Yield Curve

GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense

Executive Summary Our recommended model bond portfolio outperformed its custom benchmark index by +24bps in Q2/2022, improving the year-to-date outperformance to a solid +72bps. The Q2 outperformance came entirely from the credit side of the portfolio (+35bps), led by underweights to US investment grade corporates (+28bps) and EM hard currency debt (+24bps). The rates side of the portfolio was down slightly (-11bps), with gains from underweights in US and UK inflation-linked bonds (a combined +24bps) helping offset the hit from overweights to German and French government bonds (a combined -30bps). Looking ahead, we continue to see more defensive positioning in growth-sensitive credit sectors like US investment grade corporate bonds and EM hard currency debt, rather than duration management, as providing the better opportunity to generate alpha in bond portfolios over the latter half of 2022. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Bottom Line: In our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overall neutral duration stance and a moderate underweight of spread product versus developed market sovereign bonds. We are, however, reducing the recommended tilts in inflation-linked bonds by upgrading US TIPS to neutral and downgrading Canadian linkers to neutral. Feature Dear Client, We are about to take a mid-summer publishing break, as this humble bond strategist moves his family into a new home in a new city. Next week, you will be receiving a report written by BCA Research’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift. The following week, there will be no Global Fixed Income Strategy report published. Our next report will be published on July 26, 2022. Regards, Rob Robis Bond investors are running out of places to hide to avoid losses in 2022. The total return on the Bloomberg Global Aggregate index (hedged into USD) in the second quarter of this year was -4%, nearly matching the -6% loss seen in Q1. No sector, from government bonds to corporate debt to emerging market credit, could avoid the damage caused by hawkish central bankers belated responding to the worst bout of global inflation since the 1970s. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2022 Review & Outlook: Trading The Consolidation Phase Global inflation rates will soon peak, led by slowing growth of goods prices and commodity prices. However, inflation will remain well above central bank targets across the bulk of the developed world, supported by more domestic sources like services prices, housing costs and wages. This will limit the ability for important central banks like the Fed and ECB to quickly pivot in a more dovish direction to support weakening growth – and bail out foundering bond markets. With that backdrop in mind, we present our quarterly review of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio for the second quarter of 2022. We also present our recommended positioning for the portfolio for the next six months, as well as portfolio return expectations for our base case and alternative investment scenarios. As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q2/2022 Model Bond Portfolio Performance: All About Credit Chart 1Q2/2022 Performance: Gains From Defensive Credit Positioning Q2/2022 Performance: Gains From Defensive Credit Positioning Q2/2022 Performance: Gains From Defensive Credit Positioning The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the second quarter was -4.3%, outperforming the custom benchmark index by +24bps (Chart 1).1 In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated -11bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by +35bps. In our previous quarterly portfolio performance review in April, we noted that the greater opportunities to generate outperformance for fixed income investors would come from more defensive allocations to spread product, rather than big directional moves in government bond yields. That forecast largely panned out, as global credit markets moved to price in the growing risk of a deep economic downturn. Declining nominal government bond yields provided some modest relief at the end of June, with markets modestly pricing out some of the rate hikes discounted over the next year amid deepening global recession fears. While we maintained a neutral stance on overall portfolio duration during the quarter, we did benefit from the fact that the decline in global bond yields in late June was concentrated more in lower inflation expectations than falling real yields. Thus, our underweight positioning in inflation-linked bonds, focused on the US and UK, helped add a combined +25bps of outperformance versus the benchmark (Table 1). Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector in our model portfolio are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Government Bond Performance Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Biggest Outperformers: Underweight US investment grade Industrials (+19bps) Underweight UK index-linked Gilts (+15bps) Underweight US TIPS (+9bps) Underweight US investment grade Financials (+7bps) Underweight US MBS (+6bps) Underweight US Treasuries with maturities beyond ten years (+6bps) Biggest Underperformers: Overweight euro area investment grade corporates (-19bps) Overweight German government bonds with maturities beyond ten years (-14bps) Overweight French government bonds with maturities beyond ten years (-8bps) Overweight UK Gilts with maturities beyond ten years (-6bps) Overweight US CMBS (-4bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q2/2022. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q2 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In Q2/2022 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. That pattern largely held true in Q2/2022, especially at the tail ends of the chart. During a quarter where all the major asset classes in our portfolio lost money on a hedged and duration-matched basis, we outperformed by selectively underweighting the worst performers within the credit side of the benchmark portfolio universe. Notably, we were underweight EM USD-denominated Sovereigns (-1099bps), EM USD-denominated corporates (-816bps) and US investment grade corporates (-686bps) on the extreme right side of the chart. Some of our key overweight positions did relatively well, led by overweights in US CMBS (-148bps), Australian government bonds (-288bps) and euro area investment grade corporates (-378bps), all of which were on the left side of Chart 4. One of our key recommendations throughout the first half of 2022 - overweighting German government bonds (-517bps) and French government bonds (-657bps) versus underweighting US Treasuries (-283bps) - performed poorly in Q2. This was due to investors rapidly pricing in a far more aggressive series of ECB rate hikes than we expected, resulting in some convergence of US-European bond yield differentials. Importantly, core European bond yields have pulled back substantially over the last month, and by much more than US yields have declined. Most notably, the 2-year German yield, which began Q2 at minus-7bps and hit a peak of 1.2% on June 14, has now fallen all the way back to 0.4% as this report went to press. The 2-year US-Germany yield differential has already widened by 35bps in the first week of July, suggesting that our overweight core Europe/underweight US allocation is already contributing positively to the model bond portfolio returns for Q3. Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio outperformed its benchmark index in the second quarter of the year by +24bps – a positive result coming largely from underweight positions in US corporate bonds, EM spread product and inflation-linked bonds in the US and UK. Future Drivers Of Model Bond Portfolio Returns Just as in Q2/2022, the performance of the model bond portfolio in Q3/2022 will be driven more by relative allocations between countries and spread product sectors, rather than big directional moves in bond yields or credit spreads. Overall Duration Exposure Chart 5A More Stable Backdrop For Global Bond Yields A More Stable Backdrop For Global Bond Yields A More Stable Backdrop For Global Bond Yields In terms of portfolio duration, we still see a stronger case for global bond yields to be more rangebound than trending, especially in the US. There has already been a major downward adjustment to global bond yields via lower inflation expectations and reduced rate hike expectations. A GDP-weighted average of major developed market 10-year inflation breakevens has already fallen from an April 2022 peak of 281bps to 216bps (Chart 5). That aggregate breakeven is now back to the levels that began 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine that triggered a surge in global energy prices. We anticipate that additional declines in global inflation expectations – and the associated reductions in central bank rate hike expectations – will be harder to achieve over the latter half of 2022. “Stickier” inflation from services, housing costs and wages will remain strong enough to keep overall inflation rates above central bank targets, even as decelerating goods and commodity price inflation act to slow headline inflation rates. Our Global Duration Indicator, which is comprised of growth indicators like the ZEW expectations index for the US and Europe as well as our own global leading economic indicator, has fallen substantially and is signaling a decline in global bond yield momentum once realized inflation rates peak (Chart 6). Chart 6Our Duration Indicator Calling For Slowing Global Yield Momentum Our Duration Indicator Calling For Slowing Global Yield Momentum Our Duration Indicator Calling For Slowing Global Yield Momentum Chart 7Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Neutral Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Neutral Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Neutral We see that as signaling more of a sideways action in bond yields over the next six months, rather than a big downward move, especially in the US. Thus, we are keeping the duration of the model bond portfolio close to that of the benchmark index (Chart 7). Government Bond Country Allocation We are sticking with our view that, for countries with active central banks (i.e. everyone but Japan), favoring markets where interest rate expectations are above plausible estimates of neutral policy rates should lead to outperformance from country allocation. In Chart 8, we show 10-year bond yields and 2-years-forward 1-month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia. The shaded regions in the chart represent estimates of the range of neutral policy rates. In the case of the US, rate expectations and Treasury yields are now below the upper level of the range of neutral fed funds rates estimates, between 2-3%, taken from the latest set of FOMC economic projections. Hence, we are sticking with an underweight stance on US Treasuries with yields offering less protection against the Fed following through on its current guidance and lifting the funds rate into restrictive territory above 3%. In the other countries, rate expectations are above the range of neutral rate estimates, which suggests that bond yields have a bit more protection against hawkish central bank actions. That leads us to stay overweight core Europe, the UK and Australia in the government bond portion of the model bond portfolio. We are only keeping Canada at neutral, however, as we suspect that the Bank of Canada is more willing than other central banks to follow the Fed’s lead on taking rates to a restrictive level to help bring down elevated Canadian inflation. For other countries, we are staying neutral on Italian government bond exposure, for now, and underweight Japan (Chart 9). Chart 8Favor Countries Where Markets Expect Above-Neutral Rates Favor Countries Where Markets Expect Above-Neutral Rates Favor Countries Where Markets Expect Above-Neutral Rates Chart 9Underweight JGBs, Stay Neutral Italy (For Now) Underweight JGBs, Stay Neutral Italy (For Now) Underweight JGBs, Stay Neutral Italy (For Now) For Italy, we await news from the July 21 ECB meeting on the details of a proposal to help support Italian bond markets in the event of additional yield increases or spread widening versus Germany. It is clear from the history of the past decade that Italian bond returns suffer when the ECB is either hiking rates or slowing the growth of its balance sheet (top panel). In other words, it is difficult to recommend overweighting Italian bonds without the support of easy ECB monetary policy. Chart 10Our Inflation-Linked Bond Country Allocations Our Inflation-Linked Bond Country Allocations Our Inflation-Linked Bond Country Allocations For Japan, our recommendation is strictly related to our view on the move in overall global bond yields. The Bank of Japan is bucking the worldwide trend to tighten monetary policy because core Japanese inflation remains weak. This makes Japanese government bonds (JGBs) a good place for bond investors to “hide out” in when global bond yields are rising. Given our view that global bond yield momentum will slow – in line with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator – we do not see a strong cyclical case for overweighting low-yielding JGBs. On inflation-linked bonds, we are maintaining a cautious overall stance, with commodity prices decelerating, realized inflation momentum set to soon peak and central banks signaling more tightening ahead (Chart 10). This week, we are closing out our lone overweight recommendation on inflation-linked bonds in Canada, where we downgrading to neutral (3 out of 5, see the model bond portfolio table on page 24).2 At the same time, we are neutralizing our underweight stance on US TIPS, moving the allocation to neutral. We still see shorter-term TIPS breakevens as having downside from here, but longer-maturity breakevens have already made enough of a downward adjustment, in our view. Global Spread Product Turning to credit markets, we are maintaining our moderately cautious view on the overall allocation to credit versus government bonds. Slowing global growth momentum and tightening global monetary policy is not an environment where credit spreads can narrow, especially for growth-sensitive credit like corporate bonds and high-yield (Chart 11). Having said that – the spread widening seen in US and European corporate bond markets has introduced a better valuation cushion into spreads. Our preferred measure of spread product valuation – the historical percentile ranking of the 12-month breakeven spread – shows that investment grade spreads in the euro area are now in the top quartile (85%) of its history on a risk-adjusted basis (Chart 12). US investment grade spreads are now up into the second quartile (64%), which is a big improvement from the start of 2022 but not as much as seen in Europe. Chart 11Global Monetary Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit Global Monetary Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit Global Monetary Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit Chart 12Corporate Spread Valuations Have Improved In The US & Europe Corporate Spread Valuations Have Improved In The US & Europe Corporate Spread Valuations Have Improved In The US & Europe European credit spreads likely need to be wide as a risk premium against the numerous risks the region is facing right now – slowing growth, an increasingly hawkish ECB, soaring energy prices and the lingering uncertainties stemming from the Ukraine war. However, a lot of bad news is now discounted in European spreads and, as a result, we are maintaining our overweight stance on European investment grade corporates, especially versus US investment grade where we remain underweight. High-yield spreads on both sides of the Atlantic look more attractive on a 12-month breakeven spread basis, but also on a default-adjusted spread basis (Chart 13). Assuming a moderate increase in the high-yield default rates in the US and Europe - consistent with a sharp slowing of economic growth but no deep recession - the current level of high-yield spreads net of expected default losses over the next year is above long-run averages. It is too soon to move to an overweight stance on high-yield, with the Fed and ECB set to tighten more amid ongoing growth uncertainty, but given the improved valuation cushion we see a neutral allocation to junk in both the US and Europe as appropriate in our model portfolio. Chart 13Junk Spreads Offer Value If Recession Can Be Avoided Junk Spreads Offer Value If Recession Can Be Avoided Junk Spreads Offer Value If Recession Can Be Avoided Finally, we remain comfortably underweight emerging market USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The backdrop is poor for emerging market bond returns, given slowing global growth, softening commodity prices, a tightening Fed and a strengthening US dollar (Chart 14). Chart 14Staying Cautious On EM Debt Exposure Staying Cautious On EM Debt Exposure Staying Cautious On EM Debt Exposure Summing It All Up The full list of our recommended portfolio allocations can be seen in Table 2. The portfolio enters the second half of 2022 with the following high-level characteristics: Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Chart 15Overall Portfolio Allocation: Underweight Spread Product Vs Governments GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense the overall duration exposure remains at-benchmark (i.e. neutral) the portfolio has an underweight allocation to overall spread products versus government bonds, equal to four percentage points of the portfolio (Chart 15) the tracking error of the portfolio, or its expected volatility in excess of that of the benchmark, is 77bps – below our self-imposed 100bps tracking error limit (Chart 16) the portfolio now has a yield below that of the custom benchmark index, equal to -31bps on a currency-unhedged basis but a more modest “carry gap” of -10bps on a USD-hedged basis given the gains from hedging into USD (Chart 17). Chart 16Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Chart 17Overall Portfolio Yield: Below-Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Below-Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Below-Benchmark Bottom Line: Looking ahead, our model bond portfolio performance will continue to be driven by the same factors in Q3/2022 as in the previous quarter: the relative performance of US bonds versus European equivalents for both government debt and corporate bonds, and the path for emerging market credit spreads. Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months After making the modest changes to our inflation-linked bond allocations in the US and Canada, which can be seen in the tables on pages 23-24, we now turn to our regularly quarterly scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the next six months. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 3A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 3B). Table 3AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Table 3BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios. In the current environment, our scenarios center around the pace of global growth. Base Case (Slow Global Growth) Global growth momentum slows substantially, with firms cutting back on hiring and investing activity due to slowing corporate profit growth. An outright recession is avoided because softening energy prices help ease the drag on real spending power for consumers. China introduces more monetary and fiscal stimulus measures to boost growth. Global inflation peaks and eases on the back of slowing growth of goods prices and commodity prices, but the floor on inflation in the US and other developed markets is higher than central bank inflation targets due to sticky domestic price pressures. The Fed continues to hike at every policy meeting in H2/2022. There is a very mild bear flattening of the US Treasury curve, but with longer-term yields remain broadly unchanged over the full six month scenario period with the Fed not hiking by more than currently discounted. The Brent oil price retreats by -10%, the US dollar modestly appreciates by 2%, the VIX stays close to current levels at 28 and the fed funds rate reaches 3.25% by year-end. Resilient Growth Scenario Consumer spending surprises to the upside in the US and even Europe, as softer momentum of energy prices eases the relentless downward pressure on real incomes. Labor demand remains sold across the developed world, particularly with firms reluctant to do mass layoffs because of a perceived scarcity of quality labor. China enacts more policy stimulus with growth likely to fall below 2022 government targets. The Fed is forced to be more aggressive on rate hikes, given resilient US growth and inflation staying well above the Fed’s 2% target. The US Treasury curve bear-flattens into outright inversion, but with Treasury yields rising across the curve. The Brent oil price rises +20%, the VIX index climbs to 30, the US dollar appreciates by +3% thanks to a more aggressive Fed that lifts the funds rate to 3.75% by year-end. Recession Scenario A toxic combination of contracting corporate profits and negative real income growth drags the major developed economies into outright recession. Global inflation rates slow rapidly from current elevated levels, fueled by a rapid decline in commodity prices, but remain above central bank targets making it hard for the Fed and other major central banks to pivot dovishly to support growth. Chinese policymakers belatedly act to ease monetary and fiscal policy, but not by enough to offset the slow response from developed market policymakers. The Treasury curve moderately bull-steepens, although the absolute decline in nominal Treasury yields is relatively modest as the Fed will not pivot quickly to signaling policy easing with inflation still likely to remain above 2%. The Brent oil price falls -20%, the VIX index soars to 35, the US dollar depreciates by -3% (as lower US rates win out over slowing global growth) and the Fed pushes the funds rate to 2.75% before pausing after September. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 4A. The US Treasury yield assumptions are shown in Table 4B. For the more visually inclined, we present charts showing the model inputs and Treasury yield projections in Chart 18 and Chart 19, respectively. Table 4AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Table 4BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense Chart 18Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 19US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Given our neutral overall duration stance, the return scenarios will be driven by mostly by the credit side of the portfolio. In the recession scenario where Treasury yields decline, there is a modest projected outperformance from the rates side of the portfolio coming through the underweight to low-beta JGBs. In all scenarios, financial market volatility is expected to stay at, or above, current levels as central banks will be unable to ease policy, even in the event of an actual recession, because of lingering high inflation. Thus, the return on the credit side of the model portfolio will be the main driver of performance, delivering a range of excess return outcomes between +47bps and +60bps. Bottom Line: The model bond portfolio should benefit in H2/2022 from the ongoing cautious stance on global spread product, focused on underweights to US investment grade corporates and EM hard currency debt. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high-quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 We are also closing out our Canadian breakeven widening trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2022 Review & Outlook: Winning By Playing Defense

Global Fixed Income Strategy

07 Jul 2022

A Narrative Shift

Highlights Chart 1Are Expectations Too Dovish? Are Expectations Too Dovish? Are Expectations Too Dovish? The dominant market narrative has clearly shifted in the last few days. The primary concern among investors used to be that the Fed had fallen behind the curve on inflation. Now, asset prices are telling us that investors are more worried about an overly hawkish Fed and an increased risk of recession. The shift is evident in bond market prices. The yield curve is now priced for only 176 basis points of rate hikes over the next 12 months and only 90 bps of tightening over the next 24 months (Chart 1). What’s more, long-dated market-based inflation expectations have plunged to below the Fed’s target range (bottom panel). We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark for now, as bond yields could still have some downside during the next few months as both inflation and economic growth slow. That said, we suspect that the market is now pricing-in an overly dovish Fed tightening path for the next couple of years, a change that may soon warrant a shift back to below-benchmark portfolio duration. Stay tuned. Feature Table 1 Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Investment Grade: Underweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 168 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -379 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 28 bps on the month and it currently sits at 158 bps. Similarly, our quality-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread moved up to its 61st percentile since 1995 (Chart 2). A report from a few months ago made the case for why investors should underweight investment grade corporate bonds on a 6-12 month investment horizon.1 The main rationale for this recommendation is that the slope of the Treasury curve is very flat, signaling that we are in the mid-to-late stages of the credit cycle. Corporate bond performance tends to be weak during such periods unless spreads start from very high levels. Despite our underweight 6-12 month investment stance, there’s a good chance that spreads will narrow during the next few months as inflation falls. That said, the persistent removal of monetary accommodation and flatness of the yield curve will limit how much spreads can compress. A recent report dug deeper into the corporate bond space and concluded that investment grade-rated Energy bonds offer exceptional value on a 6-12 month horizon.2 That report also concluded that long maturity investment grade corporates are attractively priced relative to short maturity bonds. Table 3A Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 591 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -889 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 172 bps on the month to reach 578 bps, 209 bps above the 2017-19 average and 41 bps above the 2018 peak. The 12-month spread-implied default rate – the default rate that is priced into the junk index assuming a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt and an excess spread of 100 bps – moved higher in June. It currently sits at 8% (Chart 3). As is the case with investment grade, there’s a good chance that high-yield spreads will stage a relief rally in the back half of this year as inflation falls. But due to the flatness of the yield curve, we think it will be difficult for spreads to move below the average seen during the last tightening cycle (2017-19). But even a move back to average 2017-19 levels would equate to roughly 11% of excess return for the junk index if it is realized over a six month period. This potential return is the main reason to prefer high-yield over investment grade in a US bond portfolio. While we maintain a neutral (3 out of 5) allocation to high-yield for now, we would be inclined to downgrade the sector if spreads tighten to the 2017-19 average or if core inflation falls back to 4%.3 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 63 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -171 bps. We discussed the outlook for Agency MBS in a recent report.4 We noted that MBS’s poor performance in 2021 and early-2022 was driven by duration extension. Fewer homeowners refinanced their loans as mortgage rates rose, and the MBS index’s average duration increased (Chart 4). But now, the index’s duration extension is at its end. The average convexity of the MBS index is close to zero (panel 3), meaning that duration is now insensitive to changes in rates. This is because hardly any homeowners have the incentive to refinance at current mortgage rates (panel 4). The implication is that excess MBS returns will be stronger going forward. That said, we still don’t see enough value in MBS spreads to increase our recommended allocation. The average index spread for conventional 30-year Agency MBS remains close to its lowest level since 2000 (bottom panel). At the coupon level, we observe that low-coupon MBS have much higher duration than high-coupon MBS and that convexity is close to zero for the entire coupon stack. This makes the relative coupon trade a direct play on bond yields. Given that we see some potential for yields to fall during the next six months, we recommend favoring low-coupon MBS (1.5%-2.5%) within an overall underweight allocation to the sector. Emerging Market Bonds (USD): Underweight Chart 5Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Market bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 182 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -737 bps. EM Sovereigns underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 280 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -925 bps. The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index underperformed by 122 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -617 bps. The EM Sovereign Index underperformed the duration-equivalent US corporate bond index by 99 bps in June. The yield differential between EM sovereigns and duration-matched US corporates remains negative. Further, the relative performance of EM sovereigns versus US corporates has been tracking the performance of EM currencies versus the dollar and our Emerging Markets Strategy service sees further headwinds for EM currencies in the near term (Chart 5).5 The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index outperformed duration-matched US corporates by 1 bp in June. The index continues to offer a significant yield advantage versus duration-matched US corporates (bottom panel), and as such, we continue to recommend a neutral (3 out of 5) allocation to the sector. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 89 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -167 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We view the municipal bond sector as better placed than most to cope with the recent bout of spread volatility. As we noted in a recent report, state & local government revenue growth has been strong and yet governments have also been slow to hire.6 The result is that net state & local government savings are incredibly high (Chart 6) and it will take some time to deplete these coffers even as economic growth slows and federal fiscal thrust turns to drag. On the valuation front, munis have cheapened up relative to both Treasuries and corporates during the past few months. The 10-year Aaa Muni / Treasury yield ratio is currently 94%, up significantly from its 2021 trough of 55%. The yield ratio between 12-17 year munis and duration-matched corporate bonds is also up significantly off its lows (panel 2). We reiterate our overweight allocation to municipal bonds within US fixed income portfolios, and we continue to have a strong preference for long-maturity munis. The yield ratio between 17-year+ General Obligation Municipal bonds and duration-matched US corporates is 92%. The same measure for 17-year+ Revenue bonds stands at 97%, just below parity even without considering municipal debt’s tax advantage. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in June. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope flattened 26 bps on the month and the 5-year/30-year slope flattened 13 bps. The 2/10 and 5/30 slopes now stand at 4 bps and 23 bps, respectively. In a recent Special Report we noted the unusually large divergence between flat slopes at the long end of the curve and steep slopes at the front end.7 This divergence has narrowed in recent weeks, but it remains wide by historical standards. For example, the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope is currently 0 bps while the 3-month/5-year slope is 122 bps. The divergence is happening because the market moved quickly to price-in a rapid near-term pace of rate hikes, but the Fed has only delivered 150 bps of tightening so far and this is holding down the very front-end of the curve. The oddly shaped curve presents us with an excellent trading opportunity. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. The 5 over 2/10 butterfly spread has narrowed during the past month, but the trade continues to look attractive on our model (Chart 7). We also continue to recommend a position long the 20-year bullet versus a duration-matched 10/30 barbell as an attractive carry trade. TIPS: Underweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 246 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -14 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 31 bps on the month, landing back inside the Fed’s 2.3% - 2.5% comfort zone (Chart 8). Consistently, our TIPS Breakeven Valuation Indicator is drifting toward neutral territory, signaling that TIPS are becoming less expensive (panel 2). At the front-end of the yield curve, the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 57 bps in June – from 3.86% to 3.29% - and the 2-year TIPS yield rose 96 bps – from -1.33% to -0.37% (bottom 2 panels). The large drop in short-maturity breakevens is the result of increasing investor conviction that inflation has indeed peaked. In a recent report we made the case that core CPI inflation can fall to a range of 4%-5% (from its current 6.0% rate) without the Fed needing to cause a recession. We also argued that a recession will be required to push inflation from 4% back down to 2%.8 The upshot for bond investors is that TIPS breakeven inflation rates will drop further as core inflation rolls over. This will be particularly true at the front-end of the yield curve. We also noted in last week’s report that Fed policymakers have increasingly indicated a desire for positive real yields across the entire curve.9 This tells us that investors should continue to short 2-year TIPS, targeting a positive real 2-year yield. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -42 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 25 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -33 bps. Non-Aaa ABS underperformed by 5 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -93 bps. During the past two years, substantial federal government support for household incomes caused US households to build up an extremely large buffer of excess savings. Nowhere is this more evident than in the steep drop in the amount of outstanding credit card debt that was witnessed in 2020 and 2021 (Chart 9). In 2022, consumers have started to re-lever. The personal savings rate was just 5.4% in May and the amount of outstanding credit card debt has recovered to its pre-COVID level (bottom panel). But while household balance sheets are starting to deteriorate, they remain exceptionally strong in level terms. In other words, it will be some time before we see enough deterioration to cause a meaningful uptick in consumer credit delinquencies. Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum, favoring non-Aaa rated securities over Aaa-rated ones. Non-Agency CMBS: Overweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -194 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -141 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed by 52 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -340 bps. CMBS spreads remain wide compared to other similarly risky spread products and are currently slightly above their historic averages (Chart 10). Meanwhile, weak commercial real estate (CRE) investment continues to drive strong CRE price appreciation (panel 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 9 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month. It currently sits at 47 bps, close to its long-term average (bottom panel). Agency CMBS spreads also continue to look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 176 basis points of rate hikes during the next 12 months. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with excess returns for a front-loaded and a back-loaded rate hike scenario. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of June 30, 2022) A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of June 30, 2022) A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of -9 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope flattens by less than 9 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of June 30, 2022) A Narrative Shift A Narrative Shift Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Turning Defensive On US Corporate Bonds”, dated April 12, 2022. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Looking For Opportunities In US & European Corporates After The Recent Selloff”, dated May 31, 2022. 3 For more details on this call please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “When The Dual Mandates Clash”, dated June 28, 2022. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bond Market Implications Of A 5% Mortgage Rate”, dated April 26, 2022. 5 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Charts That Matter, “Beware Of Another Downleg In Risk Assets”, dated June 30, 2022. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Echoes Of 2018”, dated May 24, 2022. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy / US Investment Strategy / US Equity Strategy Special Report, “The Yield Curve As An Indicator”, dated March 29, 2022. 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No End In Sight For Fed Tightening”, dated June 21, 2022. 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “When Dual Mandates Clash”, dated June 28, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

US Bond Strategy by Ryan Swift

05 Jul 2022

No End In Sight For Fed Tightening

Executive Summary Calculating Trend Inflation Calculating Trend Inflation Calculating Trend Inflation Investors should anticipate 50 basis point rate hikes at each FOMC meeting, eventually transitioning to 25 bps per meeting once inflation shows clear and convincing evidence of trending down. This transition should occur later this year. Core inflation has peaked for the year and it can fall to a range of 4-5% even in the absence of an economic recession or meaningful labor market weakness. A recession will eventually be required to push inflation from 4% down to the Fed’s 2% target. Economic growth will slow going forward, but we won’t see enough weakness for the Fed to abandon its tightening cycle within the next 6-12 months. Bottom Line: US bond investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark, underweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and maintain a defensive posture on corporate bond spreads (underweight IG and neutral HY). The Fed Goes Big Chart 1Inflation Expectations Inflation Expectations Inflation Expectations The US Federal Reserve continued to prove its inflation-fighting mettle last week with a 75 basis point rate hike, the largest single-meeting increase since 1994. Chair Powell had initially telegraphed 50 basis point rate increases for both the June and July FOMC meetings, but he made it clear during last week’s press conference that the committee was spooked by May’s surprisingly high CPI number and by the recent jump in 5-10 year household inflation expectations (Chart 1). Alongside the 75 basis point rate hike, committee members revised up their fed funds rate forecasts. The median FOMC member now expects the funds rate to reach a range of 3.25% to 3.5% by the end of 2022. That is consistent with three more 50 basis point rate hikes and one more 25 basis point hike at this year’s four remaining FOMC meetings. Looking further out, the median committee member anticipates 25-50 bps additional upside in the fed funds rate in 2023 but is then forecasting a modest reduction in 2024. Critically, the fed funds rate is still expected to be above estimates of long-run neutral by the end of 2024. Chart 2 shows how current market expectations compare to the Fed’s forecasts. We see that, even after the Fed’s upward forecast revisions, the market still anticipates a somewhat faster pace of tightening this year. The market is also priced for rate cuts in 2023, likely due to the increasingly widespread expectation that a recession is coming within the next 12 months. Chart 2Rate Expectations: Market Versus Fed Rate Expectations: Market Versus Fed Rate Expectations: Market Versus Fed The Fed’s Near-Term Plan As for what we can expect going forward, we found two comments from Chair Powell’s press conference particularly enlightening. First, he called last week’s 75 basis point rate increase “unusually large” and said that he “doesn’t expect moves of that size to be common.” Second, Powell said that the Committee will need to see “convincing” and “compelling” evidence of falling inflation before it starts to moderate its tightening pace.1 From these statements we deduce the following near-term plan: 1. The Fed’s baseline expectation is to lift rates by 50 bps at each meeting. 2. A significant upside surprise in either the monthly core CPI data or long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to lift by 75 bps instead of 50 bps. 3. The Fed will not reduce the pace of tightening to 25 bps per meeting until there is clear and convincing evidence that inflation is trending down. Bottom Line: Investors should anticipate 50 basis point rate hikes at each FOMC meeting, eventually transitioning to 25 bps per meeting once inflation shows clear and convincing evidence of trending down. This transition from 50 bps per meeting to 25 bps per meeting should occur later this year, meaning that the Fed will tighten no more quickly than what is already priced into the yield curve for the remainder of 2022. Inflation: All Clear To 4%, 2% Will Be More Challenging It’s evident from the above discussion that inflation remains the critical input for both monetary policy and US bond yields. In particular, the key questions are: 1. Will inflation trend down, and if so, how quickly? 2. Is an economic recession required to curtail inflation? Our answer to these questions is that core US inflation should fall naturally to a trend rate of roughly 4-5%, even in the absence of recession. However, an economic recession and its associated labor market weakness are likely required to move inflation from 4% back to the Fed’s 2% target. Chart 3Calculating Trend Inflation Calculating Trend Inflation Calculating Trend Inflation To arrive at these conclusions, we seek out different ways of estimating inflation’s underlying trend (Chart 3). The first method we consider is the Atlanta Fed’s decomposition of core inflation into “flexible” and “sticky” components. As defined by the Atlanta Fed, “flexible” items tend to change price more frequently compared to “sticky” items. Items like hotels and new & used vehicles fall into the flexible index, while rent and medical care fall into the sticky index.2 As of May, 12-month core flexible inflation is running at a rate of 12.3%. Meanwhile, core sticky inflation is running at 5.0% (Chart 3, top panel). Second, we consider the New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG). The UIG uses a dynamic factor model to derive a measure of trend inflation from a broad set of data.3 In total, the measure uses 346 data series encompassing price measures and other nominal, real and financial variables. The New York Fed has demonstrated that the UIG provides better forecasts of CPI inflation than other measures of core and trimmed mean inflation. At present, the UIG is running at 4.9% (Chart 3, panel 2). A second “prices only” UIG measure that includes only price data and no other economic or financial variables is running hotter at 6.0%. Finally, we can assess inflation’s underlying trend by looking at wage growth. Specifically, we can look at unit labor costs, a measure of wages relative to productivity. Unit labor costs are volatile, but they tend to track core inflation over long periods of time. Unit labor costs grew at an extremely high rate of 8.2% in the four quarters ending in Q1, but this is partly due to huge post-pandemic swings in productivity growth. If we create a more stable measure of underlying wage pressure by subtracting annualized 5-year productivity growth from the 12-month growth rate in average hourly earnings, we see that this trend inflation measure is running at only 3.8% (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 4Auto Inflation Will Slow Auto Inflation Will Slow Auto Inflation Will Slow We conclude from our analysis that 12-month core CPI inflation will fall from its current 6.0% back down to its trend level of roughly 4-5% without the Fed needing to slam the brakes on economic growth. This will occur because we will finally see the normalization of some prices that were pushed dramatically higher during the pandemic. Auto price inflation, for example, shot up above 20% last year because the pandemic and the fiscal response to the pandemic conspired to cause a surge in auto sales at the same time as a slump in production (Chart 4). Now, for reasons that have nothing to do with monetary policy but everything to do with the waning impact of the pandemic, we see auto sales rolling over as production ramps up. This will push prices lower in the second half of this year. All that said, once core inflation reaches its 4-5% trend level, more economic pain will be required to push it lower. Shelter, for example, carries a huge weight in the Atlanta Fed’s core sticky CPI and it is highly correlated with the economic cycle. A rising unemployment rate, and an economic recession, will eventually be required to push shelter inflation down. Bottom Line: Core inflation has peaked for the year and it can fall to a range of 4-5% even in the absence of an economic recession or meaningful labor market weakness. A recession and a rising unemployment rate will eventually be required to push inflation from 4% down to the Fed’s 2% target. The Risk Of Recession Just because US inflation can fall to 4% in the absence of recession doesn’t mean that the Fed won’t get impatient and cause one anyways. In fact, the Fed made it clear last week that it isn’t interested in nuanced inflation forecasts. The Fed will tighten aggressively until it is apparent that inflation is rolling over, even if it causes economic pain. In this section, we run through several economic and financial market indicators that often send signals near the peak of Fed tightening cycles and in advance of recessions. We conclude that economic growth is slowing, but we do not yet see any evidence of an imminent recession or of any growth slowdown that would be large enough for the Fed to pause or reverse its tightening cycle. First, we look at financial conditions (Chart 5). The Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index has tightened rapidly during the past few months and that tightening is broad-based across all five of the index’s components. That said, the index has still not quite moved into “restrictive” territory. Typically, Fed tightening cycles only end once financial conditions are already restrictive, and in this cycle, high inflation means that the Fed will likely tolerate even more tightening of financial conditions than usual. Second, we observe that the end of a Fed tightening cycle is often marked by a dip in the ISM Manufacturing PMI to below 50. Presently, the PMI is a solid 56.1 but it is falling, and regional Fed surveys suggest that it may soon dip into contractionary territory (Chart 6). Chart 5Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Chart 6PMIs Are Slowing PMIs Are Slowing PMIs Are Slowing Third, residential construction activity is a strong predictor of both recession and the end of Fed tightening cycles. Specifically, we have observed that Fed tightening cycles tend to terminate once the 12-month moving average of housing starts falls below the 24-month moving average.4 At present, there is strong evidence that higher mortgage rates are starting to bite the housing market. Housing starts dipped sharply in May and homebuilder confidence is trending down (Chart 7). That said, our housing starts indicator still has a long way to go before it signals the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle (Chart 7, bottom panel). Finally, we turn to the labor market where we do not yet see any evidence of an economic slowdown. Nonfarm payroll growth usually turns negative prior to recession, but right now it is running at a rate of 4.5% during the past 12 months and 3.3% during the past three months (Chart 8). The unemployment rate, for its part, is extremely low, but this only reinforces the idea that the Fed won’t be inclined to abandon its tightening cycle anytime soon. Chart 7US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart 8The US Labor Market The US Labor Market The US Labor Market Consider that the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the natural unemployment rate is 4.4% and the median FOMC member estimates that it is 4.0%. In other words, the Fed would still consider the labor market tight even if the unemployment rate rose from its current 3.6% level to around 4%. Even though such an increase in the unemployment rate might technically be consistent with a recession, the Fed would not be inclined to ease monetary policy into such a labor market if inflation is still above its 2% target. Additionally, we must also consider that the labor force participation rate is trending up and it still has breathing room before it reaches its pre-pandemic level. Further increases in labor force participation – which seem likely – could support employment growth going forward even if the unemployment rate stops falling. Bottom Line: The Fed’s rate hikes, and tighter financial conditions more generally, will slow economic growth going forward. However, we don’t see any evidence that growth will be weak enough for the Fed to abandon its tightening cycle within the next 6-12 months. This is especially true because above-target inflation increases the amount of financial conditions tightening and labor market pain that the Fed will tolerate. Investment Implications Portfolio Duration & US Treasury Curve May’s surprisingly elevated CPI number caused US Treasury yields to move above their 2018 peaks across the entire yield curve (Chart 9). But we wouldn’t be surprised to see that uptrend take a breather during the next few months as inflation descends toward its 4-5% underlying trend. As noted above, falling inflation will likely cause the Fed to tighten by no more than what is already discounted between now and the end of the year, this should keep US Treasury yields rangebound. As a result, we advise investors to keep duration close to benchmark in US bond portfolios, with an eye toward re-evaluating this positioning once core inflation moves closer to its underlying trend. Chart 9US Treasury Yields US Treasury Yields US Treasury Yields On the Treasury curve, the 5-year note continues to trade cheap relative to the 2-year/10-year slope (Chart 9, bottom panel). We recommend buying the 5-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. TIPS Chart 10Underweight TIPS Versus Nominals Underweight TIPS Versus Nominals Underweight TIPS Versus Nominals Investors should position for inflation falling back to trend by underweighting TIPS versus duration-matched nominal US Treasuries. Not only will falling inflation weigh on TIPS breakeven inflation rates during the next few months but a resolutely hawkish Fed will also apply downward pressure (Chart 10). We are particularly bearish on short-maturity TIPS, and we advise investors to initiate outright short positions in 2-year TIPS (Chart 10, bottom panel). In last week’s press conference, Chair Powell pointed to negative short-maturity real yields as evidence that financial conditions have room to tighten further. To us, this suggests that the Fed will not quit until real yields move into positive territory across the entire yield curve. In an environment of falling inflation, this is likely to occur because of falling TIPS breakeven inflation rates. However, the Fed has now demonstrated that even if inflation doesn’t fall it will push real yields higher with its policy rate actions and forward guidance. Corporate Credit The combination of slowing economic growth and increasingly restrictive Fed policy compels us toward a defensive positioning on corporate bond spreads. Specifically, we advise investors to carry an underweight (2 out of 5) allocation to investment grade US corporate bonds and a neutral (3 out of 5) allocation to high-yield US corporate bonds. Our slight preference for high-yield comes from the view that spread widening is likely to take a breather this year as inflation turns down and the Fed tightens by no more than what is already discounted in the yield curve. Though the long-run prospects for corporate bond returns remain bleak, if inflation moderates this year as we expect, then spreads could easily re-tighten to the average levels seen during the last tightening cycle (2017-19). That would equate to 31 bps of spread tightening for investment grade US corporate bonds (Chart 11), or roughly 300 bps of excess return versus duration-matched US Treasuries.5 For high-yield, a return to average 2017-19 spread levels would equate to 133 bps of spread tightening (Chart 12), or roughly 875 bps of excess return versus duration-matched US Treasuries.6 Chart 11IG Spreads IG Spreads IG Spreads Chart 12HY Spreads HY Spreads HY Spreads In our view, this warrants a slightly higher allocation to high-yield for the time being, though we will likely turn increasingly bearish should spreads tighten to average 2017-19 levels or once inflation converges with its 4-5% trend. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220615.pdf 2 For more info on the Atlanta Fed’s sticky and flexible CPIs please see: https://www.atlantafed.org/research/inflationproject/stickyprice 3 For more info on the Underlying Inflation Gauge please see https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/underlying-inflation-gauge 4 For more details on this indicator please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bond Market Implications Of A 5% Mortgage Rate”, dated April 26, 2022. 5 This excess return estimate is roughly 31 bps of spread tightening multiplied by average index duration of 7.5. We then add half of the index OAS as an estimate of the carry earned during the next six months. 6 This excess return estimate is roughly 133 bps of spread tightening multiplied by average index duration of 4.3. We then add half of the index OAS, less estimated default losses of 200 bps, as an estimate of the carry earned during the next six months. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

US Bond Strategy, Global Fixed Income Strategy by Ryan Swift

21 Jun 2022

Volcker's Ghost

Executive Summary Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker? Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker? Economic growth is now a casualty, and not a driver, of monetary policy choices. Inflation is dictating where central banks are taking interest rates. Our baseline view remains that core US inflation will cool by enough on its own without the need for the Fed to deliver a policy-induced recession. However, the odds of the latter have increased after the upside surprise in the May US CPI report. The ECB has been dragged into the same morass as other major central banks – tightening policy because of soaring inflation, despite broad-based signs of sluggish economic growth. We still see the pricing of cumulative rate hikes in the euro area as being too aggressive, even after last week’s clear announcement from the ECB that a string of future rate hikes was coming. With the ECB also announcing an end to its QE program, but offering no details on a replacement, markets have been given the green light to push Italian yields/spreads higher (and the euro lower) until there is an ECB response to market fragmentation in European sovereign debt. Bottom Line: The Fed is still more likely than the ECB to follow through on rate hikes discounted in US and European interest rate curves - position for renewed widening of the Treasury-Bund spread. Italian bond yields will remain under upward pressure until the contours of an ECB plan to stabilize Peripheral Spreads alongside rate hikes are revealed – tactically position for a wider BTP-Bund spread. Central Bankers Cannot Worry About Growth … Or Your Investment Portfolio The US consumer price index (CPI) report for May was yet another bond-bearish shock in a year full of them. With US headline US inflation hitting an 41-year high of 8.6%, the Treasury market adjusted bond yields upward to reflect both higher inflation expectations and even more aggressive Fed tightening. Coming only a day after the June European Central Bank (ECB) meeting that provided guidance that a series of rate hikes would begin in July, that could include a 50bp hike at the September meeting, financial markets worldwide moved to price in the risk that policy-induced recessions were the only way to bring down soaring global inflation. The result: global bond yields soared to new highs for the year, while risk assets of all shapes and sizes were hammered. We have our doubts that today’s class of policymakers – especially the Fed - has the stomach to repeat the actions of former Fed Chair Paul Volcker, who famously pushed US interest rates above the double-digit inflation rates of the late 1970s to engineer a deep recession to crush inflation. The starting point of the current tightening cycle is even further behind the curve than during the Volcker era, in terms of “realized” real interest rates, with the 10-year US Treasury yield now over five percentage points below headline US CPI inflation (Chart 1). Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyAssessing The Risks To Our Main Views Central bankers are now faced with the no-win scenario of pushing nominal policy rates higher to chase soaring inflation in a bid to maintain inflation fighting credibility, regardless of the spillover effects on financial market stability or economic growth expectations. More worryingly, the rate hikes needed to establish that credibility are not only becoming more frequent but larger. 50bps has become the “standard” size for developed market rate hikes. The Fed may have upped the ante with the 75bp hike at yesterday's FOMC meeting. Such is the reality of a funds rate still only at 1.75% but with US inflation pushing toward 9%. The timing of the latest hawkish shifts from the Fed, ECB and others is surprising, looking purely from a growth perspective. The OECD leading economic indicators for the US, euro area and China are slowing, alongside depressed consumer confidence and deteriorating business sentiment (Chart 2). Similar readings are evident in comparable measures in other major economies, both in developed and emerging economies. This would normally be the type of backdrop that would entice central banks to consider easing monetary policy - IF inflation was subdued, which is clearly not the case today. Chart 1Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker? Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker? Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker? In fact, high inflation is the reason why economic sentiment has worsened. Chart 2Worrying Signs For Global Growth Worrying Signs For Global Growth Worrying Signs For Global Growth Consumers see income growth that is lagging inflation, especially for everyday items like gasoline and food. Businesses are seeing input costs rising, especially for labor in an environment of tight job markets. Inflation has become broad-based, across goods, services and wages. This is true for countries that are more advanced in their monetary tightening cycles - the US, Canada and the UK - where inflation rates are remarkably similar (Chart 3). But it is also now true in countries with lower (but still accelerating) inflation rates and where central banks have been slower to tighten monetary conditions, like the euro area and Australia (Chart 4). Chart 3Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here Chart 4Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here For the Fed, assessing the underlying momentum of US inflation, and setting monetary policy accordingly, has become a bit trickier. While headline inflation continues to accelerate in response to rising energy and food prices, core inflation ticked lower in both April and May and now sits at 6.1%, down from 6.5% in March. Longer-term survey-based measures of inflation expectations have been moving steadily higher, with the University of Michigan 5-10 year consumer inflation expectations survey now up to a 14-year high of 3.3% (Chart 5). Yet longer-term market-based inflation expectations have been more stable, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven now at 2.66%, down from the late April peak of 3.02%. There are also some mixed signals visible within the US inflation data. Core goods CPI inflation clocked in at 8.5% in May, down from the recent peak of 12.4% in February 2022, while core services CPI inflation accelerated to a 14-year high of 5.2% in May (Chart 6). A similar divergence can be seen when looking at the Atlanta Fed’s measures of “sticky” and “flexible” price inflation. Core flexible CPI inflation – measuring prices that adjust more rapidly – has fallen from a peak of 19% to 12.3% in May. At the same time, core sticky CPI inflation for prices that are slower to adjust sped up to an 31-year high of 5% in May. Chart 5Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed Chart 6US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier' US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier' US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier' Chart 7Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades In terms of the Fed’s next policy moves, the acceleration of core services (and sticky) inflation means underlying inflation momentum remains strong enough to make it difficult for the Fed to tighten by less than markets are discounting over the next year. Yet the deceleration of core goods (and flexible) inflation, if it continues, can lead to an eventual peak in overall US inflation. This would ease pressure on the Fed to tighten policy more aggressively than markets are expecting to slam the brakes on US economic growth. For nervous markets worried about Fed-induced recession risks, the clear peak in US inflation that we had been expecting has likely been pushed out further into the latter half of 2022. Thus, a significant fall in US Treasury yields that would provide relief to stressed risk assets is unlikely in the near term. Our preferred way to play that upward pressure on US Treasury yields is through an underweight stance on US Treasuries in global bond portfolios, rather than a below-benchmark duration stance. That is particularly true versus German Bunds - the 10-year UST-Bund yield spread is now well below the fair value level from our fundamental valuation model (Chart 7). Bottom Line: It is not clear that the Fed needs to “pull a Volcker” and generate a policy-induced recession to cool off US inflation. However, the Fed is far more likely to hike rates in line with market expectations than the ECB over the next 6-12 months. Stay underweight US Treasuries versus core Europe in global bond portfolios. The ECB Takes The Patient Off Life Support The ECB is finally coming to grips with surging European inflation. At last week’s policy meeting, the ECB Governing Council voted to end new bond buying via the Asset Purchase Program, while also signaling that a 25bp rate hike was on the way in July, with more hikes to follow – perhaps as much as 50bps in September if inflation remains elevated. Chart 8Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB The central bank provided a new set of quarterly economic projections that, unsurprisingly, included significant upward revisions to the inflation forecasts. The 2022 headline HICP inflation forecast was bumped from 5.1% to 6.8%, the 2023 forecast from 2.1% to 3.5% and the 2024 forecast was nudged higher from 1.9% to 2.1%. The projections for core HICP inflation were also increased to 3.3% for 2022, 2.8% for 2023 and 2.3% for 2024. The central bank now expects euro area inflation to stay above its 2% inflation target throughout its forecast period – even with a 20% decline in oil prices, and 36% fall in natural gas prices, built into the projection between 2022 and 2024. A move towards tighter monetary policy has been heralded by our ECB Monitor, which remains elevated largely due to its inflation component (Chart 8). By contrast, the growth component of the Monitor has rolled over and is now at levels consistent with unchanged monetary policy. Yet in the current environment of very elevated inflation, concerns about the economy are taking a back seat to maintaining the ECB’s inflation-fighting credibility. In the relatively young history of the ECB, dating back to the inception of the euro in 1998, there have only been three true hiking cycles that involved multiple interest rate increases: 2000, 2006-08 and 2011. In each case, both growth and inflation were accelerating in a broad-based way across the majority of euro area countries. Today, inflation is surging, with the headline HICP inflation rate hitting 8.1% in May, while core inflation (ex energy and food) is a more subdued but still high 4.4%. Economic growth is decelerating, however, with leading economic indicators now slowing in a majority of euro area countries (Chart 9). Chart 9Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth The ECB’s updated economic growth forecasts were downgraded for this year and next, with real GDP growth now expected to reach 2.8% in 2022 and 2.1% in both 2023 and 2024. Cutting growth forecasts for the current year was inevitable given the uncertainties stemming from the Ukraine war and soaring European energy prices. However, the projected growth rates do seem optimistic in the face of deeply depressed readings on economic sentiment from reliable measures like the ZEW index or the European Commission consumer confidence index, both of which have fallen sharply to levels last seen during the 2020 pandemic shock (Chart 10). Demand for European exports is also sluggish, particularly exports to China which are now flat in year-over-year terms. A similar pattern can be seen in the ECB’s inflation forecasts, which seem too optimistic in projecting lower wage growth and core inflation through 2024, even with the euro area unemployment rate forecasted to stay below 7% - under the OECD’s full employment estimate of 7.7% over the same period (Chart 11). Chart 10Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts Chart 11Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts? Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts? Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts? The ECB is facing the same communications problem as other central banks at the moment. There is a fear of forecasting a major growth slowdown that would scare financial markets, even though that is a necessary condition to help bring down elevated inflation. At the same time, projections of a big decline in inflation that would limit the need for economy-crushing monetary tightening are not credible in the current environment of historically elevated headline inflation with very low unemployment rates. Interest rate markets understand the bind that the ECB finds itself in, and have moved to price in a very rapid jump in policy rates over the next 1-2 years. The 1-month OIS rate, 2-years forward is now at 2.5%, a high level compared to estimates of the neutral ECB policy rate, which lies between 1-1.5%. Core European bond yields have moved up alongside those rising rate expectations, with the 10-year German bund yield now at 1.64%, a far cry from the -0.18% yield at the start of 2022. Additional German yield increases will prove to be more difficult in the months ahead. There has already been a major upward adjustment in the inflation expectations component of yields, with the 10-year euro CPI swap rate now up to 2.6% compared to 2% at the start of this year (Chart 12). Importantly, those inflation expectations have stabilized of late, even in the face of high oil prices. Meanwhile, real bond yields, while still negative, have also moved up substantially and are now back to levels that prevailed before the ECB introduced negative policy rates in 2014 (bottom panel). With so much bond-bearish news now priced into core European bond yields, additional yield increases from here would require a more fundamental driver – an upward repricing of terminal interest rate expectations. On that note, the German yield curve is signaling that the terminal rate in the euro area is not much above 1.75%, as that is where bond yield forwards have converged to for both long and short maturity bonds (Chart 13). Chart 12How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go? How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go? How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go? Chart 13Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate Given our view that the neutral rate in Europe is, at best, no more than 1.5%, ECB rate hikes much beyond that level would likely invert a Bund curve that is priced for only a 1.75% terminal rate. An inverted Bund curve would also raise the odds that Europe enters a policy-induced recession – turning a bond bearish outcome into a bond bullish one. Even with the relatively aggressive policy expectations priced into European bond yields, it is still too soon to raise European duration exposure with inflation still accelerating. We prefer maintaining a neutral duration stance until there is a clear peak in realized European inflation – an outcome that would also favor a shift into Bund curve steepeners as the markets price out rate hikes and, potentially, begin to discount future rate cuts. Does The ECB Even Have A Plan For Italian Debt? The ECB seems to have a clear near-term plan on the timing, and even the potential size, of rate hikes. There is far less clarity on how it will deal with stabilizing sovereign bond yields post-APP in the countries that benefitted from ECB asset purchases, most notably Italy. By offering no details on a replacement to APP buying of riskier European debt at last week’s policy meeting, markets were given the green light to test the ECB’s resolve by pushing Italian bond yields higher (and the euro lower). Volatility in both markets will continue until there is a credible ECB response to so-called “market fragmentation” in European sovereign debt (i.e. higher yields and wider spreads versus Bunds in the Periphery). With the benchmark 10-year Italian BTP yield pushing above 4%, the ECB tried to calm markets yesterday by announcing an emergency meeting of the Governing Council to discuss “anti-fragmentation” policy options. The announcement triggered a relief rally in BTP prices, likely fueled by short covering. But the ECB statement was again light on concrete details, only noting that: a) reinvestments from maturing bonds from the now-completed Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) could be used “flexibly” to support stressed parts of the European bond market b) the timeline for ECB researchers to prepare proposals for a “new anti-fragmentation instrument” would be accelerated. We expect the ECB to eventually produce a credible bond buying plan to support Peripheral European bond markets – but only after an “iterative” trial-and-error process where trial balloon proposals are floated and skeptical financial markets respond. Chart 14Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds There is almost certainly some serious horse trading going on within the ECB Governing Council, with inflation hawks demanding more rate hikes in exchange for their support of new plans to deal with market fragmentation. Details such as the size of any new program, the conditions under which it would be activated, and country purchase limits (if any) will need to be ironed out. Internal ECB debates will prolong that trial-and-error process with financial markets, keeping yield/spread/FX volatility elevated in the short-term. On a strategic (6-18 month) time horizon, we see a neutral allocation to Italy in global bond portfolios as appropriate, given the tradeoff between increasingly attractive yields and the uncertain timing of effective ECB market stabilization proposals. On a more tactical horizon (0-6 months), we expect Italian yields and spreads versus Germany to remain under upward pressure until a viable anti-fragmentation program is announced (Chart 14). To play for that move, we are introducing a new position in our Tactical Overlay Trade portfolio, selling 10-year Italy futures and buying 10-year German Bund futures. The details of the new trade, including the specific futures contracts and weightings for the two legs of the trade to make it duration-neutral, can be found in the Tactical Trade table on page 18. As we monitor and discuss this trade in future reports, we will refer to the well-followed 10-year Italy-Germany spread (currently 225bps) to determine targets and stop levels of this bond futures spread trade. We are setting a stop-out on this trade if the 10-year Italy-Germany spread has a one-day close below 200bps, while targeting a potential widening to 275-300bps (the 2018 peak in that spread). Bottom Line: The ECB’s lack of conviction on designing a plan to support Peripheral bond markets during the upcoming period of interest rate hikes will keep upward pressure on Peripheral yields/spreads over the next few months. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Volcker's Ghost Volcker's Ghost The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Volcker's Ghost Volcker's Ghost Tactical Overlay Trades

Global Fixed Income Strategy

16 Jun 2022

Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields

Executive Summary Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Bond yields in the developed world have ticked higher recently, due to a renewed increase in oil prices and the spillover effect from more hawkish policy expectations out of Europe. The competing forces of slowing global growth momentum and geopolitical uncertainty on one side, and high inflation with tightening monetary policies on the other, will keep global government bond yields rangebound over the next several months. UK investment grade corporate bonds now offer an intriguing combination of higher yields, attractive spread valuations and strong financial health. By maturity, shorter-maturity corporates offer the best value. At the industry level, spreads look most attractive for Financials. A hawkish Bank of England, both through rate hikes and upcoming outright sales of corporate debt the central bank has purchased via quantitative easing, remains a major headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Sectors most at risk to central bank sales are Water, Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Non-Cyclicals. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios. Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Trendless, Friendless Bond Markets Chart 1Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock... Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock... Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock... Although it may not feel like it given the ferocity of some daily price swings, many important financial markets have not moved all that much, cumulatively, since the first major shock of 2022 – the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24. For example, the S&P 500 is only down around -2% from the pre-invasion level, while the VIX index of equity option volatility is at 24, seven points below the closing level on February 23 (Chart 1). The Bloomberg US investment grade corporate bond index spread is only 12bps above its pre-invasion level, down 20bps from the peak seen in mid-May. More recently, even US bond yields have shown signs of stabilization. The 10-year US Treasury yield has traded in a 2.70-3.15% range since the start of April, while the MOVE index of US Treasury option volatility has fallen by one-quarter since its most recent peak in early May. Not all markets, however, have seen this kind of relative stability. Global oil prices are trading close to post-invasion highs, as are government bond yields in Germany and the UK. High-yield credit spreads in the US and Europe are both still around 50bps above where they were pre-invasion. The DXY US dollar index is 6% above the pre-invasion level, led by the USD/JPY currency pair that has appreciated to levels last seen in 2002. Given the mix of slowing global growth momentum and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty, but with persistent high inflation and tightening global monetary policy, it is unsurprising that financial markets are having a difficult time formulating a consistent message. This is especially true for global government bond yields. Chart 2Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Even as market-based inflation expectations have eased a bit in recent weeks, bond yields across the developed world have been unable to decline because markets continue to discount more rate hikes (Chart 2). Yet with such a significant amount of monetary tightening now priced in across all countries, global bond yields are more likely to stay rangebound over the next 3-6 months than begin a new trend. Chart 3DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy 10-year government bond yields and 2-year-ahead interest rate expectations in overnight index swap (OIS) curves are trading in lockstep in the US, Europe, UK, Canada and Australia (Chart 3). This correlation indicates that longer-term bond yields have become a pure play on future policy rate expectations, rather than a reflection of rising inflation expectations as was the case in 2021. However, both yields and rate expectations are now trading close to, or even well above, plausible estimates of neutral nominal policy rates in all regions - including estimates provided by central bankers themselves. For example, in Australia, where the RBA just delivered a 50bp rate hike this week, markets are pricing in a peak Cash Rate between 3.5-4%, even with RBA Governor Philip Lowe stating that the neutral rate is likely in the 2-3% range – a view that we agree with. The situation is even more extreme in the euro area, with the euro area OIS curve now pricing in a peak policy rate between 1.5-2%, with most of that increase coming over the next 12 months. While we expect the ECB to fully exit the negative (deposit) rate era by September, rate hikes beyond that are far less likely given slowing euro area growth momentum and still-moderate euro area inflation beyond the spillover effects from energy costs. Only in the US are markets potentially underestimating the potential peak in the fed funds rate for this tightening cycle. Estimates of the longer-run (neutral) funds rate from the latest set of FOMC projections back in March ranged from 2.0-3.0%. Thus, the current level of 10-year bond yields, and 2-year-ahead rates discounted in the US OIS curve, are only at the top end of that range. It is possible that the Fed will have to raise rates to restrictive levels (i.e. above 3%) given the size of the current US inflation overshoot. More importantly, the US neutral rate is likely higher than the Fed thinks it is, possibly as high as 4% according to BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin. We continue to see the US as the one major government bond market where there is a risk that markets are underestimating the neutral policy rate. For that reason, we remain underweight US Treasuries in the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio. Don’t Dismiss The QT Effect One other factor that has likely kept global bond yields elevated, even as global growth has softened, has been the shift away from central bank asset purchases towards quantitative tightening (QT). As policymakers have moved to slow, or even stop, the buying of government bonds, the term premium component of longer-term bond yields has risen. The moves have been quite large. Using our own in-house estimates, the term premium on 10-year government bond yields have jumped by about 100bps on average in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and Europe since the lows seen during the 2020 COVID global recession (Chart 4). The jump in term premiums is occurring at the same time as markets have moved to price in more rate hikes and a higher path for real interest rates (bottom panel). Chart 4Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT Chart 5Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure That combined effect of the upward repricing of term premiums – especially as more price-sensitive private investors replace the demand for bonds from price-insensitive central banks - but with less upward movement in already elevated interest rate expectations will keep longer-term bond yields in trading ranges during the “Global QT Phase” over at least the next six months and likely longer. That message is reinforced by our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum over the latter half of 2022 (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios, with yields in the major developed markets likely to stay rangebound over the next few months. Assessing The Value In UK Investment Grade Corporates Chart 6A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields Global credit markets have had a rough time in 2022, and UK corporate debt is no exception. The Bloomberg UK Corporate index of investment grade corporate debt has delivered a year-to-date total return of -11%, as the index yield-to-maturity rose 174bps to 4% - the highest level since 2014 (Chart 6). Relative to UK Gilts, the results have also been grim as corporate credit spreads have widened, with the Bloomberg UK corporate index realizing an excess return of -3% since the start of the year. We have maintained a neutral stance on UK corporate bond exposure in our global model bond portfolio during the selloff. This was the result of a relative value opinion, as we have concentrated our more defensive view on global investment grade corporate debt with an underweight to US corporates. However, after the significant repricing of UK investment grade credit, it is now a good time to reassess our opinion on the asset class. Spread Valuation From a pure spread valuation perspective, UK investment grade now looks more attractive. Our preferred valuation metric – 12-month breakeven spreads - shows that the UK investment grade corporate index spread, on a duration-adjusted basis, is now in the 75th percentile of its history over the past 25 years (Chart 7). Chart 7UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value We find 12-month breakevens to a useful spread valuation measure, as they show how much spreads would need to widen to make the expected one-year-ahead return on a credit product equal to that of a duration-matched position in government bonds. In other words, breakevens measure the spread “cushion” against excess return losses from spread widening. What makes the current attractive reading on UK investment grade spread valuation so interesting is that the absolute level of spreads is still relatively low. The Bloomberg UK investment grade corporate index spread is currently 170bps, but during previous episodes where the 12-month breakeven as near the top quartile ranking – as is currently the case – the index spread ranged from 200-350bps. The reason for that relates to the index duration which, at 7.3 years, is down 1.5 years from the 2020 peak and at the lowest level since 2011. Some of that lower duration is related to the convexity effect from higher corporate bond yields. But there has also been a reduction in the average maturity of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, with the index average maturity now at 10.4 years, down a full year lower over the past 12 months and the lowest average maturity since 1999. UK companies appear to have shortened up the maturity profile of their bond issuance, which helped reduce the riskiness (duration) of corporate bond returns to rising yields. Thus, the message from the 12-month breakevens is correct – UK investment grade corporate bond yields are attractive from a historical perspective, on a duration-adjusted basis. Chart 8UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat When looking within the UK investment grade universe, the messages on valuation are a bit more mixed. The UK credit curve is not particularly steep, when looking at the spread differences by credit rating within the benchmark index universe (Chart 8). There is a similar message when looking at 12-month breakevens broken down by credit rating, where there is little difference between the percentile rankings (Chart 9). However, the 12-month breakeven percentile rankings broken down by maturity buckets show that shorter-maturity bonds have noticeably higher percentile rankings than longer-maturity UK corporates (top panel). From a cross-country perspective, UK corporate breakeven percentile rankings are much higher than equivalent rankings for US corporates, but are lower than those of the euro area. Chart 9Shorter-Maturity UK Spreads Are More Attractive Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Corporate Financial Health Our top-down UK Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - which uses data on non-financial corporate sector revenues, expenses and balance sheets taken from GDP accounts – has shown a very strong improvement in UK corporate financial health over the past few years (Chart 10). The biggest improvements are in the categories related to debt service, with interest coverage at the highest level since 2002 and debt coverage is at the highest level since 1999. Chart 10UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates Chart 11Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done The message from our top-down UK CHM is similar to the conclusions from an October 2021 BoE report that analyzed the UK corporate sector from a financial stability perspective. In that report, the BoE used a bottom-up sample of 500 UK companies and concluded that corporate borrowing rates could rise as much as 400bps before the share of companies with a “distressed” interest coverage ratio below 2.5 would rise to the past historical peak. Within our top-down UK CHM, relatively wide corporate profit margins are also contributing to the strong reading on UK corporate health. Like the interest/debt coverage ratios, those margins provide some cushion to profits in the current environment of high inflation and elevated input costs for businesses. The all-in message from our UK CHM is that financial health is a fundamental tailwind for UK corporate bond performance. Monetary Policy Attractive spread valuations and strong financial health metrics would normally justify an overweight stance on any corporate bond market. However, the monetary policy cycle is also an important factor that drives corporate bond performance. Currently, with the BoE not only hiking rates but also moving to QT on asset purchases, monetary policy is a severe headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyIt’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts The annual growth rate of the BoE’s balance sheet has proven to be a reliable leading indicator of UK corporate bond annual excess returns. With the growth in the balance sheet set to turn negative in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 11), it will prove difficult for UK credit spreads to narrow in a way that will boost excess returns. The BoE’s aggressive (by its standards) rate hiking cycle, in response to UK inflation that is nearing 10% alongside a very tight labor market, remains a threat to UK economic growth that is already losing some momentum. As we discussed in a recent Special Report, the UK neutral interest rate is likely no more than 1.5-2%. If the BoE were to follow current market pricing and push Bank Rate toward 2.5%, this would be a restrictive policy stance that would likely result in a sharp growth slowdown if not a full-blown recession. Importantly, our UK Central Bank Monitor is showing signs of peaking (bottom panel), due to signs of slower economic growth and tightening financial conditions. A peak in UK inflation would help reduce the Monitor even further, and would likely correspond to a pause on BoE rate hikes – a necessary condition before we would upgrade our recommended stance on UK investment grade corporates to overweight. Some Final Thoughts On Industry Sector Valuation Our UK investment grade corporate sector valuation model is a cross-sectional analysis of individual industry/sector corporate credit spreads, after controlling for differences in duration, convexity and credit rating. The model is currently signaling that there are few compelling valuation stories with positive “risk-adjusted” spreads (Chart 12). Only Financials look cheap, while Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Capital Goods are all trading at expensive risk-adjusted spreads. Chart 12Not Many Compelling Values Within UK Corporates By Industry Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields An additional risk to UK corporate bond performance relates to the BoE’s decision to unwind its corporate bond portfolio. The BoE has announced that there will be outright sales from the corporate holdings accumulated over the past couple of years, with a goal of having the stock of debt fully unwound by the end of 2023. This is important for much of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, where the BoE holds between 8-10%, on average, of outstanding debt (Chart 13).1 Chart 13The BoE Has Become An Important Corporate Bondholder Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields When we compare our risk-adjusted spreads versus the BoE ownership share by sector, we conclude that Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Other Utilities offer the most unattractive combination of expensive spreads and high BoE concentration (Chart 14). We recommended underweight allocations to those sectors within an overall neutral allocation to UK corporates. Chart 14BoE Asset Sales Are A Major Risk For Some UK Corporate Sectors Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, given the mix of attractive valuations but tighter monetary policy. Favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In Chart 13, we use the market capitalization of each sector from the Bloomberg UK corporate bond index in the numerator of all ratios shown, as a proxy for outstanding debt. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields

Global Fixed Income Strategy

08 Jun 2022

The Case For A Soft Landing

Highlights Chart 1Wage Growth Is Cooling Wage Growth Is Cooling Wage Growth Is Cooling In a speech last week, Fed Governor Christopher Waller presented the theoretical underpinnings for how the Fed plans to achieve a soft landing for the US economy.1 The Fed’s hope is that tighter monetary policy will slow demand enough to reduce the number of job openings – of which there are currently almost two for every unemployed person – without leading to a significant increase in layoffs and the unemployment rate. A reduction in the ratio of job openings to unemployed will lead to softer wage growth and lower inflation. The May employment report – released last Friday – provides some evidence that the Fed’s plan may be working. In May, an increase in labor force participation led to strong employment gains and kept the unemployment rate flat. We also saw continued evidence of a deceleration in average hourly earnings (Chart 1). Fifty basis point rate hikes are all but assured at the June and July FOMC meetings, but softer wage growth and falling inflation make it more likely that the Fed will downshift to a pace of 25 bps per meeting starting in September. Feature Table 1 Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Investment Grade: Underweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 79 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -215 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 131 bps. Similarly, our quality-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread downshifted to its 45th percentile since 1995 (Chart 2). A recent report made the case for why investors should underweight investment grade corporate bonds on a 6-12 month horizon.2 The main rationale for this recommendation is that the slope of the Treasury curve is very flat, signaling that we are in the mid-to-late stages of the credit cycle. Corporate bond performance tends to be weak during such periods unless spreads start from very high levels. Despite our underweight 6-12 month investment stance, we see a high likelihood that spreads will narrow during the next few months as inflation falls and the Fed tightens by no more than what is already priced in the curve. That said, the persistent removal of monetary accommodation and flatness of the yield curve will limit how much spreads can compress. Last week’s report dug deeper into the corporate bond space and concluded that investment grade-rated Energy bonds offer exceptional value on a 6-12 month horizon.3 That report also concluded that long maturity investment grade corporates are attractively priced relative to short maturity bonds. Table 3A Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 35 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -316 bps. More specifically, high-yield sold off dramatically early in the month – the junk index lagged Treasuries by 368 bps between May 1 and May 20 – but then staged a rally near the end of May, outperforming Treasuries by 333 bps between May 20 and May 31. The 12-month spread-implied default rate – the default rate that is priced into the junk index assuming a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt and an excess spread of 100 bps – moved higher in May. It currently sits at 5.1% (Chart 3). Last week’s report reiterated our view that investors should favor high-yield over investment grade within an overall underweight allocation to spread product versus Treasuries.4 Our main rationale for this view is that there are historical precedents for high-yield bonds outperforming investment grade during periods when the yield curve is very flat but when corporate balance sheet health is strong. The 2006-07 period is a prime example. With that in mind, our outlook for corporate profit and debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 2.7% to 3.7% during the next 12 months, well below the 5.1% that is currently priced in the index. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 70 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -109 bps. We discussed the outlook for Agency MBS in a recent report.5 We noted that MBS’s poor performance in 2021 and early-2022 was driven by duration extension. Fewer homeowners refinanced their loans as mortgage rates rose, and the MBS index’s average duration increased (Chart 4). But now, the index’s duration extension is at its end. The average convexity of the MBS index is close to zero (panel 3), meaning that duration is now insensitive to changes in rates. This is because hardly any homeowners have the incentive to refinance at current mortgage rates (panel 4). The implication is that excess MBS returns will be stronger going forward. That said, we still don’t see enough value in MBS spreads to increase our recommended allocation. The average index spread for conventional 30-year Agency MBS remains close to its lowest level since 2000 (bottom panel). At the coupon level, we observe that low-coupon MBS have much higher duration than high-coupon MBS and that convexity is close to zero for the entire coupon stack. This makes the relative coupon trade a direct play on bond yields. Given that we see some potential for yields to fall somewhat during the next six months, we recommend favoring low-coupon MBS (1.5%-2.5%) within an overall underweight allocation to the sector.ext 12 months, well below the 5.1% that is currently priced in the index. Emerging Market Bonds (USD): Underweight Chart 5Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Market (EM) bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 29 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -565 bps. EM sovereigns outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 125 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -664 bps. The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index underperformed by 28 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -501 bps. The EM Sovereign Index underperformed the duration-equivalent US corporate bond index by 27 bps in May. The yield differential between EM sovereigns and duration-matched US corporates remains negative (Chart 5). As such, we continue to recommend a maximum underweight allocation to EM sovereigns. The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index underperformed duration-matched US corporates by 109 bps in May, but it continues to offer a significant yield advantage (panel 4). As such, we maintain our neutral allocation (3 out of 5) to the sector. Despite modest weakness in the trade-weighted US dollar in May, EM currencies continue to struggle (bottom panel). If the Fed tightens no more quickly than what is already priced in the curve for the next six months – as we expect – it could limit the upward pressure on the US dollar and benefit EM spreads in the near term. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 61 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -78 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We view the municipal bond sector as better placed than most to cope with the recent bout of spread product volatility. As we noted in a recent report, state & local government revenue growth has been strong and yet governments have also been slow to hire.6 The result is that net state & local government savings are incredibly high (Chart 6) and it will take some time to deplete those coffers even as economic growth slows and federal fiscal thrust turns to drag. On the valuation front, munis have cheapened up relative to both Treasuries and corporates during the past few months. The 10-year Aaa Muni/Treasury yield ratio is currently 83%, up significantly from its 2021 trough of 55%. The yield ratio between 12-17 year munis and duration-matched corporate bonds is also up significantly off its lows (panel 2). We reiterate our overweight allocation to municipal bonds within US fixed income portfolios, and we continue to have a strong preference for long-maturity munis. The yield ratio between 17-year+ General Obligation Municipal bonds and duration-matched corporates is 85%. The same measure for 17-year+ Revenue bonds stands at 92%, just below parity even without considering municipal debt’s tax advantage. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-steepened in May. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope steepened 13 bps on the month and the 5-year/30-year slope steepened 22 bps. The 2/10 and 5/30 slopes now stand at 30 bps and 16 bps, respectively. In a recent Special Report we noted the unusually large divergence between flat slopes at the long end of the curve and steep slopes at the front end.7 For example, the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope is currently 1 bp while the 3-month/5-year slope is 178 bps. The divergence is happening because the market has moved quicky to price-in a rapid near-term pace of rate hikes. However, so far, the Fed has only delivered 75 bps of tightening and this is holding down the very front-end of the curve. The oddly shaped curve presents us with an excellent trading opportunity. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This trade looks attractive on our model (Chart 7) and will profit if the rate hike cycle moves more slowly than what is currently priced but lasts longer. We also continue to recommend a position long the 20-year bullet versus a duration-matched 10/30 barbell as an attractive carry trade. TIPS: Underweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 144 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +237 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 25 bps last month, but it remains above the Fed’s 2.3% - 2.5% comfort zone (Chart 8). Our TIPS Breakeven Valuation Indicator shows that TIPS remain “expensive”, but not as expensive as they were a month ago (panel 2). While TIPS have become less expensive during the past month, we think TIPS breakeven inflation rates will continue to fall during the next few months as inflation moves lower. This will be particularly true at the front-end of the curve where breakevens remain disconnected from the Fed’s target (panel 4) and where breakevens exhibit a stronger correlation with the incoming inflation data. To take advantage of falling inflation between now and the end of the year, investors should position for a steeper TIPS breakeven curve (bottom panel) and/or a flatter real (TIPS) curve. We also recommend that investors hold outright short positions in 2-year TIPS. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 26 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -63 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 26 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -59 bps. Non-Aaa ABS underperformed by 22 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -88 bps. During the past two years, substantial federal government support for household incomes caused US households to build up an extremely large buffer of excess savings. Nowhere is this more evident than in the steep drop in the amount of outstanding credit card debt that was witnessed in 2020 and 2021 (Chart 9). In 2022, consumers have started to re-lever. The personal savings rate was just 4.4% in April, the lowest print since September 2008, and the amount of outstanding credit card debt has almost recovered its pre-COVID level. But while household balance sheets are starting to deteriorate, they remain exceptionally strong in level terms. In other words, it will be some time before we see enough deterioration to cause a meaningful uptick in consumer credit delinquencies. Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum, favoring non-Aaa rated securities over Aaa-rated ones. Non-Agency CMBS: Overweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 105 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -189 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 84 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -152 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed by 165 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -290 bps. CMBS spreads remain wide compared to other similarly risky spread products. However, after several quarters of easing, commercial real estate lending standards shifted closer to ‘net tightening’ territory in Q1 (Chart 10). This trend will bear monitoring in the coming quarters. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 49 bps, not that far from its average pre-COVID level (bottom panel). Agency CMBS spreads also continue to look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 251 basis points of rate hikes during the next 12 months. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with excess returns for a front-loaded and a back-loaded rate hike scenario. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of May 31, 2022) The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of May 31, 2022) The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of -51 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope flattens by less than 51 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of May 31, 2022) The Case For A Soft Landing The Case For A Soft Landing Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20220530a.htm 2 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Turning Defensive On US Corporate Bonds”, dated April 12, 2022. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Looking For Opportunities In US & European Corporates After The Recent Selloff”, dated May 31, 2022. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Looking For Opportunities In US & European Corporates After The Recent Selloff”, dated May 31, 2022. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bond Market Implications Of A 5% Mortgage Rate”, dated April 26, 2022. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Echoes Of 2018”, dated May 24, 2022. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy / US Investment Strategy / US Equity Strategy Special Report, “The Yield Curve As An Indicator”, dated March 29, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

US Bond Strategy by Ryan Swift

07 Jun 2022

Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession?

Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary Recession Checklist Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? US stocks were down almost 20% at their lowest point in May. Any lower and they would be pricing in recession. Central banks will raise rates to or above neutral to ensure that inflation comes back down to their targets. This will cause growth to slow. Markets will now start to worry more about faltering growth than about high inflation. In our recession checklist (see Table), no indicator is yet pointing to recession, but some may do so soon. The jury is likely to be out for some time on whether there will be a recession in the next 12-18 months. In the meantime, equities are likely to move sideways, amid high volatility. Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Bottom Line: Investors should stay cautiously positioned for now, with only a neutral weighting in equities, and tilts towards more defensive markets and sectors. We recommend a large holding in cash to allow for funds to be redeployed quickly when there is a better entry-point. The narrative driving global markets has shifted from worries about inflation, to fretting about the risk of recession. Although headline inflation remains high (8.3% year-on-year in the US and 8.1% in the eurozone), inflation pressures have clearly peaked (for now, at least): Broad measures, such as the US trimmed-mean PCE, have started to ease significantly (Chart 1). Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 1Inflationary Pressures Are Starting To Ease Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? But now signs are emerging of a slowdown in economic growth. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Indexes in all the major regions have turned down (Chart 2), and global industrial production is falling year-on-year (albeit partly because of lingering supply-side bottlenecks) (Chart 3). Chart 2Global Growth Is Turning Down Global Growth Is Turning Down Global Growth Is Turning Down Chart 3IP Growth Has Turned Negative IP Growth Has Turned Negative IP Growth Has Turned Negative Equity markets – with US stocks down 19% from their peak to the May low, and global stocks 17% – are pricing in a slowdown, but not yet a recession. As we have often argued, it is almost unheard of to have a bear market (defined as a greater than 20% decline in US stocks) without a recession – the last time that happened was in 1987 (and all on one day, Black Monday) (Chart 4). Note from the chart how often stocks correct by 19-20%, on concerns about recession, without tipping into a bear market. That is where we stand today. Chart 4US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession Table 1Recession Checklist Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? So the key question is: Will we have a recession over the next 12-18 months? We have dug out the recession checklist we last used in 2019 (Table 1). While none of the indicators are yet clearly pointing to recession, several may do so by year-end (Chart 5). And there are a number of warning signs starting to flash. The US housing market – the most interest-rate sensitive part of the economy – could soon see home prices falling, after the 200 BPs rise in the 30-year mortgage rate since the start of the year (Chart 6). Wages have failed to rise in line with inflation, which has led to retail sales falling year-on-year in real terms (Chart 7). And there are even some signs that companies are slowing their hiring, presumably on worries about the durability of the recovery: In the latest ISM surveys, the employment component fell to close to 50 (Chart 8). Chart 5Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Chart 6Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Chart 7Real Retail Sales Are Falling Real Retail Sales Are Falling Real Retail Sales Are Falling Chart 8Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? The strongest argument against there being a recession is the $2.2 trillion of excess savings held by US households (and $5 trillion among households in all major developed economies). The argument is that, even if interest rates rise and real wage growth is negative, consumers can continue to spend by dipping into these accumulated savings. But there are some problems here. The savings are highly concentrated among the rich, who have a lower propensity to spend (Chart 9). Because of “mental accounting” biases, people may think only of current income, not savings, when considering how much to spend. And, as spending shifts back from goods to services, now that pandemic rules are largely over (Chart 10), spending on manufactured products is likely to fall below trend (since many purchases were brought forward). But it is hard to catch up on previously missed services spending (you can’t take three vacations this year to make up for those you missed in 2020 and 2021), and so services spending will, at best, only return to trend. Chart 9The Rich Have All The Money The Rich Have All The Money The Rich Have All The Money Chart 10Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending? Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending? Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending? Meanwhile, central banks will be focused on fighting inflation. All of them are expected to take rates to or above neutral over the next 12 months (Chart 11) – implying a squeeze on aggregate demand. Although inflation may be peaking, it is still well above most central banks’ comfort zones. In the US, for example, the FOMC expects core PCE to ease to 4.1% by year-end and 2.6% by end-2023, but that is still higher than its 2% target. The Fed is likely to remain focused on the upside risks to inflation: From rising services prices (Chart 12), and the risk of a price-wage spiral (Chart 13). BCA Research’s bond strategists expect the Fed to hike by 50 BPs at each of the next two meetings (in June and July), and then to revert to 25 BPs a meeting, as long as it is clear by then that inflation is trending down.1 Chart 11Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Chart 12Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Our conclusion is that the jury is out on the probability of recession – and is likely to stay out for a while. So far this year, equities and bonds have both performed poorly – with a 60:40 equity/bond portfolio producing the worst start to a year in three decades (Chart 14). Equities have wobbled because of tight monetary policy and worries about slowing growth; bonds because of inflation concerns. This is likely to remain the case until there is more clarity about the risk of recession. In this environment, we expect global equities to move sideways, with significant volatility – falling on signs of weakening growth, but rallying on hopes that the Fed may change its course.2 Chart 13...And A Price-Wage Spiral ...And A Price-Wage Spiral ...And A Price-Wage Spiral Chart 14Nowhere To Hide This Year Nowhere To Hide This Year Nowhere To Hide This Year We continue, therefore, to recommend fairly cautious portfolio positioning, with a neutral weight in global equities (and a preference for defensive country and sector allocations). Investors should keep a healthy holding in cash, giving them dry powder to use when a better entry-point into risk assets presents itself. Fixed Income: Bond yields have fallen over the past month, with the US 10-year Treasury yield slipping to 2.8% from 3.1% in early May. As per BCA Research’s Golden Rule of Bond Investing, the level of yields will be determined by whether the Fed (and other central banks) surprise dovishly or hawkishly relative to market expectations (Chart 15).3 The Fed is likely to hike slightly less this year than the market is pricing in, but may continue to raise rates beyond mid-2023, compared to a market expectation of rate cuts then (see Chart 11, panel 1 above). This points to the 10-year yield remaining broadly flat for the rest of this year, but possibly rising after that. Historically, rates tend to peak in line with trend nominal GDP growth (Chart 16). This means that, if the expansion continues for another couple of years, the 10-year yield could reach 4%. We, therefore, recommend an underweight on bonds. However, government bonds do now represent a good hedge again, with strong capital gain in the event of recession (Table 2). We recommend a neutral weight on government bonds within the fixed-income category. Chart 15The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 16Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Table 2Government Bonds Now Offer Good Returns In A Recession Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 17Credit Now Offers Attractive Valuations Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? The recent rise in credit spreads has opened some opportunities. Valuations for both investment-grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) bonds are now attractive again, with all but the highest-quality bonds trading at a breakeven spread higher than the long-run median (Chart 17). The likelihood of defaults is rising, however, so we lower our weighting in HY (whilst remaining slightly overweight) and raise the weight in IG, also to a small overweight. We fund this by cutting our recommendation in Emerging Market debt to underweight. Credit, especially in the US, now offers tempting returns as long as the economy avoids recession, and is a relatively low-risk way to gain exposure to upside surprises. Chart 18US Performance Has Lagged This Year US Performance Has Lagged This Year US Performance Has Lagged This Year Equities: US relative equity performance has been a little disappointing year-to-date, dragged down by the performance of the IT sector (Chart 18). Nonetheless, we stick to our overweight, given the market’s lower beta and the likely greater resilience of the US economy. Among sectors, we raise our weighting in Energy to overweight from neutral. Our energy strategists recently lifted their forecast for end-2022 Brent crude to $120 from $90, and raise the possibility of even $140 (see below for more on why). Despite the sharp outperformance of Energy stocks over the past six months, the sector has barely registered net inflows – presumably because of ESG (Chart 19). As we argued in a recent report, oil producers could be the new “sin stocks”, making the sector attractive over the next few years to investors who do not have ethical restraints on investing in it. We fund the overweight in Energy by lowering our weighting in Industrials to neutral. Capex is a late-cycle play and capital-goods makers benefited as manufacturers rushed to increase production during the recent consumer boom. But signs are now emerging that companies are becoming more cautious on capex (Chart 20). Chart 19Weak Flows Into The Energy Sector Despite Strong Performance Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 20Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Commodities: China’s growth remains very weak and, although commodity prices have started to fall (with copper down 9% and iron ore 11% in Q2), they have not yet caught up with the slowdown in Chinese imports (Chart 21). The key question is whether China will now roll out a big stimulus. Given the government’s determination to persevere with the zero-Covid policy, and its need to achieve the 5.5% GDP growth target this year, it will eventually have no choice. But it is reluctant to trigger another housing boom, and there are doubts about how effective stimulus would be given the property market’s dysfunction. For now, we remain cautious on the Materials sector, and on commodities as an alternative asset – though the long-term structural story (because of the build-out of alternative energy) remains strong. Oil and natural-gas prices are likely to remain high due to disruptions in supply from Russia. Russia will probably have to shut 1.6 m b/d of production following the EU embargo on Russian oil imports. The EU is rushing to build up natural-gas inventories before the winter, in case Russia bans gas exports to Europe in retaliation (Chart 22). Higher oil prices are positive for the Energy sector, and for countries such as Canada (whose equity market we raise to neutral, funding this by trimming the overweight in the US). Chart 21Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Chart 22The EU Will Need To Buy Lots Of Natural Gas Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Currencies: Momentum, cyclical factors, and interest-rate differentials still favor the US dollar. Although the Fed will not raise rates quite as much as futures are pricing in, other central banks – especially the ECB and the Reserve Bank of Australia – will miss by more (Table 3). Nevertheless, the USD looks very overvalued (Chart 23) and speculators are long the currency. This means that, once global growth bottoms, there could be a sharp depreciation in the dollar. We remain neutral on the USD. Our preferred defensive currency is the CHF, since the other usual safe haven, the JPY, will remain depressed if, as we expect, the Bank of Japan persists with its yield curve control, limiting the 10-year JGB yield to 0.25%. Table 3Most Central Banks Will Not Hike As Much As Futures Predict Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 23US Dollar Is Very Overvalued US Dollar Is Very Overvalued US Dollar Is Very Overvalued Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “Echoes Of 2018” dated May 24, 2022. 2 BCA Research’s US equity strategists call this a “Fat and Flat” market. Please see “What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat”. 3 Please see “Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks” for an explanation of how the Golden Rule works in different countries. Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Global Asset Allocation

01 Jun 2022

The New Normal In Australia

Executive Summary Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates The neutral interest rate in Australia is lower than in past cycles, for several reasons: low potential growth, weak productivity, high household debt and inflated housing valuations. Interest rate markets are discounting a very aggressive monetary tightening cycle in Australia, with the RBA Cash Rate expected to reach 2.6% by end-2022 and 3.1% by end-2023. Australian inflation will peak in H2/2022, and the RBA will not need to raise rates beyond the midpoint of the RBA's estimated neutral range of 2-3%. The Australian dollar has not responded to rising interest rate expectations or high commodity prices, largely due to weak Chinese growth. The Aussie is cheap and has upside if China delivers more economic stimulus. The newly-elected Labor-led government will not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Expect modest fiscal stimulus, with increased spending, but also minor tax hikes for multinational corporations and high-income earners. Bottom Line: For global bond investors, an overweight allocation to Australian government bonds is warranted with the RBA likely to disappoint aggressive market rate hike expectations. For currency investors, the undervalued Australian dollar is an attractive play on an eventual rebound of Chinese growth. Feature The month of May has been eventful for investors in Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivered its first interest rate hike since 2010 on May 3, a move that markets had expected but which was much earlier than the RBA’s prior forward guidance. The May 21 federal election returned the Labor party to power for the first time since 2013. These events introduce new risks for the Australian economy and financial markets, altering a policy backdrop that had been highly stimulative - and, more importantly, highly predictable - during the pandemic but must now change in response to the new reality of high inflation. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy, we discuss the investment implications of the start of the monetary tightening cycle and the new government in Australia. Our main conclusions: markets are somehow pricing in both too many RBA rate hikes and not enough currency upside for the Australian dollar, while expectations for major fiscal policy changes should be tempered. Will The RBA Kill The Economic Recovery? Australian government bonds have been one of the worst performers in the developed world so far in 2022 (Chart 1), delivering a total return of -9.1% in AUD terms, and -9% in USD-hedged terms, according to Bloomberg. The benchmark 10-year yield now sits at 3.20%, up +142bps since the start of the year but off the 8-year intraday high of 3.6% reached in early May. Australia has historically been a “high-beta” bond market that sees yields rise more when global bond yields are rising. That is a legacy of the days when the RBA had to push policy rates to levels that exceeded other major central banks like the Fed during global tightening cycles. But by the RBA’s own admission, the neutral policy interest rate is now lower than in previous years, perhaps no more than 0% in real terms according to RBA Governor Philip Lowe. Our RBA Monitor, which consists of economic and financial variables that typically correlate to pressure on the RBA to tighten or ease policy, has been signaling since mid-2021 that higher interest rates were increasingly likely (Chart 2). However, markets have moved to price in a very rapid and aggressive tightening, with a whopping 268bps of rate hikes discounted over the next year in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve. Chart 1Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers Chart 2Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening The growth component of the RBA Monitor will likely soon ease up with the OECD leading economic indicator for Australia in a clear downtrend (bottom panel). However, the inflation component of the RBA Monitor will stay elevated for longer given current high inflation - headline CPI inflation in Australia hit a 20-year high of 5.1% in Q1/2022 - and the tight Australian labor market. Even with those robust inflation pressures, markets are pricing in a peak level of interest rates that appears far more restrictive than the RBA is willing, and likely able, to deliver. We see three primary reasons for this. Weak Potential Growth Implies A Lower Neutral Rate The OIS curve is priced for the RBA Cash Rate staying between 3-4% over the next decade (Chart 3). The real policy rate (adjusted by CPI swap forwards as the proxy for inflation expectations), is expected to average around 1% over that same period. Those are the highest “terminal rate” estimates among the G10 economies. At the press conference following the May 3 rate hike, RBA Governor Lowe noted that “it’s not unreasonable to expect that the normalization of interest rates over the period ahead could see interest rates rise to 2.5%”. Lowe said that was the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target, thus the expected normalization of policy rates would take the inflation-adjusted real rate to 0%. That is a far cry from the more aggressive increase in real rates discounted in the Australian OIS and CPI swap curves. Lowe also noted that a real rate above 0% “over time […] would require stronger productivity growth in Australia.” On that front, the data is not suggesting that the RBA will need to reconsider its views on the neutral real interest rate anytime soon. The 5-year annualized growth rate of labor productivity is an anemic -0.8%, down from the mid-2010s peak of around 1.5% and far below the late-1990s peak of around 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates Chart 4A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate Chart 5The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking Assuming a pre-pandemic growth rate of the working age population of between 1-1.5%, and productivity around 0.5%, Australia’s potential GDP growth rate is, at best, around 2% (middle panel) and is likely even lower than that. The working-age population growth rate fell to 0% during the pandemic due to migration restrictions that have yet to be lifted. However, population growth had already been slowing pre-COVID due to falling birth rates and reduced worker visa caps in 2018-19. High Household Debt Raises Interest Rate Sensitivity Of Consumer Demand Sluggish trend growth is not the only reason why Australia’s neutral interest rate is lower than markets are discounting. Given elevated housing valuations and aggressive lending practices, highly indebted Australian households are now more sensitive to rate increases than in years past. Australian mortgage lenders began aggressively issuing shorter-term (typically 3-year) fixed rate mortgages in 2020 after the collapse in bond yields due to the initial COVID shock, to entice borrowers to lock in low interest rates. This raised the share of new fixed rate mortgages from a historic average around 15% of all new mortgages to nearly 50%. Since the RBA ended its yield curve control policy last November, which targeted 3-year bond yields, 3-year fixed mortgage rates have surged from 2.93% to 4.34%. That already has had an impact on housing demand - home price growth has peaked in the major cities according to CoreLogic, while building approvals are contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 5). As the surge of fixed rate mortgage loans begin to mature in 2023, Australian homeowners will see a major spike in refinancing costs, both for fixed rate and variable rate lending. This trend should weaken home demand, and house price inflation, even further. Inflation Will Soon Peak The RBA expects softer house price inflation to help slow overall Australian inflation rates. The central bank is projecting headline CPI inflation to fall from the latest 5.1% to 4.3% by June 2023 and 2.9% by June 2024 (Chart 6). That would still be a level near the top of the RBA target band, but the downtrend could be even faster than that. As in many other countries, the latest surge in Australian inflation has been led by a rapid increase in goods prices related to severe demand/supply mismatches at a time of global supply chain bottlenecks. Australian goods inflation hit an 31-year high of 6.6% in Q1/2022, essentially matching the housing component of the CPI index (Chart 7). Yet with US goods inflation having already peaked, as have global shipping costs, it is likely that Australia goods inflation will soon follow suit. This will lower headline Australian inflation to levels more consistent with services inflation, which reached 3% in Q1/2022. Chart 6The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation That floor in more domestically-driven services inflation will also be influenced by the pace of wage growth in Australia. The latest reading on the best wage indicator Down Under, the Wage Price Index, showed that year-over-year wage growth only reached 2.4% in Q1/2022. Chart 7Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak This is a surprisingly low outcome given the tightness of the Australian labor market with the unemployment rate at an all-time low of 3.9% (Chart 8). Depressed labor supply is not a factor keeping the unemployment rate low, as the labor force participation rate and hours worked are both above pre-pandemic levels. Prior to the rate hike at the May 3 policy meeting, the RBA had been highlighting soft wage growth as a reason to delay the start of the monetary tightening cycle. After the May meeting, RBA Governor Lowe noted that according to the RBA’s “liaison” surveys of Australian businesses, nearly 40% of respondents said they were giving wage increases above 3%. The RBA believes that wage growth in the 3-4% range is consistent with Australian inflation remaining within the RBA’s 2-3% target band, a condition that was deemed necessary before rate hikes could begin. The message from the RBA liaison surveys was enough to trigger the start of the tightening cycle. While the Australia OIS curve is priced for an aggressive series of rate hikes, and shorter-term interest rate expectations are elevated, there is less inflationary concern priced into medium-term inflation expectations. The 5-year/5-year forward Australia CPI swap is at 2.2%, down -15bps since the start of 2022 and barely within the RBA target band. Some of that is a global factor – the 5-year/5-year forward US TIPS breakeven has declined by -44bps over just the past month. However, the Australia 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap peaked at the start of the year, just as Australian interest rate expectations began to ratchet higher (the 2-year Australia government bond yield was 0.35% at the start of 2022 and now sits at 2.61%). An increasing amount of discounted rate hikes, occurring alongside falling inflation expectations, is a sign that markets are incrementally pricing in a restrictive monetary policy. We agree with RBA Governor Lowe’s assessment that the neutral nominal Cash Rate is, at best, 2.5%. Thus, the current discounted peak in the Cash Rate of 3.2% would be restrictive. Very strong consumer spending growth at a time when inflation was already high could be a sign that a restrictive monetary stance is now necessary. However, the outlook for Australian consumption is not without risks. Consumer confidence has plunged alongside declining purchasing power, as wage growth has lagged the inflation upturn (Chart 9). While the expectation is that inflation will peak and wage growth will pick up over the latter half of 2022, it is still uncertain if the relative moves will be large enough to give a meaningful lift to real wage growth and consumer spending power. Chart 8Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment Chart 9Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer Headwinds For The Australian Consumer The RBA believes that consumer spending will be supported by the high level of savings, with the household saving rate currently at 13.6%. Yet the high level of household debt means that debt service burdens will rise as interest rates move higher, which may limit the degree to which Australian consumers run down savings to fuel greater consumer spending. Another reason why a more restrictive monetary policy could be needed is if there was a substantial loosening of fiscal policy that was fueling faster growth, especially at a time when inflation was already overshooting. This makes an analysis of the latest election results highly relevant to the path of Australian interest rates. Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in a shift to a restrictive level of interest rates in Australia, an outcome that is not necessary with inflation set to peak at a time of high household leverage. Labor Party Takes Power With Limited Political Capital Australia’s federal election on May 21 brought a Labor Party government into power, headed by new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. National policy is unlikely to change substantially. Australia has low political risk but high geopolitical risk – meaning that domestic politics are manageable for investors but China’s conflict with the West and other geopolitical events are revolutionizing Australia’s place in the world. The previous Liberal-National Coalition government had been in power since 2013, had never found a stable leader, and had been buffeted by a series of external shocks: a commodity bust, China trade conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and inflation. Hence it is no surprise that Labor came back to power – it almost did so in 2019. However, Labor’s popularity is questionable. The new government does not have a robust political mandate: Labor will fall short of a single-party majority (or will have a very thin majority at best): As we go to press, Labor won 74 seats out of 151 in the House of Representatives. A party needs 76 seats for a majority. Labor will likely rely on three Green Party seats and some of the 10 independents to pass legislation. These minor parties will have considerable influence. Labor’s popular vote share is underwhelming: Labor won 32.8% of the popular vote, down from 33.3% in 2019, and beneath the 36% of the vote won by the outgoing Liberal-National Coalition (Table 1). The Green Party rose to 12% of the vote. While this only translates to three seats in parliament, the Greens will hold the balance of power. Table 1Australian Federal Election Results, 2022 The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia Labor does not control the Senate: A bill requires a majority vote in both the House and Senate for passage. A majority requires 38 seats, but Labor and the Greens are currently slated to fall short at 36 seats. Hence, as in the House, the Labor Party will rely on “cross-bench” votes from minor parties to get a majority for bills. Labor won through pragmatism and moderation: Having suffered a surprise defeat in 2019, the Labor Party adopted a more moderate and pragmatic tone in the current election. Prime Minister Albanese campaigned on a motto of “safe change,” declared that he was “not woke,” and adopted a relatively hawkish tilt on trade and foreign policy (China relations) and immigration (“boat people”). Labor has limited room for maneuver in international relations: China’s economy is slowing down and stimulus does not work as well as it used to. China’s political system is reverting to autocracy and the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to carve a sphere of influence in the region, increasing long-term security threats to Australia in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. China has declared a “no limits” strategic partnership with a belligerent Russia, leaving the US no option but to pursue containment strategy against both powers. Prime Minister Albanese has already met with President Biden and the Quadrilateral Dialogue to emphasize Australia’s need to counter China’s newly assertive foreign policy. While Albanese may attempt to reduce trade tensions with China, any such moves will be heavily constrained. Inflation, not climate change, brought Labor to power: The media is hailing the election as a historic shift on the question of climate change and climate policy. But popular opinion has not changed much on this topic in recent years and the election results only partially support the thesis. A better explanation is that the pandemic and its inflationary aftermath galvanized opposition to the ruling Liberal-National Coalition. Hence both fiscal policy and climate policy – the most important areas of change – will be constrained by inflation. Chart 10Australia Cannot Cut Defense Amid China Challenge The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia There are two key policy takeaways from the above assessment: First, on fiscal policy, the new Labor-led government will face limitations due to inflation and the macroeconomic cycle. It will likely respond to inflation – the crisis that got it elected – even though China’s slowdown will produce negative surprises for global and Australian growth. The government will not be able to cut defense spending given the geopolitical setting (Chart 10). That means it will also not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Tax hikes are coming for multinational corporations and high-income earners. In terms of the size of the fiscal impact, the Labor Party promised spending increases worth AUD$18.9 billion (1.0% of GDP), to be offset by tax hikes amounting to AUD$11.5 billion in new revenue (0.6% of GDP). The result would be an AUD$7.5 billion increase in the budget deficit (0.4% of GDP) – a net fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). Currently the IMF projects a 1.84% fiscal drag in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit for 2023, so Labor’s plans would reduce that drag by 0.4%. However, the fiscal plans will change once the new Treasurer James Chalmers produces a new budget proposal in October. Comparison with a like-minded economy is therefore useful to put the policy change into perspective. Canada’s politics shifted from center-right to center-left in 2015 and the left-leaning government at that time put forward an agenda similar to Australia’s Labor Party today. Ultimately the budget balance declined from 0.17% to -0.45% of GDP from peak to trough (Chart 12). This 0.62% of GDP stimulus provides a point of comparison. Yet inflation was not a constraint on government spending at that time. The new Australian government may not exceed that size of stimulus in an inflationary context. But it could easily surpass it if the global economy falls back into recession. Chart 11Australian Labor’s Proposed Fiscal Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia Chart 12Canada Offers Clue To Size Of Australian Stimulus The New Normal In Australia The New Normal In Australia Second, on climate policy, the new ruling coalition probably will pass major climate legislation, given the importance of Greens and left-leaning independents. But Labor will have to constrain the smaller parties’ climate ambitions to preserve popular support in areas where fossil fuel industries remain strong. Australia consumes substantially more carbon per capita than other developed economies and will continue to rely on fossil fuel exports for growth. In other words, climate policy will bring incremental rather than radical change. Bottom Line: If a global recession is avoided, then the new government’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies may work. If not, they will produce a double whammy for the Australian economy: new corporate and resource taxes on top of a slowdown in exports. The AUD As A Shock Absorber Despite a higher repricing of the interest rate curve in Australia, and elevated commodity prices, the Australian dollar (AUD) has been very soft. Part of the story is broad-based US dollar strength that has sapped any potential rebound in the AUD. More specifically, a survey of the key drivers of the AUD unveils the main source of currency weakness, by process of elimination: The divergence in monetary policy between the RBA and the Fed? No. Clearly, that has not been a driver this time around as the RBA is expected to lift rates to 3.2% over the next 12 months, in line with market pricing for rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The commodity cycle? No. Commodity prices are softening, after being in a supply-driven bull market. As a premier resource producer, the Australian economy is intricately intertwined with the outlook for coal, iron ore, copper and even liquefied natural gas prices. As Chart 13 highlights, the AUD has massively deviated from the level implied by rising terms of trade for Australia. This is a departure from a historical correlation that has been in place since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Resource booms tend to be either demand or supply driven, or a combination of both. This time around supply restrictions have played a major role. The message from the AUD is that it responds much better to improving demand conditions. Global and relative growth dynamics? YES: The overarching driver of a weak AUD as hinted above has been slowing Chinese demand. The Zero COVID-19 policy in China has led to a drastic reduction in import volumes. This is hurting Australia’s external balance at the margin, as Chinese import volumes contract (Chart 14). Chart 13The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade Chart 14The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China There are two key takeaways from the above analysis. First, the hawkish path for interest rates priced for the RBA is not yet reflected in a weak AUD. This implies that currency and bond markets are on a collision course. Either the RBA ratifies market pricing and triggers a coiled spring rebound in the AUD, or hawkish expectations will be tempered as inflationary pressures moderate. Second, the AUD will be very sensitive to any improvement in Chinese demand, the overarching driver of currency weakness. We expect the Chinese authorities to ramp up credit stimulus, to offset weakening demand from the Zero COVID-19 policy. The AUD has historically been very sensitive to changes in Chinese money and credit variables (Chart 15). From a fundamental perspective, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the Aussie dollar. Australian GDP has already recovered above pre-pandemic levels and could be on a path to achieve escape velocity if China recovers. Chinese fiscal and monetary policy should be eased going forward. Chinese bond yields have already dropped, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. Meanwhile, Australia’s commodity exposure is well suited for a green energy shift. Besides being relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants, (higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, but pollutes less, and is in high demand in China), Australia is a big exporter of liquefied natural gas, whose prices have been soaring in recent months and is critical in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and green energy shift (Chart 16). This will provide a multi-year tailwind for Australian export volumes and terms of trade. Chart 15The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming Chart 16Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar Australia Is Resource Superstar Bottom Line: BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy went long AUD at 72 cents. In the near term, this position could prove quite volatile as markets try to discern a clear path for global growth. But given cheap valuations and beaten down sentiment, it should prove profitable in the longer term. Investment Conclusions For Fixed Income Investors Chart 17Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations Our careful analysis of Australian growth, inflation, the RBA’s likely next moves leads us to the following investment conclusions for Australian bonds (Chart 17): Maintain neutral duration exposure within dedicated Australian bond portfolios (for now): On a forward basis, the entire Australian yield curve is converging to that discounted 3.5% peak in the Cash Rate (top panel). Eventually, Australian bond yields will fall once inflation clearly peaks in H2/2022 and markets realize that the RBA will not be hiking as fast as expected, justifying an above-benchmark duration tilt. Until then, Australian bond yields will be rangebound, especially with the RBA no longer buying bonds via quantitative easing, leaving more bond issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Underweight Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal-paying government bonds: Inflation will soon peak, and the discounted RBA stance is too hawkish – a recipe for lower inflation breakevens. Overweight Australian government bonds within global bond portfolios: Australia has returned to its “high-yield-beta” status, which means that an overweight stance is warranted when global bond yields are stable or falling. BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Global Duration Indicator, a growth-focused leading indicator of the momentum of global bond yields, is signalling a more stable backdrop for global yields over the rest of 2022. The Duration Indicator is also a fine leading indicator of the relative return performance of Australian government bonds (middle panel) and is supportive of an overweight stance on Australian debt. Go Long December 2022 Australia Bank Bill futures: This is a tactical trade (i.e. investment horizon of no more than six months), based on the extreme pricing of rate hikes by year-end. The market price of the December 2022 futures contract is currently 97.11, or an implied interest rate of 2.89% compared to the current RBA Cash Rate of 0.35%. That contract is priced for far too many rate hikes than will be delivered over the remaining seven RBA meetings of 2022. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist ChesterN@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy, Geopolitical Strategy by Matt Gertken, Chester Ntonifor

26 May 2022

Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession

Next Thursday May 26, we will hold the BCA Debate – High Inflation: Here To Stay,Or Soon In The Rear-View Mirror? – a Webcast in which I will debate my colleague, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist, Bob Ryan on the outlook for inflation, and take the side that inflationary fears will soon recede. I do hope you can join us. As such, the debate will replace the weekly report, though we will renew the fractal trading watchlist on our website. Dhaval Joshi Executive Summary The second quarter’s synchronised sell-off in stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals and gold is an extremely rare star alignment. The last time that the ‘everything sell-off’ star alignment happened was in early 1981 when the Paul Volcker Fed ‘broke the back’ of inflation and turned stagflation into an outright recession. In 2022, the Jay Powell Fed risks doing the same. If history repeats itself, then the template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide for 2022-23. In which case, bond prices are now entering a bottoming process. Stocks would bottom next. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12-month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty will be industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal trading watchlist: FTSE 100 versus Stoxx Europe 600, Czech Republic versus Poland, Food and Beverages, US REITS versus Utilities, CNY/USD. 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 Bottom Line: The 1981-82 template for 2022-23 suggests that bonds will bottom first, followed by stocks. But steer clear of gold and industrial metals. Feature Investors have had a torrid time in the second quarter, with no place to hide.1 Stocks are down -10 percent. Bonds are down -6 percent. Inflation protected bonds are down -6 percent. Industrial metals are down -13 percent. Gold is down -6 percent. To add insult to injury, even cash is down in real terms, because the interest rate is well below the inflation rate! (Chart I-1) Chart I-1The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Such a star alignment of asset returns, in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold all sell off together, is unprecedented. In the eighty calendar quarters since the inflation protected bond market data became available in the early 2000s there has never been a quarter with an ‘everything sell-off’. Everything Has Sold Off, But Does That Make Sense? The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all five asset-classes should fall together (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare Chart I-3An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare A scenario dominated by rising inflation is bad for bonds, but good for inflation protected bonds, especially relative to conventional bonds. Yet inflation protected bonds have not outperformed either in absolute or relative terms. A scenario of rising inflation should also support the value of stocks, industrial metals and certainly gold, given that all three are, to varying degrees, ‘inflation hedges.’ Yet the prices of stocks, industrial metals, and gold have all plummeted. The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all asset classes should fall together. Conversely, a scenario dominated by slowing growth is bad for industrial metal prices, but good for conventional bond prices – as bond yields decline on diminished expectations for rate hikes. Yet conventional bonds have sold off. What about a scenario dominated by both rising inflation and slowing growth – which is to say, stagflation? In this case, we would expect inflation protected bonds to perform especially well. Meanwhile, with the economy still growing, the prices of industrial metals should not be collapsing, as they have been recently. In a final scenario of an imminent recession we would expect stocks, industrial metals and even gold to sell off, but conventional bonds to perform especially well. The upshot is there are virtually no economic scenarios in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold plummet together, as they have recently. So, what’s going on? To answer, we need to take a trip back to the 1980s. 1981 Was The Last Time We Had An ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Inflation protected bonds did not exist before the late 1990s. But considering the other four asset-classes – stocks, bonds, industrial metals, and gold – to find the last time that they all fell together we must travel back to 1981, the time of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and the Paul Volcker Fed. And suddenly, we discover spooky similarities with the current Zeitgeist. Just like today, the world’s central banks were obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation, which, like a monster in a horror movie, kept appearing to die before coming back with second and third winds (Chart I-4). Chart I-4In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation Just like today, the central banks were desperate to repair their badly damaged credibility in managing the economy. As the biography “Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence” puts it: “He restored credibility to the Federal Reserve at a time it had been greatly diminished.” And just like today, central bankers hoped that they could pilot the economy to a ‘soft landing’, though whether they genuinely believed that is another story. Asked at a press conference if higher interest rates would cause a recession, Volcker replied coyly “Well, you get varying opinions about that.” 2022 has spooky similarities with 1981. In fact, in its single-minded aim ‘to do whatever it takes’ to kill inflation, the Volcker Fed hiked the interest rate to near 20 percent, thereby triggering what was then the deepest economic recession since the Depression of the 1930s (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). With hindsight, it was a price worth paying because the economy then began a quarter century of low inflation, steady growth, and mild recessions – a halcyon period for which the Volcker Fed’s aggressive tightening in the early 1980s have been lauded. Chart I-5In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... Chart I-6...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession ...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession ...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession Granted, the problems of 2022 are a much scaled down version of those in 1981, yet there are spooky similarities – a point which will not have gone unnoticed by the current crop of central bankers. It is no secret that Jay Powell is a big fan of Paul Volcker. The Echoes Of 1981-82 In 2022-23 The answer to why everything sold off in early 1981 is that central banks took their economies from stagflation to outright recession, and the risk is that the same happens again in 2022-23 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession In the transition from stagflation fears to recession fears, everything sells off because first the stagflation casualties get hammered, and then the recession plays get hammered. This leaves investors with no place to hide, as no mainstream asset is left unscathed. Just as in 1981, a transition from stagflation fears to recession fears likely explains the recent ‘everything sell-off’ because the sell-off in April was most painful for the stagflation casualties – bonds. Whereas, the sell-off in May has been most painful for the recession casualties – industrial metals and stocks. In a stagflation that morphs to recession, everything sells off. What happens next? The template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide. Bond prices bottomed first, in the late summer of 1981, as it became clear that the economy was entering a downturn which would exorcise inflation. Of the three other asset classes – all recession casualties – stocks continued to remain under pressure for the next few months but were higher 12 months later. Gold fell another 30 percent, though rebounded sharply in 1982. But the greatest pain was in the industrial metals, which fell another 30 percent and did not recover their highs for several years (Chart I-8). Chart I-82022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 could be an echo of 1981-82, with bond prices now entering a bottoming process. Stocks would bottom next, with one difference being a quicker recovery than in 1981-82 because of their higher sensitivity to bond yields. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12 month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty of a stagflation that morphs into a recession will be the overvalued industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s new additions are Czech Republic versus Poland, and Food and Beverages versus the market, which appear overbought. And US REITS versus Utilities, and CNY/USD, which appear oversold. Finally, our new trade recommendation is to underweight the FTSE 100 versus the Stoxx Europe 600. The resource heavy FTSE 100 is especially vulnerable to our anticipated sell-off in commodities, and its recent outperformance is at a point of fragility that has marked previous turning points (Chart I-9). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. Chart I-9FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Chart I-10Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart I-11Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart I-12US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart I-13CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 17Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Chart 24The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 25The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 26Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 27Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart 29CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The returns are based on the S&P 500, the 10-year T-bond, the 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS), the LMEX index, and gold. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Counterpoint by Dhaval Joshi

19 May 2022

Will The Fed Get Its Soft Landing?

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (May 17 at 9:00 AM EDT, 14:00 PM BST, 15:00 PM CEST and May 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

US Bond Strategy by Ryan Swift

17 May 2022

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