War/Conflict

Highlights Duration: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. The Fed & The Dollar: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. USD Sovereigns: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Feature Please note there will be no U.S. Bond Strategy report next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on August 29, 2017. Chart 1Firm Growth, Despite Weaker $ Escalating tension between the U.S. and North Korea captured the market's attention during the past week, causing investors to ignore what in our view is a more important economic development: Global growth has managed to stay firm even in the face of significant dollar depreciation. Not only does this break the pattern of the past few years when periods of substantial dollar weakness were associated with slowing global growth (Chart 1), but in our view it sends a very bearish signal for U.S. bonds. Above all else, a weak dollar amidst strong global growth suggests that the breadth of the economic recovery is improving. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that our Global Manufacturing PMI Diffusion Index, which measures the net percentage of countries with PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line, is fast approaching 90% (Chart 2). Not only that, but PMIs from the four most important economic blocs are all showing signs of strength. Both the Eurozone and Japanese PMIs are holding firm at high levels, while the U.S. and Chinese PMIs have recently reversed their year-to-date downtrends (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Why is the breadth of the global recovery important? Precisely because a more synchronized recovery prevents the dollar from appreciating too quickly. All else equal, a stronger dollar causes investors to reduce their forecasts for future U.S. growth and inflation. This implies a slower expected pace of rate hikes and lower Treasury yields. Conversely, a weaker dollar causes investors to revise up their growth and inflation forecasts, leading to a quicker expected pace of rate hikes and higher yields. To capture the importance of both global growth and the exchange rate we turn to our 2-factor Treasury model (Chart 3). This is a simple model of the 10-year Treasury yield based on the Global PMI and bullish sentiment toward the dollar. A stronger Global PMI pressures the model's fair value higher, as does increasingly bearish dollar sentiment. Chart 2Synchronized Global Growth Chart 310-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value At present, the model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.6%, meaning the current 10-year Treasury yield of 2.22% is 38 bps below fair value. This is the most expensive Treasuries have appeared on our model since the immediate aftermath of last year's Brexit vote. Political Uncertainty & Flights To Quality While our 2-factor model does a good job, there is one important driver of Treasury yields it does not capture. That is the tendency for political events to drive a flight to safety into Treasuries (Chart 4). Typically, if it is possible to identify a purely politically-driven flight to safety - one that is unlikely to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months - then the correct strategy is to heed our model's message and position for higher yields. This strategy worked out perfectly following the Brexit vote, and we anticipate it will work again this time around. Chart 4Policy Uncertainty Is A Driver Of Bond Yields With regards to the catalyst for last week's flight to safety, our Geopolitical Strategy service wrote in a recent Special Report1 that a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea is extremely unlikely. The theatrics of the past week demonstrate only that the U.S. needs to establish a "credible threat" if it wants to eventually open a new round of negotiations over North Korea - not unlike the Iranian nuclear negotiations of the past decade. Looking further down the road, if those talks eventually fail then the potential for military conflict is high. We therefore conclude that there is not much potential for U.S. / North Korean tensions to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months, and view the recent bond rally as an opportunity to position for sharply higher yields in the near-term. Bottom Line: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. How The Fed Views A Weaker Dollar Financial Conditions Chart 5Weak $ Eases Financial Conditions The Fed views the 7% year-to-date depreciation of the dollar as a significant easing of financial conditions. In fact, most broad indicators of financial conditions have eased this year, even though the Fed has lifted rates by 75 bps since December (Chart 5). In the Fed's framework, this means that the pace of rate hikes might need to increase in order to tighten financial conditions as much as desired. New York Fed President William Dudley summed up this approach in a 2015 speech:2 All else equal, if financial conditions tighten sharply, then we are likely to proceed more slowly. In contrast, if financial conditions were not to tighten at all or only very little, then - assuming the economic outlook hadn't changed significantly - we would likely have to move more quickly. In the end, we will adjust the policy stance to support financial market conditions that we deem are most consistent with our employment and inflation objectives. Of course, all else is not equal. Core inflation has disappointed so far this year and our current assessment of monetary policy is that while the Fed will take action to start shrinking its balance sheet next month, rate hikes are on hold until inflation turns higher. We remain optimistic that inflation will show sufficient strength in time for the Fed to lift rates in December.3 Inflation Chart 6Weak $ = Higher Inflation A weaker dollar also increases the Fed's confidence that inflation will head higher. Although so far we have not seen much evidence that this is occurring. Last Friday's July CPI report showed that core CPI rose only 0.1% month-over-month, while the year-over-year growth rate held flat at 1.7%. However, evidence is mounting that core inflation will soon put in a bottom. Our CPI diffusion index bounced back into positive territory in July (Chart 6) and our PCE diffusion index is at its highest level since last October.4 Both of these measures have excellent track records capturing the near-term swings in core inflation. The year-to-date weakness in the dollar has led to a surge in import prices. Stronger import prices will soon translate into higher core goods inflation (Chart 6, panels 2 and 3). Unfortunately, any increase in core goods inflation is unlikely to be sustained beyond the next 12 months. If the year-to-date dollar weakness starts to reverse, as our currency strategists anticipate,5 then import prices will decline anew. Eventually, this will translate into a deceleration in core goods inflation. For core inflation to sustainably reach the Fed's target, improvement in the lagging core services (excluding shelter and medical care) component will be required. Historically, this component is the most tightly linked to wage growth (Chart 6, bottom panel). A Rising Wage Growth Environment Two related methods do an excellent job predicting the direction of wage growth on a cyclical horizon. First, wages accelerate when the unemployment rate is falling, and second, wages accelerate when the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio is increasing. The top two panels of Chart 7 show the relationship between wage growth and the unemployment rate. The shaded regions in both panels correspond to periods when the unemployment rate is falling. As can be seen, wage growth always rises during these periods. That being the case, we calculate that non-farm employment needs to grow by more than 125k per month (on average) for the unemployment rate to continue its downtrend, assuming the labor force participation rate remains flat. Chart 7A Rising Wage Environment Of course it is not guaranteed that the labor force participation rate will stay flat. In a recent report we discussed the risk that a large cyclical increase in the participation rate might cause the unemployment rate to rise even as the economy continues to recover.6 This is why we also look at the shaded regions in the bottom two panels of Chart 7 and see that wages always rise during periods when the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is rising. By looking at the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate we do not need to make an assumption about the trend in labor force participation. Using this method, we calculate that monthly employment growth must exceed 140k (on average) for the prime-age employment-to-population ratio to keep increasing. Non-farm payroll growth has averaged 184k per month so far in 2017 and averaged 187k per month in 2016. In other words, the U.S. jobs machine is running at a fairly steady pace, well above the thresholds we see as necessary for the recovery in wage growth to continue. Bottom Line: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. Sovereigns Not Buying The Weak Dollar USD-denominated sovereign bonds should benefit from a falling dollar. A weaker U.S. dollar makes the debt obligation cheaper in the issuing nation's local currency. However, the USD Sovereign index has actually underperformed the duration-matched Baa U.S. Credit index during the past six months, despite a depreciating U.S. currency (Chart 8). The duration-matched Baa-rated U.S. Credit index is the closest comparable we can find for the Sovereign index. It matches the Sovereign index in terms of duration and average credit rating, although historically it also delivers less excess return volatility (Chart 8, bottom panel). The two main factors we consider when deciding whether to add USD-denominated sovereigns to our portfolio at the expense of domestic U.S. credit are relative valuation and the outlook for the dollar. Historically, spread differential has been an important driver of relative returns. Attractive starting valuations even allowed sovereigns to outperform credit in 2014 and 2015 despite the dollar's surge. But at the moment, relative value is skewed heavily in favor of domestic U.S. credit (Chart 8, panel 1). Chart 8Sovereigns Too Expensive Added to that, with U.S. growth likely to remain strong and U.S. inflation poised to rebound, we think there is a high likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes than are currently priced in. This will make it difficult for the dollar to decline further from current levels. Taken together, poor relative valuation and a bullish outlook for the dollar lead us to continue underweighting USD-denominated sovereigns in our portfolio. The Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown Even though the overall index is unappealing, opportunities might still exist at the country level. Chart 9 shows a risk/reward picture for each country in the Bloomberg Barclays Sovereign index. The upper panels show the option-adjusted spread for each country relative to its duration and credit rating. The lower panels show a risk-adjusted spread on the y-axis. This risk-adjusted spread is the excess spread that remains after we adjust for differences in credit rating and duration using a cross-sectional model. What sticks out immediately is that Finland, Colombia and Mexico all offer compelling spreads after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration. The outlook for each country's currency versus the U.S. dollar is obviously also important. And in fact, the lower-right panel of Chart 9 shows that exchange rate volatility is positively correlated with the risk-adjusted spreads from our cross-sectional model. This implies that the extra compensation available in Mexican and Colombian sovereigns is probably compensation for assuming highly volatile currency risk. By this measure, Finland looks even more attractive given the euro's slightly lower volatility. Chart 9USD Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown Bottom Line: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. Remain underweight. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire", dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/dud150605 3 For further details on our outlook for the near-term path of monetary policy please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For a chart of the PCE diffusion index please see page 11 of U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen", dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. With U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in Northeast Asia may be a catalyst for a pullback. The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lags that of consumer prices. Feature Safe haven assets caught a bid last week while risk assets sold off as investors weighed geopolitical tensions in Northeast Asia and more uncertainty over fiscal policy in Washington. Last week's U.S. economic data highlighted the disconnect between a tighter labor market and a lack of wage pressures. Meanwhile, the data suggest that growth outside the U.S. is accelerating. Nonetheless, history shows that investors should be patient while waiting for an upturn in inflation. Next Up: Tax Cuts The GOP will deliver on tax cuts this year despite disarray at the White House and an incompetent Congress, but fiscal stimulus may fail to live up to its hype. Furthermore, a fiscal lift from infrastructure spending is unlikely anytime soon. Republicans need a win ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections and they have already laid the groundwork for tax reform via the budget reconciliation process. Moreover, cutting taxes is easier to justify politically than removing an entitlement program (i.e. Obamacare). Tax rates probably will not be lowered by as much as originally promised because conservative Republicans in the House will demand "revenue offsets" to pay for tax cuts. Internal GOP battles over how to fund tax cuts could spill over into some tension regarding raising the debt ceiling. However, it is in neither political party's interests to create another "fiscal cliff" out of thin air. The GOP needs Democratic votes to pass this legislation in the Senate and the Democratic leadership has indicated it is willing to support it. At what price? House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority leader Chuck Schumer may link the debt ceiling and spending bill to tax reform, and push for the tax cuts to extend to the middle class and to be revenue neutral. There is a chance that both parties will agree to temporarily eliminate the debt ceiling, perhaps beyond the 2018 mid-term elections. In any event, we expect a last minute resolution to both the U.S. debt ceiling and the potential government shutdown in September. Thus, there should be no lasting impact on financial markets from the debt ceiling debate. Turning to government regulation, the NFIB survey shows that small businesses are pleased with the Trump administration's attack on red tape. President Trump has made progress on slowing regulation and is on track to enact one-tenth the amount of economically significant regulation1 passed by the Obama administration (Chart 1). By this metric, Trump is even more frugal than Reagan. Trump and the GOP-held Congress have rolled back Obama-era rules and delayed others. Still, regulatory change is slow to impact the economy and it may take years for the regulatory rollback to provide any meaningful lift to growth. Accordingly, the "Trump Put"2 is still in place. U.S. politics will remain a mess for much of the year, delaying any progress on populist economic policies that would have buoyed U.S. nominal GDP growth and given the Fed a reason to hike interest rates more aggressively (Chart 2). Chart 1Trump Has Had Success In Slowing Regulation Chart 2The Trump Put Bottom Line: Trump will not be impeached until after the 2018 mid-term election, and only then if the Democrats manage to take control of the House. The GOP can bolster its case for re-election in 2018 by passing tax cuts and rolling back regulation. The intensifying Mueller investigation and White House incompetence will only fuel the "Trump Put", which has been positive for U.S. equities, neutral for Treasuries, and bad for the dollar, all else equal. A significant uptick in inflation could overwhelm the "Trump Put" and spark a dollar rally. As such, investors should focus on inflation prospects rather than on White House politics. Fire And Fury Investors are on high alert and with the Q2 earnings season over, may look beyond the positive news on corporate profits for direction. Our colleagues in the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service have long maintained that Northeast Asia is ripe for economic/political risk.3 The underlying driver of uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula is the Sino-American rivalry. China is an emerging "great power" that threatens the global dominance of the U.S. and its allies. The immediate consequence is mounting friction in China's periphery. That is why Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea, are all heating up. North Korea's regime is highly unpredictable as evidenced by events in the past few weeks. In that sense, it is more significant than the other "proxy battles" between the U.S. and China. In essence, North Korea is no longer merely an object of satire. A new round of negotiations over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs is about to begin. The potential for a military conflict is high unless diplomacy succeeds in convincing North Korea to freeze its weapons programs. The events on the Korean peninsula are unfolding as we expected they would. North Korea has a history of rational action. It wants a nuclear deterrent and a peace treaty, but not a regime change. The U.S. has forsworn regime change as an intention and China has recommitted to new sanctions. South Korea is pro-engagement. Moreover, we are seeing the U.S. establish a credible military as part of the "arc of diplomacy," comparable to U.S.-Iran relations 2010-15. Bottom Line: We do not expect a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea, as the constraints to conflict are extremely high and not all diplomatic options have been exhausted. Nonetheless, with U.S. equity valuations stretched, prolonged uncertainty in the region may be a catalyst for a pullback. A Rosy Global Picture The global economic outlook is brightening and will be a tailwind for U.S. economic growth and equities. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from years past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 3). Since the start of 2017, global GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.8% to 3%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.7% to 2.9%. This upward trajectory has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. Aggressive central bank actions or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, or both, may halt the improving growth forecasts. Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of global growth, but our view is that oil prices will move higher in the coming months.4 Chart 3Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Despite Stalled U.S. Growth Global leading indicators are on the upswing (Chart 4). The BCA Global Leading Indicator Index (excluding the U.S.) in July 2017 was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the global financial crisis. The increase in growth still has room to run. Admittedly, the LEI's diffusion index has dipped below 50%. It would be a warning sign for global growth if the diffusion index does not soon turn up. Nominal global GDP growth is speeding up, boosted by improving consumer and business confidence, rising capital spending and declining policy uncertainty (Chart 5). The global economic surprise index is also climbing, which provides additional support. Investors may be concerned that the global PMIs have peaked (Chart 6), but they remain at levels consistent with above-trend GDP growth and we see no reason why they should drop below 50. Chart 4LEIs Pointing Higher Chart 5Supports For Global Growth In Place Chart 6Global Economic Activity Brightening Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding nearly twice as fast as in the U.S. (Chart 5). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. A stronger dollar (as much as a 10% appreciation in the next year) may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be more a problem for 2018 than 2017. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both U.S. economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant business abroad. Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and also support additional, but gradual, tightening by the central bank. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. Waiting For Wages Rising wage pressure will be another headwind for EPS growth in 2018, although wages appear quite benign at the moment. Both primary and secondary indicators point to a tighter U.S. labor market. The July jobs report (released in early August) was yet another sign that the slack in the jobs market is vanishing.5 Data released last week on job openings (JOLTS) and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) further supported this trend, and indicated that the labor market may tighten even more. Job openings rose to a new all-time high along with BCA's quit rate less layoffs indicator (Chart 7). The hire rate remained at a cycle peak. The NFIB data was equally impressive, with hiring plans and job openings surging in July. Small businesses are also finding it increasingly difficult to find quality labor. (Chart 7, panel 4) The strength in the labor market has not yet translated into accelerating wages, but patience is required. The July NFIB survey noted that "while a tight job market may point to higher wages and rising consumer spending down the road, which is also good for small businesses, the current expansion efforts by small business owners are being choked by their difficulties in hiring and keeping workers." The NFIB's compensation plans (Chart 7) provided quantitative support for the group's qualitative assessment. However, the latest readings on labor compensation from the Q2 productivity report, the tepid July average hourly earnings data and the Atlanta Fed wage tracker suggest that the labor market is still not tight enough to generate much wage pressure (Chart 8). Chart 7Widespread Evidence That##BR##Labor Market Is Tightening Chart 8Not Much Wage##BR##Pressure Yet Inflation And Long-Expansion Dynamics That said, wages are not always a good leading indicator for the inflation cycle. Indeed, sometimes upturns in wage growth lag that of consumer prices. In previous research we split U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from medium and long expansions is the speed at which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerated, and the time it took unemployment to reach a full employment level. Long expansions were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a very slow return to full employment, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession. Chart 9 compares the current cycle to the average of two of the long cycles (the 1980s and the 1990s). We excluded the long-running 1960s expansion because the Fed delayed far too long and fell well behind the inflation curve. We define the 'late cycle' phase to be the time period from when the economy first reached full employment to the subsequent recession (shaded portions in Chart 9). The average late-cycle phase for these two expansions lasted almost four years, highlighting that reaching full employment does not necessarily mean that a recession is imminent. Inflation pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, allowing the Fed to proceed slowly. The Fed waited an average of 25 months to tighten policy after reaching full employment in these two long expansions, in part because core CPI inflation was roughly flat. The result was an extended late-cycle phase that was very rewarding for equity investors because the economy and earnings continued to grow. Of course, inflation eventually did turn higher, signaling the beginning of the end for the expansion and equity bull phase. In Chart 10, we compare the core PCE inflation rate in the current cycle with the average of the previous two long expansion episodes (the inflection point for inflation in the previous cycles are aligned with June 2017 for comparison purposes). The other panels in the chart highlight that, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth gave no warning that an inflation upturn was imminent. Indeed, wages were a lagging indicator of consumer price inflation. Chart 9Labor Market, Inflation And Stocks##BR##In The Long 80's & 90's Expansions Chart 10In The 80's & 90's Wage Growth##BR##Gave No Early Warning On On Inflation Market commentators often assume that inflation is driven exclusively by "cost push" effects, such that the direction of causation runs from wage pressure to price pressure. However, causation runs in the other direction as well. Households see rising prices and then demand better wages to compensate for the added cost of living. Chart 11Leading Indicators Of Inflation##BR##In "Slow Burn" Recoveries This is not to say that we should totally disregard wage information. But it does suggest that we must keep an eye on a wider set of data. Indicators that provided some leading information for inflation in the previous two long cycles are shown in Chart 11. To this list we would also add the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressure index, which is not shown in Chart 11 because it does not have enough history. All of these indicators have moved higher over the past 18 months, after bottoming at extremely low levels in 2015 and early 2016. However, they have all pulled back to some extent in recent months. This year's pipeline inflation "soft patch" continued into July, according to last week's release of the Producer Price Index. The easing in cost pressures at the producer level has been broadly based (i.e. one cannot blame special factors). These indicators suggest that consumer price inflation, according to either the CPI or the PCE, will struggle to rise in the next few months. The July CPI report revealed another tepid 0.1% monthly rise in the core price index, while the year-over-year rate remained at 1.7%. Rising prices for health care goods and services were offset by price declines for new and used cars. The diffusion index for the CPI moved up to the zero line in July, indicating that disinflation was a little less broadly based in the month. Bottom Line: Our base case is that core PCE inflation edges higher in the coming months, which will be enough for the FOMC to justify a rate hike in December. We also expect that inflation will be high enough in 2018 for the Fed to hike rates by more than is discounted in the bond market. Nonetheless, the warning signs of an inflation upturn are mixed at best. It would flatter our stocks-over-bonds recommendation if we are wrong on the inflation outlook, but our short duration stance would not be profitable in this case. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of Office of Management and Budget (OMB): https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain and https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The Trump Put Last" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire, dated April 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC' 2.0's Agenda," dated August 10, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Stay The Course" dated August 7, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The G20 summit highlighted our theme of multipolarity, which encourages global instability; U.S.-China tensions have resumed their escalation after a brief pause; The Middle East is still a "red herring" for investors this year, but tail risks are rising; Any negative impact on oil production from these risks should be minor; Iran stands to benefit; Egypt is a buy on the back of cyclical recovery and Saudi support. Feature For the first time in the history of G20 summits, the "sherpas" (emissaries) who prepared the event failed to reach any notable policy agreements. Allegedly, the only policy that the U.S. administration endorsed prior to the summit was women's entrepreneurialism, Ivanka Trump's pet project. Why should investors care? G20 meetings have always been abstract, retroactive (as opposed to proactive), and barely able to move the markets. But they have occasionally mattered. The summits in Washington D.C. (November 2008) and London (April 2009) set the agenda for economic stimulus and global financial regulatory reform that brought the world back from the brink of abyss. The London summit, in particular, set the stage for coordinated, global, fiscal policy that reflated the economy. At the September 2009 Pittsburgh summit, the G20 replaced the Western-dominated G8 as the premier economic governance platform. (The latter is now the G7 because of Russia's exclusion after annexing Crimea.) The idea behind the expanded forum was to give emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil a say in the global economic architecture. It was the forum's expansion that ultimately doomed its effectiveness. To our knowledge, no multilateral framework has ever successfully coordinated global affairs. Global stability has always been underpinned by hegemony, which is why we have warned our readers since 2011 that emerging global multipolarity - caused by America's relative geopolitical decline - would lead to instability.1 The press will inevitably blame President Trump's "America First" for the failures of the G20. We do not disagree, but there is more to it than just politics. "America First" is a natural political reaction to the reality of American geopolitical decline. It is also a reaction to nearly two decades of foreign policy decisions to commit massive amounts of U.S. hard and soft power to pursuing nation-building policies in the Middle East. As such, "America First" is a symptom, not the cause, of global multipolarity. The "Trump Doctrine" could indeed be highly destabilizing, if followed through to its logical conclusion.2 Ostensibly, President Trump seeks to renegotiate global security and economic arrangements that have taken advantage of American magnanimity. But it was America that initially designed these arrangements, at the height of its power in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, to secure its own interests. Institutions like NATO, the IMF, and the World Bank underpin, they do not undermine, American hegemony. Without these institutions, American allies will seek their own negotiated arrangements more freely and frequently with U.S. adversaries, slowly eroding Washington's global influence. Over the long term, the Trump Doctrine could also undermine the U.S. dollar's status as the global reserve currency. The dollar's reserve currency status is a privilege that monetizes American geopolitical hegemony. America's allies are essentially already paying for American hegemony: through their investments in U.S. dollar assets.3 Chart 1 illustrates this so-called "exorbitant privilege."4 Foreigners hold U.S. assets because of the size of the economy, the sustainability of the market, and its deep liquidity, but also because the U.S. provides them with assurances of peace through security. If Washington raises barriers to its markets and becomes a doubtful provider of security, states may gradually see less of a payoff in holding U.S. assets and thus diversify more rapidly. They could also be forced to diversify by new security guarantors, regional hegemons, and geopolitical bullies. Chart 1Exorbitant Privilege The concept of exorbitant privilege - and its economic benefits - cannot easily be explained to voters. What voters understand is that China's rapid industrialization has been accomplished at the cost of American manufacturing jobs. Candidate Trump successfully tapped into this angst during the campaign. President Trump, however, initially shied away from seriously applying the "America First" doctrine. The April Trump-Xi summit at Mar-a-Lago was hailed as evidence that fears of global protectionism were overblown and that the "globalist" camp of advisers in the White House were prevailing over the nationalists. As we expected, however, the détente did not last long. Over the past several weeks, China and the U.S. have clashed over several key issues: Taiwan: On June 29, the U.S. announced that it will sell $1.42 billion worth of arms to the island nation.5 Secondary sanctions: At the end of June, the Trump administration sanctioned a Chinese shipping company, bank, and two citizens for their ties to North Korea. Human rights: Also at the end of June, the U.S. State Department announced it would list China among the worst human trafficking offenders, which could trigger punitive actions and complicate trade negotiations in the future. Steel tariffs: President Trump asked the Department of Commerce back in April to study whether steel imports were harming national security, under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and a potential decision by Trump on tariffs is due within days. While China only accounts for 2% of U.S. steel imports, new tariffs could set in motion more protectionist measures that target additional industries. Sovereignty claims: The U.S. Navy and Air Force have made sojourns into disputed maritime areas. The navy conducted a "freedom of navigation" operation in the South China Sea in July, with USS Stethem steaming within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island. The air force also conducted separate missions sending B-1 bombers over the South China Sea, and over the Korean peninsula and East China Sea along with Japanese and South Korean F-15 fighter jets. This flurry of brinkmanship has largely emanated from Washington, not Beijing. As Trump's domestic political agenda stalled - with both health care and tax reform now in doubt - the administration has set its sights on the policy realm where the U.S. president has few constraints: foreign and trade policy. That is not to say that Beijing has not invited these actions. It has continued to militarize its artificial islands in the South China Sea and has failed to impose meaningful sanctions on North Korea. The Trump administration is clearly disappointed that its Mar-a-Lago summit failed to produce any tangible effect on these fronts, particularly with North Korea having launched a purported intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time. It is the Trump administration itself, however, that is to be blamed for China's lack of enthusiasm. One of the first acts of the Trump administration was to bring into question Washington's "One China" policy. As we remarked at the time, this would have serious implications for Sino-American policies. Defending sovereignty is a core pillar of the Chinese Communist Party; it is part of its "creation myth," and this is nowhere truer than in regard to Taiwan. When Trump brought into question the "One China" principle, he signaled to Beijing policymakers that Washington is not to be trusted. North Korea is both formally and in practical terms a Chinese ally. Though the Xi administration evidently wishes that the North was not providing the U.S. with excuses to enhance the American position on the Korean Peninsula, nevertheless it is longstanding Chinese policy to avoid destabilizing the North Korean regime. A collapse, possibly followed by a unified Korean Peninsula, could benefit the U.S. in the region. In other words, China will pressure the North enough to encourage a new round of talks but not enough to risk fracturing the regime. Chart 2Mar-A-Lago Summit Is Over What investors are seeing today is the impact of words - "signaling" to be technical - in geopolitics. To be fair to President Trump, he has not pursued a revolutionary foreign policy yet. However, his mere words - literally dithering on NATO's Article V and calling into question the "One China" policy - have pushed other global powers into realignment. The rest of the world takes Trump very seriously because he may one day act on his unorthodox policies, or because American voters may elect someone in the future who will. The likely result is further erosion of U.S. global influence. Notably, the U.S. president stood alone on several crucial global issues at the G20 summit in Germany, making it look more like a "G19" summit. American isolation makes sense from Trump's short-term, domestic-political vantage. In the long term, however, it accelerates the drift toward geopolitical multipolarity and thus encourages global instability. Over the near term, we are particularly concerned that Sino-American tensions could escalate and spill over into a trade war. Since Donald Trump's election, and particularly since the Mar-a-Lago summit, the market has largely priced out economic tensions between the two superpowers, with China-exposed S&P 500 equities outperforming the market (Chart 2). We would bet against the continuation of this trend. Lack of cooperation over North Korea is a sign that the Sino-American relationship is systematically broken. Middle East Update: Watch Power Vacuums In Iraq And Syria At the beginning of this year, we made a forecast that geopolitics in the Middle East would not be investment relevant.6 So far we are correct. However, we continue to worry that vacuums in Iraq and Syria - in the Sunni-dominated territories formerly occupied by the now-collapsing Islamic State - could become greater sources of instability in the region. We are particularly concerned about three potential flash points: North Iraq, North Syria, and East Syria. East Syria In East Syria, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) loyal to President Bashar al-Assad - as well as its Lebanese Shia ally Hezbollah - has aggressively moved to establish control over the Syrian-Iraqi border. As indicated on Map 1, SAA forces have created a land-bridge through Islamic State territory to Tayyara on the Iraqi border. This has put SAA troops in close proximity to "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) forces operating in the southeast of the country. Map 1Syria's Army Has Created A Land-Bridge To Iraq The FSA was created by the U.S. and its allies. Its forces are trained by the U.S., and the U.S. Air Force provides cover for its territory. The recent downing of Syrian fighter jets and Iranian drones have occurred near the U.S. FSA base, which is based in the proximity of the FSA stronghold at Al Tanf. Without committing land troops, however, the best the U.S. can hope for is to limit SAA incursions into FSA-held territory. The push by SAA and Hezbollah to the Iraqi border creates an all-important land-bridge from Iran to the Mediterranean. It allows Tehran to reinforce Assad's SAA and Hezbollah by land, rather than relying on sea routes - which can be intercepted by the U.S. and Israel's superior naval capabilities in the Mediterranean - or through air. Not only will Iran and Shia-dominated Iraq be able to supply Assad with weapons, but also with troops. After a five-year war of attrition, the main resource that has been depleted on all sides is manpower. A significant influx of "fresh blood" means that the power balance will shift more easily in favor of Assad. Following the collapse of the Islamic State in Mosul, Iraq will be able to deploy significant resources from its Shia militias to Syria. This could be the game changer that ends the conflict in Syria in Assad's favor over the next 12 months. The SAA penetration to Tayyara has now set up the next target: Al Bukamal to the north and also on the Iraqi border. From there, the SAA will be able to round back deep into Islamic State territory and capture Deir ez-Zor. This will give Assad control over most of Syria's border with Iraq as well as the country's highway infrastructure. It will also pin the U.S.-backed FSA to a largely irrelevant corner of Syria. The success of Iranian and Russian-backed SAA in Eastern Syria is very important for the geopolitics of the region. By creating a land-bridge between Iran and the Mediterranean, Syrian forces have now opened up the possibility of one day hosting massive natural gas and oil pipeline infrastructure that would link natural gas from the Persian Gulf, developed jointly by Qatar and Iran, and oil from Iran and Iraq to European markets (Map 2). Map 2The Path Is Opening For Iranian Pipelines Through Syria Such an alternative route to Iranian energy exports would give Tehran an upper hand over Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies. In a hypothetical conflict scenario between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, Tehran would be more willing to try to close shipping in the Straits of Hormuz if it possessed an alternative route for energy exports. This is clear to Saudi Arabia, which is why it has lashed out against Qatar in recent weeks. The main Saudi demand of Qatar is that it abandon its pro-Iranian foreign policy. It is becoming clear to Saudi Arabia that Iran's power is set to grow in the wake of the Islamic State's defeat in Iraq and Syria. As such, Saudi Arabia is trying to tie loose ends in its own coalition, starting with Qatar. Despite the reported Trump-Putin ceasefire agreed at the G19, U.S. and Russian forces could still become entangled as their proxies battle in the strategic regions near the Syrian-Iraqi border. SAA troops have also begun to operate near Raqqa, where the Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. are currently encircling the Islamic State capital. Final stages of wars tend to be erratic and even more violent. As belligerents glimpse the end of conflict they rush to seize as much territory as possible before negotiations begin. This is effectively what is happening in East Syria and around Raqqa today. Northern Syria In the Kurdish dominated northern Syria, the People's Protection Units (YPG) have massively increased the territory under their control. Supported by the U.S., YPG have encircled Raqqa and will soon defeat the Islamic State in the North. Assad's SAA will concede Raqqa in order to move onto the more strategic Resafa and Deir ez-Zor, effectively abandoning northern Syria to the Kurds to focus on establishing the land-bridge with Iraq. Turkey, however, is not interested in conceding northern Syria to YPG. The latter are allied to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that Ankara considers a terrorist organization. With SAA focused on controlling population centers and the Syrian-Iraqi border, northern Syria will descend further into Kurdish domination. This would give PKK militants a large territory from which to regroup and resupply operations in Turkey. It is therefore a real possibility that Turkey will invade YPG-controlled northern Syria as soon as the operations against the Islamic State end. This will put the U.S. into a difficult position. On one hand, Turkey is a NATO ally. On the other, the Kurds are informal U.S. allies. The YPG have fought valiantly against the Islamic State and are perhaps the group most deserving of thanks for the defeat of its so-called Caliphate. Northern Iraq In northern Iraq, a similar dynamic has emerged where the Kurds have benefited the most from the rise of the Islamic State (Map 3). Operations in Mosul will soon end the Islamic State's dominion over parts of Iraq, which will allow Iraqi forces to focus on two tasks. First, resupplying Assad's SAA with weapons and troops. Second, turning to Kurdish gains in the north, particularly in the city of Kirkuk. Map 3Kurdish Gains Threaten Conflicts With Iraqi Government ... And Turkey Iraqi Kurds, for their part, have called an independence referendum for September 25, 2017. President Masoud Barzani will not necessarily proclaim an independent Kurdistan following the referendum. The exercise could be a bid to negotiate more autonomy with Baghdad or a pre-election ploy to secure a majority in upcoming general elections and bolster the eventual presidential bid of his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani (current Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan). Iraqi Kurds may be able to find some sort of an arrangement with Baghdad for greater autonomy. The problem is that both sides claim parts of the region. Kirkuk, for example, is not officially part of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, Kurds see it as their ancient capital and thus seized it in June 2014 as a preventative move to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of the Islamic State. Not only is Kirkuk a major Iraqi population center, but it is also a significant oil-producing region. Investment Implications Over the next several months, we would expect tensions in these three geographies to increase. Given the proximity of Russian, Iranian, Turkish, and American forces, we would expect the probability of accidents to rise significantly. This could temporarily move the markets and assign some geopolitical risk premium to oil prices. However, investors should realize that the regions involved are not major producers of oil, aside from Iraqi Kurdistan where we do not expect large-scale warfare. As such, any effect on oil production would be a minor blip in the global supply. Over the long term, the clear winner in the region remains Iran. Bashar al-Assad, Iran's ally in Syria, will stay in power. It is also clear that the Sunni Islamic State Caliphate will disappear, giving back the Shia-dominated Iraqi government control over its territory. For Saudi Arabia, this is a reality that cannot be changed at the moment. As we have pointed out before, low oil prices are a constraint to war.7 They reduce government revenue and force leaders to focus on domestic stability. A major conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is therefore unlikely. However, Saudi Arabia will respond by building a Sunni alliance against Iran. With Syria and Iraq now in the Iranian sphere, the imperative for Saudi Arabia is to counter Iranian regional hegemony through alliances. Egypt will remain a clear beneficiary of this strategy. The country is already the Middle East's candidate for the "too big to fail" moniker. Its population, economy, demographics, and security challenges all make it the main candidate for chief regional security risk. As such, it will continue to receive support from the international community. For Saudi Arabia, Egypt is a way to diversify its security portfolio away from the aloof United States. As such, we would expect the Saudis to continue to prop up the Egyptian economy with loans and grants in return for being able to call on the Egyptian military in time of need. Given a cyclical recovery in Egypt, which BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy has recently elucidated, this creates a structural buying opportunity in the country's equity market.8 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist EM Equity Sector Strategy obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 The closest the world ever got to a powerful and effective multilateral structure was the nineteenth-century "Concert of Europe," which kept general peace in Europe for a century (1814-1914), but at the cost of dividing up the rest of the planet into imperial spheres of influence where European states could play out their mercantilist rivalries. Ultimately, even that architecture crumbled as the British hegemony that underpinned it weakened after the 1870s. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trump Doctrine," dated February 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 While the U.S. runs a massively negative net international investment position, its net international income remains positive. In other words, foreigners receive almost nothing for holding U.S. assets, while the U.S. benefits from risk premia in foreign markets. 5 The deal is not particularly significant in a military sense, and it is smaller in value than the last deal in December 2015, but it still sends a signal that angers Beijing, which also expects more controversial deals to be forthcoming given the Trump administration's signals that it plans to strengthen the Taiwan alliance. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Forget About The Middle East?" dated January 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust?" dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Egypt: A Cyclical Recovery Amid Lingering Structural Challenges," dated June 20, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators for 2018, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. first-quarter economic data. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. It is positive for risk assets that centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. Italian elections could be troublesome, but that is a story for next year. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. North Korea might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. Disappointing U.S. Q1 real GDP growth largely reflects weather and seasonal adjustment factors. The deceleration in bank credit growth is also temporary. The window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals remain constructive. Importantly, signs of improving pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector are finally emerging, which should allow margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. The bond rally has depressed yields to a level that makes fixed-income instruments highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Market expectations for the fed funds rate are far too benign. The ECB will announce the next tapering step later this year, and may remove the negative deposit rate. But the central bank will not be in a position to lift the refi rate for some time. Yield spreads will shift in a way that allows one last upleg in the U.S. dollar. The recent pullback in oil prices will not last, as OPEC and Russia manage global stockpiles lower this year. Feature Chart I-1Reflation Trades Returning? Traders and investors gave up on the global reflation story in early April, sending the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield below the year's trading range. Missile strikes, European elections and U.S. saber rattling regarding North Korea lifted the allure of safe havens such as government bonds (Chart I-1). At the same time, the Fed was unwilling to revise up the 'dot plot', doubts grew over the ability of the Trump Administration to deliver any stimulus and U.S. data releases disappointed. The major equity indexes held up well against the onslaught of bad news, but looked increasingly vulnerable as April wore on. The market gloom was overdone in our view, and it appears that financial markets have now returned to a 'risk on' phase. It is difficult to forecast the ebb and flow of geopolitical news so we cannot rule out another bout of risk aversion. Nonetheless, the global economic backdrop remains upbeat and tensions regarding North Korea have eased. President Trump also unveiled his Administration's tax reform plan, raising hopes of a fiscal boost to the economy. Moreover, investors have read too much into the distorted U.S. first quarter data, and our corporate pricing power indicators support our constructive earnings view in 2017. There are clouds hanging over the outlook for 2018, but the backdrop will favor risk assets for most of this year. Investors should remain overweight equities versus bonds and cash, and bullish the dollar. Geopolitics Weigh On Risk Tolerance President Trump's military show of force in Asia and comments about "losing patience" with North Korea have the world on edge. The U.S. has acted tough with the regime before, but nothing beyond economic sanctions ever materialized. The balance of power vis-à-vis China and the military threat to South Korea made North Korea a stalemate. Nonetheless, our geopolitical team argues that the calculus of the standoff is changing. Most importantly, the rogue regime is getting closer to being capable of hitting the U.S. with long-range missiles. Second, China is unhappy with the increased U.S. military presence in its backyard that North Korea is inviting. China also sees North Korea's missile tests as a threat to its own security. Third, the U.S. is prepared to use the threat of trade sanctions as leverage with Beijing. It is demanding that China use its own economic leverage to convince North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs. We do not believe that an attack on North Korea is imminent. But doing nothing is not an option either. Our base case is that the U.S. military's muscle-flexing is designed to force North Korea to the negotiating table. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. Over the next four years, the North might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. The safe-haven bid in the Treasury market will moderate if Kim Jong-un agrees to negotiations. That said, this is probably North Korea's last chance to show it can be pragmatic. A failure of negotiations would induce a real crisis in which the U.S. contemplates unilateral action. It would be a bad sign if North Korea's long-range missile tests continue, are successful, and show greater distances. Chart I-2Macron Appears Set For Victory Turning to Europe, investors breathed a sigh of relief following the first round of the French Presidential election. The pre-election polls turned out to be correct, and our Geopolitical Team has no reason to doubt the polls regarding the second round (Chart I-2). We expect Macron to sweep to victory on May 7 because Le Pen will struggle to get any voters from the candidates exiting the race. What should investors expect of a Macron presidency? A combination of President Macron and a right-leaning National Assembly should be able to accomplish some reforms. Several prominent center-right figures have already come out in support of Macron, perhaps to throw their name in the ring for the next prime minister. This is positive for the markets as it means that French economic policy will be run by the center-right, with an ultra-Europhile as president. Over in the U.K., the big news in April was Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold a snap election, which reduces the risk of a "hard Brexit". The current slim 12-seat majority that the Conservatives hold in Parliament has made May highly dependent on a small band of hardline Tories who would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. If the Conservatives are able to increase their seats in Parliament - as current opinion polls suggest is likely - May will have greater flexibility in reaching an agreement with Brussels and will face less of a risk that Parliament shoots down the final deal. U.S. Fiscal Policy: Positive For 2017, But Long-Term Negative Chart I-3Long-Term U.S. Budget Pressures The drama will be no less interesting in Washington in the coming weeks. As we go to press, Congress is struggling to pass a bill to keep the U.S. government running through the end of fiscal year 2017 (the deadline is the end of April). We expect a deal will get done, but a partial government shutdown lasting a few weeks could occur. Separately, Congress will need to approve an increase in the debt ceiling by July-September in order for the Treasury to avoid defaulting on payments. Both events could see temporary safe-haven flows into Treasurys. However, markets may have gone too far in pricing-out tax cuts or fiscal stimulus. For example, high tax-rate companies have given back all of their post-election equity gains. Even if Republicans are unable to overhaul the tax code, this will not prevent them from simply cutting corporate and personal taxes. "Dynamic scoring" will be used to support the argument that the tax cuts will self-funding through faster growth. We also expect that Trump will get his way on at least a modest amount of infrastructure spending. The so-called Trump trades may wither again in 2018, but we see a window this year in which the stock-to-bond total return ratio lifts as growth expectations rebound. Looking further ahead, it seems likely that the U.S. budget deficit is headed significantly higher. Health care and pension cost pressures related to population aging are well known (Chart I-3). A recent Special Report by BCA's Martin Barnes highlighted that "it is not reasonable to believe that there can be tax cuts and increases in defense spending and domestic security, while protecting entitlement programs and preventing a massive rise in the budget deficit."1 There is simply not enough non-defense discretionary spending to cut. Larger U.S. Federal budget deficits could lead to a widening fiscal risk premium in Treasury yields, although that may take years to show up. Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. government sector will be a larger drain on the global pool of available savings in the coming years. We highlight in this month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, that there are several key macro inflection points under way that will temper the "global savings glut" and begin to place upward pressure on global bond yields. A Temporary Soft Patch Or Something Worse? The first quarter GDP report for the U.S. is due out as we go to press, and growth is widely expected to be quite weak. The retail sales and PCE consumer spending data have fed concerns that the U.S. economy is running out of gas, despite the surge in the survey data such as the ISM. We believe that growth fears are overdone. Financial markets should be accustomed to weak readings on first quarter GDP. Over the past 22 years, the first quarter has been the weakest of the four on 12 occasions, or 55% of the time. Second quarter GDP growth has been faster than Q1 growth 70% of the time. A large part of the depressed Q1 GDP growth rate and lackluster "hard data" readings likely reflect poor seasonal adjustment and weather distortions. The "soft" survey data are more consistent with the labor market. Aggregate hours worked managed to increase by 1.5% at an annualized rate in Q1. If GDP growth really was barely above zero, this would imply an outright decline in the level of labor productivity. Even in a world where structural productivity growth is lower than it was in the past, this strikes us as rather implausible. The March reading of the Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator provided no warning that underlying growth is about to trail off, although a couple of the regional Fed surveys have pulled back from their recent highs. With April shaping up to be warmer than usual across the U.S., we expect a bounce back in the weather-impacted "hard" data in May and June. What about the slowdown in commercial and industrial loan growth and corporate bond issuance late in 2016 and into early 2017? This is a worry, but it partly reflects the lagged effects of the contraction in capital spending in the energy patch. C&I loan growth is still responding to the surge in defaults that resulted from the energy sector's 2014 collapse. Now that the defaults have waned, this process will soon go into reverse. Higher profits more recently have permitted these firms to pay back old bank loans, while also enabling them to finance new capital expenditures using internally-generated funds. In addition, the rising appetite for corporate debt has allowed more companies to access the bond market. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged-loan market saw $434 bn in issuance in Q1, the highest level on record (Chart I-4). The rest we chalk up to uncertainty surrounding the U.S. election. The recent spikes in the political uncertainty index correspond with the U.K.'s vote to leave the European Union as well as the U.S. election in November. There has been a close correlation between these spikes and the deceleration in C&I loan growth. CEOs are also holding back on capex in anticipation of new tax breaks from Congress. The good news is that bond issuance has rebounded strongly in January and February of this year (Chart I-5). The soft March U.S. CPI release also appeared to be quirky, showing a rare decline in the core price level in March (Chart I-6). However, the March reading followed two months of extremely strong gains and it still appears as though measures of core inflation put in a cyclical bottom in early 2015. While our CPI diffusion index is still below zero, signaling that inflation is likely to remain soft during the next couple of months, it would be premature to suggest that the gradual uptrend in core inflation has reversed. Chart I-4U.S. Bank Credit Slowdown Is Temporary Chart I-5U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance Is Rebounding Chart I-6U.S. Inflation: Sogginess Won't Last Global Economic Data Still Upbeat For the major industrialized economies as a group, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. For example, retail sales growth continues to accelerate, reaching 4½% in February on a year-over-year basis (Chart I-7). This follows the sharp improvement in consumer confidence. Manufacturing production growth is also accelerating to the upside, in line with the PMIs. The global manufacturing sector is rebounding smartly after last year's recession that was driven by the collapse in oil prices and a global inventory correction. Readers may be excused for jumping to the conclusion that the rebound is largely in the energy space, but this is not true. Production growth in the energy sector is close to zero on a year-over-year basis, and is negative on a 3-month rate of change basis (Chart I-8). The growth pickup has been in the other major sectors, including consumer-related goods, capital goods and technology. In the U.S., non-energy production has boomed over the six months to March (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Global Pick-Up On Track Chart I-8Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Chart I-9U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging The weak spot on the global data front has been capital goods orders (Chart I-7). We only have data for the big three economies - the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone - but growth is near zero or slightly negative for all three. These data are perplexing because they are at odds with an acceleration in the production of capital goods (noted above) and a pickup in capital goods imports for 20 economies (Chart I-7, third panel). Improving CEO sentiment, accelerating profit growth and activity surveys all suggest that capital goods orders will catch up in the coming months. That said, one risk to our positive capex outlook in the U.S. is that the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises. This is not our base case, but current capex plans could be cancelled or put on indefinite hold were there to be no corporate tax cuts or immediate expensing of capital spending. As for China, the economic data are holding up well and deflationary pressures have eased. Fears of a debt crisis have also ebbed somewhat. That said, fiscal and monetary stimulus is fading and it is a worrying sign that money and credit growth have decelerated because they tend to lead production. Our China experts believe that growth will be solid in the first half of the year, but they would not be surprised to see a deceleration in real GDP growth in the second half that would weigh on commodity prices. Bond Market Vulnerable To Fed Re-Rating A rebound in the U.S. activity data in the coming months should keep the Fed on track to raise rates at least two more times in 2017. A May rate hike is unlikely, but we would not rule out June. The bond market is vulnerable to a re-rating of the path for the fed funds rate because only 45 basis points of tightening is priced for the next 12 months. This is far too low if growth rebounds as we expect. The FOMC also announced that it intends to start shrinking its balance sheet later this year by ceasing to reinvest both its MBS and Treasury holdings. Our bond strategists do not think this by itself will have much of an impact on Treasurys because yields will continue to be closely tied to realized inflation and the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart I-10). Fed policymakers are trying to de-emphasize the size of the balance sheet and would rather investors focus on the fed funds rate to assess the stance of monetary policy. It is a different story for mortgage-backed securities, however, where spreads will be pressured wider by the lack of Fed purchases. All four of our main forward-looking global economic indicators appear to have topped out, except the Global Leading Economic Indicator (GLEI), suggesting that the period of maximum growth acceleration has past (Chart I-11). Nonetheless, all four are still consistent with robust growth. They would have to weaken significantly before they warned of a sustained bond bull market. Chart I-10Shrinking Fed Balance Sheet: ##br##Bearish For Bonds? Chart I-11Leading Indicators: ##br##Some Worrying Signs The rapid decline in the diffusion index, based on the 22 countries that comprise our GLEI, is the most concerning at the moment. The LEIs for two major economies and two emerging economies dipped slightly in February, such that roughly half of the country LEIs rose and half fell in the month. While it is too early to hit the panic button, the diffusion index is worth watching closely; a decline below 50 for several months would indicate that a peak in the GLEI is approaching. The bottom line is that global bond yields have overshot on the downside: underlying U.S. growth is not as weak as the Q1 figures suggest; market expectations for the fed funds rate are too benign; the Republicans will push ahead with tax cuts and infrastructure spending; the global economy has healthy momentum, and the majority of the items on our Duration Checklist suggest that the bond bear market will resume; the ECB will announce another tapering of its asset purchase program this autumn, placing upward pressure on the term premium in bond yields across the major markets; and the Treasury and bund markets no longer appear as oversold as they did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. Large short positions have largely unwound. For the U.S., we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.3%-2.6% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.8%-3% area by year-end. We recommend keeping duration short of benchmarks within fixed-income portfolios. One Last Leg In The Dollar Bull Market Chart I-12ECB In No Hurry To Lift Rates While we see upside for the money market curve in the U.S., the same cannot be said in the Eurozone. The economic data have undoubtedly been robust. The composite PMI is booming and capital goods orders are in a clear uptrend. Led by gains in both manufacturing and services, the composite PMI rose from 56.4 in March to 56.7 in April, a six-year high. The current PMI reading is easily consistent with over 2.0% real GDP growth (Chart I-12). This compares favorably to the sub-1% estimates of trend growth in the euro area. Private sector credit growth reached 2½% earlier this year, the fastest pace since July 2009. Despite this good news, the ECB is in no rush to lift interest rates. The central bank will taper its asset purchase program further in 2018, but ECB President Draghi has made it clear that he will not raise the refi rate until well after all asset purchases have been completed, which probably will not be until late 2019 at the earliest (although the ECB could eliminate the negative deposit rate to ease the pressure on banks). Unemployment is still a problem in Spain and Italy, while core CPI inflation fell back to just 0.7% in March. The euro could strengthen further in the near term if Macron wins the second round of the French elections, easing euro break-up fears. Nonetheless, we expect the euro to trend lower on a medium-term horizon versus the dollar as rate expectations move further in favor of the greenback. Some real rate divergence is already priced into money and currency markets, but there is room for forward real spreads to widen further, possibly pushing the euro to parity versus the dollar before this cycle is over. We are also bullish the dollar versus the yen for similar reasons. On a broad trade-weighted basis, we still expect the dollar to rally by another 10%. Positive Signs For U.S. Corporate Pricing Power Chart I-13U.S. Corporations Gaining Pricing Power Turning to the equity market, it is still early days for Q1 U.S. earnings, but the results so far are positive for a pro-risk asset allocation. After a disappointing Q4, positive Q1 earnings surprises for the S&P 500 are on track to match their highest level in two years, with revenue surprises also materially higher than previous quarters. At the industry level, banks and capital goods companies stand out: the former registered an earnings beat of nearly 8%, and it was nearly 12% for the latter. We highlighted the positive 2017 outlook for U.S. corporate profits in our March 2017 Monthly Report. Earnings growth is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, which was related to energy prices and a temporary slowdown in nominal GDP growth relative to aggregate labor costs. Proprietary indicators from our sister publication, the U.S. Equity Sectors Strategy service, confirm our thesis. First, deflation pressures appear to be abating. A modest revival in corporate pricing power is underway according to our Pricing Power Proxy (Chart I-13). It is constructed from proxies for selling prices in almost 50 industries. Importantly, the rise in the Proxy is broadly-based across industries (as shown by the diffusion index in the chart). As a side note, the Profit Proxy provides some evidence that recent softness in core CPI inflation will not last. Second, the upward march of wage growth appears to be taking a breather (Chart I-13). Average hourly earnings growth has softened in recent months. Broader measures, such as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker, tell a similar story. We do not expect wage growth to decelerate much given tightness in the labor market. Nonetheless, the combination of firming pricing power and contained wage growth (for now) suggests that margins will continue to expand modestly in the first half of the year. Our model even suggests that U.S. EPS growth has a very good shot at matching perpetually-optimistic bottom-up estimates for 2017 (Chart I-14). Many companies have supported per share profits in this expansion via share buybacks, often funded through debt issuance. This has generated some angst that companies are sacrificing long-term earnings growth potential for short-term EPS growth. This appeared to be the case early in the expansion, but the story is less compelling today. Chart I-15 compares the cumulative dollar value of equity buybacks and dividends in this expansion with the previous three expansion phases. The cumulative dollar values are divided by cumulative nominal GDP to make the data comparable across cycles. By this metric, capital spending has lagged previous expansion, but not by much. While capital spending growth has been weak, the same is true for GDP. Chart I-14U.S. Profit Model Is Very Upbeat Chart I-15U.S. Corporate Finance Cycle Comparison Dividend payments have been stronger than the three previous expansions. Buyback activity was also more aggressive compared with the 1990s and 2000s, although repurchase activity has been roughly in line with the expansion that ended in 2007. Net equity issuance since 2009, which includes the impact of IPOs, share buybacks and M&A activity, has not been out of line with previous expansions (positive values shown in Chart I-15 represent net equity withdrawals). CFOs have not been radically different in this cycle in terms of apportioning funds between capital spending and returning cash to shareholders. Nonetheless, buybacks have boosted EPS growth by almost 2% over the past year according to our proxy (Chart I-16). We expect this tailwind to continue given the positive reading from our Capital Structure Preference Indicator (third panel). Firms have a financial incentive to issue debt and buy back shares when the indicator is above zero. Stronger global growth should continue to power an acceleration in corporate earnings outside the U.S. over the remainder of the year. Chart I-17 shows that the global earnings revision ratio has turned positive for the first time in six years, implying that analysts have been behind the curve in revising up profit projections. Our profit indicators remain constructive for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Chart I-16Incentive To Buy Back ##br##Stock Remains Strong Chart I-17Global Profit ##br##Growth On The Upswing It is disconcerting that the rally in oil prices has faltered in recent days as investors worry that increased U.S. shale production will thwart OPEC's plans to trim bloated inventories. A breakdown in oil prices could spark a major correction in the broader equity market. Indeed, commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. The aim of last year's agreement between OPEC and Russia to remove some 1.8mn b/d of oil production from the market in 2017 H1 was to get visible inventories down to five-year average levels. They are well short of that goal. Without trimming stockpiles to more normal levels, storage capacity remains too close to topping out, which raises the risk of another price collapse. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like Saudi Arabia, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. This is the reason why our commodity strategists expect the OPEC/Russia production cuts to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25. This will significantly raise the odds that OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. Investment Conclusions Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. Admittedly, some of the U.S. data have been disappointing given the extremely upbeat survey numbers. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. economic data in the first quarter. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. As for European political risk, centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the economic and profit outlook in 2018. Nonetheless, we believe that the window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals are constructive. The passage of market-friendly fiscal policies in the U.S. later in 2017 will be icing on the cake. Perhaps more importantly, we are finally seeing signs that pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector is improving, allowing margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. Our profit models remain upbeat for the major advanced economies and for China. It has been frustrating for those investors looking for an equity buying opportunity. Despite the surge in defensive assets such as gold and Treasurys, the major equity bourses did not correct by much. Value remains stretched in all of the risk asset classes. Nonetheless, investors should stay positioned for another upleg in the stock-to-bond total return ratio in the coming months. Perhaps the largest risk lies in the bond market. The rally has depressed yields to a level that makes bonds highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Within an underweight allocation to fixed-income in balanced portfolios, investors should overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds in the U.S. and U.K. We are more cautious on Eurozone corporates as the ECB's support for that sector will moderate. Looking ahead to next year, our bond strategists foresee a shift to underweight credit given the advanced nature of the releveraging cycle in the U.S. corporate sector. Our other recommendations include: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. in currency-hedged terms. Continue to favor defensive over cyclical equity sectors in the U.S. for now, but a shift may be required later this year. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Stay cautious on EM bonds, stocks and currencies. Overweight small cap stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Recent underperformance is a buying opportunity. Value has improved and cyclical conditions favor small caps. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst April 27, 2017 Next Report: May 25, 2017 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "U.S. Fiscal Policy: Facts, Fallacies and Fantasies," dated April 5, 207, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart II-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart II-1Global Disequilibria The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings Chart II-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart II-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart II-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart II-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart II-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart II-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart II-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart II-5). In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart II-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Chart II-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart II-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Chart II-6Hollowing Out Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart II-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart II-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart II-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart II-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase Chart II-9Working-Age Population ##br##To Shrink In G7 And China It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart II-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Chart II-10Globalization Peaking? Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart II-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart II-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. Chart II-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart II-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart II-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart II-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart II-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Chart II-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart II-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too Chart II-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart II-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart II-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart II-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table II-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table II-1Key Secular Drivers No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart II-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Chart II-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart II-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart II-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The modest correction in April did not improve equity valuation by much in any of the major markets. Our U.S. valuation metric is still hovering just below the +1 sigma mark, above which would signal extreme overvaluation. Measures such as the Shiller P/E ratio are flashing red on valuation, but our indicator takes into consideration 11 different valuation measures. Technically, the U.S. equity market still has upward momentum, while our Monetary indicator is neutral for stocks. The Speculation index indicates some froth, although our Composite Sentiment indicator has cooled off, suggesting that fewer investors are bullish. The U.S. net revisions ratio is hovering near zero, but it is bullish that the earnings surprise index jumped over the past month. First-quarter earnings season in the U.S. has got off to a good start, while the global earnings revisions ratio has moved into positive territory for the first time in six years (see the Overview section). Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little 'dry power' left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. April's rally in the U.S. bond market dragged valuation close to neutral. However, we believe that the market is underestimating the amount of Fed rate hikes that are likely over the next year. Now that oversold technical conditions have been absorbed, this opens the door the next upleg in yields. Bonds typically move into 'inexpensive' territory before the monetary cycle is over. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year to meet support at the 200-day moving average and overbought conditions have largely, but not totally, been worked off. We still believe there is more upside for the dollar, despite lofty valuation readings, due to macro divergences. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen TechnicalsChart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro TechnicalsChart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China

Special Report

Highlights The latest saber-rattling signals a turn in U.S. policy; New negotiations, with tighter sanctions, will follow; The Iran playbook can work with North Korea ... ... But failure could mean war down the road. Feature The United States's "Pivot to Asia" was not a passing fancy, as the past two weeks of saber-rattling have shown. Over this period, U.S. President Donald Trump took two largely symbolic actions in Syria and Afghanistan. First he launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian air base, then he dropped the world's largest non-nuclear bomb on an underground hub of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Neither action implied an increase in commitment to the region. Instead, the spotlight shifted to North Korea. Trump's multiple conversations with Chinese President Xi Jinping, his orders to move three aircraft carriers to the peninsula, and his standoff with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un over a failed missile launch, all indicated that one of our major geopolitical themes is alive and well: the rotation of risk from the Middle East to Asia Pacific (Chart 1).1 Chart 1The Pivot To Asia Is Not Done Yet The underlying driver of geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula is Sino-American rivalry. China is an emerging "great power" that threatens the global dominance of the United States and its alliance system. The immediate consequence is rising friction in China's periphery. That is why Taiwan, the South China Sea, and North Korea are all heating up in various ways.2 However, North Korea's regime is highly unpredictable and potentially able to strike the American homeland in a few years. In that sense it is more significant than the other "proxy battles" between the U.S. and China.3 In essence, North Korea is no longer merely an object of satire. A big new round of negotiations over Korea is about to begin - not unlike the Iranian nuclear negotiations over the past decade. Unless diplomacy succeeds in convincing North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile progress, the potential for a military conflict is high. What Caused The Latest Spike In Tensions? This past week the new U.S. administration, hitherto untested in foreign affairs, has drawn a stark line on how it intends to manage global security. Both President Barack Obama and Presidential Candidate Trump sowed doubts about America's willingness to remain involved in maintaining global order.4 Obama seemed reluctant to reinforce American "red lines" in Syria, Ukraine, and the South China Sea; Trump threatened outright isolationism, rejecting NATO, and notably suggesting that U.S. allies Japan and South Korea might have to fend for themselves. In office, however, Trump is rapidly "normalizing" and abandoning his isolationist rhetoric. Notably, he is maintaining the Obama administration's "pivot" away from the Middle East and toward Asia Pacific. Though he unilaterally withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, he has emphasized the need to renegotiate America's relationship with China, voiced aggressive support for Taiwan, reinforced U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and sent Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence on high-profile regional tours. He may visit China himself in May. The current tense standoff with North Korea - which has seen high-flying rhetoric, the aircraft carrier strike groups diverted to the region, extra military exercises with South Korea and Japan, and no less than three conversations with President Xi of China - should remove any doubt that Asia is high on his foreign-policy list. Another major factor contributing to the current flare-up in Korean tensions is Korean peninsula politics. The past year has seen extraordinary South Korean domestic political turmoil and a sharp increase in the frequency of North Korean nuclear and missile tests (Chart 2). These issues are connected. Robust empirical research shows that North Korean foreign policy from 1960-2011 has been more likely to turn hostile in the context of internal difficulties as well as periods of South Korean power transition (Chart 3).5 The past year's events support that conclusion: Chart 2North Korea Run Amok? Chart 3Bull Market For North Korean Threats South Korean turmoil: South Korea's ruling party, the conservative Saenuri Party - hawkish on North Korea - has collapsed in flames under the Park Geun-hye administration. She has been impeached and removed from office and is now under arrest and investigation. It is a sequence of events without comparison since the turmoil that accompanied the country's transition to democracy in the late 1980s. Essentially, the past ten years of conservative rule in the South appear discredited, even as North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has consolidated power through purges of enemies and family members at home. If there was ever a time for the North to flex its muscles, the past year has been it. Economic weakness: Kim's muscle-flexing at home and abroad have also coincided with internal economic difficulties. China accounts for about 91% of North Korea's trade ex-South Korea, and the North has suffered from the secular slowdown in Chinese growth. Bilateral trade with China collapsed by 10% since its peak in January 2014 (Chart 4). This slowdown has been particularly pronounced in China's northeast, namely Liaoning province, which is key for North Korea. A composite indicator of Chinese and Russian provinces bordering North Korea suggests that internal demand is still contracting (Chart 5). Moreover, the North is mainly an exporter of commodities, such as coal and iron ore, and did not escape the general commodity bust of 2014-16. The Kim regime, already concerned about the pace of pseudo-liberalization of the economy, is using its military advances to distract its populace. Chart 4China Trade Took A Hit Chart 5Regional Economic Weakness These factors coalesced late last year - as we argued - to create a situation ripe for a new Korean crisis.6 The collapse of South Korea's conservatives meant that left-leaning candidates became the only real contenders in the presidential election, now scheduled on May 9 (Chart 6). All leading candidates are more likely to try diplomacy and economic engagement with North Korea than to maintain the past ten years of conservative efforts to strengthen military deterrence via stronger alliances with the U.S. and Japan.7 As a result, early this year the U.S. and the flailing Park regime rushed ahead with the deployment of the controversial THAAD missile defense system and ratcheted up pressure tactics on the North via high-intensity regular and irregular military exercises.8 The North responded by testing four short-range missiles at once, threatening to attack Japan and American bases with nuclear weapons, launching another unidentified missile in the face of U.S. warnings, and preparing to conduct another nuclear test and an intercontinental ballistic missile test for the first time. Meanwhile, China imposed sanctions on both Koreas - the former for its missile tests and the latter for THAAD, which China resolutely opposes (Chart 7).9 China sees South Korean weakness as an opportunity to increase its sway in the region, but is sanctioning the North as well because it does not want the latter to provide the U.S. with a pretext to intervene on the Korean Peninsula or take anti-China trade measures. Chart 6Leftward Swing In South Korea Chart 7China Imposes Sanctions On Seoul? Bottom Line: The recent spike in Korean tensions (as opposed to some in the past) is driven by real, geopolitical factors - not by media hype alone. The Trump administration is going forward with the "Pivot to Asia" in all but name, and showing a lower threshold than its predecessor for military action globally, while South Korea's power vacuum has emboldened North Korea in its weapons tests and China in its willingness to affect peninsular politics. Is North Korea A Red Herring? Despite the above, this week's spike in Korean tensions failed to generate real panic among global investors, though it did cause a 32% rise in Korean credit-default swaps price and a 2% depreciation of the Korean won from end of March to mid-April (Chart 8). North Korea did not conduct a major provocation on April 15 or thereafter, as it warned it might do.10 The tensions have not fizzled, but seem likely to, once again raising the question of whether North Korea is a red herring for investors. Normally we would say "Yes." Chart 9 explains why. The North has committed a number of acts of aggression over recent decades, killing American as well as South Korean citizens and servicemen. None of these acts has had a pronounced market impact. That is because there is a balance of power on the Korean peninsula and the major players refuse to allow the North to upset that balance through provocations. Chart 8South Korean Risks Rising Chart 9North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long Specifically, the North already has a "nuclear option," and it has nothing to do with an atomic bomb. It is approximately 9,000 units of artillery hidden and deeply ensconced in the hills just 35 miles north of the South Korean capital Seoul. This conventional fighting force is ready to attack on a moment's notice and would take days to defeat even granting the vast superiority of American and South Korean forces. In that time it could cause massive casualties in the metropolitan area. In 1994 - when the U.S. chose diplomacy with North Korea for lack of an acceptable military option - a simulation estimated that 1 million people or 9% of the city's population might die - the equivalent of which would be 2.4 million today.11 A conventional attack on Seoul is North Korea's longstanding and well-known trump card. It has prevented the U.S. or South Korea from trying to "solve" the North Korea problem militarily for decades and it remains an active threat. The question, then, is whether this stalemate is changing in a way that breaks the cycle of transgression-and-containment and poses real risks to regional economies and political stability. The answer is "Yes" again. North Korea is no longer a red herring because its nuclear and missile capabilities are improving and it is becoming a bigger problem in U.S.-China relations. Capabilities First, North Korean capabilities are advancing steadily forward, giving the U.S. a smaller window of opportunity to decide whether it can accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. Previous crises with North Korea occurred after the Soviets fell, after 9/11, and after the Great Recession - they were driven exogenously and the U.S. had the luxury of time and distance. That is gradually proving no longer to be the case. To be clear, North Korea has not proved the ability to launch ICBMs reliably. The farthest it has ever shot a missile is around 1,000km, aside from tests of space launch vehicles, which are comparable but as yet inconclusive. Map 1 demonstrates that its missiles are currently a risk to U.S. military bases and allies in Asia Pacific more so than to the continental U.S. Even hitting Guam may be a stretch at the moment. Effective ICBM capabilities are exceedingly rare, as revealed by the fact that only a handful of countries have achieved them (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, India, and arguably North Korea itself). Map 1North Korea's Proven Missile Reach Nevertheless, a number of prominent U.S. defense and intelligence officials have asserted that the U.S. government must be "prudent" and "assume the worst" - i.e. that the North can attach a nuclear warhead to one of its ICBMs (which may function properly) and fire it at the continental U.S.12 The North has surprised the world several times in recent memory with marked advances on everything from nuclear miniaturization to uranium enrichment to the types of long-range missiles in development. While it has not gained the ability to strike the U.S. reliably and accurately, the U.S. wants to stay ahead of the curve. Moreover, nuclear weapons will give the North a much more influential position on the global stage even assuming that it never intends to push the button. (Pyongyang is unlikely to use nukes because to do so would be regime suicide - the response of the U.S. and its allies would be devastating.) As it gains the ability to strike U.S. bases and neighboring Asian countries, it would be able to blackmail the U.S. and its allies more effectively. One result is that the U.S. and South Korea may start to drift apart. As the North gains the ability to strike the U.S. directly, the U.S. loses the willingness to delay military strikes on account of the people of Seoul. Since South Korea knows this, it has an incentive to engage with North Korea and strike a bilateral deal. This is particularly the perception among Koreans born in the 1970s and 1980s, who are gradually assuming power in the country. Though they still support the U.S., like all Koreans, nevertheless they favor it less than other age groups. They also have the highest sympathy for North Korea and China - especially compared to those born after 1988 (Chart 10 A&B). The latter are too young to take charge of policy while the more conservative elderly cohort has been discredited with the fall of Park, at least until the political pendulum swings back again at some point in the future. This suggests a basis for peace overtures. Chart 10AMiddle-Aged Koreans ##br##Sympathetic With China... Chart 10B... And With ##br##North Korea The May 9 election is likely to point in this direction. An inter-Korean thaw may encourage the North to calm down outwardly, but may also encourage its technological efforts inwardly. This occurred during the "Sunshine Policy" of liberal South Korean governments from 1998-2007. The North will expect to face greater diplomatic leniency and economic assistance. Such a thaw will also raise the potential that the U.S. and Japan eventually grow frustrated with South Korean (and Chinese) inaction over the course of talks, especially if the North breaks faith, as it did in the late 1990s and early 2000s.13 This is why a new round of negotiations is crucial to the probability of war. China The second reason North Korea is no longer a red herring for investors is that the U.S.'s approach to China is shifting - it is threatening to slap China with secondary sanctions, trade tariffs, and other measures. The U.S. is demanding that China enforce sanctions and use its economic leverage to convince the North to freeze its nuclear and missile programs. For the first time ever, the U.S. has sanctioned Chinese companies and individuals for their involvement in the North Korean missile program - this is a trend that will continue to evolve.14 Judging by China's stated willingness to ban some coal imports this year (Chart 11), Beijing knows that the U.S. is getting more serious and needs to be pacified. Chart 11Chinese Yet To Punish Pyongyang But unless "this time is different," China will not impose crippling sanctions on North Korea. The latter is a military and ideological ally, a proxy state that helps keep the U.S. alliance at bay, and a massive liability in the event of collapse (North Korean refugees would flood into northeast China). Investors should remember that the U.S. and China fought a war directly against one another over the Korean peninsula. Time and again, China chooses not to destabilize North Korea, even if that means abetting its nuclear and missile advances.15 In short, North Korea is one more reason - along with trade, China's maritime assertiveness, and Taiwan - that U.S.-China relations will worsen over time, notwithstanding the beginnings of a Trump-Xi détente at Mar-a-Lago in early April. There is some military urgency here as well: Chinese military capabilities are rapidly improving and that further narrows the window for the U.S. to shape the outcome on the peninsula militarily. The longer the U.S. waits, the greater China's ability to deter U.S. action against the North. Hence the U.S.'s simmering conflict with the North could easily feed into a larger U.S.-China confrontation. Moreover, if we are wrong and China imposes crippling sanctions on the North, the investment-relevance of North Korea still goes up. The latter will become unstable in that case, given its vast overreliance on China. Eventually the regime could fragment and impact China's economy and internal stability, or lash out at its other neighbors and instigate tit-for-tat conflicts. Bottom Line - The current saber-rattling is carefully orchestrated. But North Korea can no longer be consigned to the realm of satire. The very fact that the U.S. administration is adopting greater pressure tactics makes this year a heightened risk period. Investors should be especially wary of any missile tests that reveal North Korean long-range capabilities to be substantially better than is known to be the case today. Table 1 provides a checklist for investors to determine if the current tensions get out of hand. Table 1Will The U.S. Attack North Korea? Investors should also be wary of U.S. sanctions on China, or broader U.S.-China tensions, which are structurally driven and have not substantially subsided despite the Trump-Xi talks. In lieu of war, a deterioration in Sino-American relations is the key investment risk from North Korea. What Is The End Game? The U.S. has three paths it can take: Do nothing: The U.S. has allowed murderous tyrants to develop deliverable nuclear weapons before: see Stalin and Mao. It is possible that the U.S. could do the same for North Korea, essentially "setting in stone" the current status quo for lack of willingness to fight a second Korean war. Such an arrangement would put "rational actor theory" to the test - and so far that has been the case, with no second Korean war occurring. Attack, attack, attack! The North holds the South hostage, but Washington might decide someday to "shoot the hostage." For instance, if its own security needs outweigh its loyalty to its ally. Negotiate a solution: China's tentative cooperation on sanctions this year suggests that a major multilateral initiative is getting under way, comparable to the Iranian negotiations that concluded with the nuclear-monitoring and sanctions-lifting deal of 2015. The solution would likely consist of North Korea retaining its nuclear capability but admitting some inspections and refraining from developing long-range missile capabilities. It would seek a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice as well as sanctions relief and economic aid. Chart 12The Great East Asian Powder Keg What is wrong with these options? First, the U.S. has not yet accepted the North as a nuclear-armed state. Trump's naval buildup this month was evidence of a policy change designed to increase pressure tactics, with the aim of getting a better (non-nuclear-armed) result. It is still believed that the North will use its nuclear deterrent as a cover to expand its campaign of military intimidation and coercion against sovereign states: it has a record of attacks on civilians, attempted assassinations, and acts of war, including but not limited to the Chonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010. As the North gains the ability to strike the U.S., any hostilities will become harder for the U.S. public and defense establishment to ignore. Moreover, doing nothing allows a nuclear-armed Korea to kick off a nuclear arms race in a region that is already developing into a powder keg (Chart 12). More generally, it reduces America's ability to shape outcomes regarding China. A preemptive strike, on the other hand, would devastate Seoul and deliver a shock to the global economy. It would destabilize the peninsula and call all alliances and relationships into question. This option is extremely unlikely unless the U.S. is attacked, believes it is about to be attacked, or sees one of its allies suffer a serious attack. Diplomacy is the only real option. And in fact it is already taking shape. The theatrics of the past few weeks mark the opening gestures. And theatrics are a crucial part of any foreign policy. The international context is looking remarkably similar to the lead-up to the new round of Iranian negotiations in 2012. The United States pounded the war drums and built up the potential for war before coordinating a large, multilateral sanctions-regime and then engaging in talks with real willingness to compromise (Chart 13). Chart 13Tensions Ramp Up As Nuclear Negotiations Begin Today the U.S. is similarly showing off its capabilities and willingness to use force to the North, thus establishing a "credible threat."16 The other actors are playing their parts. China is offering to assist with tougher sanctions than usual; South Korea is heading for a policy shift; Japan is raising alarms and demonstrating its lock-step with the U.S.; Russia is calling for calm and a return to talks. However, over time, diplomacy could be unsatisfactory if it merely approximates the first option of "doing nothing." This is likely North Korea's last chance to prove that it can be pragmatic. Bottom Line: Therefore we are at the critical phase - within say one-to-four years - in which the U.S. must decide whether to attack. Given the current heightened tensions, the danger zone consists of (1) the near-term, in which the U.S. is applying more pressure, tensions are spiking, and talks have not yet taken shape (2) the long term, when talks could fail. Conclusion The Korean peninsula is the site of a proxy battle between China and the U.S. However, China sees the dangers of a nuclear-armed North Korea and recognizes that its patronage has a strategic downside by provoking U.S. military intervention. Like Russia in the Iranian negotiations, it can be brought to the table if the U.S. is convincing in warning that it may take matters into its own hands. China's apparent decision to enforce sanctions on coal imports, combined with the U.S. aversion to preemptive strikes and South Korean political leftward tilt, make this new round of talks especially likely to occur. Japan also prefers North Korea to be a threat, but a contained threat, as it looks to normalize its defense posture yet avoid an economic destabilization. The threat in North Korea will be a convenient excuse for Prime Minister Abe to pursue his re-militarization agenda. Thus, over the next four years, the North might be persuaded to freeze its programs to create an uneasy modus vivendi, as with Iran. This would require a non-aggression nod from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. It could also bring economic engagement with all parties into focus, even though North Korea does not have as much economic resources to offer as Iran. It is looking to trade national security for national security. All of this has a limit, however. China will not cripple the North Korean economy or force out the regime. Remember that in the case of Iran it was only willing to go so far, and received a waiver for the Iranian oil sanctions - yet North Korea is even closer to its immediate security. Therefore the North's willingness to change its behavior - to demonstrate that it is a rational player if brought in from the cold - is critical to the effectiveness of negotiations. Trump's reelection prospects may also be critical. A lame duck Trump in 2020, in the face of another failed North Korea policy, could attempt a decisive action, especially if the North is belligerent. By contrast, there is very little risk that Japan will "go rogue" and attack North Korea - even less so than there was with Israel in the Iran talks. It is Trump who is playing the role of the unpredictable negotiator who might "go it alone." The U.S. will continue to make the military option credible in spite of Seoul's vulnerability to retaliation. Therefore any failure of negotiations will induce a real crisis in which the U.S. contemplates unilateral action. The final question of whether the U.S. will attack may hinge on the fact that the U.S. has a potent form of nationalism in the country that could be directed against North Korea under certain circumstances, as has happened against other regimes like Vietnam and Iraq. A North Korean act of war, or even a suspected imminent act of war in certain scenarios, could prompt a wave of reaction. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist EM Equity Sector Strategy obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and EM Equity Sector Strategy Joint Report, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" dated March 28, 2017, Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was," dated March 8, 2017, Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2016: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, and "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Robert Daniel Wallace, "The Determinants Of Conflict: North Korea's Foreign Policy Choices, 1960-2011," doctoral dissertation, Kansas State University (2014), available at krex.k-state.edu. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Joint Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Most notably, the South Korean foreign policy shift will likely put an end to the unified U.S.-Japan-Korea stonewalling of North Korea that has prevailed since 2008. If Moon Jae-In wins, in particular, it will call the U.S. THAAD missile system emplacement into question. It will also call into question the progress in Korea-Japan relations, which includes a Japanese attempt to settle the "comfort women" controversy and a notable military-cooperation and intelligence-sharing agreement. 8 Including letting it be known that they would simulate special-forces operations to strike at the leadership in Pyongyang and decapitate the regime. 9 China opposes THAAD because its radar will be able to penetrate deep into China's territory. More broadly, it opposes U.S. efforts to upgrade its military capabilities in the region or otherwise shift the regional balance of power. 10 Kim Il Sung Day, or the "Day of the Sun," is, like several regime holidays, a possible occasion for missile tests or other provocative actions or revelations. However, Pyongyang is rarely predictable. Faced with a notable display of force by the U.S., the North conducted a small missile test, which failed. Notably, it steered clear of testing another nuclear device, as predicted. More may be to come. 11 Please see W. J. Hennigan and Barbara Demick, "Trump administration faces few good military options in North Korea," April 14, 2017, available at www.latimes.com. 12 Please see Admiral Bill Gortney's comments: "Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 [ICBM] and shoot it at the homeland ... That is the way we think, and that's our assessment of the process," in Aaron Mehta, "US: N. Korean Nuclear ICBM Achievable," April 8, 2015, available at www.defensenews.com. In 2013, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey said that "in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary, we have to assume the worst case, and that's ... why we're postured as we are today," quoted in "Hagel: North Korea Near 'Red Line,'" UPI, April 10, 2013, available at www.upi.com. See also Mark Landler, "North Korea Nuclear Threat Cited by James Clapper, Intelligence Chief," New York Times, February 9, 2016; Siegfried S. Hecker, "The U.S. Must Talk To North Korea," New York Times, January 12, 2017, available at www.nytimes.com; Jeff Seldin, "N. Korea Capable of Nuclear Strike at US, Military Leader Says," Voice of America, April 7, 2015, available at www.voanews.com. 13 Japan is especially likely to diverge from South Korea as a left-leaning government in Seoul will likely see relations decline far faster with Japan than with the U.S. Increasingly, Japan is concerned about North Korea's risk and is boosting its Self-Defense Forces and attempting to win popular support for controversial constitutional revisions that would ultimately have a bearing on national security posture. North Korea is both a real and a convenient threat at this time. 14 Please see "US sanctions Chinese company for alleged support of North Korea," The Guardian, September 26, 2016, available at www.theguardian.com; see also the Department of Commerce, "Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr. Announces $1.19 Billion Penalty For Chinese Company's Export Violations To Iran And North Korea," dated March 7, 2017, available at www.commerce.gov. 15 And Chinese state-owned companies are implicated in significant and recent military advances, such as the provision of Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) for North Korea's mobile-launched ICBM prototypes. Please see Melissa Hanham, "North Korea's Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How Chinese Missile Hardware Ended Up In Pyongyang," Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 31, 2012, available at www.nti.org. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Feature Game theory teaches us that "credible threats" are an important part of creating stable equilibria. To enforce a credible threat, a geopolitical actor must have the capability and willingness to act on a standing threat. For example, if a country A states that action X will produce a response a, it must follow through decisively with a if X occurs. Otherwise, the lack of action will incite other actors to shirk compliance and conduct action X with little threat of retaliation. The lack of enforcement raises the probability of action X occurring in the future. President Donald Trump has re-established American credibility when it comes to the long-standing opposition to the use of chemical weapons. According to various news reports, approximately 50 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from two U.S. Navy destroyers - USS Porter and USS Ross - in the Eastern Mediterranean. The air strike targeted Syrian government-controlled Shayrat Air Base 30km southeast of Homs. The air base was allegedly used by Syrian forces earlier in the week to launch the chemical attack that left at least 86 people, including 28 children, dead. The following are facts that we know surrounding the attack: Russian angle: Russian military has had a presence at the Shayrat air base since December 2015, which has included a contingent of attack helicopters since April 2016.1 This information is public knowledge and therefore was known to American officials ahead of the strike. According to news reports, U.S. officials informed their Russian counterparts of the strike earlier in the day, but President Trump did not speak to President Vladimir Putin ahead of the attack. Limited target: Cruise missiles focused on the parts of the airbase critical to launching further air strikes: runway, aircraft hangars, and fuel depots. However, given the American warning to Russia of the incoming attack, it is highly likely Syrian forces had advance warning as well. Therefore, the attack is likely to have had no discernable military effect. Justification: President Trump justified the attack in broad terms in his statement following the attacks, citing "vital national security interest... to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons." He also cited Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and U.N. Security Council rulings. There is no evidence that the U.S. is preparing a more comprehensive intervention in Syria. While such an action cannot be ruled out, given that Trump has been overseeing a comprehensive policy review, the nature of the strike suggests that it was designed to re-establish America's credible threat against the use of chemical and biological weapons. What does America's commitment to use of military force mean in broader geopolitical sense? We think that the timing and the optics of the attack are relevant in five ways: Re-establishing "red lines": The alleged chemical attack - if indeed perpetrated by the armed forces of the Syrian government and not by rebel forces or the Islamic State to draw the U.S. into conflict - has little or no military utility. As such, it appears to have been conducted precisely to test President Trump's credibility and commitment to enforcing American "red lines," which were put into question in Syria in particular by the previous administration. We speculate, but the attack may have been encouraged by Assad's allies Iran and Russia to create a low-cost crisis - where both could claim plausible deniability - that tests Trump's resolve to retaliate militarily. Objectively speaking, President Trump has passed the test. Signaling: The quick reaction from Washington signals to potential foes like Iran and North Korea that President Trump has a lower threshold for using military force than his predecessor. Most notably, President Trump did not seek authorization of U.S. Congress for the attack, instead justifying the use of force via international law and longstanding U.S. commitment to defending allies.2 Timing: The attack occurred while President Trump and China's President Xi Jinping were dining at the Mar-a-Lago Florida resort. President Trump notably stated ahead of Xi's visit that "if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will." His administration has also said that time was running out on North Korea and all options were on the table. Words like these carry greater weight in light of Trump's actions today. On the other hand, the attack against Syria does allow Trump to scale-down rhetoric on North Korea and South China Sea - having now proven his military mettle - where conducting a military show-of-force would have been much more difficult for the U.S. Capabilities: The attack reminds the world that U.S. military capabilities and its global reach are unrivaled. Much has been made of Russian power-projection capabilities since their successful intervention in Syria. However, the U.S. was able to deliver a payload of 50-60 cruise missiles without tipping its hand and with little fanfare.3 Russian and Chinese capabilities to project power within their spheres of influence have increased dramatically over the past ten years. However, the U.S. remains the only actor capable of acting globally. Doctrine: President Trump's quick decision to use force suggests that he will not follow an extreme isolationist foreign policy. As we wrote in a February note, a truly isolationist America would produce paradigm shifting outcomes, including the eventual loss of U.S. dollar reserve currency status.4 However, Trump's decision to cite international law and American responsibility to allies as justifications for the Syrian air strikes suggest that the Trump White House has abandoned the isolationist rhetoric of the campaign. It also reveals the preferences of the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment, which has re-established its influence in the Trump White House. Incidentally, the air strike coincides with the removal of ultra-isolationist Steve Bannon - campaign chief and White House Chief Strategist - from the National Security Council. Investment Implications We believe that the air strikes are a limited attack whose main purpose is messaging. If the U.S. planned to accomplish broader goals, we would have expected to see multiple strikes against Syrian air force, air defense installations, and command and control capabilities. A risk to this view would be any follow-up rhetoric from the White House on establishing "no-fly zones" above Syrian air space. We suspect that the attack against Shayrat air base will instead be eventually followed by closer coordination with Russia and other regional players to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian civil war. As such, any negative market reaction, bid-up in oil prices, or safe-haven flows should be temporary (Chart 1). In fact, the attack is bullish for risk assets for three reasons: Political recapitalization: We suspect that President Trump will see a bump in approval rating due to the limited, but resolute, air strikes. Currently, Trump is plumbing unseen lows in overall popularity and even his support among Republican voters appears to be slipping (Chart 2).The strikes will be a shot-in-the-arm, at least among GOP voters. This will further aid President Trump in his ongoing squabbles with the fiscally conservative Freedom Caucus and thus increase the probability of tax legislation being passed by Congress later this year.5 Chart I-1Market Reaction ##br##Should Be Temporary Chart 2Can A Resolute Strike ##br##Rescue Trump's Popularity? Establishment strikes back: The air strikes are a highly orthodox reaction to a foreign policy crisis, suggesting that the extreme isolationist rhetoric of the Trump's presidential campaign has been abandoned. It also suggests that the U.S. establishment has wrestled control of foreign policy from unpredictable novices like Steve Bannon. Escalation is limited: We don't see the probability of air strikes against North Korea as having risen. As we will show in a forthcoming military assessment of the risks on the Korean peninsula, North Korea retains considerable retaliatory capacity. It can still inflict massive civilian casualties on Seoul via a conventional artillery barrage. We suspect that the market will quickly realize the objective superiority of a foreign policy that enforces credible threats. As such, the probability of future use of force declines, now that the U.S. has reestablished its commitment to military retaliation when its "red lines" are crossed. The two risks to our view are that: Russia decides it must respond to the U.S. attack for either strategic or domestic political reasons; President Trump is emboldened by the political recapitalization that follows the attack to expand operations in Syria or to attempt a similar strike in North Korea. We doubt that either will happen, but it may take time for the market to be convinced. First, Russia will likely oppose U.S. involvement rhetorically, given the close proximity of its forces to the attack. This is despite the fact that the U.S. informed Russia, showing the courtesy of a geopolitical peer. Indeed, Russian officials are already threatening to scuttle the agreement with the U.S. that keeps the two militaries informed of each other movement in Syria. Second, we doubt that the U.S. defense establishment will advise President Trump to attack North Korea, as it has understood Pyongyang's retaliatory capability for decades. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 The airport was used by the Russian forces as an "advance airfield," which means that it was mainly used for quick refueling and rearming of frontline aviation. There was no permanent presence of Russian troops. 2 In his statement following the attacks, President Trump stated that destabilization of the region and ongoing refugee crisis threatened the U.S. and its allies. 3 As a side note, the number of cruise missiles involved in the strike appears to be complete overkill given the limited nature of the attack. The number appears to have been selected for maximum PR effect, showing again that the attack was meant to serve a signaling purpose. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trump Doctrine," dated February 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea are here to stay; China has reached the ability to impose massive costs on any state that tries to roll back its control; U.S. advantages in the region are significant, but declining and overrated. We put together a portfolio of stocks that give investors exposure to the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Dear Client, Today's Special Report is jointly authored by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Equity Strategy services and focuses on the tail risks around the South China Sea conflict. In this report, our colleagues Matt Gertken of the Geopolitical Strategy and Oleg Babanov of the Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy ask whether China has "won" the South China Sea, and what the implications might be for investors. At the end of the report, we provide detailed investment recommendations for both EM-dedicated as well as global investors. Kindest Regards, Garry Evans Senior Vice President EM Equity Sector Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President, Geopolitical Strategy "We're going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years ... There's no doubt about that." - Steve Bannon, prior to becoming President Donald Trump's Chief Strategist, Breitbart News, March 2016 The South China Sea is a headline grabber that has failed to produce any market-disruptions despite years of rising tensions. In fact, it would appear that the issue has been relegated to the backburner, with the Trump administration laying off its earlier aggressive rhetoric and America's Asian allies focusing on building a trade relationship with China. Compared to the Koreas, in particular, where geopolitical risk is spiking due to political turmoil in the South and weapons advances in the North, the South China Sea seems relatively calm.1 We are not so sanguine, however, and advise investors to take the tail-risk of a conflict in the South China Sea seriously. First, there has been a general "rotation" of global geopolitical risk from the Middle East to Asia Pacific, as BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has chronicled over the years.2 China's transformation into a "peer" or "near-peer" competitor to the United States, and the U.S.'s various reactions, are transforming the region and sowing the seeds of a new Cold War. Second, despite a thaw in the relationship between China and the Trump Administration, the latest positive signals have not extended to the South China Sea.3 In North Korea, China is offering to enforce sanctions. In Taiwan, Trump has backed away from hints of encouraging independence. But in the South China Sea, the two sides have increased activity even as they have made reassuring statements.4 Third, fact remains that despite headline grabbers, China has managed to expand its military installations in the region over the past half-decade and now possesses a layered-defense system in the region. In this report, we ask whether China has "won" the South China Sea, and what the implications might be for investors, particularly EM-dedicated investors, on the sectoral level. We find that China has reached the ability to impose massive costs on any state that should try to roll back its control of the disputed islands. We also do not think that the U.S. is ready to accept this new Chinese "sphere of influence." This means that the two countries are in a "gray zone" in which policy mistakes could occur. This uncertainty is driving the odds of a crisis higher. China is flush with recent victories in the islands, and yet the United States will continue to insist on free passage and the defense of allies and partners. Nationalism and rising jingoism in both countries also raises the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Until the Trump and Xi administrations agree to a robust strategic deal that arranges for de-escalation, the South China Sea will remain a source of low-probability, high-impact geopolitical risk for investors. It is only one aspect of a broader deterioration in U.S.-China relations that we see as the ultimate driver of a secular rise in geopolitical risk in Asia Pacific.5 Unfortunately, history also teaches us that such "strategic resets" are normally motivated by a dramatic crisis. At the end of this report, we provide investment recommendations for investors in emerging markets (and a couple for the U.S. as well). Why Not Ignore The South China Sea? Map 1Nine-Dash Line Reaches Far Beyond China Maritime territorial disputes between China and several of its neighbors - Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and partly Indonesia - have a long history. China declared its "Nine Dash Line," an expansionist claim of sovereignty over almost the entirety of the sea, in 1947 (Map 1). Since then, conflicts have flared up sporadically. The most notable skirmishes illustrate that the maritime disputes are always simmering but tend to boil over only when larger geopolitical issues heat up.6 Since the 1990s, China and the other claimants have raced to "grab what they can," particularly in the Spratly Islands. However, conflicts have especially intensified since the mid-2000s (Charts 1 and 2). A major factor has been the rise in competition for subsea resources: Chart 1Territorialism Rising In South China Chart 2Rising Number Of Confrontations Energy and minerals - Although estimates vary widely, the South China Sea contains respectable reserves of oil and natural gas (Chart 3) and there are also hopes of extracting other minerals from the sea floor. Most of the region's states are net importers. Several conflicts have been sparked by exploration, test drilling, and unilateral development.7 It is a fact that the past decade's buildup in tensions has coincided with a global bull market for energy prices and offshore energy investment and capex (Chart 4). Chart 3Not Insignificant Reserves Of Oil And Gas In South China Sea Fishing Grounds - The South China Sea holds vast fish resources, a source of food security, exports, and jobs for littoral countries. It is estimated that over 10% of global fishing catches come from here. Fishing as a whole accounts for about 1-3% of GDP for the countries involved in the disputes (Chart 5), and the South China Sea is a large chunk of that. A quick glance at recent skirmishes reveals that fishing rights are a major cause of conflict (Table 1). Chart 4Offshore Oil Production In Decline Chart 5Fisheries Non-Negligible For Asian States Table 1Notable Incidents In The South China Sea (2010-16) Nevertheless, resource extraction is not the main driver of discord. Frictions spiked in 2015-16 despite the collapse in China's and other countries' offshore rig counts (Chart 6). And fishing rights are also clearly a pretext for attempts to assert control over waters and rocks.8 Chart 6Energy Interest Declining, Tensions Still Elevated Moreover, China's conversion of the sea's various geographical features into artificial islands through a process of land reclamation, and its construction of military facilities and stationing of armaments on these islands, points not to strictly economic interests but to broader strategic security interests. Similarly, the United States' enforcement of international rights of free navigation and overflight is not related to oil and fish. What is really at stake is national security, supply-line control, and international prestige. First, the United States has long executed a grand strategy of preventing any country from forming a regional empire and denying the U.S. access. China has the long-term potential to make this happen, and the South China Sea is its earliest foray into empire-building abroad. (Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet are all old news and expand Chinese hegemony into the largely useless Eurasian hinterland.) Second, the main global trading lines from Eurasia and Africa to and from Asia mostly go through the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. We illustrate this process through our diagram of the sea as a large traffic roundabout (Diagram 1). China is attempting to control the centerpiece of the roundabout, which - in combination with China's southern mainland forces - would eventually give it veto power over transit. Diagram 1South China Sea As A Vital Supply Roundabout The economic value of the trade potentially affected by power struggles is what makes this all highly market relevant if a full-blown war ever occurs. We estimate that roughly $4.8 trillion worth of trade flowed through this area in 2015, which is comparable to the $5.3 trillion estimate from 2012 frequently cited in news media.9 Moreover, the trade does not consist merely of manufactured goods from Asian manufacturing centers but also basic commodities vital to the Asian countries' economic and political stability. Essential commodities account for about 20-35% of Northeast and Southeast Asian imports, and almost all of this by definition flows through the South China Sea (Charts 7 and 8). Chart 7Commodity Imports Go Through South China Sea... Chart 8...And Greatly Affect Asian Economies The numbers belie how vital the supply lanes are for individual countries: Japan, for instance, gets 80% of its oil via the South China Sea. A total cutoff would be devastating after strategic reserves were exhausted; and even a marginal hindrance of energy imports would bite into the current account surpluses that grease the wheels of high-debt Asian economies. The South China Sea is therefore vital even to countries like Japan and South Korea that are not party to the maritime-territorial disputes. A commerce-destroying war could strangle their economies. Military access is another reason states seek control. This is separate but related to the need to secure economic supplies. Chinese military planners are clear that they want to be able to deny access to foreign powers if need be, in order to secure the southern half of the country, or cut off Taiwan's or Japan's supply lines. American military planners are equally clear that they will not allow a state to deny them access to international commons, or to coerce others through supply-lane control.10 Finally, there are political and legal aspects to the South China Sea disputes. China's successful alteration of the status quo in the face of opposition from the U.S., Asian neighbors, and a high-profile international tribunal (the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague), has undermined international legal institutions and the U.S. prestige in the region. Over time, regional states, perceiving that "might makes right," may feel the need to cling more closely to China or the U.S., giving rise to proxy battles.11 With supply security and national defense at risk - and China in the process of "militarizing" the islands - there is a rising probability of a major "Black Swan" incident. The involvement of a number of major powers and minor allies means that a small incident could escalate into something significant. The friction between U.S. global dominance and China's rising regional sway is the chief source of instability. China could agree to a "Code of Conduct" with the Asian states possibly as early as this year. But without improvement in U.S.-China relations, the geopolitical consequences of such a code will be moot. Southeast Asian risk assets could benefit temporarily, but the chief tail-risks of the U.S. and China falling out would be unresolved. Bottom Line: He who controls the sea routes controls the traffic. China has made an overt bid for the ability to govern the sea routes and deny foreign powers access to the sea. The U.S. has threatened forceful responses to acts of "area-denial" or military coercion. Thus, geopolitical uncertainty and risks in the region remain elevated. How Do The Contenders Size Up? If China had clearly achieved full control of the waterways, airways, and geographical features of the South China Sea, then geopolitical risk over the area might decline. Countries would adjust to Beijing's rules of the game and the region would enter a period of hegemonic stability. The reason we are in a gray area today is that China has not yet reached dominance. China's advantages are significant, growing rapidly, and underrated; meanwhile the U.S.'s advantages are significant, declining, and overrated. A simple comparison of the U.S.'s and China's military advantages and disadvantages will make this clear. China Considering that the South China Sea is China's backyard, the country has a major advantage of playing on its "home court" versus the United States. China can afford to concentrate its military capabilities and planning specifically on its near seas, whereas American resources are dispersed globally and reduced to an "expeditionary force" when operating in China's neighborhood.12 Even so, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Navy (PLAN), and Air Force (PLAAF) have major obstacles to overcome if they are to contend with American forces. Until relatively recently, China's defense buildup focused on traditional ground capabilities, creating weak spots in its ability to project military power over the South China Sea. What matters is whether China has addressed these shortfalls sufficiently to raise the costs of U.S. intervention to a prohibitive level. So far, it is attempting to do so in the following ways: Sea Power - China's naval capabilities have generally lagged far behind those of the U.S. and Japan. An important step was the commissioning of China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012. It is a renovated Soviet carrier of the type that Russia has recently used in Syria. A second carrier, Shandong, is 85% complete and set to be commissioned in 2018 - it is an indigenously produced copy of the former. It is set to be stationed in Hainan, which will influence the balance of power given that the U.S. only has one carrier permanently in the region (though several more dock in San Diego). A third carrier is slated for 2022 and expected to be stationed in the South China Sea. The navy has also significantly increased China's logistic and support capabilities in the area, with amphibious warships and air cover. China has also vastly expanded its destroyers and smaller ships. Only its submarine capabilities face serious doubts about the degree of improvement and capability. Air Transport - China's naval and air force lifting capabilities, necessary to transport troops and equipment quickly to disputed territories, were initially very limited. But in recent years, China has improved these capabilities. Considering satellite pictures of the Spratly and Paracel Islands with new hangars and landing strips, China has made considerable progress toward the goal of quick material and troop supply for the islands. Of course, it is notoriously difficult to resupply small scattered islands amid enemy disruptions, but it is also difficult to disrupt without committing more than one aircraft carrier wing to the problem. Clearly China's capacity has improved. Infrastructure - China has converted Hainan, its southernmost island (and smallest province) into a major military and logistics base. Its new Yulin Naval Base can host up to 20 nuclear submarines as well as two carrier groups and several assault ships. This is China's "Pearl Harbor," and unlike the American version, it is in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, on the disputed islands, China had not built infrastructure until very recently. It was in fact the last of the island claimants to pave an airstrip. But its construction has been bigger, faster, and more ambitious - including for air transport, fighter jets, and surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, all of which have added greatly to its ability to deny the U.S. access to the sea. Air Power - One of the main issues the PLAAF had over the years was the limited radius of its fighter planes, which would not allow full air superiority in the South China Sea. Airfield infrastructure was built on the disputed islands so that fighter planes could be stationed closer to the area. China therefore does not possess just one aircraft carrier, but rather numerous ones if we think of islands as aircraft carriers. Also, Russia is delivering to China a number of multirole fighters that can cover the South China Sea from bases on the mainland. And China's fifth-generation fighter is coming along. By far the most significant military development in China's arsenal, however, is its development of short- and medium-range missiles. This development greatly increases the danger to American ships and aircraft seeking access to the region. First, China has concentrated on building short-range, DF-21D "Carrier Killer" anti-ship missiles, which pack enough punch to take out an American aircraft carrier with one hit, and which the U.S. has limited means to defend against.13 China has also paraded around the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, or "Guam Killer," which can reach as far as Guam, can carry a nuclear charge, and has a mobile launch platform that would be difficult for U.S. forces to detect and knock out before the launch. In turn, the U.S. has deployed Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems in Guam and South Korea in preparation for precisely this kind of attack.14 Second, China has amassed around 500 surface-to-air missiles on Hainan Island, waiting to be shipped to the disputed rocks. The armory consists of a combination of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles to create a layered air-defense perimeter. Satellite images of the islands show that China has also positioned short-range and medium-range missile systems on some of the islands, namely Woody Island in the Paracels. Finally, China has fielded better radar systems to gain full coverage of the South China Sea (as well as other nearby waters) in order to find or guide friendly or hostile ships or planes and to support the various activities of its air and ship defenses. This combination of radar and missile capabilities amounts to a game changer. They make it possible for China to raise the costs of conflict to such a level that the United States might balk. Will the U.S. seek to change the balance of power with force? No. But Washington has reaffirmed its "red lines" in the region, namely freedom of passage. This was the takeaway from Secretary of Defense James Mattis's first foreign trip, not incidentally to Japan and South Korea. Mattis indicated that freedom of passage is "absolute" not only for the U.S. merchant fleet but also for the navy. However, he also said the U.S. will exhaust "diplomatic efforts" and eschew "any dramatic military moves" in the South China Sea, while maintaining the U.S.'s neutrality on sovereignty disputes. This is status quo, and the status quo favors China's rapidly growing ability to deny others' access to the area. The United States The U.S. has several bases in the Indo-Pacific area, with ground, air, naval, and marine assets. It also has extensive experience conducting wars and special operations in East Asia. Yet despite this dispersed and historic basing, China poses a challenge the likes of which it has not seen in the region. The distances to be covered, the complexities of the logistics, and China's growing strengths, make any U.S. intervention in the South China Sea harder than is typically assumed. The U.S.'s key five bases make these advantages and disadvantages clear: Guam, with almost 6,000 troops, will most likely be the first base to respond to a threat in the South China Sea, or to become engaged in a conflict there. It hosts part of the Seventh Fleet, including a ballistic-missile submarine squadron. It would be a key launch pad for regional operations. It could also be an early target for China's long-range ballistic missiles in a major conflict. Guam sits almost 3,000km from the South China Sea. South Korea hosts one of the U.S.'s oldest and largest regional deployments, with about 28,000 troops. Korea hosts the Eighth U.S. Army and Seventh Air Force, as well as Special Operations Command Korea. Its chief advantage is its proximity to China. However, assuming a conflict involves no direct engagement with mainland China, Korea comes with some disadvantages. Most of the ground staff is located around the North Korea border. The U.S. command in the region will be wary of lifting troops from the border and exposing its northern flank. North Korea (or conceivably China itself) could take advantage of U.S. distraction in the South China Sea. At the same time, the operational radius of planes on the Osan Air Base would not allow direct engagement in the South China Sea, though they could cover the southeast to hinder any maneuvers of the Chinese air force. Japan is the United States' largest overseas deployment with about 49,000 troops - heavily tilted toward naval and air power. The Fifth U.S. Air Force is spread across three main bases in Misawa, Yokota, and Kadena, while the Seventh Fleet is the largest forward-deployed U.S. fleet. It has several powerful task forces including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and naval special warfare, amphibious assault, mine warfare, and marine expeditionary forces. The strong presence and firepower of this fleet as well as its maneuverability make it the prime candidate for any sort of engagement in the South China Sea (or East China Sea for that matter). The air bases around Tokyo and Okinawa can provide air support down to Taiwan and run airlift operations down to China's Hainan Island, the base of China's southern fleet. The only disadvantages stem from vulnerability to layered air defense and long supply lines for the navy, which will become targets after any lengthy engagement. Moreover, U.S. Forces Japan lack large ground units to organize landing operations, which will need to be sourced from South Korea or Hawaii. Hawaii is the home of the U.S. Pacific Command, which oversees regional forces, and contains sizable ground units to reinforce regional bases. It hosts the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor (with a second base in San Diego). Hawaii has a large ground troop presence, which, together with U.S. air-lift capabilities, would provide the main ground forces for offensive operations. The large fleet secures U.S. presence in the region. Hawaii would host and resupply the core of any naval operations in the South China Sea. The only disadvantage is geographic: the distance to any U.S. ally's territory is significant, and main operational areas in the South China Sea cannot be reached in a single lift. This means that troop and equipment movement will take time and will not go unmolested. In any scenario involving land operations, the redeployment of troops will give the other side time to prepare. Alaska is also worth mention as it houses infantry brigades and air force combat units, albeit no significant naval presence. We only give small consideration to the base here because of its proximity to Russia. Assuming the neutrality of Russia during a hypothetical conflict, the U.S. would still be unlikely to draw resources from Alaska to aid operations in the South China Sea, since that would leave its own territory exposed to some degree. Other Allied Bases - We do not feature other allied bases in the region mainly because of the small numbers of troops that can be deployed and the low capabilities of U.S. allies. Some countries, such a Singapore, which has a respectably army, could disappoint the U.S. by trying to remain neutral. The most reliable help would come from Japan and Australia, but even Australia would face a very intense internal dilemma as a result of its economic dependency on China. South Korea would also be preoccupied with North Korea's ability to take advantage. A quick survey of the "order of battle" of the U.S. and China in the region would make our assertion that China has gained supremacy laughable. Then again, geopolitics does not work in ceteris paribus terms. Yes, the U.S. maintains military hegemony in the region, but China's abilities to impose real pain on American naval forces creates a complicated political dilemma for the U.S.: is Washington prepared to expend blood and treasure to defend allies and their supply lines in case of a conflict over this area? China is not yet looking to project power globally. It is not actively trying to compete for supremacy with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, or Caribbean Sea. As such, it can concentrate its forces in the South and East China Seas and dedicate its entire naval strategy to the sole purpose of denying the U.S. navy access there. The U.S., meanwhile, has to plan for a global confrontation and then dedicate a portion of its forces to China's home court. Japan may very well hold the balance of power in a potential conflict over the region. Its import dependency is at the core of its national psyche and it would view a Chinese blockade of the South China Sea as an existential threat - not unlike the American threat of oil embargo that precipitated war in the early 1940s. Japan is not likely to go rogue, but it would be a tremendous addition to the American effort, even in a situation where other states refrained from action out of fear. However, while China will see the above as a reason not to initiate armed conflict with the United States, it will not be able to retrench in the South China Sea in the face of domestic nationalism either. These pressures virtually ensure that it is locked into the assertive foreign policy it has pursued over the past ten years. Bottom Line: A simple analysis of the current disposition shows that the military capabilities of the two countries - in this limited theater - are not as disparate as one might think. Both sides have weaknesses: the U.S. is bound to a handful of distant bases and has a global range of obligations and constraints, while China lacks technology, experience, and cooperation among its military branches. Nevertheless, China is approaching full air and sea cover of the area within the Nine Dash Line (Map 1) and is rapidly gaining greater ability through radar and missiles to inflict politically unacceptable damage on the U.S. The U.S.'s interest in the South China Sea is ultimately limited to free passage and the defense of treaty allies. The Trump administration is primed to strengthen the country's rights and deterrence, namely through a large increase in defense spending that focuses heavily on the navy - aiming at a 600-ship fleet - and likely on Asia Pacific. In the context of a massive new assertion of U.S. regional presence and power, it is significant that China has not yet given any concrete indication of slowing down its island reclamation, militarization, or control techniques. Investment Implications BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has been warning clients of the rising risks in the South China Sea, and East China in general, since 2012. However, it has been a challenge to construct an investment strategy based on our view. For starters, it is unclear when the crisis could emerge. It is difficult to know when accidents and miscalculations will happen. What we can say with some degree of certainty, however, is that the window of opportunity for any realistic campaign to reverse the militarization of the disputed islands will probably be closed by the end of this year. By "realistic," we mean operations that would promise control over the disputed territory with a calculated degree of risk and an acceptable degree of casualties. At the same time, the U.S. still has the ability to win a full-blown war with China. We have not addressed scenarios like cutting off China's oil supplies at the Strait of Hormuz, for instance, but have limited our discussion to a conflict in the South China Sea over control of the newly militarized islands. In that context, the American threshold for pain is low and its military advantages are narrowing. We are therefore entering a danger zone now because both China and the U.S. stand at risk of becoming overly assertive in the near future: Chart 9Will Trump Seek Political Recapitalization Via Conflict? China because it has domestic nationalist pressures that the Communist Party needs to vent as the economy slows; The U.S. because it has an unpopular (Chart 9), nationalist leadership that seeks to increase its defense presence in the region and may fall to brinkmanship in order to extract major trade concessions from Beijing. The tail-risk in the South China Sea suggests that global investors should also continue to hedge their exposure to risk assets with exposure to safe-haven assets receptive to geopolitical risk, like gold, Swiss bonds, though perhaps not U.S. Treasuries. The persistence of Sino-American distrust - beyond whatever happy encounter Trump and Xi may have at Mar-a-Lago in April - suggests that Chinese economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated and global financial volatility to rise. U.S.-China tension also feeds our broader narrative of rising mercantilism and protectionism. Investors will want to overweight domestic-oriented economies, consumer-oriented sectors, and small cap companies relative to their export-oriented, manufacturing, and large cap counterparts. We also recommend that EM-dedicated investors be wary about Asian states caught in the middle of de-globalization and vulnerable to geopolitical tail-risks. We are neutral to bearish on South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Our long Vietnam equities trade has been downgraded to tactical. We prefer Thailand and Japan, U.S. allies that are removed from conflict zones (Thailand) or domestically oriented and reflationary (Japan). We are also long China relative to Hong Kong and Taiwan, given the risks of both de-globalization and Chinese political troubles for the latter two. We are bullish on U.S. defense stocks.15 The U.S. defense establishment is conducting extensive reviews of the navy's force structure and future strategic needs - the fleet peaked in 1987 and fell below 300 battle force ships in 2003, but has projected that 355 battle force ships is necessary. This would require a major injection of funds in the coming decade. The Trump administration has endorsed this assessment in principle and is planning a significant increase in defense spending, marked by a requested increase of $50 billion in his first annual budget. Trump has signaled that defense manufacturing, notably shipbuilding, will be one of the ways in which he seeks to boost American manufacturing and jobs. This plays to his blue-collar base of support and could move the needle in battleground states like Virginia. It should be beneficial on the margin for U.S. defense companies.16 Below are our corporate-level recommendations for both EM-dedicated and global investors. The Companies Given the likelihood that tensions in the SCS will continue, and the projected build up in defense spending in both the U.S. and China, EMES recommends investors look to take exposure to defense stocks. We have put together a portfolio of such stocks that is intended to give exposure to the developments between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea. We recommend the following basket of companies: AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK); AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH); AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH); AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH); China Avionics Systems (600372 CH); Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US); General Dynamics Corporation (GD US). The basket consists of four Chinese defense companies, mostly centered around the aviation industry. The choice of listed companies in China is constrained and hence we have been forced to gain exposure through aviation companies rather than naval. We recommend two companies in the U.S. that are involved in military vessel production for the U.S. Navy. We believe that the main ramp-up in defense spending from the U.S. side will come through a significant increase in the number of ships in the Asian region. Chart 10Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AviChina Vs. MSCI EM AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK): Chinese aviation holding company (Chart 10). AviChina is the listed subsidiary of the government-controlled Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). Airbus is another large shareholder, with over 11% of the free float. The company produces dual-purpose aircraft - civil and military -- including helicopters, trainers, parts and components (including radio-electronic), avionics and electrical products and components. AviChina itself is a holding company with a rather complicated structure, which makes it difficult for investors to access its market value. Listed subsidiaries include AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH), China Avionics (600372 CH), AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH) and Hongdu Aviation (600316 CH). In terms of the revenue stream, 49% is generated from whole aircraft production, 28% from engineering services and another 23% from parts and components manufacturing. The company reports semi-annual results. The latest full-year report released on March 15 came out mixed. Revenues were strong, up 39% year over year, but costs accelerated at a faster pace (+45% year over year). Operating income was still strong, growing 12.3% year over year, but margins declined across the board. EBITDA margin contracted by 257 basis points to 9.94%, while operating margin fell by 170 basis points to 7.32%. Despite this, the bottom line still managed to grow by 18.75% year over year. AviChina is currently trading at a forward P/E of 21.2x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 9.5% for the next three years. Chart 11Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Jonhon Optronic Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH): Profiting from growing military and EV spending (Chart 11). A subsidiary of AVIC and AviChina, the company specializes in production of optical and electric connectors (third largest in China), and cable components. Jonhon is unrivalled in the defense market. It profits from rising electronic content and from supplying major components to other parts of the AVIC group, shipbuilders, railways and aerospace. It is also successfully developing its civil offering, specifically for the fast-growing electric vehicle market and the 4G space in the telecoms industry. Looking at the revenue composition, 54% is generated by sales of electric connectors, a further 24% from fiber-optic cables, and 19% from conventional cable and assembly products. As for the civil-military split, the company is expected to receive 60% of total revenues from its civil applications, growing approximately 10% per annum. Jonhon Optronics reported its full-year results on March 15. Revenues saw a strong increase, jumping 23.7% year over year. Cost growth was also higher, though it slowed from the previous year (up 23.8% year over year). This led to an operating profit increase of 19.7%, but slight margin deterioration. EBITDA margin fell by 77 basis points to 16.98%, and operating margin was down 5 basis points to 14.32. On the other hand, profit margins improved to 12.6% (up 54 basis points) as the bottom line grew by 29.8% year over year. Jonhon Optronics is currently trading at a forward P/E of 24.4x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 15.2% for the next three years. Chart 12Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Helicopter Company Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH): AVIC's helicopter arm (Chart 12). As the name already suggests, the company specializes in helicopter production, which accounts for almost 100% of the overall revenue stream. The main helicopters currently marketed are from the AC series, in particular the AC311, AC312 and AC313, the Z series - Z-8, Z-9 and Z-11. We expect further tailwinds for the company stemming from China's future defense budget. The country's helicopter fleet is still only a tenth of the size of the U.S.'s fleet. It will continue to ramp up production. Export contracts will also support revenue growth for AVIC Helicopter Co. With a strong advance on the Asian military helicopter market, the company is looking to expand in the region. Furthermore, we see some promising developments in the civil helicopter space, with Chinese emergency services and the Civil Aviation Administration ramping up demand. The main headwind might come from the transition to new models, with the new production cycle to be in full force in 2018. AVIC Helicopter Co reported full year results on March 15, which came out weaker than expected. Revenues were virtually flat, contracting by 0.3% year over year, while cost of revenue grew 1.3% year over year. Operating income was also stable relative to last year, contracting 0.4% year over year, helped by an operating expense reduction of 12% year over year. Nevertheless, EBITDA margin declined slightly by 19 basis points to 6.77%, while operating margin fell by 131 basis points to 13.99%. A marginally lower income tax in FY16 allowed the firm to eke out 1.3% year-over-year bottom-line growth. AVIC Helicopters is currently trading at a forward P/E of 48.2x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 13.8% for the next two years. Chart 13Performance Since March 2016: ##br## AVIC Aviation Engine Vs. MSCI EM AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH): Sole leader in Chinese engine production (Chart 13). Aviation Engine Corporation is part of the government-controlled Aeroengine Corporation of China (AECC), which was established in August 2016 and contributes just under 50% to Being in a monopolistic position on the Chinese market, the company profits from rising military aircraft procurement and prices. As part of the AECC, the company also receives tailwinds from scale effects within the company as well as cost savings in the supply chain. AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation reported weak full year results on March 16. Revenue slid 5.5% year over year, but management kept costs under control (down 7.3% year over year). Operating expenses grew only marginally (up 5.2% year over year), which left operating profit flat compared to last year. Margin trends have been strong; EBITDA margin improved by 78 basis points to 13.05%, while operating margin grew by 42 basis points to 7.78%. However, high net interest expense depressed the bottom line, which fell 13.3% year over year. At the same time the company managed to decrease its debt level for the fourth year in a row. AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation is currently trading at a forward P/E of 52.0x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 14.4% for the next two years. Chart 14Performance Since March 2016: ##br## China Avionics Systems Vs. MSCI EM China Avionics Systems (600372 CH): Leading developer and producer of avionics equipment (Chart 14). China Avionics Systems is also a subsidiary of AviChina, which controls 43% of the free float. The company is active in R&D, running several research institutes in the fields of radar, aviation and navigation control as well as aviation computers and software. China Avionics enjoys a near-monopoly on the Chinese aviation electronics market, and also controls over 90% of the military market for air data systems. Looking at the revenue breakdown, 80% of total revenues come from military contracts, while it is expected that the share of civil revenues will increase with the development of civil aircraft in the country. Aircraft data acquisition devices contribute the most to overall revenue, at 25% of total, followed by airborne sensors at 15%, auto-pilot systems at 14%, distance-sensing alarm systems at 9.5%, and air data systems at 9%. The company reported full year results on March 16. Revenues experienced a mild increase of 1.9% year over year, while costs increased at the same pace (2% year over year). On the operating side, costs increased by 3% year over year, suppressing income by 1% year over year. EBITDA margin fell 37 basis points to 15.15%, while operating margin contracted 30 basis points to 10.60%. The bottom line contracted 3.5% year over year. China Avionics Systems is currently trading at a forward P/E of 55.0x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 13% for the next two years. Chart 15Performance Since March 2016: ##br## Huntington Ingalls Industries Vs. S&P 500 Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US): Largest listed U.S. military shipbuilder (Chart 15). Initially a part of Northrop Grumman, Huntington was spun off and listed in 2011. Huntington enjoys a monopolistic market position, as over 70% of the current U.S. Navy fleet was designed and built by the company's Newport News or Ingalls divisions in Virginia and Mississippi. Huntington is currently the sole designer, builder and re-fueler of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the U.S. In the nuclear submarines space, the company has one competitor: the Electric Boat unit of General Dynamics. The company also provides a range of services through its Technical Solutions division, centered around fleet support, integrated missions solutions and nuclear and oil and gas operations. Huntington reported full-year results on February 16. Full year revenue was virtually flat (+1% on quarterly basis), while costs increased slightly by 1.6% year over year. The company managed to reduce operating expenses, which fell by 16% to the lowest level since 2010. This helped boost operating profit by 13% year over year. EBITDA margin improved by an impressive 125 basis points to 14.77%, and operating margin was up by 119 basis points to 12.14%. New orders grew by US$5.2 billion, bringing the total pipeline to US$21 billion. The bottom line jumped by 45% year over year, helped by a lower income tax bill and a one-off after-tax adjustment. Huntington Ingalls Industries is currently trading at a forward P/E of 18.1x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 4.2% for the next two years. Chart 16Performance Since March 2016: ##br## General Dynamics Vs. S&P 500 General Dynamics (GD US): Primary contractor for U.S. Navy submarines (Chart 16). General Dynamics is a multinational defense corporation and currently the fourth-largest defense company in the world. The company has four business segments, from which we are mainly interested in the marine systems segment, contributing 25% of overall group revenue. The marine systems segment is represented by General Dynamics' unlisted subsidiary, GD Electric Boat. Electric Boat has long been the main builder of nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy out of Connecticut, and is expected to be one of the main beneficiaries of the U.S. Navy expansion program under the Trump administration. General Dynamics reported full-year results on January 27, which generally came in flat. Revenue fell by a marginal 0.4% year over year (after the adoption of a new revenue-recognition standard), but the company did a good job in managing costs, which contracted by 1% year over year. Operating income grew by 4% year over year, helped by lower operating costs. Margins improved across the board; EBITDA margin went up 45 basis points to 15.19%, while operating margin was up 54 basis points to 13.74%. The bottom line grew 5% year over year. Management seem confident in their guidance through 2020, including detailed but conservative estimates. Especially promising was the good pipeline visibility in the marine segment, driven by the company's Columbia-class submarine sales. General Dynamics is currently trading at a forward P/E of 19.3x, whilst the market estimates an EPS CAGR of 6.5% for the next two years. How To Trade? The GPS/EMES team recommends gaining exposure to the sector through a basket of the listed equities, which would consist of five Chinese companies and two U.S. companies. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): AviChina Industry & Technology (2357 HK); AVIC Jonhon Optronic (002179 CH); AVIC Helicopter Company (600038 CH); AVIC Aviation Engine Corporation (600893 CH); China Avionics Systems (600372 CH); Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII US); General Dynamics Corporation (GD US). ETFs: At current time there is one listed ETF covering the China defense sector: Guotai CSI National Defense ETF (512660 CH); And three listed ETFs covering the U.S. defense sector: iShares U.S. Aerospace & Defense ETF (ITA US); SPDR S&P Aerospace & Defense ETF (XAR US); PowerShares Aerospace & Defense Portfolio (PPA US). Funds: At current time there are no funds with significant defense sector exposure. Please note that the trade recommendation is long-term (1Y+) and based on a straight long trade. We don't see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equally-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To The Investment Case The largest risk to our investment case - leaving aside company-specific risks - would be an unexpected fading away of the tensions in China's near seas, and of China's and America's military spending ambitions. Such a development - which would require a robust diplomatic agreement and an about-face from what the leaders have stated - would hit the weapons producers. Though such a settlement would not necessarily occur overnight, or receive immediate publicity, it would be observable over the course of negotiations between the Trump and Xi administrations. A key event to watch is the upcoming April summit between the two leaders. At the same time, the large momentum in the defense industry (with very long production pipelines), and the very low flexibility of defense budgeting, means that we are comfortable in terms of timing an exit should geopolitical tensions begin to recede. Another risk might come from a slowdown in economic growth in China or the U.S., which could lead to cuts in defense budgets. Nevertheless, in a case of a further escalation in China's near-abroad, we would most likely see defense spending continue to grow despite any weak economic performance, warranted by strategic needs. This is a key dynamic that investors should understand. Strategic distrust between the U.S. and China has worsened since the Great Recession, indicating that the preceding period of strong growth helped keep a lid on U.S.-China tensions. Now the two countries have entered a dilemma in which relations have soured despite their economic recoveries, since both sides are using growth to fuel military development, yet an economic relapse would fuel further distrust. Only a high-level political settlement can break this spiral and such settlements between strategic rivals traditionally require a "crisis." Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was," dated March 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 The United States sent the USS Carl Vinson carrier group to the South China Sea as part of Freedom of Navigation Operations that the Trump administration may intensify; China is involved in a new spat about "environmental" monitoring stations in the Paracel Islands and in Scarborough Shoal, and is also increasing activity east of the Philippines; it is threatening to impose a new law that would govern foreign ships' access; the question of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone lingers; and China has also begun sending large tourist groups to the Paracels. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2017, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013 and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Most notably in 1971, 1974, 1988, 1995, 2001, and 2011-14. In the two biggest "battles," 1974 and 1988, China kicked Vietnamese forces out of the Paracel Islands and parts of the Spratly Islands, respectively. These conflicts took place in the context of Vietnam's wars with itself, the U.S., and China, just as the recent rise in tensions takes place in the context of China's emergence as a global power - in other words, international tensions are the cause and maritime-territorial disputes are but a symptom. 7 Most notably the HS981 showdown between China and Vietnam in 2014, which occurred when China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moved a large mobile drilling rig into the farthest southwest island of the Paracel Islands, near Triton Island, triggering a months-long skirmish with Vietnamese coast guard ships and fishermen that involved Chinese warships and aircraft and the sinking of at least one Vietnamese fishing boat. 8 In fact, officers from China's People's Liberation Army-Navy's southern fleet have recently written publicly and approvingly of the well-known Chinese tactic of fighting "behind a civilian front" to establish control over the sea - which has involved a host of private and public actions covering fishing, energy, coast guard, administration, science and environment, and tourism. Please see "Chinese Military's Dominance in S. China Sea Complete: Report," Kyodo News, March 20, 2017. 9 Please see Bonnie S. Glaser, "Armed Clash In The South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, April 2012, available at cfr.org. Separately, an American diplomatic estimate from 2016 claims that "more than half the world's merchant fleet tonnage" passes through these waters; see Colin Willett, "Statement ... Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee ... 'South China Sea Maritime Disputes,'" July 7, 2016, available at docs.house.gov [http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20160707/105160/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-WillettC-20160707.pdf]. A Chinese study estimates that 47.5% of China's total foreign trade in goods transited the sea in 2014; see Du D. B., Ma Y. H. et al, "China's Maritime Transportation Security And Its Measures Of Safeguard," World Regional Studies 24:2 (2015), pp. 1-10. 10 When President Trump's Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarified remarks at his senate confirmation hearing in which he threatened that the U.S. would deny China's access to the islands in the South China Sea, he reformulated his statement to say that in the event of a contingency the U.S. needed to be "capable of limiting China's access to and use of its artificial islands" to threaten the U.S. and its allies and partners. 11 Please see footnote 3 above. Another potential implication might be a weaker U.S. position in the partition of the Arctic shelf (which has far more hydrocarbon reserves than the South China Sea), which U.S. rivals like Russia will pursue next against the claims of the U.S. and its allies Norway, Canada, and Denmark. 12 Please see Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014). 13 It is understood by multiple sources that these missiles cannot be defended successfully against by current anti-missile technology, with one potential exclusion - the recently tested SM-6 Dual I. Otherwise, possible defense methods would lie in the realm of electronic countermeasures. 14 We believe, with medium conviction, that the incoming administration in South Korea will remove the THAAD missile defense sometime in 2017 or 2018 in what would be a major diplomatic quarrel between Seoul and Washington. This is because the soon-to-be ruling Minjoo Party (Democratic Party) will seek to engage North Korea and mend relations with China, and the latter countries' top demand will be removal of the missile defense system that was only put in place in a rushed manner in the final days of the discredited and impeached Park Geun-hye administration. Such a removal would illustrate the U.S.'s disadvantages relative to China in having to deal with alliances, basing, and force structure in a foreign region. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Joint Special Report, "Brothers In Arms," dated January 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see "2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA)," dated December 14, 2016, and Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2016.

Highlights Tensions are still high between the U.S. and China; China's neighbors are in the line of fire; Korea and Taiwan stand to suffer; We are bullish Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines; We are bearish Indonesia and Malaysia. Feature Over the past two weeks we have taken clients on a tour through Europe, where we think political and geopolitical risks are generally overstated in the short term. This provides ample room for European financial assets to outperform this year.1 This week we turn to Asia Pacific, where the situation is quite different. We see this region as the chief source of geopolitical "Black Swans," mainly due to rising U.S.-China tensions, which we have highlighted since 2012.2 While U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have recently reassured the world that relations will be cooperative and stable, it is far too soon to declare that the two have resolved anything substantial. While we have addressed U.S.-China relations before, it is essential to watch the rest of EM Asia, where proxy battles between the U.S. and China continue to play out.3 If the Philippines shocked the world in 2016 by pivoting away from the U.S. and toward China, South Korea is the country that will do the same in 2017. In this report, we review the opportunities and risks afforded by this regional dynamic. I. Will Trump And Xi Cool Their Heels? Fundamentally, geopolitical risk in Asia Pacific is driven by the "Thucydides Trap," a struggle between the established regional and global power (the United States), and an emerging power that seeks to rewrite the region's geopolitical order (China).4 This dynamic emerged well before President Donald Trump's election.5 Trump is an unpredictable agent thrown into a structural dynamic. His election on an avowed platform of protectionism, his comments singling out China as a U.S. threat, and his break with the U.S. foreign policy establishment all suggest that the secular rise in Sino-U.S. tensions is about to get worse.6 Yet, since taking office, Trump has sent mixed signals. On the one hand, he threatens a policy of isolationism that would see the U.S. withdraw from its global security commitments. On the other hand, he has threatened to escalate geopolitical conflicts in order to get what he wants on business and trade. Table 1Market Implications Of ##br##Trump's Options Toward China As Table 1 illustrates, it is extremely important for investors which of these foreign policies Trump ultimately pursues - nationalist or isolationist - and whether he combines it with the trade protectionism (or mercantilism) that he has threatened. In the short term, the most bullish combination would be the economic status quo with a scaled-down U.S. presence. The most bearish would be mercantilism combined with nationalist foreign policy. Trump's recent interchanges with Xi were notable because for once he adhered to diplomatic protocol. He and Xi gave some initial - and we would add tentative - assurances to the world that Sino-U.S. relations will not explode in a ball of flames this year: Taiwan - Trump reaffirmed the One China Policy, i.e., that Taiwan has no claim to independence from the mainland. Trump's phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in December, and subsequent comments, had put this principle in doubt, raising the prospect of a new Cold War or actual war. North Korea - China has offered to enforce a stringent new set of economic sanctions on North Korea, namely barring coal imports for 2017. This is significant, given the short duration of China's previous punitive measures against the North and the hit that North Korean exports have already suffered from China's slowing economic growth (Chart 1). The Obama administration had begun sanctioning China as a result of its unwillingness to enforce, so with enforcement may come the Trump administration's deactivation of such threats for a time. The RMB - Trump did not accuse China of currency manipulation on "day one" of his administration as he had promised during his campaign, though he has informally called the Chinese the "grand champions" of manipulation.7 This strongly suggests that he will allow the Treasury Department's semi-annual foreign exchange review process to run its course (Diagram 1). On that time frame, the U.S. would issue a warning in the April report and then begin negotiations that legally should take a year. Of course, China does not qualify by the usual measures. Since 2015 it has been propping up its currency rather than suppressing it (Chart 2), and its current account surplus has dropped sharply from 10% to 2% of GDP over the past ten years (though still massive in absolute terms). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - Trump yanked the U.S. out of the major multilateral trade initiative of the Obama administration, which was an advanced trade deal that excluded China and primarily benefited smaller Chinese competitors like Vietnam and Malaysia. Though Trump acted unilaterally - and therefore cannot have gotten any real concessions from China in exchange for killing an "anti-China" trade deal - he avoided the frictions with China that would have resulted over the coming years from implementing the deal. Chart 1Will China Cut Imports From Here? Chart 2The 'Grand Champions' Of Currency Manipulation In addition, the Trump administration is already embroiled in domestic politics with a number of its early actions. Thus it would not surprise us if Trump - exactly like Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush - needed to pacify relations with China despite his early tough talk. Meanwhile President Xi wants stability even more than usual this year as the Communist Party holds its "midterm" five-year National Party Congress. We will return to the party congress in an upcoming report, but for now we will simply reiterate that stability means neither excessive stimulus nor excessive reform (Chart 3). Chinese policymakers could trigger unintended consequences with their financial tightening, but that's why we think they will be exceedingly cautious.8 If Trump does not try to sabotage this politically sensitive year, China should be relatively stable. Chart 3China Wants Stability, Not Speed, Ahead Of Five-Year Party Congress So have U.S.-China ties become bullish all of a sudden? No. At least, not yet. Consider the following: South China Sea still a powder keg - On both sides, the idea of excluding "access" to the sea is being openly discussed, if disavowed.9 While there is conceivably a path for both sides to de-escalate, it will take very tough negotiations, and we are not there yet. Trade fight hasn't even begun - Though previous presidents got sidetracked, Trump was the first to campaign aggressively on a protectionist, anti-China platform, and to put a team in place to pursue that platform.10 We think he will get tough. We also think he will endorse the House Republicans' plan of a Border Adjustment Tax - a tax on imports - which would hurt China most of all as the country with the biggest trade surplus with the U.S.11 Japan is proactive - Japan has virtually no domestic political constraints and has an incentive to play up security threats. Why? Because Prime Minister Abe wants a nationwide popular referendum on revising the constitution to legitimize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.12 And this is not even to mention that Taiwan and the Koreas are still major risks. Structurally, we still see Sino-U.S. tensions as the chief source of geopolitical risk and "Black Swan" events this year that could rattle markets in a very big way. Bottom Line: A modus vivendi between Trump and Xi is conceivable, but the U.S. and China are not out of the woods yet. II. What About The Neighbors? Short of the formidable "left-tail" risk of direct U.S.-China conflict, China's periphery is the chief battlefield and source of risk for investors. Asian EM economies have the most to risk from the reversal of the past decade's trade globalization (Chart 4). Investors also tend to underrate the fact that they are in the thick of the geopolitical risk arising from Sino-U.S. tensions and global "multipolarity" more broadly.13 A look across the region suggests that most Asian EM economies are shifting their policy to become more accommodative with China. This should reduce their geopolitical risk in the short term, though it is too soon to sound the "all clear." We remain strategically short EM stocks relative to DM. Within the EM space, we are bullish on Thailand, less so on the Philippines and Vietnam, and neutral-to-bearish on Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Chart 4De-Globalization Hurts Asia Pacific Most Of All Koreas - Here Comes The Sunshine Policy South Korea is at the center of the U.S.-China struggle as it faces a domestic political crisis, economic pressure from China, rising North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, and a likely clash with the new U.S. administration. First, the Constitutional Court must decide the fate of impeached President Park Geun-hye. The market has rallied since the ruling Saenuri Party turned against her in early December, paving the way for her December 9 impeachment in the assembly. However, the politics of the court makes her removal from office less likely than the market expects, especially if the court does not rule by March 13, when a second judge this year retires from the bench.14 If the impeachment falters, it will lock South Korea into greater political instability throughout the year, at least until the scheduled election on December 20. Chart 5Leftward Policy Shift In South Korea ... However, it is virtually impossible for the Saenuri Party candidate, Acting President Hwang Kyo-Anh, to win the election, despite his fairly strong polling (Chart 5). His party has been discredited and split, and there are now calls for his impeachment as he defends Park from further investigation. The leading contenders are all left-of-center. They are contending in a primary election over how to redistribute wealth, crack down on the Chaebol (corporate conglomerates), engage North Korea, and improve relations with China. These policies are receiving a tailwind because Korean society has seen the economic system shocked by the end of the debt supercycle in the United States and the slowdown in China. Moreover, inequality has been rising in Korea (Chart 6). As in neighboring Taiwanese elections last year, the election is shaping up to be a backlash against the pro-trade and globalization policies of the preceding decade. Korea's share of global exports has increased, and its tech companies are profitable, but the government has engaged in conservative fiscal policies, its workers are overworked and underpaid, and its social safety net is non-existent (Chart 7). Redistribution and reforming the Chaebol could bring serious benefits over the long run, but both will negatively affect corporate profits on the margin. Internationally, improving relations with North Korea and China will mean that the new South Korean government, in H2 of this year or H1 of next, could be on a collision course with the United States and especially Japan. We expect Korea to go its own way for a time, giving the impression globally that another American ally is "pivoting to China" (after the Philippines in 2016).15 While this may seem bullish for Korea, as it did for the Philippines due to the fact that China is a growing economy, Korean exports to the U.S. and Japan are still a significant portion of its total exports (Chart 8). Korea is also constrained by the fact that China is increasingly a trade competitor, and Korea's exports to China mainly consist of goods that China wants to make itself: high-end electronic manufacturing, cars, and car parts. Thus, China will welcome greater ties as it looks for substitutes for the increasingly protectionist West in acquiring technology and expertise, but Korea's new government will see rising fears of economic "absorption" as it attempts to improve access to Chinese markets. Chart 6... As Inequality Has Risen Sharply Chart 7Workers Want More Largesse Chart 8Korea's Balancing Act What are the market implications? South Korea is in a decent place in the short run. Global growth, exports, and corporate earnings are improving, and stock valuations have come down, especially relative to EM. Over the long run, however, we are turning bearish. Korean labor productivity is in a downtrend (Chart 9), its population is not growing, and there is no reservoir of young people left to tap. There are three basic options for securing future growth. First, Korea could become a net investor nation like Japan (Chart 10). However, it is not yet wealthy enough to do so, and needs to build the aforementioned social safety net. Second, South Korea could reunify with the North, which would alleviate its labor force problems, though the costs of reunification would be extreme (Chart 11). Chart 9Reforms On Hold Until New Government Sits Chart 10Korea's Japanese Dream Chart 11Reunification Would Increase Labor Force Third, it could continue on its current path of trying to secure large markets like the U.S. and China, while conducting a balancing act between them as geopolitical tensions rise. The problem right now is that the first two options are not ready and the balancing act is getting too hard, too soon. The South stands to suffer from both protectionism and multipolarity, i.e., being sandwiched between resurgent Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese tensions. Furthermore, the Trump administration has not yet decided whether its North Korea policy will be one of engagement, aggression, or continued neglect. Yet the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment's threat assessment is reaching a level that will cause greater public concern and more demand for action. Until Trump's policy is clear, South Korea's attempts to launch a new "Sunshine Policy" toward eventual reunification will be extremely vulnerable. Over time, North Korea is likely to become more of a black swan than the red herring it has been in the past (Chart 12). Chart 12North Korean Incidents: Mostly Red Herrings Bottom Line: Now is ostensibly a good entry point for Korean stocks relative to EM stocks, but we remain reluctant due to the political and geopolitical factors. Also, the path of least resistance for the Korean won is down, so we recommend going long THB/KRW, discussed further below. Taiwan - "One China" Or More? Our prediction that China-Taiwan relations would deteriorate dramatically, and that Taiwan could be one of five "Black Swans" of 2016, has essentially played out.16 The two sides cut off formal contact, Trump accepted a phone call from the Taiwanese president in a sharp break with U.S.-China convention, and the Taiwanese navy accidentally fired a missile toward the mainland during a drill on the Chinese Communist Party's 95th birthday on July 1. Despite the tensions, hard data coming out of Taiwan have been strong. Its export-oriented economy is buoyed by strong global growth. Both its equities and currency are the few bright spots in the EM universe and investors have been responding positively to the strong data (Chart 13). Yet Taiwan remains highly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, as its economy is "too open," especially to China. China has imposed discrete economic sanctions, as we expected. The number of mainland tourists to Taiwan have dropped by 50% (Chart 14). This trend will continue, hurting consumer sentiment. While Trump has backed away from his threat to break the One China Policy, a move markets view as very reassuring, he cannot unsay his words and China will not forget them. Moreover, his administration will attempt to shore up the U.S.-Taiwan alliance in traditional ways, including with new arms sales that will provoke angrier responses than in the past from Beijing (Chart 15). Chart 13Investors Do Not Fear Independence Talk Yet Chart 14China's Silent Sanctions Chart 15Plenty More To Come Crucially, Taiwan's domestic politics are not a major constraint on its actions, which heightens the risks of a cross-strait "incident." The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in control at almost every level of government on the island. President Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP swept to power on a popular mandate to stall and roll back trade liberalization with China, which the public felt had gone too far under the previous Kuomintang government. Perhaps if Trump had never entered the picture, Taiwan and China would have found a new equilibrium in which Taiwan distanced itself while assuring the mainland it did not seek independence. Now, however, the odds of that solution are declining. Taipei may become overly aggressive if it believes Trump has its back, and this dynamic will ensure continuous Chinese pressures and sanctions, all negative for Taiwanese assets. Bottom Line: Despite the fact that Taiwan's economy has some bright spots (exports, capital formation), we are sticking with our "One China Policy" trade of going long Chinese equities / short Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities. BCA's China Investment Strategy agrees with this call and is shorting Taiwanese stocks relative to its mainland counterparts.17 We expect China to penalize these territories for expressing the desire for greater autonomy. We also suggest going short the Taiwanese dollar versus the Philippine peso, to be discussed further below. Thailand - The Junta's Persistence Is Bullish For most of the past fifteen years, the death of Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej, which occurred on October 13 of last year, was feared as a catalyst for a total breakdown of law and order due to the deep socio-political and regional division in Thai politics that has pitted an urban royalist faction against a rural populist faction. But the 2014 coup was intended to preempt the king's death and ensure that the royalist, pro-military faction held firm control over the country during the risky succession period. The market responded positively during the coup in 2014 and upon the king's death last year (Chart 16). We recommended going long Thai stocks and THB last October, in a joint report with BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy, and both trades are in the black.18 Chart 16Thailand: Investors Cheered The Succession Crisis The junta's strategy has been to root out the leaders of the populist movement and rewrite the constitution to legitimize its ability to intervene in the future. The new monarch has cooperated with the military so far, upholding the status quo, but if at any point he favors the populists to the detriment of the military, political uncertainty will spike from its current historically low levels (Chart 17). The junta is fully in charge for the time being. It has pushed back elections to February 2018 or later, delaying the re-introduction of political instability into the Thai market. It is also surging public spending and transfers to the rural poor to ensure social stability. Historically, strong public capital investment and global exports coincide with strong Thai manufacturing output (Chart 18). Favorable domestic and external macro environments should be bullish for Thai equities, creating a near-term buying opportunity in the Thai market. Chart 17Junta Keeps A Lid On Politics... Chart 18... And Buys Friends With Public Money Thailand is distant from China's quarrels with its neighbors over the South China Sea. It was the first of the U.S. allies to hedge against President Obama's pivot and seek better relations with China instead, a strategy that has paid off. Thailand, like many regional actors, may be forced to choose between China and U.S. at some point, but for now it enjoys the best of both worlds. With a fundamentally strong macro-backdrop, including a large current account surplus of 12% of GDP, we are bullish on Thai assets relative to EM. Bottom Line: Thailand is the most attractive Asian EM economy right now from an investment-oriented geopolitical point of view. It is not too late to go long THB/KRW or long Thai stocks relative to EM. Philippines - The War On Drugs Is A Headwind The Philippines continues to display strong macro-fundamentals and market momentum in the EM universe. However, domestic political risks are significant and prevent us from returning to an overweight stance relative to EM.19 The inauguration of populist southerner Rodrigo Duterte as president of the Philippines in July of last year led the country into a bloodbath that has since claimed over 7,000 lives in a "war on drugs." Only recently has it shown any sign of abating, and it is not clear that it will. The political backlash is gradually building. Duterte's policy preferences are left-leaning and mark a partial reversal of the pro-market, reform orientation of the preceding Aquino government.20 As a result, foreign investment has dropped off from its sharp rise, though it remains elevated (Chart 19). The Philippines may also fall victim to its own success. Due to the booming economy under the Aquino presidency, bank loans and deposits have enjoyed strong growth in recent years. However, the loan-to-deposit ratio is getting overextended and the economy is showing signs of heating up with inflation creeping above 2% in 2016 (Chart 20). Populist policies and the advanced cyclical expansion may add more heat. Thus, it is becoming more likely that monetary policy will tighten as the economy moves into the advanced stage of its cyclical expansion. Duterte could create a problem if at any point he decides to interfere with the central bank or technocratic management of the economy more broadly. In terms of geopolitical risk, Duterte is engineering a pivot away from the United States toward Russia and China, aggravating relations with the former, its chief ally (Chart 21). As relations with China improve, they will bring some investment in infrastructure and a calming of the near seas. Chart 19Duterte Marked The Top Chart 20Credit Is Strong, Inflation Creeping Back Chart 21Duterte's 'Pivot' To Asia Ultimately, however, we view this calming as temporary, since China's assertiveness is a long-term phenomenon. We also think that the fundamental U.S.-Philippine alliance will survive any major disagreements of the Duterte era. Duterte is constrained by his weakness in the Philippine Senate and the popularity of the United States among Filipinos, which is among the highest in the world. In essence, the public is not anti-American but "anti-colonialist" - many feared that the U.S. "Pivot to Asia" of the Obama and Aquino administrations would put the Philippines into a subordinate "colonial" role highly vulnerable to Chinese aggression. Like other U.S. allies in the region, the Philippines wants to be a partner of the U.S. and not just a naval base. Thus, for now, we see the Philippines in a gray area of frictions with the U.S. yet disappointing hopes with regard to China. Until Duterte removes the headline risk to internal stability from his belligerent law and order policies - and compromises on his more anti-market economic stances - we are at best open to tactical possibilities. Bottom Line: Considering its strong macro-fundamentals, advanced cyclical expansion, and politically driven uncertainty, we are only willing to entertain short-term, tactical opportunities in the Philippines. Now is a decent entry point for equities relative to EM. Also, our colleagues at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy point out that the peso is currently trading at a 10% discount.21 We recommend going long the peso versus the Taiwanese dollar to capitalize on the dynamics outlined for both countries above. Indonesia - A Dream Deferred Indonesia outperformed our expectations throughout 2016.22 President Joko Widodo ("Jokowi") managed to corral his party behind him despite an internal leadership struggle. And the large bureaucratic party, Golkar, joined his coalition in parliament, creating a strong legislative majority. These were our two preconditions for a more effective government; Jokowi has also found allies within the military, as we surmised. As a result, he managed to make some progress on his tax-raising, union-restraining, and infrastructure-building initiatives. Nevertheless, the market has sniffed out the difference between a pro-reform government and the enormous difficulties of pulling off reform in Indonesia. Long-term investment has fallen even as short-term portfolio investment has rallied on the back of the EM reflation trade (Chart 22). While Jokowi reduced the size of costly domestic fuel subsidies in his first year, it was easy to do so amid the oil-price collapse in 2014. Since then, Indonesian retail gasoline prices have remained subdued, indicating that subsidies are still significant. As the global oil prices continue increasing, so will the subsidy (Chart 23), adding to the country's budget deficit. Jokowi also put forth minimum-wage reforms in 2015, introducing a formula which requires the minimum wage to be adjusted every year based on inflation and economic growth (rather than ad hoc negotiations with local unions and governments). Predictably, wages have skyrocketed since the indexing policy was implemented, which is negative for profit margins (Chart 24). Chart 22Investors Skeptical Of Jokowi's Reforms Chart 23Fuel Subsidies Still In Effect Chart 24No Wage Rationalization Yet Indonesia is on the outskirts of China's claims in the South China Sea and has a domestically driven economy that should suffer less than that of its neighbors in a context of de-globalization. In that sense, we are inclined to view it favorably. However, its currency is at risk from twin deficits - current account and budgetary reforms have stalled, and the credit impulse is weakening. If Jokowi's favored candidate wins the heavily contested gubernatorial run-off in Jakarta in April, it will not be very bullish, but a loss would be bearish for Jokowi's reform agenda ahead of the 2019 elections. Bottom Line: We are still short Indonesia within the EM space - its underperformance since the second half of last year can persist. Vietnam - No American Guarantee Vietnam is highly vulnerable to a geopolitical conflict with China which would impact markets. Unlike the Philippines and Thailand, it cannot count on an underlying bedrock of American defense to anchor its pivot toward China - and yet, it has the greatest historical and territorial conflicts with China of all the Southeast Asian states. Chart 25Fighting In The Teeth Of The Dragon Nevertheless, in the short term, geopolitical risks are abating. Relations have improved since a recent low point in 2014.23 And Vietnamese leaders, having invested heavily in the TPP as the trade pact's biggest potential beneficiaries, are trying to make amends with China now that it is canceled. Thus, we remain long Vietnamese equities relative to EM. This is mostly due to the country's strong domestic demand and export competitiveness (Chart 25), attractive environment for foreign investment, and ability to capitalize on diversification away from China. The country's reforms are not perfect, but it has at least recognized NPLs and begun privatizing some SOEs. Bottom Line: We are sticking with long Vietnamese equities versus EM, though downgrading it to a tactical trade due to our wariness of a turn for the worse in China relations or the broader trade environment. Malaysia - Going To The Pawnshop Malaysia, with Vietnam, was to be the top beneficiary of the TPP. It, too, has lost greater access to the U.S. market that the deal would have provided and must now make amends with China. The latter process has already begun, as Malaysia's government has turned to China for a $33 billion deal in exchange for energy assets and valuable land in the state of Johor. The general election of 2013 and the economic slowdown have catalyzed domestic political divisions, especially ethnic and religious ones, igniting a drastic push over the past two years to have Prime Minister Najib Razak ousted for his alleged embezzlement of funds from the state-owned 1MDB corporation. Najib chose to crack down on the opposition and ride out the storm, which he has managed so far, causing unprecedented political instability. Najib's decision to sell land to the Chinese will not sit well with much of the Malay population. Many will see it as undignified; and historically, there is much animosity toward the local Chinese. Najib already faces an intense political struggle due to the exodus of high-ranking politicians from his ruling United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Former strongman leader Mahathir Mohammad and ex-Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin are leading the defectors to form a new Malay party that will pose a serious challenge in the 2018 elections. Recent flirtation between the ruling UMNO and the Islamist Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS) also injected new uncertainty into the already turbulent domestic political environment. In essence, the one-party state that investors once knew (and loved) is forming new factions that will contest the upcoming elections with abandon. Chart 26Growth Slowing, Credit Drying Up This struggle over the 2018 election promises to be emphatically unfriendly to investors. And until Najib gets a new mandate, he can do very little to arrest the economic breakdown. As long as the support and continuity of Najib's policies are in question, it is difficult to take a directional view of Malaysian assets. A victorious UMNO does not mean that investors should be bullish, but it will resolve the question of "Who is in charge?" At that point, we can reassess the market attractiveness based on the higher "certainty" of the policy preferences of the country. Meanwhile the constraints to Malaysia's economy are clear from a host of weak data, from domestic trade to the property market to the current account and the currency, along with a rise in NPLs that will undermine the inadequately provisioned banks' willingness to lend (Chart 26). While palm oil and petroleum prices have recovered, which is positive for Malaysian markets, this is not enough to outweigh the negative factors. Bottom Line: We are bearish on Malaysian assets and currency. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "A Fat-Tails World," dated February 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Looming Conflict In The South China Sea," dated May 29, 2012, available at gis.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?" The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, available at www.theatlantic.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9 In the short time since Trump's and Xi's phone call, the U.S. has announced that it intends to intensify the Freedom of Navigation Operations around the rocks in the South China Sea to assert its rights of navigation and overflight. Meanwhile Chinese lawmakers have revealed that they want to pass a new maritime law by 2020 that would encourage maritime security forces to bar foreign ships from passing through Chinese "sovereign" waters if they are ill-intentioned. 10 Trump's Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin was only just confirmed by the Senate and could not have taken any significant action yet. His appointees, notably Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, are China hawks. If not currency, Trump's team will rotate the negotiations to focus on China's capital controls and failure to liberalize the capital account, its lackadaisical cuts to industrial overcapacity, and the negative business environment for U.S. firms. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?" dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 The first nationwide evacuation drill in the event of a North Korean missile attack will take place sometime in March of this year. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Bringing the total number of judges from nine to seven, and thus reducing the threshold for a vote in favor of retaining Park in office from four to two, for constitutional reasons. All but one of the judges were appointed by Park or her party's predecessor. 15 For instance, if the new administration reverses the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, it will provoke a crisis with the U.S., but if it does not, China will continue its underhanded economic sanctions on the South, and the new South Korean president's North Korean policy will be stillborn. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, and "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Taiwan's 'Trump' Risk," dated February 2, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see "Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 For instance, he is imposing controls on the mining sector that will scare away investors, in an echo of Indonesia's mining fiasco implemented since 2013, and he is working on eliminating a "contract worker" system that enables employers to avoid the costs of full-time hiring. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models," dated February 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Stick To Long Modi / Short Jokowi," dated November 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Vietnam has moved toward better crisis management with China since the HYSY-981 incident in 2014, when a clash broke out over a mobile Chinese oil rig in the South China Sea. Significantly, the Vietnamese Communist Party's leaders removed former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the highest-ranked China hawk and pro-market reformer on the Politburo, in the January 2016 leadership reshuffle.

Highlights Three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors appear complacent. Foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks has reached a new record high. Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares. Feature Taiwan's economy and financial markets have shown remarkable resilience of late. Last week's advance GDP release confirmed that the Taiwanese economy continued to accelerate in the final quarter of the year. The Taiwanese dollar (TWD) is among the few currencies that have strengthened since early last year, not only in trade-weighted terms but also against the mighty greenback. Taiwanese stocks have been a bright spot in the emerging market universe, which has been plagued with structural challenges and political instability in recent years. Taiwan's remarkable strength of late is notwithstanding the sudden deterioration in its relationship with mainland China since the DPP party regained power last year, and more recently brewing trade tensions among the major global economies kicked off by the Trump Administration. This highlights the growing disconnect between Taiwan's macro outlook and its financial asset performance, offering a particularly poor risk-return profile. We remain underweight Taiwan among the greater China bourses, and recommend a short position in the TSE versus Chinese H shares. Macro Risks Are Rising... In a nutshell, three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. First, Taiwan is among the most open economies in the world, and will suffer disportionally in any disruption in global trade (Chart 1). Although having fallen sharply since the global financial crisis, exports of goods and services still account for over 60% of Taiwan's GDP, among the highest of the major economies. Therefore, Taiwan's growth outlook is almost completely dictated by global demand, making it particualrly vulnerable at times of rising global uncertainty. Indeed, Taiwan's growth acceleration since mid-last year has been entirely driven by a synchronized acceleration in overseas demand. Both China and the U.S. have been strengthening, which will likely continue to support Taiwan's growth outlook in the near term.1 However, the strength in the Taiwanese currency is worrisome, as the exchange rate has historically been tightly correlated with overseas new orders and domestic producer prices. Chart 2 shows that the strong TWD has the potential to lead to a sudden deterioration in deflation as well as new export orders. Chart 1Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Chart 2TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports Second, the cross-strait relationship has already deteriorated notably, and a vicious feedback loop appears to be developing. On the one hand, the Chinese authorities are worried that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen will not uphold the "1992 Consensus" that forms the foundation of cross-straight integration,2 and will step up efforts to contain her "pro-independence" initiatives. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government, faced with increasing pressure from the mainland, feels the urge to reach out to a broader global audience, which in turn may be perceived by Beijing as provocative. President Tsai's controversial phone call with Donald Trump, her stop-over visit to the U.S. en route to South America and the attendance of the government's delegation to President Trump's inauguration have only further reinforced Beijing's suspicion - and propelled forward a self-feeding negative dynamic in the cross-strait relationship that is difficult to reverse. The consequence of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan is unimaginably costly, and still extremely unlikely. However, the economic ties between the two will continue to cool. A telltale sign is that number of mainland Chinese visitors to Taiwan has already dropped precipitously since early last year, causing visible stress in Taiwan's tourism industry (Chart 3). Furthermore, exports to China account for over 40% of total Taiwanese exports, far higher than to any other market, and its trade surplus with China accounts for 5% of Taiwanese GDP - both of which are at risk should cross-strait tensions continue to rise (Chart 4). Moreover, the deteriorating relationship with the mainland is also hurting domestic confidence. Chart 5 shows that Taiwanese consumer confidence has historically been tightly linked with stock market performance, but a widening gap has developed since early last year when stocks began to rebound but confidence continued to weaken, which we suspect is to some extent attributable to the DPP party's dealings with the mainland. Weakening confidence bodes poorly for consumption, making the economy even more vulnerable to external shocks. Chart 3Cross - Strait Relationship ##br##Has Cooled Sharply Chart 4China Trade ##br##Is Crucial For Taiwan Chart 5Cooling China - ties##br## Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Finally, tensions between China and the U.S. are bound to rise under President Trump, and Taiwan may fall victim to the "clash of the Titans." Trump has openly questioned the "One China" policy that fundamentally underpins the Sino-U.S. relationship. John Bolton, a top adviser to President Trump, has even recommended positioning U.S. troops in Taiwan to counter the mainland. It is likely that Trump is using the "Taiwan card" as a bargaining chip to win concessions from China on trade-related issues.3 However, these remarks are dangerously provocative. Any miscalculation could lead to a drastic escalation in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the Taiwanese economy will suffer profoundly. Even if trade tensions are contained between China and the U.S., Taiwan will also suffer because it is a critical part of the highly complex and integrated supply chain in the global technology and electronics industries. It is premature and overly alarmist to predict any "war-like" scenario, but stakes are exceedingly high for Taiwan, and any move in this direction should be monitored extremely carefully. ...But Investors Appear Complacent Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors still appear comfortable in Taiwanese stocks. Foreign capital has continued to flock to Taiwan, despite gloomy sentiment among global investors on emerging markets overall. Net foreign purchases of Taiwanese stocks, historically tightly linked with fund flows to U.S. emerging market mutual funds, have rebounded sharply, while EM mutual fund sales have weakened, a rare divergence historically (Chart 6). Cumulative foreign net purchases of Taiwanese stocks have pushed foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks to 37%, a new all-time high (Chart 7). Foreign fund flows have been a key reason behind the relative strength of both Taiwanese stocks and its exchange rate of late. Chart 6Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Chart 7Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Granted, Taiwan's macroeconomic conditions are largely stable, characterized by its massive current account surplus, small fiscal deficit and low government debt - which make it stand out in an otherwise perilous, crisis-prone EM world. However, we suspect large foreign flows to Taiwan in recent years are also due to the tech-heavy nature of its stock market. Chart 8 shows the relative performance of global tech stocks bear a strong resemblance to Taiwan's relative performance against the EM benchmark after the global financial crisis. In other words, investors are largely attracted to the Taiwanese market as a way to play the global tech rally rather than because of any specific macro factors unique to Taiwan. This also means that investors could be blindsided by any escalation of trade or geopolitical tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the large percentage of foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks risks a disorderly unwinding and sudden exodus - and an ensuing sharp spike in volatility. The last episode of military tension between Taiwan and the mainland in the mid-1990s offers the only precedent in terms of how financial markets might respond. China reacted to the U.S. visit of Taiwan's then President Lee-Teng-hui with aggressive saber-rattling by mobilizing troops and firing missiles, which led to the "third Taiwan Strait Crisis" (Chart 9). Even though the crisis officially lasted from July 1995 to March 1996, Taiwanese stocks tumbled well in advance when the tensions first began to emerge. In fact, the crisis itself, and the resolution of it, marked the bottom in Taiwanese stock prices. Chart 8Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Chart 9The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension Long H Shares, Short Taiwan Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable bourse in the Greater China region. A short position of the TSE versus Chinese H shares offers an attractive risk-return profile. Chinese stocks have long been punished by various macro concerns, and are likely under-owned by global investors. Investor sentiment on Taiwan, on the other hand, appear to be unduly complacent, and Taiwanese stocks have likely been overweighted and over-owned. Chinese stocks are much less exposed to global trade than their Taiwanese counterparts. Even though tech stocks are the largest sectors for both markets, the largest Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu are mainly software and service providers, and derive the majority of their revenue from the domestic market.4 In contrast, Taiwanese tech companies, also the largest constituents in the Taiwanese index, such as TSMC, Hon Hai and Largan, are all hardware producers, and are overwhelmingly dependent on the global market, making them more vulnerable to any disruption in global trade flows. Valuations of Taiwanese stocks are not particularly demanding by global comparison, but they are trading at a premium to their mainland peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Moreover, the recent improvement in Taiwanese earnings will be tested, given the strength of the TWD and deterioration in terms of trade (Chart 11). Historically, Taiwanese earnings have been highly cyclical and prone to sharp swings, led by global business cycles. Technically speaking, the multi-year underperformance of Chinese investable shares against the Taiwanese market has become very advanced and appears to have formed an enduring bottom (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 10Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: ##br##Valuation And Technical Perspective Chart 11Taiwanese Earnings Improvement##br## Will Be Tested Bottom Line: Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares as a trade. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The "1992 Consensus" refers to the outcome of a meeting in 1992 between China and Taiwan's then ruling party KMT. The terms means that both sides recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but both sides agree to interpret the meaning of that one China according to their own definition. 3,4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard," dated January 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and India this week, and as such there will be no regular Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the Middle East has reached a stable equilibrium, as much as is possible, and will not drive the news or markets in 2017. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights The Middle East is not a major geopolitical risk in 2017. Saudi-Iranian and Russo-Turkish tensions will de-escalate, for now. The OPEC production cut will go through; oil prices will average $55/bbl in 2017. Geopolitical risk continues to rotate to the Asia Pacific region. Trump, Iranian elections, and Iraqi instability pose risks to the view. Feature The Middle East has dominated the news flow for the past five years, for good reason. The carnage in Syria and Iraq is tragic and reprehensible. However, the investment relevance of the various regional conflicts is dubious. For all the attention paid to the rise of the Islamic State, we would remind clients that the group's conquest of Iraq's second-largest city Mosul in June 2014 did not cause a spike in oil prices but rather marked the end of the bull market (Chart 1)! From an investment perspective, the only dynamic worth watching in the Middle East is the "Great Game" between regional actors, which have been looking to fill the vacuum left by America's dramatic geopolitical deleveraging (Chart 2). The U.S. strategy is permanent and driven by global interests, namely the rise of China and the need to shift resources towards East Asia. Given the incoming Trump administration's laser focus on China, we expect that the U.S. will remain aloof from the Middle East. Chart 1Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Chart 2While The U.S. Military Deleverages... Does the recent détente between Russia and Turkey in Syria, and between Iran and Saudi Arabia over OPEC production cuts, signal that the Middle East has finally found geopolitical equilibrium? We tentatively think the answer is yes. This will reduce the importance of the region as the primary source of geopolitical risk premia, which BCA's geopolitical strategists have expected to shift to Asia for some time.1 Saudi-Iranian Tensions Are On Ice Chart 3...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up Since the U.S. decision to deleverage from the region in 2011, Saudi Arabia has leveraged up, becoming one of the world's largest arms purchasers and involving itself overtly and covertly in several regional conflicts in the process (Chart 3). Saudi insecurity deepened following President Barack Obama's decision to leave no troops in Iraq. The last U.S. soldier of the main occupation force left Iraq on December 18, 2011. The very next day, on December 19, Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran, issued an order for the arrest of the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. The move by al-Maliki set off what essentially became a civil war in the country, with the Sunni minority eventually turning to ever-more radicalized militant groups for protection. From the Saudi perspective, Iraq is a vital piece of real estate as it is a natural buffer between itself and its Shia rival Iran. While the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy, based in Bahrain, continues to guard against any Iranian incursion via the Persian Gulf, there is very little space between the Saudi oil fields and Iran if Iraq falls into Iran's orbit. The subsequent five years saw Iran and Saudi Arabia fight several proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These included direct military action by Iran in Iraq and Syria against Saudi-backed militants and by Saudi Arabia in Yemen against Iranian-backed militants. It also included oil politics, with Saudi Arabia announcing in November 2014 that it was ending years of its price-setting strategy. These strategies ultimately proved to be unsustainable and BCA's Geopolitical Strategy called the peak in Saudi-Iranian tensions in February 2016.2 Why? First, because oil prices collapsed! Geopolitical adventurism is a luxury afforded to those with the means to pursue adventures. The combination of low oil prices, domestic social outlays, and an expensive war in Yemen forced Saudi Arabia to burn through $220 billion of its foreign reserves between July 2014 and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of its central-bank holdings!3 There is a relationship between high oil prices and aggressive foreign policy in oil-producing states (Chart 4). Political science research shows that the relationship is not spurious. As Chart 5 illustrates, petrol states led by revolutionary leaders are much more likely to engage in militarized international disputes.4 This relationship is particularly pronounced when oil sells at above $70 per barrel. At that price, oil producing states become more prone to disputes than non-oil states, regardless of leadership qualities. Second, Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen proved to be a disaster. The kingdom intervened in March 2015 to reinstate the democratically elected President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been removed from power by Iranian-linked Houthi rebels. The real reason for the intervention was for the Saudis to gauge their war-making capabilities, test their recently purchased military equipment, and put a check on Iranian influence in the region. A quick, successful war in Yemen would have been a template for future interventions in Iraq and Syria on behalf of Sunni allies, and would have cemented Saudi Arabia's position as a regional power in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy warned, however, defeating the experienced Houthis would not be easy and Saudi Arabia would ultimately hesitate to commit to a land war.5 The intervention has resulted in disaster for Saudi Arabia on several levels: Houthis remain in control of the capital Sana'a and largely the same territory that encompassed the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen); The Saudis, desperate for a ground-force presence, have turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's and ISIS's control of almost a third of the country in the south and coastal regions; Saudi forces have taken considerable losses, including some high-tech and high-priced items; The conflict has exposed severe military deficiencies, from the low level of strategic and tactical planning of senior staff, to the poor communication of units at the middle level, to the pervasive low morale and training of the rank-and-file. The biggest loss for Saudi Arabia has been that of leadership. What began as a pan-Sunni intervention led by Riyadh, with considerable involvement by the UAE and Egypt, has seen the Saudis lose almost all their allies. The UAE removed its troops in mid-2016 (in somewhat of a diplomatic spat with Riyadh) and Egypt has subsequently held military exercises with Russia, a Saudi rival in the region, and decided in December to provide military advisors to the Syrian Arab Army. All the talk about a "Sunni NATO" is over. Saudi Arabia's experience in Yemen, combined with the decline in its currency reserves, forced it to come to terms with reality, and eventually agree to an oil production cut with Russia and Iran. Thus it took Saudi Arabia exactly five years, from the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, to realize the limits of its regional power. Bob Ryan, Senior Vice President of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, correctly forecast the OPEC cut and expects the deal to be successfully implemented in 2017.6 One reason Bob is confident is that both Saudi Arabia and Russia are looking to privatize their energy sector significantly by 2018. Russia has sold 19.5% of Rosneft and the Saudis want to conduct an IPO of 5% of their state-owned oil company Aramco. It makes no sense to do this IPO in an environment of low oil prices. Furthermore, sovereign debt issuance to cover budget deficits will become cheaper when oil prices are higher. Geopolitics are aligning with Bob's view as well. Saudi Arabia's attempt to counter Iranian influence in the region has failed both militarily and via oil politics. Riyadh is focusing inwards, on its "Vision 2030" reforms, which will entail considerable domestic upheaval as a result of its comprehensive effort to remove the ultra-conservative religious establishment from power.7 This is now coming to light, with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently announcing harsh punitive measures for any cleric who incites or resorts to violence against the reform agenda. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia's bid for regional hegemony is over, at least for now. The country is focusing inwards, on long-term political and social reforms and economic diversification. Its efforts to bring Iran to heel with low oil prices and with direct military confrontation in Yemen have failed. The oil production-cut deal between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia should hold as a result of the de-escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions and the socio-economic priorities of all three states. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service is overweight energy relative to other commodities as a result.8 Is The Russia-Turkey Détente Sustainable? Turkey and Russia have concluded a political and military détente in Syria with surprising speed. This has made one of our major geopolitical risks for 2017 - a Turkish-Russian confrontation over Syria - already obsolete. Much as with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has had a bite of regional hegemony, did not like the bitter taste, and has decided to make a deal with its rivals instead. For Turkey, the real concern over the past five years has been American inaction in Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent a lot of political capital opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He had hoped that a successful revolution would create a new client state for Turkey, yielding Turkey overland access to Persian Gulf energy sources. Erdogan was therefore beyond dismayed when President Barack Obama failed to intervene in Syria in 2013 following Assad's use of chemical weapons. The chronology of what happened next is important: Russia intervened two years later, in September 2015, to stem the progress of anti-Assad rebels and save the regime from collapse. Two months later, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 was shot down by Turkish F-16s in the Turkey-Syria border area. Turkey and Russia broke relations for a while, but tensions did not escalate. Ankara faced a coup attempt in mid-July 2016, which the ruling party linked to the U.S.-based Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen. The Obama administration refused to extradite Gülen without concrete evidence of his involvement. By late July, Turkish officials were calling Russia a "friendly neighbor" and a "strategic partner." In early August, Erdogan met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, after issuing a letter with an apology to the family of the shot-down pilot. Then, on August 24, Turkey invaded Syria. The military intervention, dubbed "Operation Euphrates Shield," was officially launched to fight the Islamic State, a common pretext these past three years. Erdogan officially stated that he also aimed to fight Assad's regime, but this appeared to put Ankara and Moscow back on collision course, and statements from the Turkish side have since been "corrected." The real reason for the intervention was not to fight ISIS or Assad, but rather to curb the gains made by the various Kurdish militias on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In particular, Ankara intervened to prevent the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) - the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, which is affiliated with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party - from linking up with its now vast territory held in the north of Syria (Map 1). The territory, which our map shows has expanded considerably as the YPG has claimed mostly Islamic State-held areas, is split between Rojava, the main territory east of the Euphrates river, and the Afrin enclave near the Mediterranean Sea. For Turkey, the proximity of such a vast Kurdish-held territory so close to its own Kurdish southeastern region presents a national-security nightmare. The operation's strategic goal was to capture Al-Bab, the stronghold of the Islamic State in northern Syria and a strategic point between the two YPG-held swaths of territory. However, it has taught the Turks that they have no experience fighting a prolonged battle, especially against local insurgents and militants who know the region. Since the first attack on Al-Bab's western part, the Turkish army has suffered three defeats and retreated to initial positions. With Turkey stuck in Al-Bab, the Russian air force has now begun to bomb Islamic State positions to help their tentative new ally. This level of operational coordination is notable and important. It suggests that Turkey, a NATO member state, is now reliant on Russian air strikes for ground support rather than on American sorties flying out of NATO's air base in Incirlik, Turkey. Turkey even claims that U.S. presence in Incirlik is obsolete if it receives no help from the U.S. Air Force around Al-Bab. How sustainable is the Turkey-Russia détente? We suspect it will be quite sustainable, at least in the short term. Ankara has moved away from demands for Assad to step down, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmus, recently stating that Turkey would not "impose any decision" on the Syrian people regarding future leadership. The assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey also failed to derail Russo-Turkish cooperation. Beyond the short term, however, the question remains what Turkey intends to do about Kurdish gains, which are considerable in both Syria and Iraq. The town of Manbij, for instance, is strategically located west of the Euphrates and was supposed to be ceded to Turkey by the Kurds. The situation could grow even more complicated for Turkey as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq may proclaim independence after the Islamic State stronghold of Mosul is liberated in early 2017.9 The YPG in Syria could then ask to join their fellow Kurds in Iraq in forming a unitary state. Although unlikely, this scenario is probably on Turkey's mind, as it would mean that the Kurds inside Turkey may intensify their anti-government insurgency. Note, however, that this scenario does not bother Russia. As far as Moscow is concerned, it has succeeded in keeping Assad in power, its Syrian naval base in Tartus is secure, and it has proven its ability to project power outside of its immediate sphere of influence (Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, and the Caucasus), thus advertising its "Great Power" status. Bottom Line: For the time being, the Russian-Turkish détente will hold. The real risk is not a Turkish-Russian confrontation, but rather a wider Turkish engagement in both Syria and Iraq against the Kurds sometime in the future. We suspect that the Turkish military experience in Syria may make the Turks think twice about engaging in a large-scale war against the Kurds across three states. But given the erratic policymaking out of Ankara in recent years, it is difficult to say this with any confidence. The geopolitical risk of Turkish imperial overreach will continue to weigh on Turkish assets in 2017. Risks To The Sanguine View There are many reasons why investors should stay up at night in 2017, but the Middle East is not one of them. The process of U.S. deleveraging from the region has been painful and costly (from a human perspective especially), but it has ultimately forced regional powers to figure out how to carve out the leftover space between them. There are a few questions left to answer, starting with the Kurdish question. But, for the most part, we do not expect to see the major players - Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, or Israel - come to blows with each other. There are three major risks to this sanguine view. The U.S. Is Back! The current semi-stable equilibrium will definitely be thrown off track if the Trump administration decides to sink its teeth fully into the Middle East. We expect President-elect Donald Trump to authorize greater military action against the Islamic State, including more intense air strikes. However, this is not a qualitative reversal of Obama's deleveraging policy. A real reversal would be if Trump decided to follow the advice of Iran hawks in his government - of whom there are several - and increase tensions with Tehran. This is unlikely, given Trump's focus on China and his willingness to improve ties with Russia, a nominal ally of Iran. In fact, there has been almost no talk of Iran from either President-elect Trump or any of his advisors since the election. Furthermore, while U.S. oil imports from OPEC are no longer declining, they are still massively down since their peak in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). It is unlikely that Trump will commit resources to a region of diminishing importance to U.S. interests. Change Of Guard In Tehran. While the risk of Washington saber-rattling with Iran is overstated, what happens if the moderate President Hassan Rouhani is defeated in the upcoming May election? Hardliners are arguing that the nuclear deal with the West has done nothing for the economy, the main pillar of Rouhani's 2013 platform. This is not true. Headline inflation ticked up in late 2016, but remains well off the 40% levels in 2013, while GDP growth has been in the black throughout Rouhani's term, and net exports have bottomed (Chart 7). However, the flow of FDI into the country has been tepid, probably due to ongoing uncertainty with the government transition in the U.S. Both European and Asian businesses are waiting to see if the incoming Trump administration wants to revive sanctions. Meanwhile, skirmishes between U.S. and Iranian vessels - purportedly controlled by the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - have increased in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the hardliners in Tehran are hoping that they can bait the hardliners in D.C. into a pre-election confrontation that sinks Rouhani. Iraqi Instability. Although the Iraqi government is set to take over Mosul from the Islamic State some time in Q1 2017, the fact remains that the country is bitterly divided between Sunnis and Shia amidst sluggish oil revenues. While the production cut deal will raise revenues marginally, revenues will still be well below their highs (Chart 8). Defeating the Islamic State militarily is one thing, but the real challenge is for Baghdad to reintegrate the Sunni population, which largely lives in territory devoid of oil production. A renewal of civil strife and terrorism targeting Iraqi civilians, which could happen as the Islamic State militants blend back into the wider population, may be a risk in 2017. Chart 6U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low Chart 7Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Chart 8Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs A word on Israel may also be in order. Israel has not played a major geopolitical role in the region for the past five years and we suspect it will not in the next five. It is secure from its neighbours, who cannot match it in terms of military capability, and remains preoccupied with domestic politics and internal security. Meanwhile, the days when the region unified against Israel are over. Sectarian and ethnic conflicts have gutted Israel's traditional enemies. And former foes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are now close allies. The one geopolitical threat that remains is Iran. However, that threat remains dormant as long as Israel maintains nuclear supremacy over Iran and as long as the U.S. remains a security guarantor for Israel. We do not see either changing any time soon. Investment Implications The main investment implication of our thesis that the Middle East has found a new equilibrium is that the region will not dominate the news flow in 2017. Short of a major Turkish blunder in Syria and Iraq, we see the current status quo largely frozen in place. Saudi Arabia appears to have conceded, for now at least, its inferior place in the geopolitical pecking order. Investors have plenty of things to worry about in 2017, such as general de-globalization, a potential Sino-American trade war, geopolitical tensions in East Asia, and elections in four of the five largest euro-area economies. Our geopolitical team's long-standing thesis that geopolitical risk is rotating out of the Middle East and into East Asia is therefore fully playing out.10 Chart 9KSA-Russia Production ##br##Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories In the near term, the geopolitical equilibrium should allow Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia to maintain their six-month agreement to cut production by up to 1.8 million b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 million b/d from OPEC, 300,000 b/d from Russia, and another 300,000 b/d from other non-OPEC producers. The goal of this agreement is to reduce global oil inventories to more normal levels, which our commodity strategists believe will happen by the end of 2017 (Chart 9). Bob Ryan, of the Commodity & Energy Strategy, forecasts U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl in 2017. The incoming Trump administration will focus its Middle East policy on cooperating with regional actors against the Islamic State. Investors should expect to see more American "muscle" dedicated to the fight, perhaps at the risk of causing civilian casualties (which the Obama White House was careful to avoid). The downside of this strategy is that as the Islamic State loses its territory and ceases to be a caliphate, it will revert to being a more conventional terrorist organization. Its foreign fighters may return home to Europe, Russia, and elsewhere, while home-grown militants will seek to sow further Sunni-Shia discord, especially in Iraq. Unfortunately, this trend will keep our thesis of "A Bull Market For Terror" intact, which lends support to U.S. defense stocks.11 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Middle East: Saudi-Iran Tensions Have Peaked," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 According to the estimates of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Cullen S. Hendrix, "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior," Peterson Institute for International Economics, dated July 2014, available at iie.com. According to Hendrix, revolutionary leaders are "leaders who come to power by force and attempt to transform preexisting political and economic relationships, both domestically and abroad." The definition is broad and includes leaders who used force in order to gain prominence. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Does Yemen Matter?" dated March 26, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Emerging Market Equity Sector Strategy, "MENA: Rise Early, Work Hard, Strike Oil," dated October 4, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see P. Ronzheimer, C. Weinmann, and K. Mössbauer, "Kurden Brauchen Mehr Deutsche Abwehrraketen," Bild, dated October 28, 2016, available at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/mossul/kurden-brauchen-dringend-milan-systeme-48495330.bild.html. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades