real rates between the U.S. and the rest of the G-10 has fallen significantly since October 2018. Reversals in real rates herald a weaker dollar, especially when it faces valuation, technical and flow handicaps. Moreover, European five-year forward short rate expectations are near record lows. If global growth can stabilize, then the five-year forward one-month OIS will pick up, especially relative to the U.S. An uptick will boost the EUR/USD pair and hurt the dollar (Chart I-22). Chart I-21Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics Turning Against The USD Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics Turning Against The USD Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics Turning Against The USD Chart I-22Relative Long-Term Rate Expectations And The Euro Relative Long-Term Rate Expectations And The Euro Relative Long-Term Rate Expectations And The Euro   The three most pro-cyclical currencies in the G-10 – the AUD, NZD and SEK - strengthen the most when BCA’s Global LEI bottoms but global inflation slows (Chart I-23). The GBP will likely generate a much stronger-than-normal performance next year. Cable trades at a 22% discount to PPP. It is also 19% cheap versus short-term interest rate parity models. The absence of a “No-Deal” Brexit should allow these risk premia to dissipate and the pound to recover. The CAD is also more attractive than Chart I-23 implies. The loonie is trading 10% below its PPP, and the USD/CAD often lags the EUR/CAD, a pair that has broken down (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Currency Performance As A Function Of Growth And Inflation November 2019 November 2019 Chart I-24EUR/CAD Flashing A Bearish USD/CAD Signal EUR/CAD Flashing A Bearish USD/CAD Signal EUR/CAD Flashing A Bearish USD/CAD Signal Bottom Line: A rebound in the global manufacturing sector next year will hurt the USD. The dollar is particularly vulnerable because growth differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have melted, the greenback is expensive, balance-of-payment dynamics are deteriorating and interest rate differentials are becoming less supportive. The USD’s depreciation will ease global financial conditions and supports growth further. Additional Investment Implications Bond Yields Have More Upside While the short-term outlook for bonds remains murky, the 12- to 18-month outlook is unambiguously bearish. The BCA Bond Valuation Index is still consistent with much higher U.S. yields in the next 12-18 months (see Section III, page 51). BCA’s Composite Technical Indicator for T-Notes is massively overbought and sentiment, as approximated by the Long-Term Interest Rates component of the ZEW survey, is overly bullish (Chart I-25). Thus, bonds represent an attractive cyclical sell. The Fed will not cut rates aggressively enough for bonds to ignore these valuation and technical risks. Treasurys have outperformed cash by 7.5% in the past year. Based on historical relationships, the Fed needs to cut rates to zero for bonds to beat cash in the coming 12 months (Chart I-26). After this week’s Fed cut to 1.75%, our base case is none to maybe one more rate cut. Chart I-25Sentiment Points To Yield Upside Sentiment Points To Yield Upside Sentiment Points To Yield Upside Chart I-26The Fed Must Cut To Zero For T-Notes To Outperform Cash Further The Fed Must Cut To Zero For T-Notes To Outperform Cash Further The Fed Must Cut To Zero For T-Notes To Outperform Cash Further   Bond yields will need a recession to move lower. The deviation of 10-year Treasury yields from their two-year moving average closely tracks the Swedish Economic Diffusion Index (Chart I-27, top panel). Sweden, a small, open economy highly levered to the global industrial cycle, is a good gauge of the global business cycle. The broad weakness in the Swedish economy is unlikely to worsen unless the global slowdown morphs into a deep recession. Even if global growth remains mediocre, Sweden’s Economic Diffusion Index will rise along with yields. The expansion in securities holdings of U.S. commercial banks and the stabilization in China’s credit flows both support this notion (Chart I-27, bottom panel). Financial market developments also point to higher yields. Sectors that typically capture the momentum in the global economy are perking up. For example, bottoms in the annual performance of European luxury equities or Taiwanese stocks have preceded increases in yields (Chart I-28). Chart I-27Yields Have Upside Yields Have Upside Yields Have Upside Chart I-28Key Financial Market Signals For Yields Key Financial Market Signals For Yields Key Financial Market Signals For Yields   Stocks Will Outperform Bonds Our conviction is strengthening that equities will outperform bonds. The total return of the stock-to-bond ratio has upside. BCA’s Global Economic and Financial Diffusion Index has rallied sharply, which often precedes an ascent in the stock-to-bond ratio, both in the U.S. and globally (Chart I-29). Bonds are much more expensive than stocks, therefore, only a recession will allow stocks to underperform in the coming 12 to 18 months. The environment is positive for equities. BCA’s Monetary Indicator is very elevated and our Composite Sentiment Indicator shows little complacency toward stocks among investors (see Section III, page 47). Finally, the strength in the U.S. Financial Liquidity Indicator supports the S&P 500’s returns (Chart I-30). Chart I-29Cyclical Indicators Argue In Favor Of Stocks Over Bonds Cyclical Indicators Argue In Favor Of Stocks Over Bonds Cyclical Indicators Argue In Favor Of Stocks Over Bonds Chart I-30Liquidity Tailwind For The S&P 500 Liquidity Tailwind For The S&P 500 Liquidity Tailwind For The S&P 500   A few market developments are noteworthy. 55.6% of the S&P 500’s constituents have reported Q3 earnings, and 74% of those firms are beating estimates. Moreover, the market is generously rewarding firms with the largest positive earnings surprises. Additionally, the Value Line Geometric Index is forming a reverse head-and-shoulder pattern, while the relative performance of the Russell 2000 has formed a double bottom (Chart I-31). The environment also favors cyclicals relative to defensive equities. By lifting bond yields, stronger economic activity leads to a contraction in the multiples of defensives relative to cyclicals. The latter’s earnings expectations respond more positively to reviving economic activity, which creates an offset to climbing discount rates. As a result, cyclicals often outperform defensives when the stock-to-bond ratio increases, or after Taiwanese equities gain momentum (Chart I-32). Chart I-31Improving Equity Market Dynamics Improving Equity Market Dynamics Improving Equity Market Dynamics Chart I-32Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives   Compared to other equity markets, the U.S. faces the most challenges. Our model forecasts a 3% annual drop in the S&P 500’s operating earnings in June 2020, and the deviation of U.S. equities from their 200-day moving average has greatly diverged from net earnings revisions (Chart I-33). U.S. equities have already discounted a turnaround in earnings. Moreover, the S&P 500’s margins have downside, a topic covered by BCA’s Chief Equity Strategist Anastasios Avgeriou.4 Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion Index and Corporate Pricing Power Indicator all remain weak (Chart I-34). Downward pressure on margins will limit how rapidly earnings respond when a rebound in global economic activity lifts revenues. Finally, the S&P 500 trades at a historically elevated forward P/E ratio of 18.4, the MSCI EAFE trade at a much more reasonable 14-times forward earnings. Chart I-33Headwinds For U.S. Stocks Headwinds For U.S. Stocks Headwinds For U.S. Stocks Chart I-34Headwinds For U.S. Margins Headwinds For U.S. Margins Headwinds For U.S. Margins   The tech sector will also weigh on the performance of U.S. equities relative to international stocks. Tech stocks represent 22.5% of the U.S. benchmark, compared with 9.7% for the euro area. Anastasios recently argued that software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown; it will likely lag spending on machinery and structures when the cycle picks up.5 Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Moreover, tech multiples will suffer when the dollar depreciates and bond yields rise (Chart I-35). As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to discount factors. Unaffected by those negatives, European equities will benefit most from the outperformance of stocks relative to bonds. A weak dollar will be the first positive for the common-currency returns of European equities. Valuations are the second tailwind. The risk premium for European equities is 300 basis points higher than for U.S. stocks. Moreover, U.S. margins will likely diminish relative to the Eurozone’s because of stronger unit labor costs in the U.S. Sector composition will also dictate the performance of European equities. Compared with the U.S., Europe is underweight tech and healthcare stocks, a defensive sector (Table I-1). Investors who favor Europe will also bet against these two sectors. Europe is a wager on the other cyclical sectors: materials, industrials, energy and financials. Chart I-35Tech P/Es Are At Risk Tech P/Es Are At Risk Tech P/Es Are At Risk Table I-1Europe Overweights The Correct Cyclicals November 2019 November 2019   European financials are particularly attractive. Negative European yields are a major handicap for European financials, but this handicap is already reflected in their price. European banks trade at a price-to-book ratio of 0.6 versus 1.3 for the U.S. This discount should be narrowing, not widening. Yields are bottoming and European loan growth is contracting at a -2% annual rate relative to the U.S. versus -8.6% five years ago. Meanwhile, the annual rate of change of European deposits is in line with the U.S. The attraction of European banks comes from the outlook for their return on tangible equity. A model shows that three variables govern European banks’ ROE: German yields, Italian spreads and the momentum of the silver-to-gold ratio (SGR). German yields impact net interest margins, Italian spreads drive peripheral financial conditions and thus, loan generation in the European periphery, and the SGR tracks the global manufacturing cycle (silver has more industrial uses than gold, but is equally sensitive to real yields), which affects loan flows in the European core. This model logically tracks the performance of European banks and financials (Chart I-36). Our positive outlook on global growth and yields, along with the fall in Italian spreads, augurs well for cheap European financial equities and banks in particular. Commodities Our constructive stance on the global business cycle and yields, plus our negative view on the greenback, is consistent with higher industrial commodity prices. Copper looks particularly attractive. Speculators are aggressively selling the metal, whose price stands at an important technical juncture (Chart I-37). Chart I-36The Drivers Of RoE Point To Higher European Bank Stock Prices The Drivers Of RoE Point To Higher European Bank Stock Prices The Drivers Of RoE Point To Higher European Bank Stock Prices Chart I-37Cooper Is An Attractive Play On Global Growth Cooper Is An Attractive Play On Global Growth Cooper Is An Attractive Play On Global Growth   Chart I-38Favorable Technical Backdrop For Silver-To-Gold Ratio Favorable Technical Backdrop For Silver-To-Gold Ratio Favorable Technical Backdrop For Silver-To-Gold Ratio Finally, we have favored the SGR since late June. Silver is deeply oversold and under-owned relative to the yellow metal (Chart I-38). Consequently, silver’s greater industrial usage should be a potent tailwind for the SGR.6 Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 31, 2019 Next Report: November 22, 2019 - Outlook 2020   II. Back To The Nineteenth Century The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.7 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. The U.S.-China conflict will not lead to complete bifurcation of the global economy. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”8 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”9 Chart II-1Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.10 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart II-1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. In a multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart II-2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart II-2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative November 2019 November 2019 In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart II-3). Chart II-3The Beijing Consensus November 2019 November 2019 Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead To Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. Diagram II-1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram II-1Trade War In A Bipolar World November 2019 November 2019 However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.11 History teaches us that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime. The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.12 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart II-4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart II-4The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart II-5). This is for three reasons: Chart II-5Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.13 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. Diagram II-2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram II-2Trade War In A Multipolar World November 2019 November 2019 Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.14 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts II-1 and II-4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”15 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”16 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”17 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.18 Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.19 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart II-6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart II-7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart II-6The Allies Traded With Germany ... November 2019 November 2019 Chart II-7… Right Up To WWI November 2019 November 2019   Chart II-8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade November 2019 November 2019 A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart II-8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram II-2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart II-9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart II-9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart II-10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart II-11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing. Marko Papic Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group III. Indicators And Reference Charts The S&P 500 is making marginally new all-time highs. Seasonality is becoming very favorable for stock prices. However, our U.S. profit model continues to point south and expanding multiples have already driven this year’s equity gains. The S&P 500 has therefore already priced in a significant improvement in profits. Further P/E expansion will be harder to come by with bond yields set to rise. Thus, until the dollar falls and creates another tailwind for profits, stocks will not be as strong as seasonality suggests and will only make marginal new highs. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remains cautious towards equities. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive readings from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if strong market momentum is not supported by valuations and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Until global growth bottoms and boosts the earnings forecasts of our models, stock gains will stay limited. The outlook for next year remains constructive for stocks. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. continues to improve. This same indicator has recently turned lower in Japan. Meanwhile, it is deteriorating further in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Global yields have turned higher but they remain at exceptionally stimulating levels. Moreover, money and liquidity growth has picked up around the world, and global central banks continue to conduct very dovish policies. As a result, our Monetary Indicator remains at extremely elevated levels. Furthermore, our Composite Technical Indicator is still flashing a buy signal. Also, our BCA Composite Valuation index is still improving. As a result, our Speculation Indicator is back in the neutral zone. 10-year Treasury yields continue to rise, but they remain very expensive. Moreover, both our Bond Valuation Index and our Composite Technical Indicators are still flashing high-conviction sell signals. If the strengthening of the Commodity Index Advance/Decline line results in higher natural resource prices, then, inflation breakevens will also climb meaningfully. Therefore, the current setup argues for a below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios. Weak global growth has been the key support for the dollar in recent months. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar remains extremely expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator has lost momentum and has formed a negative divergence with the Greenback’s level. Moreover, the U.S. current account deficit has begun to widen anew. This backdrop makes the dollar highly vulnerable to a rebound in global growth. In fact, a breakdown in the greenback will be the clearest signal yet that global growth is rebounding for good. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-23Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "September 2019," dated August 29, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2019," dated July 25, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4   Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report "Peak Margins," dated October 7, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5   Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Profit Trail," dated October 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6   Please see Foreign  Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver," dated October 11, 2019, available on fes.bcaresearch.com 7   Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 8   Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 9   See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017).  10  The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 11   Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 12   We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own.  13   See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 14   Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 15   See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 16   Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 17   Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 18  Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia.  19  See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.

Highlights The U.S. and China are moving toward formalizing a trade ceasefire that reduces geopolitical risk in the near term. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is finished – removing a major downside to European assets. Spanish elections reinforce our narrative of general European political stability. Go long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Geopolitical risks will remain elevated in Turkey, rise in Russia, but remain subdued in Brazil. A post-mortem of Canada’s election suggests upside to fiscal spending but further downside to energy sector investment over the short to medium term. Feature After a brief spike in trade war-related geopolitical risk just prior to the resumption of U.S.-China negotiations, President Trump staged a tactical retreat in the trade war. Chart 1Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Negotiating in Washington, President Trump personally visited the top Chinese negotiator Liu He and the two sides announced an informal “phase one deal” to reverse the summer’s escalation in tensions: China will buy $40-$50 billion in U.S. agricultural goods while the U.S. will delay the October 15 tariff hike. More difficult issues – forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies – were punted to later. The RMB is up 0.7% and our own measures of trade war-related risk have dropped off sharply (Chart 1). We think these indicators will be confirmed and Trump’s retreat will continue – as long as he has a chance to save the 2020 economic outlook and his reelection campaign. Odds are low that Trump will be removed from office by a Republican-controlled senate – the looming election provides the republic with an obvious recourse for Trump’s alleged misdeeds. However, Trump’s approval rating is headed south. While it is around the same level as President Obama’s at this point in his first term, Obama’s started a steep and steady rise around now and ended above 50% for the election, a level that is difficult to foresee for Trump (Chart 2). So Trump desperately needs an economic boost and a policy victory to push up his numbers. Short of passing the USMCA, which is in the hands of the House Democrats, a deal with China is the only way to get a major economic and political win at the same time. Hence the odds of Presidents Trump and Xi actually signing some kind of agreement are the highest they have been since April (when we had them pegged at 50/50). Trump will have to delay the December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some of the tariffs over next year as continuing talks “make progress,” though we doubt he will remove restrictions on tech companies like Huawei. Still, we strongly believe that what is coming is a détente rather than the conclusion of the Sino-American rivalry crowned with a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Strategic tensions are rising on a secular basis between the two countries. These tensions could still nix Trump’s flagrantly short-term deal-making, and they virtually ensure that some form of trade war will resume in 2021 or 2022, if indeed a ceasefire is maintained in 2020. Both sides are willing to reduce immediate economic pain but neither side wants to lose face politically. Trump will not forge a “grand compromise.” Our highest conviction view all along has been – and remains – that Trump will not forge a “grand compromise” ushering in a new period of U.S.-China economic reengagement in the medium or long term. China’s compliance, its implementation of structural changes, will be slow or lacking and difficult to verify at least until the 2020 verdict is in. This means policy uncertainty will linger and business confidence and capex intentions will only improve on the margin, not skyrocket upward (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump Needs A Policy Win And Economic Boost How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Chart 3Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat The problem for bullish investors is that even if global trade uncertainty falls, and the dollar’s strength eases, fear will shift from geopolitics to politics, and from international equities to American equities (Chart 4). Trump, hit by impeachment and an explosive reaction to his Syria policy, is entering into dangerous territory for the 2020 race. Trump’s domestic weakness threatens imminent equity volatility for two reasons. Chart 4American Outperformance Falls With Trade Tensions bca.gps_wr_2019_10_25_c4 bca.gps_wr_2019_10_25_c4 Chart 5Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative First, if Trump’s approval rating falls below today’s 42%, investors will begin pricing a Democratic victory in 2020, i.e. higher domestic policy uncertainty, higher taxes, and the re-regulation of the American economy (Chart 5). This re-rating may be temporarily delayed or mitigated by the fact that former Vice President Joe Biden is still leading the Democratic Party’s primary election race. Biden is a known quantity whose policies would simply restore the Obama-era status quo, which is only marginally market-negative. Contrary to our expectations Biden's polling has not broken down due to accusations of foul play in Ukraine and China. Nevertheless, Senator Elizabeth Warren will gradually suck votes away from fellow progressive Senator Bernie Sanders and in doing so remain neck-and-neck with Biden (Chart 6). When and if she pulls ahead of Biden, markets face a much greater negative catalyst. (Yes, she is also capable of beating Trump, especially if his polling remains as weak as it is.) Chart 6Warren Will Rise To Front-Runner Status With Biden How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Second, if Trump becomes a “lame duck” he will eventually reverse the trade retreat above and turn into a loose cannon in his final months in office. Right now we see a decline in geopolitical risk, but if the economy fails to rebound or the China ceasefire offers little support, then Trump will at some point conclude that his only chance at reelection is to double down on his confrontation with America’s enemies and run as a “war president.” A cold war crisis with China, or a military confrontation with Iran (or North Korea, Venezuela, or some unexpected target) could occur. But since September we have been confirmed in believing that Trump is trying to be the dealmaker one last time before any shift to the war president. Bottom Line: The “phase one” trade deal is really just a short-term ceasefire. Assuming it is signed by Trump and Xi, it suggests no increase in tariffs and some tariff rollback next year. However, as recessionary fears fade, and if Trump’s reelection chances stabilize, U.S.-China tensions on a range of issues will revive – and there is no getting around the longer-term conflict between the two powers. For this and other reasons, we remain strategically short RMB-USD, as the flimsy ceasefire will only briefly see RMB appreciation. BoJo's Brexit Bluff Is Finished Our U.K. indicator captured a sharp decline in political risk in the past two weeks and our continental European indicators mirrored this move (Chart 7). The risk that the U.K. would fall out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed even further than in September, when parliament rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit and we went long GBP-USD. We have since added a long GBP-JPY trade. Chart 7Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Chart 8Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This The risk of “no deal” is the only reason to care about Brexit from a macro point of view, as the difference between “soft Brexit” and “no Brexit” is not globally relevant. What matters is the threat of a supply-side shock to Europe when it is already on the verge of recession. With this risk removed, sentiment can begin to recover (and Trump’s trade retreat also confirms our base case that he will not impose tariffs on European cars on November 14). Since Brexit was the only major remaining European political risk, European policy uncertainty will continue to fall. The Halloween deadline was averted because the EU, on the brink of recession, offered a surprising concession to Johnson, enabling him to agree to a deal and put it up for a vote in parliament. The deal consists of keeping Northern Ireland in the European Customs Union but not the whole of the U.K., effectively drawing a new soft border at the Irish Sea. The bill passed the second reading but parliament paused before finalizing it, rejecting Johnson’s rapid three-day time table. The takeaway is that even if an impending election returns Johnson to power, he will seek to pass his deal rather than pull the U.K. out without a deal. This further lowers the odds of a no-deal Brexit as it illuminates Johnson's preferences, which are normally hidden from objective analysis. True, there is a chance that the no-deal option will reemerge if Johnson’s deal totally collapses due to parliamentary amendments, or if the U.K. and EU have failed to agree to a future relationship by the end of the transition period on December 31, 2020 (which can be extended until the end of 2022). However, the chance is well below the 30% which we deemed as the peak risk of no-deal back in August. Johnson created the most credible threat of a no-deal exit that we are likely to see in our lifetimes – a government with authority over foreign policy determined to execute the outcome of a popular referendum – and yet parliament stopped it dead in its tracks. Johnson does not want a no-deal recession and his successors will not want one either. After all, the support for Brexit and for the Tories has generally declined since the referendum, and the Tories are making a comeback on the prospect of an orderly Brexit (Chart 8). All eyes will now turn toward the impending election. Opinion polls still show that Johnson is likely to be returned to power (Chart 9). The Tories have a prospect of engrossing the pro-Brexit vote while the anti-Brexit opposition stands divided. No-deal risk only reemerges if the Conservatives are returned to power with another weak coalition that paralyzes parliament. Chart 9Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Chart 10Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Whatever the election result, we maintain our long-held position that Brexit portends greater fiscal largesse (Chart 10). The agitated swath of England that drove the referendum result will not be assuaged by leaving the European Union – the rewards of Brexit are not material but philosophical, so material grievances will return. Voter frustration will rotate from the EU to domestic political elites. Voters will demand more government support for social concerns. Johnson’s own government confirms this point through its budget proposals. A Labour-led government would oversee an even more dramatic fiscal shift. Our GeoRisk indicator will fall on Brexit improvements but the question of the election and next government will ensure it does not fall too far. Our long GBP trades are tactical and we expect volatility to remain elevated. But the greatest risk, of no deal, is finished, so it does make sense for investors with a long time horizon to go strategically long the pound. The greatest risk, of a no deal Brexit, is finished. Bottom Line: Brexit posed a risk to the global economy only insofar as it proved disorderly. A withdrawal agreement by definition smooths the process. Continental Europe will not suffer a further shock to net exports. The Brexit contribution to global policy uncertainty will abate. The pound will rise against the euro and yen and even against the dollar as long as Trump’s trade retreat continues. Spain: Further Evidence Of European Stability We have long argued that the majority of Catalans do not want independence, but rather a renegotiation of the region's relationship with Spain (Chart 11). This month’s protests in Barcelona following the Catalan independence leaders’ sentencing are at the lower historical range in terms of size – protest participation peaked in 2015 along with support for independence (Table 1). Table 1October Catalan Protests Unimpressive How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Our Spanish risk indicator is showing a decline in political risk (Chart 12). However, we believe that this fall is slightly overstated. While the Catalan independence movement is losing its momentum, the ongoing protests are having an impact on seat projections for the upcoming election.  Chart 11Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Chart 12Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Since the April election, the right-wing bloc of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos, and Vox has been gaining in the seat projections at the expense of the Socialist Party and Podemos. Over the course of the protests, the left-wing parties’ lead over the right-wing parties has narrowed from seven seats to one (Chart 13). If this momentum continues, a change of government from left-wing to right-wing becomes likely. However, a right-wing government is not a market-negative outcome, and any increase in risk on this sort of election surprise would be short-lived. The People’s Party has moderated its message and focused on the economy. Besides pledging to limit the personal tax rate to 40% and corporate tax rate to 20%, the People’s Party platform supports innovation, R&D spending, and startups. The party is promising tax breaks and easier immigration rules to firms and employees pursuing these objectives. Chart 13Spanish Right-Wing Parties Narrow Gap With Left How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Another outcome of the election would be a governing deal between PSOE and Podemos, along with case-by-case support from Ciudadanos. After a shift to the right lost Ciudadanos 5% in support since the April election, leader Albert Rivera announced in early October that he would be lifting the “veto” on working with the Socialist Party. If the right-wing parties fall short of a majority, then Rivera would be open to talks with Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. A governing deal between PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos would have 175 seats, as of the latest projections, which is just one seat short of a majority. As we go to press, this is the only outcome that would end Spain’s current political gridlock, and would therefore be the most market-positive outcome. Bottom Line: Despite having a fourth election in as many years, Spanish political risk is contained. This is reinforced by a relatively politically stable backdrop in continental Europe, and marginally positive developments in the U.K. and on the trade front. We remain long European versus U.S. technology, and long EU versus Chinese equities. We will also be looking to go long EUR/USD when and if the global hard data turn. Following our European Investment Strategy, we recommend going long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Turkey, Brazil, And Russia Chart 14Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkey’s political risk skyrocketed upward after we issued our warning in September (Chart 14). We maintain that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship is not a basis for optimism regarding Turkey’s evading U.S. sanctions. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress are preparing a more stringent set of sanctions, focusing on the Turkish military, in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northeast Syria. At a time when Trump needs allies in the senate to defend him against eventual impeachment articles, he is not likely to veto and risk an override. Moreover, Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, which may wax and wane, stems from economic and political weakness at home and will eventually exacerbate that weakness by fueling the growing opposition to Erdogan’s administration and requiring more unorthodox monetary and fiscal accommodation. It reinforces our bearish outlook on Turkish lira and assets. Chart 15Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazil’s political risk has rebounded (Chart 15). The Senate has virtually passed the pension reform bill, as expected, which raises the official retirement age for men and women to 65 and 63 respectively. This will generate upwards of 800 billion Brazilian real in savings to improve the public debt profile. Of course, the country will still run primary deficits and thus the public debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise. Now the question shifts to President Jair Bolsonaro and his governing coalition. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has ticked up as we expected (Chart 16). If this continues then it is bullish for Brazil because it suggests that he will be able to keep his coalition together. But investors should not get ahead of themselves. Bolsonaro is not an inherently pro-market leader, there is no guarantee that he will remain disciplined in pursuing pro-productivity reforms, and there is a substantial risk that his coalition will fray without pension reform as a shared goal (at least until markets riot and push the coalition back together). Therefore we expect political risk to abate only temporarily, if at all, before new trouble emerges. Furthermore, if reform momentum wanes next year, then Brazil’s reform story as a whole will falter, since electoral considerations emerge in 2021-22. Hence it will be important to verify that policymakers make progress on reforms to tax and trade policy early next year. Our Russian geopolitical risk indicator is also lifting off of its bottom (see Appendix). This makes sense given Russia’s expanding strategic role (particularly in the Middle East), its domestic political troubles, and the risks of the U.S. election. The latter is especially significant given the risk (not our base case, however) that a Democratic administration could take a significantly more aggressive posture toward Russia. Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Russia is a candidate for a “black swan” event, given the eerie quiet that has prevailed as Putin devotes his fourth term to reducing domestic political instability. Brazil, on the other hand, has a 12-month window in which reform momentum can be reinforced, reducing whatever spike in risk occurs in the aftermath of the ruling coalition’s completion of pension reform. Canada: Election Post-Mortem Prime Minister Justin Trudeau returned to power at the head of a minority government in Canada’s federal election (Chart 17). The New Democratic Party (NDP) lost 15 seats from the last election, but will have a greater role in parliament as the Liberals will need its support to pass key agenda items (and a formal governing coalition is possible). The NDP’s result would have been even worse if not for its last-minute surge in the polls after the election debates and Trudeau’s “blackface” scandal. Chart 17Liberals Need The New Democrats Now How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 The Conservative Party won the popular vote but only 121 seats in parliament, leaving the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan aggrieved. The Bloc Québécois, the Quebec nationalist party, gained 22 seats to become the third-largest party in the House. Energy investment faces headwinds in the near-term. The Liberal Party will face resistance from the Left over the Trans Mountain pipeline. Trudeau will not necessarily have to sacrifice the pipeline to appease the NDP. He may be able to work with Conservatives to advance the pipeline while working with the NDP on the rest of his agenda. But on the whole the election result is the worst-case scenario for the oil sector and political questions will have to be resolved before Canada can take advantage of its position as a heavy crude producer near the U.S. Gulf refineries in an era in which Venezuela is collapsing and Saudi Arabia is exposed to geopolitical risk and attacks. More broadly, the Liberals will continue to endorse a more expansive fiscal policy than expected, given Canada’s low budget deficits and the need to prevent minor parties from eating away at the Liberal Party’s seat count in future. Bottom Line: The Liberal Party failed to maintain its single-party majority. Trudeau’s reliance on left-wing parties in parliament may prove market-negative for the Canadian energy sector, though that is not a forgone conclusion. Over the longer term the sector has a brighter future.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix GeoRisk Indicator TRADE WAR GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TRADE WAR GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR U.K.: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR France: GeoRisk Indicator FRANCE: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR FRANCE: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Germany: GeoRisk Indicator GERMANY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR GERMANY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Spain: GeoRisk Indicator SPAIN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR SPAIN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Italy: GeoRisk Indicator ITALY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR ITALY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Canada: GeoRisk Indicator CANADA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR CANADA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Russia: GeoRisk Indicator RUSSIA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR RUSSIA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator TURKEY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TURKEY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator TAIWAN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TAIWAN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Korea: GeoRisk Indicator KOREA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR KOREA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR What's On The Geopolitical Radar? How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights There is a tentative decline in geopolitical risk: An orderly Brexit or no Brexit is the likely final outcome and the U.S.-China talks are coming together. The outstanding geopolitical risks still warrant caution on global equities in the near term. Internal and external instability in Saudi Arabia, any American persistence with maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, and domestic instability in Iraq pose a risk to global oil supply. Go long spot crude oil and GBP/JPY. Feature Chart 1A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk A Tentative Decline In Geopolitical Risk Our views on Brexit and the U.S.-China trade talks are coming together, resulting in a tentative decline in geopolitical risk (Chart 1). The British parliament still needs to ratify Boris Johnson’s exit agreement, painstakingly negotiated with the EU in a surprise summit this week. He may not have the votes. If he fails then he will have a basis to seek an extension to the Brexit deadline on October 31. But it is clear that the EU is willing to allow compromises to prevent a no-deal exit shock from exacerbating the slowdown in the European economy. An orderly Brexit is the final outcome (or no Brexit at all if an election and new referendum should say so). We are removing the $1.30 target on our long GBP/USD call in light of these developments and going long GBP/JPY. Similarly, while uncertainty lingers over U.S.-China relations, it is clear that President Trump is sensitive to the impact of the manufacturing recession and the risk of an overall recession on his reelection prospects. He is therefore pursuing a ceasefire and delaying tariffs. China is minimally reciprocating to forestall a collapse in relations. The December 15 tariff hike will be delayed and, if a ceasefire fails to improve the economic outlook, we expect Trump to engage in some tariff rollback on the pretext that talks are “making progress.” However, we do not expect a bilateral trade agreement or total tariff rollback. And other factors (like political risks in Greater China) could still derail the process. The outstanding geopolitical risks still warrant caution on global equities in the near term. These risks include a collapse in the U.S.-China talks (e.g. due to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the tech race), and the ascent of Elizabeth Warren as the front runner in the Democratic Party’s early primary election. There is also the risk of another oil price shock emanating from the Middle East, which we discuss in this report. The Aftermath Of Abqaiq It has been a geopolitically eventful summer in the Middle East (Diagram 1). While there were plenty of warning shots, the September 14 drone and missile strikes on Saudi Aramco infrastructure was the big bang – wiping out 5.7 mm b/d of crude oil supplies overnight (Chart 2). The attacks were significant not only in terms of their impact on global oil markets, but also because they exposed the U.S.’s and Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to engage in a full-scale military confrontation with Iran. It is too early to call peak tensions in the Persian Gulf. Diagram 1Timeline: Summer Fireworks In The Persian Gulf Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Chart 2Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Around The Middle East Around The Middle East It is too early to call peak tensions in the Persian Gulf. The October 11 strike on an Iranian-owned oil tanker in the Red Sea and the reported U.S. cyber-attacks against Iranian news outlets may well mark the “limited retaliation” that we expected. Nevertheless, last month’s events uncovered vulnerabilities that suggest that even if the U.S. and its Gulf allies back off, geopolitical risk will remain elevated. Chart 3Saudis Are Profligate Defense Spenders Around The Middle East Around The Middle East The most obvious outcome of the September 14 attack is the realization of just how vulnerable Saudi Arabia is to attacks by its regional enemies. Despite being the third most profligate defense spender in the world – and the first relative to GDP (Chart 3) – Saudi Arabia was unable to protect its critical infrastructure. For that, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) will surely face domestic pressure. After five years, Saudi Arabia has little to show from its war in Yemen, other than a humanitarian crisis that has hurt its international standing. Instead, the operation has been a burden on the kingdom’s finances and a nuisance to security in the southwestern provinces of Najran, Jizan and Asir, where the Iran-allied Houthis have conducted regular attacks on oil infrastructure and airports. Some domestic disquiet will be defused if the Yemen war is downgraded or resolved. Saudi Arabia recently accepted the olive branch extended by the Houthis and is reportedly in talks to deescalate. But this will not fully eliminate domestic uncertainty. After all, MBS’s other initiatives – in Syria, in Iraq, in lobbying the U.S. – are also in jeopardy. The conspiracy theory surrounding the September 29 murder of General Abdulaziz al-Faghem, King Salman’s longstanding personal bodyguard, is case in point. Rumor has it that the king was enraged upon hearing of the Houthi movement’s September 28 capture of three Saudi military brigades, and decided to revoke the Crown Prince’s title, instead appointing the youngest Sudairi brother, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, in his place.1 The ploy was allegedly uncovered, resulting in General al-Faghem’s murder.2 This is entirely speculation and we find the idea of MBS’s removal to be highly doubtful. The King’s and Crown Prince’s joint appearance during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the kingdom earlier this week should dispel speculation about a brewing palace coup. Nevertheless, the murder itself is extremely concerning and reinforces independent reasons for concerns about internal stability. Chart 4Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability Impatient Diversification Threatens Domestic Stability The pursuit of the Saudi reform agenda, “Vision 2030,” is premised first and foremost on the consolidation of power in the hands of MBS and his faction. The appointment of King Salman’s son, Prince Abdulaziz, as energy minister was motivated by a desire to expedite the initial public offering of state oil giant Saudi Aramco, which could begin as early as November. This was preceded by the appointment of Yasir Al-Rumayyan, head of the sovereign wealth fund and a close ally of MBS, as chairman of Aramco. Moreover, wealthy Saudis – some of whom were detained at the Ritz Carlton in November 2017 – are reportedly being strong-armed into buying stakes in the pending IPO. While weaning Saudi Arabia’s economy off of crude oil is the best course of action for long-term stability (Chart 4), the transition will threaten domestic stability. Meanwhile the conflict with Iran is far from settled. Bottom Line: The September 14 drone strikes on key Saudi oil infrastructure revealed both Saudi Arabia’s and the U.S.’s unwillingness to engage in military action against and a full confrontation with Iran. This will raise concerns regarding the kingdom’s ability to defend itself. Moreover, Saudi Arabia remains vulnerable to domestic pressure as MBS strives to maintain his consolidation of power in recent years and pursues Vision 2030. Internal or external instability in Saudi Arabia poses a risk to global oil supply. Iran’s Resistance Economy Can Handle Trump’s Maximum Pressure Chart 5Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite Iran's Economy Is Feeling The Bite On the other side of the Persian Gulf, the Iranians are displaying a higher pain threshold than their enemies. The economy is suffering under the U.S.’s crippling sanctions, with exports at the lowest level since 2003 (Chart 5). The IMF expects Iran’s economy to contract by 9.5% this year, with annual inflation forecast at 35.7%. Oil exports, the lifeblood of its economy, are down 89% YoY. Nevertheless, Iran is well-versed in the game of chicken, it is methodically displaying its ability to create havoc across the region, and it has not waivered in its stance that President Trump must ease sanctions and rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal if it is to engage in bilateral talks. All the while, Iran continues to reduce its nuclear commitments. On September 5, Rouhani indicated plans to completely abandon research and development commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to begin working on more advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges which was capped at 3.7% under the JCPOA (Table 1). We also expect Iran to follow-through on its threat of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if Trump maintains sanctions. Table 1Iran Is Walking Away From 2015 Nuclear Deal Around The Middle East Around The Middle East The same resolve cannot be shown on the part of the United States or Saudi Arabia. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Around The Middle East Around The Middle East President Trump is constrained by the risk of an Iran-induced oil price shock ahead of the 2020 election. He is therefore eager to deescalate tensions with Iran. He is abandoning the field in Syria (on which more below), opting to add a symbolic 1,800 troops into Saudi Arabia for deterrent effect instead. This defensive posture is being undertaken within the context of American public opinion, which opposes war with Iran or additional military adventures in the Middle East (Chart 6). This signifies the U.S.’s strategic deleveraging from the Middle East in order to shift its focus to Asia Pacific, where America has a greater priority in managing the rise of China. At the same time, negotiations between the Saudis and Yemeni Houthis suggest a lack of Saudi appetite for all-out conflict with Iran, clearing the way for a diplomatic solution. As Rouhani stated “ending the war in Yemen will pave the ground for de-escalation in the region,” specifically between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Saudis have amply signaled in the wake of the Abqaiq attack that they wish to avoid a direct confrontation, particularly given the Trump administration’s apparent unwillingness (under electoral constraint) to continue providing a “blank check” for MBS to conduct an aggressive foreign policy. Already the United Arab Emirates – a key player in the Saudi-led coalition against Yemen – has distanced itself from Riyadh and sought to ease tensions with Iran. It recently reduced its commitment to the Yemen war and engaged in high-level meetings with Iran. The UAE’s national security adviser, Tahnoun bin Zayed, visited Tehran on a secret mission, the latest in a series of backchannel efforts to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other reported efforts at diplomacy include visits by Iraqi and Pakistani officials. The remaining uncertainty is whether Trump will quietly ease sanctions on Iran, and whether Iran will quit while it is ahead. If Trump maintains maximum pressure, Iran may need to stage further attacks and oil disruptions to threaten Trump’s economy and encourage sanction relief. Otherwise, Iran, smelling American and Saudi fear, could overstep its bounds and commit a provocation that requires a larger American response, thus re-escalating tensions. While Trump’s economic and electoral constraint suggests that he will ease sanctions underhandedly, Iran’s risk appetite is apparently very high: Abqaiq could have gone terribly wrong. It also has an opportunity to flex its muscles and demonstrate American inconstancy to the region. This could lead to miscalculation and a more significant oil price shock than already seen. Bottom Line: Iran has remained steadfast in its position while the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their allies appear to be capitulating. They have more to lose than gain from all-out conflict. But Iran’s decision-making is opaque and any American persistence with maximum pressure sanctions will motivate additional provocations, escalation, and oil supply disruption. Making Russia Great Again? Recent events in Turkey and Syria do not come as a surprise. We have long highlighted a deeper Turkish intervention into Syria as a regional “black swan” event. In August we warned clients that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship would not save Turkey from impending U.S. sanctions. In September we warned that Turkish geopolitical risk premia had collapsed, as measured by our market-based GeoRisk indicator, and that this collapse was certain to reverse in a major way, sending the lira falling. As we go to press the Turks have declared a ceasefire to avoid sanctions but nothing is certain. Putin has pounced on the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S. retreat. If Turkey is the loser, who is the winner? First, Trump, who benefits from fulfilling a campaign pledge to reduce U.S. involvement in foreign wars – a stance that will ultimately be rewarded (or at least not punished) by a war-weary public. Second, Iran and Russia, Syria’s major allies, who have invested greatly in maintaining the regime of Bashar al-Assad throughout the civil war and now face American withdrawal and heightened U.S. tensions with its allies and partners in the region as a result. Iran benefits through the ability to increase its strategic arc, the so-called “Shia Crescent,” to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia benefits through solidifying its reclaimed status as a major player in the Middle East – an indication of global multipolarity. President Vladimir Putin has pounced on the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S. retreat with official visits to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE this week. He made promises of both stronger economic ties and the ability to broker regional power. On the economic front, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) selected Saudi Arabia as the venue for its first foreign office, signaling its interest in the region. It has already approved 25 joint projects with investment valued at more than $2.5 billion. There are also talks of RDIF-Aramco projects in the oil services sector worth over $1 billion and oil and gas conversion projects worth more than $2 billion. Moreover, RDIF signed multiple deals worth $1.4 billion with UAE partners. Chart 7Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Russia Has Been Complying With OPEC 2.0 Cuts Most importantly, the Saudis and Russians share the same objective of supporting global oil prices and have been jointly managing OPEC 2.0 supply since 2017 (Chart 7). Russia’s approach to the region focuses on enhancing its all-around strategic influence. Chart 8Erdogan Is Playing Into Turkish Concerns About Syrian Refugees Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Although Russia’s allies include Iran and Syria – Saudi Arabia’s rivals – it has presented itself as a pragmatic partner to other powers, including Turkey and even the Saudis and Gulf states. As such, the Kremlin has leverage on both sides of the regional divide, giving it the potential to serve as a power broker. However, any Saudi purchase of the Russian S-400 defense system, long under negotiation, would unsettle the United States. Turkey is threatened with American sanctions for its purchase of the same system.3 The U.S. may be willing to tolerate some increased Russian influence in the Middle East, but a defense agreement may be its red line. The Trump administration still wields the stick of economic sanctions. Growing Russian influence extends beyond the Gulf states. The U.S.’s withdrawal from northeast Syria last week and the Turkish invasion is a gift to the Russians. They are now the only major power from outside the Middle East engaged in Syria. They have embraced this position, positioning themselves as peace brokers between the Syrian regime, with whom they are allied, and Turkey, as well as the Turkish arch-enemy, the Kurds, who now lack American support and must turn to Syria and Russia for some kind of arrangement to protect themselves. Russia has therefore cemented its return as a strategic player in the region, after its initial intervention in Syria in 2015. Turkey’s incursion into Syria is an attempt by President Erdogan to confront the battle-hardened Syrian Kurds and prevent a Kurdish-controlled continuous border with Syria, and to distract from his weakened domestic position. He is striving to garner support by playing to broad Turkish concerns about Syrian refugees in Turkey (Chart 8). The intervention will seek to create a space for refugees to be placed on the Syrian side of the border. However given that there is little domestic popular support for a military intervention, he runs the risk of further alienating voters, who are already losing patience with his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). So far, the incursion has the official support of all Turkey’s political parties except the Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). However this will change as the intervention entails western economic sanctions, a drawn-out military conflict, and limited concrete benefits other than the removal of refugees. Chart 9Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit Turkey's Already Vulnerable Economy Will Take A Hit The already vulnerable economy is likely to take a hit (Chart 9). Markets have reacted to the penalties imposed by the U.S. so far with a sigh of relief as they are not as damaging as they could have been – i.e. Turkish banks were spared.4 However, this is just the opening salvo and more sanctions are on the way – Congress is moving to impose sanctions of its own, which Trump is unlikely to veto. Moreover, the European Union is following suit and imposing sanctions of its own, including on military equipment. Volkswagen already announced it is postponing a final decision on whether to build a $1.1 billion plant in Turkey. This comes at a time of already existing sensitivities with the EU over Turkish oil and gas drilling activities in waters off Cyprus. EU foreign ministers are responding by drawing up a list of economic sanctions. These economic risks will likely hold back the central bank’s rate cutting cycle as the lira and financial assets will take a hit. Bottom Line: The U.S. pivot away from the Middle East is a boon for Moscow, which is pursuing increased cooperation in the Gulf and gaining influence in Syria. Russia is marketing itself as a strategic player and effective power broker. Erdogan’s incursion in Syria, while motivated by domestic weakness, will backfire on the Turkish economy. Maintain a cautious stance on Turkish currency and risk assets. Iraq Is The Fulcrum Iraq’s geographic position, wedged between Saudi Arabia and Iran, renders it the epicenter of the regional power struggle. In the wake of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran we have frequently highlighted that a dramatic means of Iranian pushback, short of closing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, is fomenting unrest in an already unstable Iraq. This would be a threat to U.S. strategy as well as to global oil supplies. Iraq is the epicenter of the regional power struggle. In this context, Iraq’s revered Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s visit to Iran on September 10, just four days ahead of the September Saudi Aramco attack, raises eyebrows. Sadr is the key player in Iraq today and over the past two years he had staked out a position of national independence for Iraq, eschewing overreliance on Iran. A rapprochement between Sadr and Iran is a negative domestic development for Iraq, which has recently been making strides to reduce Iran’s political and military grip. It would undermine Iraqi stability by increasing divisions over ideology, sect, economic patronage, and national security. There is speculation that Sadr’s trip was intended to discuss Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is perceived as weak and incapable of managing the various powers on Iraq’s political scene. The violent protests rocking Iraq since early September support this assessment. Protestors are motivated by discontent over unemployment, poor services, and government corruption, which are perceived to have mostly deteriorated since the start of Abdul Mahdi’s term (Chart 10). While Abdul Mahdi has announced some reforms in response to the popular discontent, including a cabinet reshuffle and promises of handouts for the poor, they have done little to quell the protests. The popular demands are only one of the existential threats facing the government. The second and potentially more serious risk is the security threat. Iraq has been failing at its attempts to formally integrate the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) – Iran-backed paramilitary groups that were instrumental in ISIS’s defeat – into the national security forces. This is essential in order to prevent Iran from maintaining direct control of security forces within Iraq. A majority of the public agrees that the PMU should not play a role in politics (Chart 11), reflecting the underlying trend demanding Iraqi autonomy from Iran. Chart 10Rising Discontent In Iraq Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Chart 11Little Support For A Political Role For The PMU Around The Middle East Around The Middle East Given that the PMU is in effect an umbrella term for ~50 predominantly Shia paramilitary groups, internal divisions exist within the forces which compete for power, legitimacy, and resources. Recently, it has been purging group leaders perceived as a threat to the overall forces and the senior leadership which maintain strong links to Iran. Chart 12Iraq Is Divided Across Political Affiliation Around The Middle East Around The Middle East This internal struggle also reflects the intra-Shia struggle for power among Iraq’s main political parties. On the one side there is the conservative, pro-Khamenei bloc led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and PMU commander Hadi al-Ameri, and on the other is the reformist, nationalist leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s joined by Ammar al-Hakim. Given that most Iraqis view their country as a divided nation across political affiliation, this is a risk to domestic stability (Chart 12). Thus even if the wider risk of regional tensions abates and reduces the threat of sabotage to oil infrastructure and transportation, the current domestic situation in Iraq remains uneasy. But given that we do not see the regional tensions abating yet – due to either American maximum pressure or Iranian hubris – this dynamic translates into an active threat to oil supplies, with 3.4 mm b/d of exports concentrated in the southern city of Basra. Bottom Line: Heightened domestic instability in Iraq poses a non-negligible threat to oil supplies. This risk is compounded by Iraq’s location as a geographic buffer between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s interest in fomenting unrest to pressure the U.S. into relaxing sanctions. Investment Conclusions The common thread across the Middle East is a persistent threat to global oil supply in the wake of the extraordinary Abqaiq attack. First, it cannot be stated with confidence that Iran will refrain from causing additional oil disruptions, as it is convinced that President Trump’s appetite for conflict is small (and Trump is indeed constrained by fear of an oil shock). President Rouhani has an interest in removing Trump from power, which an oil shock might achieve, and the Supreme Leader may even be willing to risk a conflict with the United States as a means of increasing support for the regime and infusing a new generation with revolutionary spirit. Iran loses in a total war, but Tehran is convinced that the U.S. does not have the will to engage in total war. Second, Russia’s interest in the region is not in generating a durable peace but in filling the vacuum left by the United States and making itself a power broker. Any instability simply increases oil prices which is positive for Russia. Third, Iraq’s instability is both domestically and internationally driven. It is nearly impossible to differentiate between the two. Iranian hubris could manifest in sabotage in Iraq. Or Iraq could destabilize under the regional pressures with minimal Iranian encouragement. Either way the world’s current below-average spare oil production capacity could be hit sooner than expected if shortages result. Go long spot crude oil. On equities, with a U.S.-China ceasefire in the works, and little chance of a no-deal Brexit, we see our cyclically positive outlook reinforced, though we maintain near-term caution due to U.S. domestic politics. In terms of equity focus, we are overweight European equities in developed markets and Southeast Asian equities in emerging markets.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Sudairi branch of the al-Saud family is made up of the seven sons of the late King Abdulaziz and Hussa al-Sudairi of the powerful Najd tribe. 2 Please see TRT World “Killing of Saudi King’s Personal Bodyguard Triggers Speculation,” October 2, 2019, available at https://www.trtworld.com. 3 In the wake of the attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities, President Putin trolled the U.S. by recommending that Saudi Arabia follow the footsteps of Iran and Turkey in purchasing Russia’s S-300 or S-400 air defense systems. 4 The U.S. penalties include sanctions against current and former officials of the Turkish government, a hike in tariffs on imports of Turkish steel back up to 50 percent, and the halt in negotiations on a $100 billion trade deal.

Highlights The Cold War is a limited analogy for the U.S.-China conflict; In a multipolar world, complete bifurcation of trade is difficult if not impossible; History suggests that trade between rivals will continue, with minimal impediments; On a secular horizon, buy defense stocks, Europe, capex, and non-aligned countries. Feature There is a growing consensus that China and the U.S. are hurtling towards a Cold War. BCA Research played some part in this consensus – at least as far as the investment community is concerned – by publishing “Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” in September 2012.1 For much of this decade, Geopolitical Strategy focused on the thesis that geopolitical risk was rotating out of the Middle East, where it was increasingly irrelevant, to East Asia, where it would become increasingly relevant. This thesis remains cogent, but it does not mean that a “Silicon Curtain” will necessarily divide the world into two bifurcated zones of capitalism. Trade, capital flows, and human exchanges between China and the U.S. will continue and may even grow. But the risk of conflict, including a military one, will not decline. In this report, we first review the geopolitical logic that underpins Sino-American tensions. We then survey the academic literature for clues on how that relationship will develop vis-à-vis trade and economic relations. The evidence from political theory is surprising and highly investment relevant. We then look back at history for clues as to what this means for investors. Our conclusion is that it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will continue to be geopolitical rivals. However, due to the geopolitical context of multipolarity, it is unlikely that the result will be “Bifurcated Capitalism.” Rather, we expect an exciting and volatile environment for investors where geopolitics takes its historical place alongside valuation, momentum, fundamentals, and macroeconomics in the pantheon of factors that determine investment opportunities and risks. The Thucydides Trap Is Real … Speaking in the Reichstag in 1897, German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow proclaimed that it was time for Germany to demand “its own place in the sun.”2 The occasion was a debate on Germany’s policy towards East Asia. Bülow soon ascended to the Chancellorship under Kaiser Wilhelm II and oversaw the evolution of German foreign policy from Realpolitik to Weltpolitik. While Realpolitik was characterized by Germany’s cautious balancing of global powers under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Weltpolitik saw Bülow and Wilhelm II seek to redraw the status quo through aggressive foreign and trade policy. Imperial Germany joined a long list of antagonists, from Athens to today’s People’s Republic of China, in the tragic play of human history dubbed the “Thucydides Trap.”3 Chart 1Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch Imperial Overstretch The underlying concept is well known to all students of world history. It takes its name from the Greek historian Thucydides and his seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides explains why Sparta and Athens went to war but, unlike his contemporaries, he does not moralize or blame the gods. Instead, he dispassionately describes how the conflict between a revisionist Athens and established Sparta became inevitable due to a cycle of mistrust. Graham Allison, one of America’s preeminent scholars of international relations, has argued that the interplay between a status quo power and a challenger has almost always led to conflict. In 12 out of the 16 cases he surveyed, actual military conflict broke out. Of the four cases where war did not develop, three involved transitions between countries that shared a deep cultural affinity and a respect for the prevailing institutions.4 In those cases, the transition was a case of new management running largely the same organizational structure. And one of the four non-war outcomes was nothing less than the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The fundamental problem for a status quo power is that its empire or “sphere of influence” remains the same size as when it stood at the zenith of power. However, its decline in a relative sense leads to a classic problem of “imperial overstretch.” The hegemonic or imperial power erroneously doubles down on maintaining a status quo that it can no longer afford (Chart 1). The challenger power is not blameless. It senses weakness in the hegemon and begins to develop a regional sphere of influence. The problem is that regional hegemony is a perfect jumping off point towards global hegemony. And while the challenger’s intentions may be limited and restrained (though they often are ambitious and overweening), the status quo power must react to capabilities, not intentions. The former are material and real, whereas the latter are perceived and ephemeral. The challenging power always has an internal logic justifying its ambitions. In China’s case today, there is a sense among the elite that the country is merely mean-reverting to the way things were for many centuries in China’s and Asia’s long history (Chart 2). In other words, China is a “challenger” power only if one describes the status quo as the past three hundred years. It is the “established” power if one goes back to an earlier state of affairs. As such, the consensus in China is that it should not have to pay deference to the prevailing status quo given that the contemporary context is merely the result of western imperialist “challenges” to the established Chinese and regional order. Chart 2China’s Mean Reverting Narrative Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century In addition, China has a legitimate claim that it is at least as relevant to the global economy as the U.S. and therefore deserves a greater say in global governance. While the U.S. still takes a larger share of the global economy, China has contributed 23% to incremental global GDP over the past two decades, compared to 13% for the U.S. (Chart 3). Chart 3The Beijing Consensus Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century Bottom Line: The emerging tensions between China and the U.S. fit neatly into the theoretical and empirical outlines of the Thucydides Trap. We do not see any way for the two countries to avoid struggle and conflict on a secular or forecastable horizon. What does this mean for investors? For one, the secular tailwinds behind defense stocks will persist. But what beyond that? Is the global economy destined to witness complete bifurcation into two armed camps separated by a Silicon Curtain? Will the Alibaba and Amazon Pacts suspiciously glare at each other the way that NATO and Warsaw Pacts did amidst the Cold War? The answer, tentatively, is no. … But It Will Not Lead to Economic Bifurcation President Trump’s aggressive trade policy also fits neatly into political theory, to a point. Realism in political science focuses on relative gains over absolute gains in all relationships, including trade. This is because trade leads to economic prosperity, prosperity to the accumulation of economic surplus, and economic surplus to military spending, research, and development. Two states that care only about relative gains due to rivalry produce a zero-sum game with no room for cooperation. It is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” that can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes in which both actors chose not to cooperate. The U.S.-China conflict will not lead to complete bifurcation of the global economy. Diagram 1 illustrates the effects of relative gain calculations on the trade behavior of states. In the absence of geopolitics, demand (Q3) is satisfied via trade (Q3-Q0) due to the inability of domestic production (Q0) to meet it. Diagram 1Trade War In A Bipolar World Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century However, geopolitical externality – a rivalry with another state – raises the marginal social cost of imports – i.e. trade allows the rival to gain more out of trade and “catch up” in terms of geopolitical capabilities. The trading state therefore eliminates such externalities with a tariff (t), raising domestic output to Q1, while shrinking demand to Q2, thus reducing imports to merely Q2-Q1, a fraction of where they would be in a world where geopolitics do not matter. The dynamic of relative gains can also have a powerful pull on the hegemon as it begins to weaken and rethink its originally magnanimous trade relations. As political scientist Duncan Snidal argued in a 1991 paper, When the global system is first set up, the hegemon makes deals with smaller states. The hegemon is concerned more with absolute gains, smaller states are more concerned with relative, so they are tougher negotiators. Cooperative arrangements favoring smaller states contribute to relative hegemonic decline. As the unequal distribution of benefits in favor of smaller states helps them catch up to the hegemonic actor, it also lowers the relative gains weight they place on the hegemonic actor. At the same time, declining relative preponderance increases the hegemonic state’s concern for relative gains with other states, especially any rising challengers. The net result is increasing pressure from the largest actor to change the prevailing system to gain a greater share of cooperative benefits.5 The reason small states are initially more concerned with relative gains is because they are far more concerned with national security than the hegemon. The hegemon has a preponderance of power and is therefore more relaxed about its security needs. This explains why Presidents George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all made “bad deals” with China. Writing nearly thirty years ago, Snidal cogently described the current U.S.-China trade war. Snidal thought he was describing a coming decade of anarchy. But he and fellow political scientists writing in the early 1990s underestimated American power. The “unipolar moment” of American supremacy was not over, it was just beginning! As such, the dynamic Snidal described took thirty years to come to fruition. When thinking about the transition away from U.S. hegemony, most investors anchor themselves to the Cold War as it is the only world they have known that was not unipolar. Moreover the Cold War provides a simple, bipolar distribution of power that is easy to model through game theory. If this is the world we are about to inhabit, with the U.S. and China dividing the whole planet into spheres like the U.S. and Soviet Union, then the paragraph we lifted from Snidal’s paper would be the end of it. America would abandon globalization in totality, impose a draconian Silicon Curtain around China, and coerce its allies to follow suit. But most of recent human history has been defined by a multipolar distribution of power between states, not a bipolar one. The term “cold war” is applicable to the U.S. and China in the sense that comparable military power may prevent them from fighting a full-blown “hot war.” But ultimately the U.S.-Soviet Cold War is a poor analogy for today’s world. In a multipolar world, Snidal concludes, “states that do not cooperate fall behind other relative gains maximizers that cooperate among themselves. This makes cooperation the best defense (as well as the best offense) when your rivals are cooperating in a multilateral relative gains world.” Snidal shows via formal modeling that as the number of players increases from two, relative-gains sensitivity drops sharply.6 The U.S.-China relationship does not occur in a vacuum — it is moderated by the global context. Today’s global context is one of multipolarity. Multipolarity refers to the distribution of geopolitical power, which is no longer dominated by one or two great powers (Chart 4). Europe and Japan, for instance, have formidable economies and military capabilities. Russia remains a potent military power, even as India surpasses it in terms of overall geopolitical power. Chart 4The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar The World Is No Longer Bipolar A multipolar world is the least “ordered” and the most unstable of world systems (Chart 5). This is for three reasons: Chart 5Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Multipolarity Is Messy Math: Multipolarity engenders more potential “conflict dyads” that can lead to conflict. In a unipolar world, there is only one country that determines norms and rules of behavior. Conflict is possible, but only if the hegemon wishes it. In a bipolar world, conflict is possible, but it must align along the axis of the two dominant powers. In a multipolar world, alliances are constantly shifting and producing novel conflict dyads. Lack of coordination: Global coordination suffers in periods of multipolarity as there are more “veto players.” This is particularly problematic during times of stress, such as when an aggressive revisionist power uses force or when the world is faced with an economic crisis. Charles Kindleberger has argued that it was exactly such hegemonic instability that caused the Great Depression to descend into the Second World War in his seminal The World In Depression.7 Mistakes: In a unipolar and bipolar world, there are a very limited number of dice being rolled at once. As such, the odds of tragic mistakes are low and can be mitigated with complex formal relationships (such as U.S.-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction, grounded in formal modeling of game theory). But in a multipolar world, something as random as an assassination of a dignitary can set in motion a global war. The multipolar system is far more dynamic and thus unpredictable. In a multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system. Diagram 2 is modified for a multipolar world. Everything is the same, except that we highlight the trade lost to other great powers. The state considering using tariffs to lower the marginal social cost of trading with a rival must account for this “lost trade.” In the context of today’s trade war with China, this would be the sum of all European Airbuses and Brazilian soybeans sold to China in the place of American exports. For China, it would be the sum of all the machinery, electronics, and capital goods produced in the rest of Asia and shipped to the United States. Diagram 2Trade War In A Multipolar World Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century Could Washington ask its allies – Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. – not to take advantage of the lucrative trade (Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1) lost due to its trade tiff with China? Sure, but empirical research shows that they would likely ignore such pleas for unity. Alliances produced by a bipolar system produce a statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows, a relationship that weakens in a multipolar context. This is the conclusion of a 1993 paper by Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield.8 The authors draw their conclusion from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, which captures several decades of global multipolarity. Unless the U.S. produces a wholehearted diplomatic effort to tighten up its alliances and enforce trade sanctions – something hardly foreseeable under the current administration – the self-interest of U.S. allies will drive them to continue trading with China. The U.S. will not be able to exclude China from the global system; nor will China be able to achieve Xi Jinping’s vaunted “self-sufficiency.” A risk to our view is that we have misjudged the global system, just as political scientists writing in the early 1990s did. To that effect, we accept that Charts 1 and 4 do not really support a view that the world is in a balanced multipolar state. The U.S. clearly remains the most powerful country in the world. The problem is that it is also clearly in a relative decline and that its sphere of influence is global – and thus very expensive – whereas its rivals have merely regional ambitions (for the time being). As such, we concede that American hegemony could be reasserted relatively quickly, but it would require a significant calamity in one of the other poles of power. For instance, a breakdown in China’s internal stability alongside the recovery of U.S. political stability. Bottom Line: The trade war between the U.S. and China is geopolitically unsustainable. The only way it could continue is if the two states existed in a bipolar world where the rest of the states closely aligned themselves behind the two superpowers. We have a high conviction view that today’s world is – for the time being – multipolar. American allies will cheat and skirt around Washington’s demands that China be isolated. This is because the U.S. no longer has the preponderance of power that it enjoyed in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Insights presented thus far come from formal theory in political science. What does history teach us? Trading With The Enemy In 1896, a bestselling pamphlet in the U.K., “Made in Germany,” painted an ominous picture: “A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.”9 Look around your own houses, author E.E. Williams urged his readers. “The toys, and the dolls, and the fairy books which your children maltreat in the nursery are made in Germany: nay, the material of your favorite (patriotic) newspaper had the same birthplace as like as not.” Williams later wrote that tariffs were the answer and that they “would bring Germany to her knees, pleading for our clemency.”10 By the late 1890s, it was clear to the U.K. that Germany was its greatest national security threat. The Germany Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 launched a massive naval buildup with the singular objective of liberating the German Empire from the geographic constraints of the Jutland Peninsula. By 1902, the First Lord of the Royal Navy pointed out that “the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us.”11 There is absolutely no doubt that Germany was the U.K.’s gravest national security threat. As a result, London signed in April 1904 a set of agreements with France that came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The entente was immediately tested by Germany in the 1905 First Moroccan Crisis, which only served to strengthen the alliance. Russia was brought into the pact in 1907, creating the Triple Entente. In hindsight, the alliance structure was obvious given Germany’s meteoric rise from unification in 1871. However, one should not underestimate the magnitude of these geopolitical events. For the U.K. and France to resolve centuries of differences and formalize an alliance in 1904 was a tectonic shift — one that they undertook against the grain of history, entrenched enmity, and ideology.12 History teaches us that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime. Political scientists and historians have noted that geopolitical enmity rarely produces bifurcated economic relations exhibited during the Cold War. Both empirical research and formal modeling shows that trade occurs even amongst rivals and during wartime.13 This was certainly the case between the U.K. and Germany, whose trade steadily increased right up until the outbreak of World War One (Chart 6). Could this be written off due to the U.K.’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics? Or perhaps London feared a move against its lightly defended colonies in case it became protectionist? These are fair arguments. However, they do not explain why Russia and France both saw ever-rising total trade with the German Empire during the same period (Chart 7). Either all three states were led by incompetent policymakers who somehow did not see the war coming – unlikely given the empirical record – or they simply could not afford to lose out on the gains of trade with Germany to each other. Chart 6The Allies Traded With Germany… Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century Chart 7… Right Up To WWI Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century Chart 8Japan And U.S. Never Downshifted Trade Back To The Nineteenth Century Back To The Nineteenth Century A similar dynamic was afoot ahead of World War Two. Relations between the U.S. and Japan soured in the 1930s, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the bedrock of the Pacific balance of power – and began a massive naval buildup. In 1937, Japan invaded China. Despite a clear and present danger, the U.S. continued to trade with Japan right up until July 26, 1941, few days after Japan invaded southern Indochina (Chart 8). On December 7, Japan attacked the U.S. A skeptic may argue that precisely because policymakers sleepwalked into war in the First and Second World Wars, they will not (or should not) make the same mistake this time around. First, we do not make policy prescriptions and therefore care not what should happen. Second, we are highly skeptical of the view that policymakers in the early and mid-twentieth century were somehow defective (as opposed to today’s enlightened leaders). Our constraints-based framework urges us to seek systemic reasons for the behavior of leaders. Political science provides a clear theoretical explanation for why London and Washington continued to trade with the enemy despite the clarity of the threat. The answer lies in the systemic nature of the constraint: a multipolar world reduces the sensitivity of policymakers to relative gains by introducing a collective action problem thanks to changing alliances and the difficulty of disciplining allies’ behavior. In the case of U.S. and China, this is further accentuated by President Trump’s strategy of skirting multilateral diplomacy and intense focus on mercantilist measures of power (i.e. obsession with the trade deficit). An anti-China trade policy that was accompanied by a magnanimous approach to trade relations with allies could have produced a “coalition of the willing” against Beijing. But after two years of tariffs and threats against the EU, Japan, and Canada, the Trump administration has already signaled to the rest of the world that old alliances and coordination avenues are up for revision. There are two outcomes that we can see emerging over the course of the next decade. First, U.S. leadership will become aware of the systemic constraints under which they operate, and trade with China will continue – albeit with limitations and variations. However, such trade will not reduce the geopolitical tensions, nor will it prevent a military conflict. In facts, the probability of military conflict may increase even as trade between China and the U.S. remains steady. Second, U.S. leadership will fail to correctly assess that they operate in a multipolar world and will give up the highlighted trade gains from Diagram 2 to economic rivals such as Europe and Japan. Given our methodological adherence to constraint-based forecasting, we highly doubt that the latter scenario is likely. Bottom Line: The China-U.S. conflict is not a replay of the Cold War. Systemic pressures from global multipolarity will force the U.S. to continue to trade with China, with limitations on exchanges in emergent, dual-use technologies that China will nonetheless source from other technologically advanced countries. This will create a complicated but exciting world where geopolitics will cease to be seen as exogenous to investing. A risk to the sanguine conclusion is that the historical record is applicable to today, but that the hour is late, not early. It is already July 26, 1941 – when U.S. abrogated all trade with Japan – not 1930. As such, we do not have another decade of trade between U.S. and China remaining, we are at the end of the cycle. While this is a risk, it is unlikely. American policymakers would essentially have to be willing to risk a military conflict with China in order to take the trade war to the same level they did with Japan. It is an objective fact that China has meaningfully stepped up aggressive foreign policy in the region. But unlike Japan in 1941, China has not outright invaded any countries over the past decade. As such, the willingness of the public to support such a conflict is unclear, with only 21% of Americans considering China a top threat to the U.S. Investment Implications This analysis is not meant to be optimistic. First, the U.S. and China will continue to be rivals even if the economic relationship between them does not lead to global bifurcation. For one, China continues to be – much like Germany in the early twentieth century – concerned with access to external markets on which 19.5% of its economy still depend. China is therefore developing a modern navy and military not because it wants to dominate the rest of the world but because it wants to dominate its near abroad, much as the U.S. wanted to, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine. This will continue to lead to Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas, raising the odds of a conflict with the U.S. Navy. Given that the Thucydides Trap narrative remains cogent, investors should look to overweight S&P 500 aerospace and defense stocks relative to global equity markets. An alternative way that one could play this thesis is by developing a basket of global defense stocks. Multipolarity may create constraints to trade protectionism, but it engenders geopolitical volatility and thus buoys defense spending. Second, we would not expect another uptick in globalization. Multipolarity may make it difficult for countries to completely close off trade with a rival, but globalization is built on more than just trade between rivals. Globalization requires a high level of coordination among great powers that is only possible under hegemonic conditions. Chart 9 shows that the hegemony of the British and later American empires created a powerful tailwind for trade over the past two hundred years. Chart 9The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex Of Globalization Is Behind Us The Apex of Globalization has come and gone – it is all downhill from here. But this is not a binary view. Foreign trade will not go to zero. The U.S. and China will not completely seal each other’s sphere of influence behind a Silicon Curtain. Instead, we focus on five investment themes that flow from a world that is characterized by the three trends of multipolarity, Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, and apex of globalization: Europe will profit: As the U.S. and China deepen their enmity, we expect some European companies to profit. There is some evidence that the investment community has already caught wind of this trend, with European equities modestly outperforming their U.S. counterparts whenever trade tensions flared up in 2019 (Chart 10). Given our thesis, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. would completely lose market share in China to Europe. As such, we specifically focus on tech, where we expect the U.S. and China to ramp up non-tariff barriers to trade regardless of systemic pressures to continue to trade. A strategic long in the secularly beleaguered European tech companies relative to their U.S. counterparts may therefore make sense (Chart 11). Chart 10Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Europe: A Trade War Safe Haven Chart 11Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? Is Europe Really This Incompetent? USD bull market will end: A trade war is a very disruptive way to adjust one’s trade relationship. It opens one to retaliation and thus the kind of relative losses described in this analysis. As such, we expect that U.S. to eventually depreciate the USD, either by aggressively reversing 2018 tightening or by coercing its trade rivals to strengthen their currencies. Such a move will be yet another tailwind behind the diversification away from the USD as a reserve currency, a move that should benefit the euro. Bull market in capex: The re-wiring of global manufacturing chains will still take place. The bad news is that multinational corporations will have to dip into their profit margins to move their supply chains to adjust to the new geopolitical reality. The good news is that they will have to invest in manufacturing capex to accomplish the task. One way to articulate this theme is to buy an index of semiconductor capital companies (AMAT, LRCX, KLAC, MKSI, AEIS, BRIKS, and TER). Given the highly cyclical nature of capital companies, we would recommend an entry point once trade tensions subside and green shoots of global growth appear. “Non-aligned” markets will benefit: The last time the world was multipolar, great powers competed through imperialism. This time around, a same dynamic will develop as countries seek to replicate China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.” This is positive for frontier markets. A rush to provide them with exports and services will increase supply and thus lower costs, providing otherwise forgotten markets with a boon of investments. India, and Asia-ex-China more broadly, stand as intriguing alternatives to China, especially with the current administration aggressively reforming to take advantage of the rewiring of global manufacturing chains. Capital markets will remain globalized: With interest rates near zero in much of the developed world and the demographic burden putting an ever-greater pressure on pension plans to generate returns, the search for yield will continue to be a powerful drive that keeps capital markets globalized. Limitations are likely to grow, especially when it comes to cross-border private investments in dual-use technologies. But a completely bifurcation of capital markets is unlikely. The world we are describing is one where geopolitics will play an increasingly prominent role for global investors. It would be convenient if the world simply divided into two warring camps, leaving investors with neatly separated compartments that enabled them to go back to ignoring geopolitics. This is unlikely. Rather, the world will resemble the dynamic years at the end of the nineteenth century, a rough-and-tumble era that required a multi-disciplinary approach to investing.   Marko Papic, Consulting Editor, BCA Research Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?,” September 25, 2012, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think,” October 4, 2013, “The Great Risk Rotation,” December 11, 2013, and “Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward,” January 23, 2014, “Underestimating Sino-American Tensions,” November 6, 2015, “The Geopolitics Of Trump,” December 2, 2016, “How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia,” March 1, 2017, and others available at gps.bcaresearch.com or upon request. 2 Please see German Historical Institute, “Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’” (1897), available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 4 The three cases are Spain taking over from Portugal in the sixteenth century, the U.S. taking over from the U.K. in the twentieth century, and Germany rising to regional hegemony in Europe in the twenty-first century. 5 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, 85:3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726. 6 We do not review Snidal’s excellent game theory formal modeling in this paper as it is complex and detailed. However, we highly encourage the intrigued reader to pursue the study on their own. 7 See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 8 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political Science Review, 87:2 (June 1993), pp. 408-420. 9 See Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press), available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830. 10 Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014). 11 Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” international Security, 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175. 12 Although France and Russia overcame even greater bitterness due to the ideological differences between a republic founded on a violent uprising against its aristocracy – France – and an aristocratic authoritarian regime – Russia. 13 See James Morrow, “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 12-37; and Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading With the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies, 13:3 (December 2004), pp. 1-47.