Yield Curve

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Corporate sector selling price inflation is nil while leading wage inflation indicators signal additional labor cost increases in the coming months. The risk is that profit margins have already peaked for the cycle. We reiterate our tactically cautious overall equity market view. Galloping higher private and public sector software outlays, a structurally enticing software demand backdrop and ongoing industry M&A all signal that it still pays to be bullish software stocks Recent Changes Last Thursday we downgraded the S&P railroads index to underweight. Also last Thursday we trimmed the S&P air freight & logistics index to neutral. Table 1 Have SPX Margins Peaked? Have SPX Margins Peaked? Feature The SPX stalled last week, digesting the now-complete Fed pivot. Our sense is that the Fed’s dovish turn is now fully reflected in equities. Importantly, the longer and wider the dichotomy between stocks and bonds gets, the more painful the ramifications from the eventual snap will be, likely with equities yielding to the bond market (Chart 1). As we first posited on March 4, short-term equity market caution is still warranted.1 Chart 1Time To Get Back Together Time To Get Back Together Time To Get Back Together While the Fed meeting and sharp decline in Treasury yields dominated headlines last week, it was the NFIB’s latest release that really caught our attention. Importantly, it revealed that taxes and big government are no longer the biggest problems facing small and medium business owners, but labor is: “Twenty-two percent of owners cited the difficulty of finding qualified workers as their Single Most Important Business Problem, only 3 points below the record high. Ten percent of owners find labor costs as their biggest problem, a record high for the 45-year survey.”2 Historically, such extreme tightness in the SME labor market is a precursor of a yield curve inversion (NFIB cost of labor shown inverted, Chart 2). The link is clearer if we show this same NFIB series with the Labor Department’s average hourly earnings monthly release that is currently running at a 3.4%/annum clip (Chart 3). In other words, a tight labor market is conducive to corporations bidding up the price of labor which in turn causes the Fed to raise interest rates, eventually inverting the yield curve. Chart 2Cycle Is Long In The Tooth Cycle Is Long In The Tooth Cycle Is Long In The Tooth Chart 3Wage Growth... Wage Growth... Wage Growth... This macro backdrop is slightly unnerving and our biggest concern is the S&P 500’s profit margins (Chart 4). Q3/2018 marked the all-time peak in SPX quarterly margins according to Standard & Poor’s,3 and in Q4/2018 margins have deflated from a high mark of 12.13% to 10.11%, or a 16.7% q/q drop. Chart 4...Denting Margins ...Denting Margins ...Denting Margins Undoubtedly, last year’s fiscal easing-induced all-time highs in SPX margins is unsustainable, and a tight labor market is a warning shot. Using the same NFIB series on cost of labor being the most important problem SMEs face and subtracting it from our corporate pricing power proxy, we constructed an equity market margin proxy, shown as a Z-score in Chart 5. Historically, the y/y change in SPX profit margins move in lockstep with our margin proxy and the current message is grim (Chart 5). Chart 5Margin Trouble Ahead Margin Trouble Ahead Margin Trouble Ahead Before getting too bearish though, we want to make three salient points: First, while the NFIB survey’s labor related indicators are disconcerting, unit labor costs – the best measure of wage growth – remain muted as productivity growth has ramped up recently. Second, using empirical evidence dating back to the 1960s, the ultimate SPX profit margin mean reversion occurs during recessions, when EPS suffer a major setback. The implication is that margins can move sideways or grind lower in the coming year. As a reminder, BCA’s review remains that the U.S. will avoid recession in the next 12 months. Third, the most important yield curve slope, the 10/2, has not yet inverted, and even when it does invert, investors will have time to start positioning defensively; we have shown in recent research that the S&P peaks after the yield curve inverts.4 On a related note, we use this opportunity to update our corporate pricing power proxy, and Table 2 summarizes the sectorial results. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power Have SPX Margins Peaked? Have SPX Margins Peaked? Corporate sector selling price inflation has ground to a halt at a time when wage inflation is rearing its ugly head. Worrisomely, our pricing power diffusion index’s breadth sunk below the 50% line, whereas our wage growth diffusion index spiked higher; 70% of the 44 industries we track are struggling with rising wages (second & third panels, Chart 6). Taken together, there is evidence that broad-based profit margin pressures are escalating, the mirror image of what our gauges were signaling in our last update late-last year.5 Chart 6Margins Have Likely Peaked Margins Have Likely Peaked Margins Have Likely Peaked Digging beneath the surface of our corporate pricing power proxy is revealing. As a reminder, we calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. 57% of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices, but only 27% are raising prices at a faster clip than overall inflation. Both figures are lower than our early-November report. Outright deflating sectors increased by eight to twenty four since our last update, fifteen of which are deflating at 1%/annum pace or lower. One third of the industries we cover are experiencing a downtrend in selling price inflation, representing a 43% increase since our most recent report (Table 2). Deep cyclicals/commodity-related industries (ex-oil) continue to dominate the top ranks, occupying the top six slots (Table 2). Despite the ongoing global manufacturing deceleration and still unresolved U.S./China trade tussle, the commodity complex's ability to increase prices remains resilient. On the flip side, energy-related industries occupy the bottom of the ranks as WTI crude oil is still 22% lower than the most recent peak in October 2018. In sum, business sector selling price inflation is nil while leading wage inflation indicators signal additional labor cost increases in the coming months. The risk is that profit margins have already peaked for the cycle. We reiterate our tactically cautious overall equity market view. This week we update a high-conviction overweight tech subgroup and recap our transportation subsurface moves from last Thursday. Buy The Software Breakout Software stocks are on fire and leading profit indicators suggest that more gains are in store in the coming months. Last week, we published a table ranking all the sectors and subsectors by 12-month forward profit growth estimates (please refer to Table 2 from the March 18 Weekly Report). While the broad tech sector is on an even keel with the SPX, software EPS are racing at twice the speed of the broad market, roughly 14%. Keep in mind, when growth gets scarce, investors flock to industries with accelerating profit prospects. The software profit juggernaut is intact and we reiterate our high-conviction overweight recommendation. Sustained capital outlays on software are a key driver of industry profits (bottom panel, Chart 7). In an otherwise muted Q4 GDP release, rising non-residential fixed investment in general and surging investment in software in particular suggest that our bullish software capex thesis is alive and kicking (middle panel, Chart 7). Chart 7Software On A Tear Software On A Tear Software On A Tear The move to cloud computing and SaaS, the proliferation of AI, machine learning and augmented reality are not fads but enjoy a secular growth profile, and signal that capital outlays on software are also in a structural uptrend. Not only private sector software capex is near all-time highs as a share of total outlays, but also government investment in software is reaccelerating at the fastest pace since the tech bubble. When productivity gains are anemic, both the business and government sectors resort to software upgrades in order to boost productivity. Cyber security is another more recent source of software related demand as governments are taking such risks extremely seriously the world over (second panel, Chart 8). Chart 8Earnings Led Advance Earnings Led Advance Earnings Led Advance Meanwhile, fear of missing out has rekindled industry M&A and both the dollar amount and number of deals are sky high, with acquirers bidding up premia to the stratosphere (Chart 9). This supply reduction is bullish for industry pricing power. Chart 9M&A Frenzy M&A Frenzy M&A Frenzy Granted the M&A frenzy has pushed relative valuations on the expensive side especially on a forward P/E basis, but on EV/EBITDA software stocks are trading below the historical mean and still significantly lower than the late-1990s peak valuation (bottom panel, Chart 8). If our bullish software profit thesis continues to pan out, then software stocks will grow into their pricey valuations. Finally, shareholder friendly activities are ongoing in this key tech subsector and buybacks in particular provide an added layer of artificial EPS growth (bottom panel, Chart 9). Adding it up, galloping higher private and public sector software outlays, a structurally enticing software demand backdrop and ongoing industry M&A, all signal that it still pays to be bullish software stocks. Bottom Line: Buy the software breakout. The S&P software index remains a high-conviction overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT – MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, INTU, ADSK, RHT, CDNS, SNPS, ANSS, SYMC, CTXS, FTNT. Tweaking Transport Subgroup Positioning The S&P transports index’s recovery rally has stalled recently and is a cause for concern for the overall market. In more detail, the recent gulf between relative share prices and the SPX has widened and warns that the overall market is at a risk of suffering a pullback (Chart 10). Chart 10Engine Trouble Engine Trouble Engine Trouble Thus on Thursday last week, we made two subsurface transport changes, downgrading a subgroup to underweight that commands lofty valuations at a time when leading profit indicators are flashing red, and also downgrading to neutral a globally exposed transport sub-index. Get Off The Rails In our downgrade of the S&P railroads index late last year to a benchmark allocation, we highlighted that two of our key industry Indicators, the Railroad Indicator and our Rail Shipment Diffusion Indicator, had turned negative.6 These indicators have continued to deteriorate, including total rail shipments which have now started to contract for the first time since the 2015-16 manufacturing recession (third panel, Chart 11). Intermodal shipments in particular have nosedived, likely a result of weak retail sales, as we highlighted earlier this month.7 Chart 11Downgrade Rails To... Downgrade Rails To... Downgrade Rails To... This contraction would be far less concerning were it not for the rapid degradation of industry balance sheets as firms have sought to increase relatively cheap leverage in order to retire equity. Railroads are now significantly more indebted than the broad market which itself has not shown an aversion to adding leverage (bottom panel, Chart 11). Such a change in railroad capital structure has kept EPS growth rates artificially high while simultaneously adding an extra measure of equity risk premium that does not yet appear fully reflected in relative share prices. Moreover, when we downgraded the S&P railroads index to neutral last year, deteriorating Indicators were offset by exceptionally healthy pricing power.8 After a multi-year expansion, selling price inflation has now rolled over (second panel, Chart 12), taking away the remaining pillar supporting a neutral view which compelled us to move to an underweight allocation last week. Chart 12...Underweight ...Underweight ...Underweight Pricing power is one of the key determinants in our earnings model that, when combined with the previously noted contracting volumes, is indicating the end to the industry’s above-trend earnings growth is nigh (third panel, Chart 12). With relative earnings growth slowing and rising leverage adding incremental risk, the S&P railroads index’s premium valuation multiple looks increasingly dicey (bottom panel, Chart 12). Bottom Line: Broad based declines in traffic volumes, falling pricing power and high leverage suggest that earnings will underwhelm. Accordingly, last Thursday we moved to an underweight recommendation on the S&P railroads index as we expect a de-rating phase to materialize. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Air Freight Had Its Wings Clipped We have been offside on the high-conviction overweight call on the S&P air freight & logistics index and the recent FedEx warning suggests that profits will come under pressure for this index for the rest of the year and will trail the SPX. As such, we trimmed exposure to neutral late-last week and removed it from the high-conviction overweight list for a loss of 14%. Chart 13 shows that all the profit drivers we had identified in early December last year have taken a sharp turn for the worse. Energy costs are no longer in deflation as oil prices have jumped from $42/bbl to near $60/bbl. Not only is global growth still decelerating, but also U.S. growth is in a softpatch: the manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratio is on the verge of contraction, warning that delivery services’ selling prices are in for a turbulent ride (second panel, Chart 13). In addition, definitive news of Amazon becoming a formidable competitor in courier delivery services is structurally negative for the industry. Chart 13Air Freight: Move To The Sidelines Air Freight: Move To The Sidelines Air Freight: Move To The Sidelines Nevertheless, we refrain from turning outright bearish as air freight stocks are technically oversold and valuations are trading at the steepest discount to the broad market since mid-2002. Bottom Line: Last Thursday we downgraded the S&P air freight & logistics index to neutral and also removed it from the high-conviction overweight list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Good, The Bad And The Ugly” dated March 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.nfib.com/assets/jobs0219hwwd.pdf 3https://ca.spindices.com/documents/additional-material/sp-500-eps-est.xlsx?force_download=true 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Recuperating” dated November 5, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Critical Reset“, dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Good, The Bad And The Ugly“, dated March 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Critical Reset“, dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights Chart 1Track The CRB/Gold Ratio Track The CRB/Gold Ratio Track The CRB/Gold Ratio Earlier this year the Fed signaled a dovish policy shift in response to slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions. In large part due to the Fed’s move, financial conditions are now easing and the CRB Raw Industrials index – a timely proxy for global growth – is starting to perk up. But when will this improvement translate to higher Treasury yields? The CRB/gold ratio offers some clues. Gold moves higher when monetary policy eases. Then with a lag, that easier policy spurs stronger global growth and a rising CRB index. Eventually, that stronger growth puts rate hikes back on the table. A more hawkish Fed limits the upside in gold and sends Treasury yields higher. In fact, we find that the 10-year Treasury yield only starts to rise when the CRB index outpaces the gold price (Chart 1). The recent jump in the CRB index is a positive sign, but we shouldn’t expect Treasury yields to rise until the CRB/gold ratio heads higher. In the meantime, investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and initiate positive-carry yield curve trades (see page 10) to boost returns while we wait for the next upward adjustment in yields. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +243 bps. The Federal Reserve’s pause opens a window for corporate spreads to tighten during the next few months. We recommend overweight positions in corporate bonds for now, but will be quick to reduce exposure once spreads reach our near-term targets (Chart 2). Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview In last week’s report we published option-adjusted spread targets for each corporate credit tier.1 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads during prior periods when the slope of the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.2 Currently, the Aa-rated spread of 59 bps is 3 bps above our target (panel 2). The A-rated spread of 91 bps is 6 bps above our target (panel 3). The Baa-rated spread of 156 bps is 28 bps above our target (panel 4). The Aaa-rated spread is already below our target. We advise investors to avoid the Aaa-rated credit tier. With profit growth poised to moderate during the next few quarters, it is unlikely that gross corporate leverage will continue to decline at its current pace (bottom panel). As such, we will be quick to reduce corporate bond exposure when spreads reach our targets. Renewed Fed hawkishness will be another headwind for corporate bonds in the second half of the year. Chart Chart High-Yield: Overweight High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 175 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +590 bps. In last week’s report we published near-term spread targets for each high-yield credit tier.3 The targets are based on the median 12-month breakeven spreads seen during periods when the yield curve is quite flat but not yet inverted, what we call a Phase 2 environment.4 At present, the Ba-rated option-adjusted spread is 224 bps, 37 bps above our target. The B-rated spread is 376 bps, 81 bps above our target. The Caa-rated spread is 780 bps, 208 bps above our target. Our default-adjusted spread is an alternative measure of high-yield valuation. It represents the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses. It is currently 243 bps, very close to the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast during the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 243 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview The Moody’s baseline forecast calls for a default rate of 2.4% during the next 12 months. This appears a touch too optimistic, as our own macro model is calling for a default rate closer to 3.5%.5 In either case, junk bonds currently offer adequate compensation for default risk. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 2 bps on the month, driven by a 5 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The fall in option cost was partially offset by a 3 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The recent drop in the 30-year mortgage rate led to a jump in mortgage refinancings from historically low levels, putting some temporary upward pressure on MBS spreads (Chart 4). However, the relatively tepid pace of new issuance during the past few years means that the existing MBS stock is not very exposed to refinancing risk, even if mortgage rates fall further. All in all, we view agency MBS as one of the safest spread products in the current macro environment. Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview The problem with MBS is that valuation remains unattractive. The index option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year MBS is well below its average pre-crisis level (panel 3) and the sector offers less compensation than normal compared to corporate bonds (panel 4). We continue to recommend a neutral allocation to agency MBS. An upgrade will only be appropriate when value in the corporate sector is no longer attractive relative to expected default risk. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 97 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +320 bps. Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 54 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 44 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +109 bps, while Domestic Agencies outperformed by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +9 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 10 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. The USD-denominated sovereign debt of most countries continues to look expensive relative to equivalently-rated U.S. corporate credit. However, in a recent report we highlighted that Mexican sovereign debt is an exception (Chart 5).6 Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Not only is Mexican sovereign debt cheap relative to U.S. corporate credit, but our Emerging Markets Strategy service highlights that the Mexican peso is very cheap as measured by the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs.7 This is not surprising given that the peso has been relatively flat versus the dollar during the past two years, despite real interest rates being much higher in Mexico than in the U.S. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 5% in February, and currently sits at 81% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and right at the average level that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview In other words, municipal bonds on average are no longer cheap. Rather, they appear fairly valued compared to similar prior macro environments. But a pure focus on the average yield ratio across the curve hides an important distinction. The yield ratio for short maturities (2-year and 5-year) is very low relative to history, while the yield ratio for long maturities (10-year, 20-year and 30-year) remains quite cheap (panel 2). Investors should continue to focus on long-maturity municipal debt to add yield to U.S. bond portfolios. In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +3 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +64 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage).8 Given strong historical returns during the current phase of the cycle and the fact that our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory (bottom panel), we advocate an overweight allocation to municipal bonds. Treasury Curve: Favor 2/30 Barbell Over 7-Year Bullet Treasury yields rose in February, led by the long-end of the curve. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 3 bps on the month and currently sits at 21 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 57 bps. Our 12-month fed funds discounter remains below zero, meaning that the market is priced for rate cuts during the next year (Chart 7). We continue to view rate hikes as more likely than cuts on this time horizon, and therefore recommend yield curve trades that will profit from a move higher in our discounter. In prior research we found that the 5-year and 7-year Treasury maturities are most sensitive to changes in our discounter, so any trade where you sell the 5-year or 7-year bullet and buy a duration-matched barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the curve will provide the appropriate exposure.9 Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview An added benefit of implementing a barbell over bullet strategy in the current environment is that barbells currently offer higher yields than bullets, meaning that you earn positive carry as you wait for the market to price rate hikes back into the curve (bottom 2 panels).10 Not surprisingly, barbell strategies also look attractively valued on our yield curve models, the output of which is found in Appendix B. TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 36 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +120 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 11 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.96%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.07%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. After last month’s increase, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently very close to the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations model (Chart 8).11 This model is based on a combination of backward-looking and forward-looking inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ inflation expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. The current fair value reading from the model is 1.97%, but that fair value will trend steadily higher as long as core CPI inflation remains above 1.84%. The 1.84% threshold is the annualized trailing 10-year growth rate in core CPI, and it is the most important variable in the model. Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation On that note, core CPI has increased at an annual rate of 2.58% during the past four months, well above the necessary threshold. And while some forward-looking inflation measures have moderated, notably the ISM Prices Paid index (panel 3), this is largely a reaction to the recent drop in energy prices. A drop that should reverse as global growth improves in the coming months. ABS: Neutral Cut To Underweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +38 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 31 bps, 3 bps below its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Our excess return Bond Map, shown in Appendix C on page 18, shows that Aaa-rated ABS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. bond sectors. Aaa-rated auto loan ABS in particular offer greater risk and lower potential return than the Aggregate Plus index (the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate index plus high-yield).  Tight spreads look even more unattractive when you consider that the delinquency rate for consumer credit is rising, and according to the uptrend in household interest expense, will continue to march higher in the coming quarters (panel 4). Lending standards are also tightening for both credit cards and auto loans, a dynamic that often coincides with a rising delinquency rate and wider ABS spreads (bottom panel). Given the recent spread tightening, we advise investors to reduce consumer ABS exposure in U.S. bond portfolios. Other sectors, such as Agency CMBS, offer a more attractive risk/reward trade-off within high-rated spread product. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 74 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +142 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 13 bps on the month and currently sits at 93 bps, below the average pre-crisis level but somewhat higher than the recent tights (Chart 10). Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks tightened lending standards on commercial real estate (CRE) loans in Q4 and witnessed falling demand (bottom 2 panels). This, coupled with decelerating CRE prices paints a relatively negative picture for non-agency CMBS. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Teasury index by 49 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +77 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 48 bps. The excess return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 2 basis points of rate cuts during the next 12 months. Given that we expect the Fed to deliver rate hikes in the second half of this year, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the change in the fed funds rate. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Image Image Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +55 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 55 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of February 28, 2019) The Sequence Of Reflation The Sequence Of Reflation Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of February 28, 2019) The Sequence Of Reflation The Sequence Of Reflation Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) The Sequence Of Reflation The Sequence Of Reflation Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return.   Chart 12 Ryan Swift,  U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com   Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018 available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Chart 1Look For Rate Hikes In H2 2019 Look For Rate Hikes In H2 2019 Look For Rate Hikes In H2 2019 First things first: The Fed’s rate hike cycle is not over. Last week’s FOMC statement told us that the Fed will be “patient” and Chairman Powell cited slower global growth and tighter financial conditions as reasons to keep the funds rate steady. However, both of those reasons could soon evaporate. With the market now priced for 8 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months and the dollar off its highs, there is scope for financial conditions to ease and global growth to improve in the first half of the year. According to our Fed Monitor, only tight financial conditions warrant a pause in rate hikes (Chart 1). The economic growth and inflation components of our Monitor (not shown) continue to recommend a tighter policy stance. The message is that if risk assets rally during the next six months causing financial conditions to ease, then all else equal, the Fed will have the green light to re-start rate hikes in the second half of the year. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in U.S. bond portfolios. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 183 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 25 bps on the month and currently sits at 127 bps. We upgraded our recommended allocation to corporate bonds three weeks ago because spreads had become too wide given the current phase of the credit cycle.1 Presently, we observe that the 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated corporate bonds has been tighter 43% of the time since 1989 (Chart 2). In the phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps, corporate breakeven spreads are typically in the lower third of their distributions.2 Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Baa-rated bonds currently offer better value than higher-rated credits. The 12-month breakeven spread for A-rated debt has been tighter 29% of the time since 1989 (panel 2). Aa and Aaa-rated credits clock in at 25% and 4%, respectively. With the Fed in a holding pattern, we are comfortable taking credit risk for the next six months and recommend that investors move down in quality to capture the extra return. The Fed’s Q4 Senior Loan Officer Survey, released yesterday, showed that a net 3% of banks reported tightening lending standards on C&I loans. Tighter lending standards correlate with higher defaults and wider spreads, so this tentative development bears close monitoring going forward. Chart   Chart High-Yield: Overweight High-yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 408 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 103 bps, and currently sits at 416 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 224 bps, slightly below the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast for the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 224 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview Moody’s revised its baseline 12-month default rate forecast higher last month, from 2.6% to 3.4%, and as was discussed in last week’s report, the revised forecast looks reasonable given our economic outlook.3 Specifically, our measure of nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage – calculated as total debt over pre-tax profits – is roughly consistent with a 4% default rate. This leverage measure improved rapidly during the past year, but should start to stabilize during the next few quarters as profit growth decelerates. All in all, baseline default rate expectations have moved higher in recent months, but junk spreads still offer adequate compensation for that risk. In fact, if we assume excess compensation equal to the historical average, then junk spreads embed an expected default rate of 3% (panel 4), not far from the Moody’s base case. While junk spreads offer adequate compensation given our 12-month default outlook, the near-term outlook for excess returns is somewhat brighter as the Fed’s dovish turn should lead to spread compression during the next few months. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in January. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread tightened 3 bps on the month, driven by a 3 bps decline in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) held flat. The drop in the 30-year mortgage rate to 4.46%, from 4.94% in November, led to a sharp spike in mortgage refinancings. However, refi activity remains very low relative to history (Chart 4). With the longer-run uptrend in mortgage rates still intact, the recent spike in refinancings is bound to reverse in the coming months. This will keep MBS spreads capped near historically low levels. Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Outside of refi activity, MBS spreads are also influenced by changes in mortgage lending standards. The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed no change in residential mortgage lending standards in Q4 2018 (bottom panel), while reported mortgage demand took a significant dip. Periods of tightening lending standards tend to coincide with MBS spread widening, but faced with weaker demand banks are much more likely to ease standards going forward. This is particularly true because very little progress has been made easing lending standards since the financial crisis. The median FICO score for new mortgages peaked at 781 in Q1 2011, but had only fallen to 758 as of Q3 2018. With relatively little risk of spread widening we are comfortable with a neutral allocation to Agency MBS, though tight spreads make the sector less appealing than corporate bonds from a return perspective. Later in the cycle, when the risk of corporate spread widening is more pronounced, MBS will likely warrant an upgrade. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 53 basis points in January. Sovereign debt led the way, outperforming the Treasury benchmark by 221 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 65 bps, Local Authorities outperformed by 32 bps, and Supranationals outperformed by 3 bps. Domestic Agency bonds were the sole laggard, underperforming Treasuries by 3 bps on the month. The Fed’s pause and the accompanying weakness in the dollar spurred last month’s outperformance of USD-denominated Sovereign debt. But given the current attractiveness of U.S. corporate credit, we are not eager to chase the outperformance in Sovereigns. The option-adjusted spread advantage in Baa-rated U.S. corporate credit relative to the Sovereign index is as wide as it was in mid-2016 (Chart 5), a period when corporate bonds outperformed Sovereigns by a significant margin. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview At the country level, our analysis of USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign spreads shows that only Argentina, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Poland offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.4 We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. The sector offers similar value to Aa/A-rated corporate debt on a breakeven spread basis (bottom panel), and it is also dominated by taxable municipal securities that are insulated from weak foreign economic growth. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in January (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 2% in January, and currently sits at 84% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean but above the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of -14 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +47 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage).5  Given strong historical returns during the current phase of the cycle and the fact that our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory (bottom panel), we advocate an overweight allocation to municipal bonds. Long maturity municipal debt continues to offer a substantial yield advantage relative to the short-end of the curve. For example, a muni investor needs an effective tax rate of 35% to equalize the after-tax yields between a 5-year Aa-rated municipal bond and the equivalent-duration U.S. credit index. For a 20-year muni the same breakeven tax rate is between 10% and 17%. Treasury Curve: Favor 2/30 Barbell Over 7-Year Bullet Treasury yields declined in January, with the 5-year and 7-year maturities falling more than the short and long ends of the curve. The 2/10 slope flattened 3 bps on the month, from 21 bps to 18 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps on the month, from 51 bps to 56 bps. In a recent report we looked at the correlations between different yield curve slopes and our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter.6 We found that the 5-year and 7-year maturities are most sensitive to changes in the discounter, while the short and long ends of the curve tend to be more stable. In other words, a decline in our 12-month discounter, like the one seen during the past two months (Chart 7), will tend to flatten the curve out to the 5-year/7-year maturity point and steepen the curve beyond that point. An increase in the discounter has the opposite effect. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview We expect the market to price some Fed rate hikes back into the curve as financial conditions ease during the next few months. Based on that view, we recommend adopting a yield curve strategy that benefits from a rise in our 12-month discounter. A position short the 7-year bullet and long a duration-matched 2/30 barbell provides the appropriate exposure and is attractively valued by our yield curve models (panel 4).7 TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 84 basis points in January. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 14 bps on the month, and currently sits at 1.88%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 9 bps, and currently sits at 2.04%. Both rates remain below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed’s target. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate also remains below the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).8 This model is based on a combination of backward-looking and forward-looking inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. The current fair value reading from the model is 1.97%, but that fair value reading will trend steadily higher as long as core CPI inflation remains above 1.83%. The 1.83% threshold is the annualized trailing 10-year growth rate in core CPI, and it is the most important variable in our model.   Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation On that note, core CPI has increased at an annual rate of 2.48% during the past 3 months, well above the necessary threshold. And while some forward-looking inflation measures have moderated, notably the ISM Prices Paid index (panel 4), this is largely a reaction to the recent drop in energy prices. A drop that should reverse as global growth improves in the coming months. ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 16 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 8 bps on the month, and currently sits at 40 bps, 6 bps above its pre-crisis low. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that consumer ABS offer greater expected return than Domestic Agencies and Supranationals, though with a commensurate increase in risk. The Map also shows that Agency CMBS offer very similar return potential with much less risk. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for Q4 2018 showed that banks tightened lending standards slightly for both credit cards and auto loans. This is consistent with a continued gradual uptrend in consumer credit delinquencies (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Rising household interest expense further confirms that the consumer credit delinquency rate is biased higher, albeit from a low starting point (panel 4). All in all, ABS still offer a reasonable risk/reward trade-off but could warrant a downgrade in the coming quarters as credit quality worsens. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 67 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 11 bps on the month and currently sits at 105 bps. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks tightened lending standards on commercial real estate (CRE) loans in Q4 and witnessed falling demand (Chart 10). This is a typical negative environment for CMBS spreads. Decelerating CRE prices are also a cause for concern (panel 3). Investors should maintain an underweight allocation to non-Agency CMBS. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 28 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 57 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 8 basis points of rate cuts during the next 12 months. Given that we expect the Fed to deliver rate hikes in the second half of this year, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Appendix B- Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury yield curve. The models are explained in detail in the following two Special Reports: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of January 31, 2019) On Pause But Not Forgotten On Pause But Not Forgotten   Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of January 31, 2019) On Pause But Not Forgotten On Pause But Not Forgotten   Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) On Pause But Not Forgotten On Pause But Not Forgotten Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return. Chart 12   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on how we divide the credit cycle based on the slope of the yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Running Room”, dated January 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk”, dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearh 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 The output from all of our yield curve models is shown in Appendix B of this report. 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

The hiatus in the Fed’s rates-normalization policy in 1H19 in the wake of its capitulation to financial markets, supports our bullish view on gold prices, as it raises the risk of an inflation overshoot later this year. Per the Fed’s dual mandate, inflation and employment gauges are signaling the need for tighter policy, according to BCA’s proprietary Fed Monitor. The pause in hiking fed funds raises the likelihood the Fed will find itself behind the inflation curve, as the economy enters a late-cycle phase. Gold will outperform other commodities and equities in this phase. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Highlights Energy: The U.S. imposed sanctions on state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), including a ban on the company’s Houston-based Citgo remitting earnings back to the parent company.  This raises the likelihood production and exports will fall sharply as we expect.  Separately, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih said the country will reduce output below its recently agreed 10.3mm b/d cap in 1H19, in line with our own balances expectation.1 Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral.  Iron ore prices likely will continue to move higher, following the collapse of a wet-processing dam at Vale’s Córrego do Feijão mine.  The company suffered a similar breach at its Samarco mine in March 2016, which still has not re-opened. Output will fall, if it follows through with additional dam closures. Precious Metals: Neutral.  Gold prices will continue to move higher, as the Fed’s near-term capitulation on its rates-normalization policy raises the odds the U.S. central bank will find itself behind the inflation curve.  (See below.) Ags/Softs: Underweight.  USDA reported soybeans inspected for export to China during the week ended January 24 accounted for close to 37% of the total beans inspected.  This made China the No. 1 importer of American soybeans again. Feature In February 2018, we wrote that “price risk in gold will remain skewed to the upside this year, even as our base case scenario calls for limited gains from here.” In line with this expectation, we suggested remaining long gold as a portfolio diversifier and hedge against mounting equity risks. This turned out to be an accurate call. Despite losing 8.4% between January and September 2018 because of an aggressive Fed, gold rose by 7.6% in 4Q18 amid the rising equity volatility and ended the year down a minor -1.5% compared to -6.2%, -11.2% and -7.1% for the S&P 500, global equities and the CRB commodity index. This reflects the convexity in gold returns and is the reason we favored gold in 2018. Gold returns are not simply a function of the U.S. dollar and real interest rates. As highlighted in our 2019 Key Views report last December, in mature economic cycles, gold’s ability to hedge against equity and inflation risks dominate its price formation, while its correlation with the U.S. Treasury yields diminishes (Chart of the Week).2 Chart of the WeekGold's Correlation With U.S. Rates Declines As The Cycle Matures Gold's Correlation With U.S. Rates Declines As The Cycle Matures Gold's Correlation With U.S. Rates Declines As The Cycle Matures As the current cycle extends to 2019, the skewness in gold return will prove profitable. The Fed’s retreat on its quarterly rate-hike cycle only adds to our positive view, as it increases the probability the U.S. central bank falls behind the curve. Stay long gold as a portfolio hedge. Fed’s Short-Term Capitulation Strengthens Our View The recent downward revision in the Fed’s rate-hike path reinforces our positive stance on gold prices, as risks of an overshoot in inflation rises. The dichotomy in U.S. vs. rest of the world growth puts the Fed in a difficult position. The current capitulation was mainly driven by tightening financial conditions – chiefly, the rising U.S. dollar, declining stock prices, and widening credit spreads. However, under the Fed’s dual mandate, inflation and employment still are signaling “tightening-required” per BCA Research’s Fed Monitor, a model maintained by our U.S. Bond strategists (Chart 2). Since economic growth cannot remain above-trend indefinitely, short-term productive capacity constraints (i.e. capital and labor factors of production) are already binding and will force the Fed to raise rates later this year as inflation creeps up. Chart 2Growth And Inflation Signal Tighter Money Is Required Growth And Inflation Signal Tighter Money Is Required Growth And Inflation Signal Tighter Money Is Required As it reaffirms its data dependence, the Fed is opening the door to falling behind the inflation curve, given inflation is a lagging indicator of the price pressures that are building up in the economy (Chart 3). As a result, we expect gold’s ability to hedge against inflation will support its price in 2H19. Chart 3Inflationary Pressure Will Rise In 2019 Inflationary Pressure Will Rise In 2019 Inflationary Pressure Will Rise In 2019 Short-term, a Fed pause also supports gold by readjusting investors’ expectations regarding the U.S. dollar and real interest rates lower. Our bond strategists identified two previous periods where similar conditions led to a false start in the Fed hiking cycle, 1997 and 2015. In both cases, the Fed’s capitulation led to a reversal in gold’s downward price trajectory, as the market perceived the central bank was keeping its short-term policy rate at a level that was inconsistent with the so-called R-star rate or natural rate of interest – i.e., “the real interest rate expected to prevail when the economy is at full strength” (Chart 4).3 Chart 4AGold Price's Trajectory Reversed In 1997... Gold Price's Trajectory Reversed In 1997... Gold Price's Trajectory Reversed In 1997... Chart 4B ... And In 2015 ... And In 2015 Using a conceptual four-quadrant framework developed by our colleagues at The Bank Credit Analyst to describe the Fed’s behavior, we currently believe the outcome with the highest probability of being realized by the Fed’s capitulation is Policy Mistake 2 (Table 1, lower right quadrant). If we’re right, this raises the odds of an inflation overshoot above the Fed’s 2% target later this year.4 Table 1Four Fed Policy Scenarios Inflation Overshoot More Likely; Stay Long Gold Inflation Overshoot More Likely; Stay Long Gold This is not a foregone conclusion. However, generally speaking, the higher the inflation uncertainty and the higher the perception the Fed will fall behind the curve, the higher gold is bid up. Recent price action seems to corroborate this. Chart 5 shows that the recent downward revision in the median long-term fed funds rate projection coincides with a rise in gold prices. At present, gold investors are signaling that the fed funds rate is below the neutral rate consistent with R-star. Chart 5Gold Markets Signal Monetary Policy Is Accommodative Gold Markets Signal Monetary Policy Is Accommodative Gold Markets Signal Monetary Policy Is Accommodative Gold And The U.S. Economic Cycle Gold prices are difficult to model and predict, given the collection of time-varying, often conflicting, components determining their evolution. Its core determinants change as we move through the economic cycle. In their current late-cycle environment, inflation and equity risks – i.e., fears of a sharp correction – usually gain in importance. In this report, we characterize the market’s late-cycle phase using two metrics: (1) the fed funds rate relative to R-star, (2) the phase of the yield curve cycle.5 We have already discussed (1) in our outlook and found that when the fed funds rate is rising yet still below the estimate of R-star, gold returns are highly skewed to the upside (Chart 6).6 For (2), we compared the yellow metal’s return to other assets returns in different phases of the U.S. Treasury yield curve’s evolution. We define these yield-curve phases as follow: Chart 6 Phase 1: Normal (i.e., positively sloped: 10-year rates are greater than 3-month rates). The 3-month/10-year treasury slope is above 75 bps. Phase 2: On its way to flattening and returning to normal. The 3-month/10-year Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 75 bps. We divide this in two sub-phases: (a) steepening, and (b) flattening. Phase 3: Inverted (i.e., negatively sloped). The 3-month/10-year Treasury slopes is below 0 bps (Chart 7).7 Chart 7Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle We found that: first, DM and EM equities are the best performers in the group we looked at during Phase 1, when the slope of the yield curve is steep (above 75 bps). Second, there is wide difference between the steepening and flattening sections of Phase 2. EM equities and copper experience the largest rebound once the slope’s curve steepens from below zero. Lastly, gold performs best in the flattening section of Phase 2 and, critically, it outperforms oil, copper, broad commodity indices and equities (Table 2). Table 2Gold Returns Are Positive When The Yield Curve’s Slope Flattens Inflation Overshoot More Likely; Stay Long Gold Inflation Overshoot More Likely; Stay Long Gold Our U.S. Investment and Bond Strategists believe the Fed’s policy rate will remain in the below-r-star-and-rising range, and in Phase 2 of the yield curve cycle for most of 2019. We agree, and believe our analysis indicates gold prices will increase this year on the back of these factors. Recession Fear And Equity Risks Will Drive Gold For most of 2018, investor sentiment and positioning were primarily determined by the U.S. dollar and real rates. As these variables rose last year, investors’ sentiment and positioning turned overly bearish; this pushed our Gold Composite Indicator in the oversold territory (Chart 8).8 In our view, the other (important) drivers of gold prices were ignored during that period. The end-of-year equity selloff led to a reshuffle of the core determinants of the yellow metal’s price, pushing the equity risk factor higher on the list of variables explaining its price. Chart 8Sentiment Collapsed In 1H18 Sentiment Collapsed In 1H18 Sentiment Collapsed In 1H18 Chart 9 shows gold and the U.S. equity risk premium disconnected in 2018, until the October equity selloff. In general, these variables are positively linked. When risk aversion is elevated, investors demand higher compensations for holding risky assets, and increase their demand for safe-haven assets. This pushes up both the equity risk premium and gold prices. Chart 9Gold And Equity Risk Premium Correlation Picked Up Gold And Equity Risk Premium Correlation Picked Up Gold And Equity Risk Premium Correlation Picked Up Gold’s performance in 4Q18 supports our recommendation for holding it as a portfolio diversifier in 2018, and why we continue to do so this year (Chart 10). Chart 10 Separately, our U.S. dollar and rates-only model moved up recently, easing the downward pressure on gold (Chart 11). While we believe these two variables’ marginal impact diminished since 4Q18, they are included in our gold “fair-value” model, which currently indicates it is fairly valued and that its support remains intact. Chart 11Upside Pressures Are Building Upside Pressures Are Building Upside Pressures Are Building Bottom Line: The Fed’s near-term capitulation raises the odds the U.S. economy will experience an inflation overshoot. Our fair-value model also is supportive of gold prices. We remain long as a diversification and portfolio hedge. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see “Saudis Pledge Deeper Oil Cuts in February Under OPEC+ Deal,” published by bloomberg.com January 29, 2019.  See also “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone” published January 24, 2019, for our latest supply-demand balances and price forecasts.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published December 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see John C. Williams’s remarks delivered to the Economic Club of Minnesota May 15, 2018, entitled “The Future Fortunes of R-Star: Are They Really Rising?”  Williams was president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco at the time, and now has the same role at the NY Fed..  We explore this further below.  See also BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled “An Oasis Of Prosperity,” published August 21, 2018. It is available at usb.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA Research’s The Bank Credit Analyst January 2019 Monthly Report published December 21, 2018. It is available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5      The San Francisco Fed defines R-star as the inflation-adjusted “natural” rate of interest consistent with a fully employed economy, with inflation close to the Fed’s target. R-star is used to guide interest-rate policy consistent with long-term macro goals set by the Fed. Please see “R-star, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy,” by Kevin J. Lansing, published in the FRBSF Economic Letter May 30, 2017. 6      We presented this analysis in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published December 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      For a similar analysis applied to different asset classes, please see BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Implication For U.S. Fixed Income,” published December 11, 2018, and The Bank Credit Analyst January 2019 Monthly Report published December 21, 2018. These reports are available at usb.bcaresearch.com and bca.bcaresearch.com. Our approach is slightly different from our colleagues’ methodology. We used a threshold of 75 bps instead of 50 bps in order to increase the sample size of the Phase 2, flattening section. This improves the accuracy of using the average as our main descriptive statistic. Note that the yield curve can remain inverted for some time before a recession occurs, this explains why equity returns are positive in Phase 3 (curve inversion). 8      Our Gold Composite Indicator has three components: (1) Sentiment, (2) Speculative positioning and (3) Technical. It is meant to assess if there is any mismatch between our fundamental analysis and investors’ sentiment and expectations. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Image

Highlights Yield Curve Drivers: A rebound in rate hike expectations will cause the curve to steepen somewhat during the next few months, though accelerating wages limit the upside. The yield curve will not invert until after long-dated inflation expectations are fully re-anchored, probably not until late in the year. Yield Curve Positioning: Correlations that have been in place since the financial crisis show that the 5-year and 7-year maturities are most sensitive to changes in near-term rate hike expectations. With the discounter likely to move higher in the coming months, investors should favor yield curve trades that are short that portion of the curve. Investment Recommendation: Close our recommended long 2-year short 1-year/5-year trade for a profit of 2 bps. Replace it with a position short the 7-year bullet and long a duration-matched 2-year/30-year barbell. Feature The yield curve flattened throughout most of 2018, and actually fell enough that talk of curve inversion hit a fever pitch last November, around the same time that the market started to doubt the Fed’s ability to lift rates (Chart 1). As of today, the 2/10 Treasury slope sits at a mere 17 basis points, but we don’t see it falling below zero any time soon.1 Chart 1Too Soon For Curve Inversion Too Soon For Curve Inversion Too Soon For Curve Inversion In this week’s report we consider the factors that will determine how the slope of the curve evolves over the next few months, and also recommend an investment strategy to take advantage of those movements. Yield Curve: Macro Drivers Driver 1: Rate Hike Expectations The number one factor that will influence the slope of the yield curve in the coming months is the market’s assessment of the near-term path for Fed rate hikes. Chart 2 shows the 5-year rolling correlation between monthly changes in the 2/10 slope and monthly changes in our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter. A positive correlation means that the 2/10 slope steepens when the market prices in more rate hikes and flattens when it prices in fewer hikes. A negative correlation means that the slope flattens when the market prices in more hikes and steepens when it prices in fewer hikes. Chart 2Rising Rate Expectations = Steeper 2/10 Slope Rising Rate Expectations = Steeper 2/10 Slope Rising Rate Expectations = Steeper 2/10 Slope The correlation was consistently negative throughout the pre-crisis period because the 2-year yield reacted more to changes in near-term rate hike expectations than the 10-year yield. In other words, a given increase (decrease) in the discounter would lead to a larger increase (decrease) in the 2-year yield than in the 10-year yield, and the curve flattened (steepened) as a result. But this correlation flipped following the Great Recession. Zero-bound interest rates and Fed forward guidance were an important reason for the switch. But even during the past few months, as the 12-month discounter fell from 66 bps in early November to -1 bp currently, the 10-year yield fell by 45 bps and the 2-year yield by only 36 bps. Even with interest rates off zero and the Fed scaling back its forward guidance, the positive correlation between the 2/10 slope and the 12-month discounter persists. We think that the 12-month discounter is close to its near-term bottom. Our Fed Monitor has fallen somewhat in recent months but it remains above zero, suggesting that the economy requires further monetary tightening (Chart 3). A look at the three components of our Monitor gives us even more confidence that the discounter is near its trough. The economic growth component of the Monitor is nicely above zero (Chart 3, panel 3), and the inflation component continues to trend up (Chart 3, panel 4). All of the Fed Monitor’s recent weakness can be attributed to tighter financial conditions (Chart 3, bottom panel). As we discussed in last week’s report, now that the market views Fed policy as much more accommodative, it is only a matter of time before financial conditions ease.2 Chart 3Fed Monitor Still Suggests Tightening Fed Monitor Still Suggests Tightening Fed Monitor Still Suggests Tightening In fact, some easing has already begun (Chart 4): Chart 4Financial Conditions Starting To Ease Financial Conditions Starting To Ease Financial Conditions Starting To Ease The stock-to-bond total return ratio has bottomed (Chart 4, top panel) High-Yield spreads have peaked (Chart 4, panel 2) The VIX has moderated (Chart 4, panel 3) The trade-weighted dollar has started to depreciate (Chart 4, bottom panel) Ironically, easier financial conditions will give the Fed the green light to re-start rate hikes, probably by June, and this could re-test risk assets in the second half of the year. But between now and then, a move higher in 12-month rate expectations will apply some steepening pressure to the 2/10 slope. Driver 2: Inflation Expectations Instead of looking at nominal yields and rate hike expectations, another approach is to split yields into their real and inflation components. This is potentially revealing in the current environment since a large portion of the recent drop in yields was driven by the cost of inflation compensation. Since the November 8 peak in the discounter, the cost of 10-year inflation protection fell 26 bps and the real 10-year yield fell 19 bps. The cost of 2-year inflation protection declined 46 bps while the real 2-year yield actually rose 10 bps. Based on those numbers, it is evident that when the cost of inflation compensation fell alongside the oil price, it exerted a steepening pressure on the yield curve that was offset by a flattening in the real yield curve. One might conclude that a rebound in inflation will cause the curve to flatten going forward. That is probably true in the event of a pure inflation shock that does not impact global growth. But such a shock is highly unlikely. Oil (and other commodity) prices fell during the past few months because of a slowdown in global growth. A rebound in commodity prices that drives inflation higher will almost certainly occur alongside stronger global growth. In other words, splitting nominal yields into the real and inflation components probably doesn’t get us any closer to figuring out the near-term path for the yield curve. A better way to incorporate the cost of inflation compensation into our thinking about the yield curve is to focus on the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate. That rate is currently 1.99%, well below the range of 2.3%-2.5% that has historically been consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations (Chart 5). Chart 5Inflation Expectations Are Too Low For The Fed Inflation Expectations Are Too Low For The Fed Inflation Expectations Are Too Low For The Fed It is difficult to believe that the Fed would allow the yield curve to invert with the 5-year/5-year breakeven rate so low. The combination of an inverted yield curve and below-target inflation expectations would signal that the Fed wants to run a restrictive monetary policy before inflation has fully recovered. That would be completely contrary to the Fed’s mandate. From this argument, we reason that the 2/10 slope is unlikely to sustainably fall below zero until the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is at least above 2.3%. With the 2/10 slope already at 17 bps, this means it is much more likely to stay near its current level or steepen somewhat during the next few months. Driver 3: Wage Growth The third factor driving our yield curve view is the pace of wage growth. Stronger wage growth is tightly correlated with a flatter yield curve, though the yield curve tends to lead wage growth by 6-12 months (Chart 6). Chart 6A Flatter Curve Leads Faster Wage Growth Higher Wage Growth = Flatter Curve A Flatter Curve Leads Faster Wage Growth Higher Wage Growth = Flatter Curve A Flatter Curve Leads Faster Wage Growth Higher Wage Growth = Flatter Curve In fact, a typical cyclical pattern is for the 2/10 slope to flatten rapidly and then stay at a low (but positive) level for some time as wage growth catches up. In that sense, this cycle is playing out just like every other. The yield curve has already undergone its large flattening and wage growth is now accelerating to catch up. Bottom Line: The three factors discussed above lead us to expect a small amount of curve steepening during the next few months. A rebound in rate hike expectations due to easier financial conditions will cause the curve to steepen, though accelerating wages limit the upside. The yield curve will not invert until after long-dated inflation expectations are fully re-anchored, probably not until late in the year. Yield Curve Positioning In the first section of this report we noted that the 10-year yield fell by more than the 2-year yield between the early-November peak in the 12-month discounter and today. But Table 1 shows that the 5-year and 7-year yields fell by even more. This is the expected result. Table 1Treasury Curve From Peak In 12-Month Discounter To Present Don't Position For Curve Inversion Don't Position For Curve Inversion Turning once again to the correlations between different segments of the yield curve and our 12-month discounter, we see that yield curve segments out to the 5-year maturity point are all positively correlated with the 12-month discounter. Also, curve segments beyond the 7-year maturity point are all negatively correlated with the discounter. The 5/7 slope has virtually no correlation (Chart 7). Chart 75-Year & 7-Year Are Most Sensitive To Rate Expectations 5-Year & 7-Year Are Most Sensitive To Rate Expectations 5-Year & 7-Year Are Most Sensitive To Rate Expectations These correlations tell us that we should expect the 5-year and 7-year yields to move the most in response to changes in the 12-month discounter. In other words, if we expect the discounter to move higher in the coming months we should maintain short exposure to this part of the curve. This short exposure should be offset by long exposure at either the very short-end or the very long-end of the curve, where yields will see less upside when the discounter rebounds. To figure out where to focus this long exposure we can turn to our butterfly spread models.3 Table 2 presents the raw residuals from our butterfly spread models. These models are based on regressions of different butterfly spreads versus the slope of the yield curve segment that spans the two wings of the barbell portion of the trade. For example, Table 2 shows a residual of -9 bps for the 5-year bullet relative to the 2/10 barbell. This means that the 5-year appears 9 bps expensive versus the 2/10 barbell, given where the slope of the 2/10 curve is today. Table 3 shows the standardized residuals from the different curve models so that they can be compared against each other. Table 2Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Residuals Don't Position For Curve Inversion Don't Position For Curve Inversion Table 3Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Don't Position For Curve Inversion Don't Position For Curve Inversion Notice in Tables 2 and 3 that almost all of the numbers are negative. This means that bullet trades are currently expensive relative to barbell trades. Using our criteria of wanting to be short the 5-year or 7-year part of the curve, we can use the tables to see that a position short the 7-year bullet and long the duration-matched 2-year/30-year barbell has an attractive standardized residual of -1.00. This appears to be the most attractive curve trade for the current environment. As such, today we close our current yield curve recommendation to favor the 2-year bullet over the 1-year/5-year barbell for a gain of 2 bps. This recommendation had been in place since November 5. In its place, we initiate a recommendation to go long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 30-year maturities and short the 7-year note. Bottom Line: Correlations that have been in place since the financial crisis show that the 5-year and 7-year maturities are most sensitive to changes in near-term rate hike expectations. With the discounter likely to move higher in the coming months, investors should favor yield curve trades that are short that portion of the curve. With that in mind, we close our 2-year over 1-year/5-year trade and initiate a position short the 7-year bullet and long a duration-matched 2-year/30-year barbell. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We don’t expect to see sustained yield curve inversion until late this year. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on the models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Checklist To Buy Credit Checklist To Buy Credit Checklist To Buy Credit The sell-off in spread product continued through the holiday season, but with spreads now looking more attractive, it is time to consider increasing exposure to corporate credit. Much like in 2015/16, spread widening is being driven by the combination of weaker global growth and the perception of restrictive monetary policy. With that in mind, we are monitoring a checklist of global growth and monetary policy indicators to help us decide when to step back in.1 With the market now pricing-in rate cuts for the next 12 months, monetary policy indicators already signal a buying opportunity (Chart 1). However, before increasing spread product exposure from neutral to overweight we are waiting for a signal from our high frequency global growth indicators. The CRB Raw Industrials index has so far only flattened off (Chart 1, top panel). It started to rise prior to the early-2016 peak in credit spreads. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon, and a neutral allocation to spread product for now. We expect to upgrade spread product in the near future as global growth indicators stabilize. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 106 basis points in December. The index option-adjusted spread widened 16 bps on the month to reach 153 bps. Corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 320 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for corporate bond performance since 2011. Recent poor performance has restored some value to the corporate bond sector. The 12-month breakeven spread for Baa-rated debt has only been wider 37% of the time since 1988 (Chart 2). As a result, we are actively looking for an opportunity to increase exposure to corporate bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview To assess when to raise exposure from neutral to overweight, we are monitoring a checklist of indicators related to global growth and monetary policy.2 While current spread levels present an attractive tactical entry point, spreads may not re-tighten all the way back to their post-crisis lows. Corporate profit growth far outpaced debt growth during the past year causing our measure of gross leverage to fall (panel 4), but a stronger dollar and rising wage bill will weigh on profit growth in 2019. We expect gross corporate leverage to rise in 2019. Chart   Chart High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 366 basis points in December. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 108 bps, and currently sits at 498 bps. High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 363 bps in 2018, making it the worst year for high-yield excess returns since 2015. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 394 bps, well above average historical levels (Chart 3). In other words, if corporate defaults match the Moody’s baseline forecast for the next 12 months, high-yield bonds will return 394 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries, assuming no change in spreads. If we factor in enough spread compression to bring the default-adjusted spread back to its historical average, then we get a 12-month expected excess return of 814 bps. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview For a different perspective on valuation, we can also calculate the default rate necessary for High-Yield to deliver 12-month excess returns in line with the historical average. As of today, this spread-implied default rate is 4.58%, well above the 2.64% default rate anticipated by Moody’s (panel 4). Junk bond value is definitely attractive, and as stated on the front page of this report, we are looking for an opportunity to tactically upgrade the sector. That being said, the uptrend in job cut announcements makes it likely that default rate forecasts will be revised higher in 2019 (bottom panel). At present, spreads appear to offer enough of a buffer to absorb these upward revisions. MBS: Neutral Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in December. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 8 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). MBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 59 bps in 2018. The zero-volatility spread widened 12 bps on the year, split between a 10 bps widening in the OAS and a 2 bps increase in the option cost. Lower mortgage rates during the past two months spurred a small jump in refinancings, but this increase will prove fleeting. Interest rates are poised to move higher in 2019, and higher rates will limit mortgage refi activity and keep a lid on MBS spreads (Chart 4). Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview All in all, with higher interest rates likely to limit refinancings, and with mortgage lending standards still easing from restrictive levels (bottom panel), the macro back-drop for MBS remains supportive. Elevated corporate bond spreads currently offer a better opportunity than those in the MBS space, but the supportive macro back-drop means that there is very low risk of significant MBS spread widening during the next 12 months. We maintain a neutral allocation to MBS for now, and will only look to upgrade the sector as the credit cycle matures and it becomes time to adopt an underweight allocation to corporate credit. For the time being, corporate bonds are the more attractive play. Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in December, and by 80 bps in 2018. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 77 bps in December and by 263 bps in 2018. Sovereign spreads still appear unattractive compared to similarly-rated U.S. corporate spreads (Chart 5). Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Foreign Agencies underperformed by 24 bps in December and by 152 bps in 2018. Local Authorities underperformed by 86 bps in December and by 75 bps in 2018. Domestic Agencies underperformed by 7 bps in December and by 6 bps in 2018. Supranationals outperformed by 3 bps in December and by 22 bps in 2018. In a recent report we looked at USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign debt by country and found that only a few nations offer excess spread compared to equivalently-rated U.S. corporates.3 Those countries are Argentina, Turkey, Lebanon and Ukraine at the low-end of the credit spectrum and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE at the upper-end. We continue to view the Local Authority sector as very attractive. The sector offers similar value to Aa/A-rated corporate debt on a breakeven spread basis (bottom panel), and it is also dominated by taxable municipal securities that are insulated from weak foreign economic growth. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 114 basis points in December, and by 17 bps in 2018 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 2% in December, and currently sits at 87% (Chart 6). This is about one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean but above the average of 81% that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview In our research into the phases of the credit cycle, we often divide the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve. Since 1983, in the middle phase of the credit cycle when the 3/10 Treasury slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps (where it stands today), investment grade corporate bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of -49 bps. In contrast, municipal bonds have delivered annualized excess returns of +45 bps before adjusting for the tax advantage.4 We attribute the pattern of mid-cycle outperformance to the fact that state & local government balance sheet health tends to lag the health of the corporate sector. At present, our Municipal Health Monitor remains in “improving health” territory, consistent with an environment where ratings upgrades will outpace downgrades (bottom panel). Meanwhile, corporations are already deep into the releveraging process. Treasury Curve: Favor The 2-Year Bullet Over The 1/5 Barbell Treasury yields fell sharply in December, but with only minor changes to the slope beyond the 2-year maturity point. The 2/10 slope was unchanged on the month and currently sits at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 49 bps. The biggest changes in slope occurred for maturities less than 2 years, as a result of Fed rate hikes being completely priced out of the curve (Chart 7). Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter fell from +44 bps at the beginning of the month to -11 bps currently. Meanwhile, our 24-month discounter fell from +41 bps to -23 bps. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview As a result of the sharp 1/2 flattening, the 2-year note no longer appears cheap relative to the 1/5 barbell (panel 4). Alternatively, we could say that the 1/2/5 butterfly spread is now priced for 15 bps of 1/5 steepening during the next six months (bottom panel). In fact, our yield curve models now point to bullets being expensive relative to barbells for almost every butterfly spread combination (see Tables 4 and 5). This means it is currently less attractive to initiate curve steeper trades than flattener trades. Despite the relatively low yield pick-up in steepener trades, we think they still make sense at the moment given that the Treasury market is discounting an economic outlook that is far too grim. As we discussed in our Key Views report for 2019, sustainable yield curve inversion is unlikely until later in the year, after inflation expectations are re-anchored around pre-crisis levels.5 As such, we maintain our recommendation to favor the 2-year bullet over the duration-matched 1/5 barbell.  TIPS: Overweight TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 196 basis points in December, and by 175 bps in 2018. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.71%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate also fell 26 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.91%. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen sharply alongside the prices of oil and other commodities during the past two months, as they continue to grapple with two competing forces: Falling commodity prices on the one hand, and U.S. core inflation that continues to print close to the Fed’s target on the other. Eventually, the decisive factor in the TIPS market will be core U.S. inflation continuing to print close to the Fed’s 2% target. This will drive both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates back into a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, once the headwind from weakening commodity prices has passed. This is reinforced by the fact that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now well below the fair value from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).6 This model is based on a combination of long-run and short-run inflation measures and is premised on the idea that investors’ expectations take time to adjust to changing macro environments. In other words, the market will need to see core inflation print close to the Fed’s target for some time before deciding that it will remain there on a sustained basis. Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation ABS: Neutral Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 8 basis points in December, but outperformed by 13 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened by 6 bps on the month and now stands at 48 bps, 14 bps above its pre-crisis low. The excess return Bond Map on page 15 shows that consumer ABS offer greater expected returns than Domestic Agencies and Supranationals, though with a commensurate increase in risk. The Map also shows that Agency CMBS offer very similar return potential with much less risk. The New York Fed’s most recent SCE Credit Access Survey showed a decline in consumer credit applications during the past year, as well as an increase in rejection rates. This is consistent with the observed uptrends in household interest expense and the consumer credit delinquency rate (Chart 9). Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Going forward, consumer credit delinquencies will continue to rise from very low levels, but are unlikely to spike without a significant deterioration in labor market conditions. As such, we maintain a neutral allocation to consumer ABS for now, but our next move will likely be a reduction to underweight as consumer credit delinquencies rise further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in December, but outperformed by 20 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 14 bps on the month and currently sits at 92 bps (Chart 10). A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards on commercial real estate loans as well as falling demand. The Fed’s Q3 Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that lending standards were close to unchanged and that demand deteriorated. All in all, a slightly negative macro picture for CMBS that will bear close monitoring in the coming quarters. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 bps in December, and by 2 bps in 2018. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 60 bps. The Bond Maps on page 15 show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this sector continues to make sense. Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11   Chart 12   Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of January 4, 2019) Get Ready To Buy Credit Get Ready To Buy Credit   Table 5Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Get Ready To Buy Credit Get Ready To Buy Credit   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Charts 2A and 2B in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For the full checklist please see Charts 2A and 2B from the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed In 2019”, dated December 18, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Oil Supply Shock Is A Risk For Junk”, dated October 9, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Investors ran for cover in December as they succumbed to a litany of worries regarding the outlook. The key question is whether the pessimism is overdone or an extended equity bear market is underway. Our outlook for the U.S. and global economies has not changed since we published our 2019 Outlook. There are some tentative signs that the two U.S. weak spots, housing and capital spending, are bottoming out. However, our global leading economic indicators continue to herald a soft first half of 2019 outside of the U.S. The dollar thus has more upside in the near term. The political risks facing investors have not diminished either. In particular, we expect turbulence related to the U.S./China trade war to extend well beyond the 3-month “truce” period. The returns to stocks, corporate bonds and commodities historically have not been particularly attractive on average when the U.S. yield curve is this flat. Nonetheless, the risk/reward balance has improved enough as prices fell over the past month to justify upgrading equities in the advanced economies back to overweight. Move to a neutral level of cash, and keep bonds underweight on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The upgrade to stocks in the developed markets does not carry over to emerging markets. The backdrop will remain hostile to EM assets until China pulls out the big policy stimulus guns and the dollar peaks. Stay clear of EM assets and neutral on base metals for now, but be prepared to upgrade sometime in 2019. Global government bonds could rally a little more in the near term if the risk-off phase continues. Nonetheless, with little chance of any more rate hikes discounted in the U.S. yield curve, the risks for U.S. and global yields are tilted to the upside. Bond investors with a 6-12 month horizon should ride out the near-term volatility with a short-duration position. Oil prices have overshot to the downside. Supply is adjusting and, given robust energy demand in 2019, we still expect prices to rise to $82. Feature Investors ran for cover in December as they succumbed to concerns regarding the U.S./China trade war, corporate leverage, global growth, rising U.S. interest rates and the shift toward quantitative tightening. Some equity indexes, such as the Russell 2000, reached bear market territory, having lost more than 20%. Losses have been even worse outside the U.S. Earnings revisions have plunged into the “net downgrade” zone. Implied volatility has spiked and corporate bond spreads are surging (Chart I-1). The key question is whether the pessimism is overdone or an extended equity bear market is underway. Chart I-1A Flight To Quality A Flight To Quality A Flight To Quality We laid out our economic view in detail in the BCA Outlook 2019 report, published in late November. Not enough has changed on the global economic front in the three weeks since then that would justify such a violent shift in investor sentiment. That said, our favorite global leading economic indicators continue to erode (Chart I-2). The only ray of hope is that the diffusion index constructed from our Global Leading Economic Indicator appears to have bottomed. Nonetheless, the actual LEI will keep falling until the diffusion index shifts into positive territory.   Chart I-2Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Flashing Red Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Flashing Red For China, a key source of investor angst, the latest retail sales and industrial production reports reinforced that economic momentum continues to recede. We will not be convinced that growth is bottoming until we see an upturn in our credit impulse indicator (Chart I-3). Its continued decline in November suggests that the outlook for emerging market assets and commodity prices is poor for at least the next quarter. Global industrial output appears headed for a mild contraction. The manufacturing troubles are centered in the emerging Asian economies, but Europe and Japan are also feeling the negative effects. Chart I-3China: No Bottom Yet China: No Bottom Yet China: No Bottom Yet In the U.S., November’s bounce in housing starts and permits is a hopeful sign that the soft patch in this sector is ending. However, it is not clear how the devastating wildfires on the west coast have affected the housing data (Chart I-4). The downdraft in capital goods orders may also be drawing to a close, based on the latest reading from the Fed’s survey of capital spending intentions. The U.S. leading economic indicator dipped slightly in November, but remains consistent with above-trend real GDP growth in the months ahead. Chart I-4U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs The bottom line is that our outlook for growth has not been significantly altered. We see little risk of a U.S. recession in 2019. The global economy continues to weaken, but we expect enough policy stimulus out of China to stabilize growth in that economy in the second half of the year. We highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019 that, while the risks appeared elevated, we would consider shifting back to overweight in stocks if they cheapened sufficiently. Valuation has indeed improved in recent weeks and sentiment has turned more cautious. Global growth will likely continue to decelerate in the first half of 2019, but markets have largely discounted this outcome. In other words, the shift toward pessimism in financial markets appears overdone. The fact that the Fed has signaled a move away from regular quarter-point rate hikes adds to our confidence in playing what will likely be the last upleg in risk assets in this cycle. Fed: Rate Hikes No Longer On Autopilot The Fed lifted rates by a quarter point in December and signaled that any additional tightening will be data-dependent. The FOMC also trimmed the expected peak in the funds rate and its estimate of the long-run, or neutral, level. Policymakers were likely swayed by some disappointing U.S. economic data, the pullback in core PCE inflation, and the sharp tightening in financial conditions (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Financial Conditions Have Tightened Financial Conditions Have Tightened Financial Conditions Have Tightened Monetary conditions are not tight by historical yardsticks, such as the level of real interest rates. The problem is that investors fear that the neutral level of the fed funds rate, the so-called R-star, remains very depressed. If true, it could mean that the Fed is already outright restrictive, which would signal that the monetary backdrop has turned hostile for risk assets. The OIS curve signals that the consensus believes that the Fed is pretty much done the tightening cycle (Chart I-6) Chart I-6Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! We believe that R-star is higher than the current policy setting and is rising, as the growth headwinds related to the Great Financial Crisis fade with the passage of time. The problem is that nobody knows the level of the neutral rate. Thus, we need to watch for signs that the fed funds rate has surpassed that level, such as an inverted yield curve. The 10-year/3-month T-bill spread is still in positive territory, but barely so. Meanwhile, our R-star indicator is also flashing yellow as it sits on the zero line (Chart I-7). It is a composite of monetary indicators that in the past have been useful in signaling that monetary policy had become outright restrictive, leading to slower growth and trouble for risk assets. The lead time of this indicator relative to economic activity and risk asset prices has been quite variable historically, but a breakdown below zero would send a powerful bearish signal for risk assets if confirmed by an inverted yield curve. Chart I-7Worrying Signs Of Tight Money Worrying Signs Of Tight Money Worrying Signs Of Tight Money The Implications Of Four Fed Scenarios It is not surprising that investors are struggling with a number of different possible scenarios on how the R-star/Fed policy nexus will play out. We can perhaps boil down discussion of the Fed and the implications for financial markets to a matrix of four main outcomes, based on combinations related to the level of R-Star (high or low) and the pace of Fed rate hikes in 2019 (pause or continue increasing rates by 25 basis points per quarter). Policy Mistake #1: R-star is still very low, but policymakers do not realize this and the FOMC continues to tighten into restrictive territory in 2019. By definition, the economy begins to suffer in this scenario, inflation and inflation expectations decline and long-bond yields are flat-to-lower. The yield curve inverts. However, current real rates are still so low that the fed funds rate cannot be very far above R-Star, which means it would represent only a small policy mistake. As long as the Fed recognizes the economic slowdown early enough and truncates the rate hike cycle, then there is a good chance that a recession would be avoided. Investors would initially fear a recession, however, which means that risk assets would be hit hard in absolute terms and relative to bonds and cash until recession fears fade. The direction of the dollar is perhaps trickiest part because there are so many potential cross currents. To keep things simple we will assume that global growth follows our base-case view and remains lackluster in the first half of 2019, followed by a modest re-acceleration. We believe the dollar would likely rally a little as the Fed continues tightening, but then would fall back as the FOMC is forced to turn dovish in the face of a U.S. growth scare. Policy Mistake #2: R-Star is high and rising but the Fed fails to hike rates fast enough to keep up. The economy accelerates in this scenario because monetary policy remains stimulative through 2019, at a time when the 2018 fiscal stimulus will still be providing a demand tailwind. Core PCE inflation moves above 2% and long-term inflation expectations shift up, signaling to investors that the Fed has fallen behind the inflation curve. Risk assets rip for a while and the yield curve bear-steepens as the 10-year Treasury yield moves gradually higher at first. Belatedly, the FOMC realizes it has underestimated the neutral rate and signals a hawkish policy shift. A 50-basis point rate hike at one FOMC meeting causes risk assets to buckle on the back of surging Treasury yields. The yield curve begins to bear-flatten. Eventually the curve inverts and the economy enters recession. The dollar weakens at first because higher inflation lowers U.S. real interest rates relative to the rest of the world. Global growth prospects would initially get a boost from the acceleration in U.S. growth, which is also dollar-bearish. However, in the end the dollar would likely rise as global financial markets turn risk-off. Fed Gets It Right (1): R-star is high and rising. The Fed continues to tighten in line with the increase in the neutral rate. Treasurys sell off hard and the yield curve shifts higher, but remains fairly flat (parallel shift). The curve could mildly invert temporarily, but market worries about a recession eventually recede as economic momentum remains robust, allowing the curve to subsequently trade in the 0-50 basis point range. As discussed below, risk assets tend to outperform Treasurys and cash when the yield curve is in this range, but not by much. The Treasury market would suffer significant losses. This is the most dollar-bullish of the four scenarios, given our global growth view (tepid) and the fact that the market is not even priced for a full quarter-point rate hike in 2019. Fed Gets It Right (2): R-Star is actually still quite low, but the Fed correctly sees recent economic data disappointments and the tightening in financial conditions as signs that policy is close to neutral. The Fed pauses the rate hike cycle, followed by a slower and more data-dependent pace of tightening. The yield curve stays fairly flat and flirts with inversion as investors try to figure out if the Fed has overdone it. Risk assets are volatile and deliver little return over cash. Treasurys rally a bit as the chance of any further rate hikes is priced out of the market, but the rally is limited unless the economy falls into recession (which is not part of this scenario because we are assuming the Fed “gets it right”). The dollar fluctuates, but delivers no real trend since U.S. yield differentials versus the rest of the world do not change much. As we go to press, financial markets are moving in a way that is consistent the Policy Mistake #1; the consensus appears to believe that the Fed has already lifted the fed funds rate too far, causing financial conditions to tighten. But if U.S. real GDP growth remains above-trend as we expect, then the market view could eventually transition to a belief in Mistake #2; the Fed falls behind the inflation curve. The curve would re-steepen and risk assets could have one last hurrah before the Fed gets hawkish again and the 2020 recession arrives. The transition from Mistake #1 to Mistake #2 is essentially our base-case outlook. Nonetheless, obviously the risks around this central scenario are high, especially given how late it is in the U.S. economic and policy cycle. Asset Returns And The Yield Curve Our 2018 late-cycle investing theme focussed on historical asset return and policy dynamics after the U.S. unemployment rate fell below the full-employment level in past cycles. We found that risk assets tend to run into trouble once the U.S. S&P 500 operating margin peaks. As we highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019, our margin proxies are still not heralding that a peak is at hand. Given the recent investor obsession with the U.S. yield curve, this month we look at historical asset returns at different levels of the 10-year/3-month T-bill yield curve slope: Phase I, when the slope is above 50 basis points; Phase II, when the curve is between 0 and 50 basis points; and Phase III, when the curve is inverted (Table I-1). The data are presented as (not annualized) monthly average returns. It may be surprising that risk asset returns are for the most part positive even in when the curve is inverted. However, keep in mind that we are focussing on the curve, not on recession periods. The curve can be inverted for a long time before the subsequent recession occurs. Risk asset returns often remain positive during this period. The broad conclusions are as follows: Unsurprisingly, risk assets perform their best, in absolute terms and relative to government bonds and cash, in Phase I when the yield curve is steep. Returns tend to deteriorate as the curve flattens. This includes equities, corporate bonds and commodities. Small caps underperform large caps when the curve is between 0 and 50 basis points, but the reverse is true when the curve is flatter or steeper than that range. The ratio of cyclical stocks to defensives has not revealed a consistent pattern with respect to the yield curve, although this may reflect the short historical period available. Value stocks shine versus growth when the curve is inverted. Hedge fund and private equity returns have not varied greatly across the three yield curve environments. Structured product, such as CMBS and ABS, have enjoyed their best performance when the curve is inverted. Timberland and Farmland have also rewarded investors during Phase III. We suspected that asset returns when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range would vary importantly with the direction of the curve. In Table I-I we split Phase II into two parts: when the curve is steepening after being inverted, and when the curve is flattening after being steep. In other words, when the consensus is either transitioning from quite bullish to very bearish, or vice-versa. Chart I- Risk assets such as equities (U.S. and Global) and U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds indeed perform much better in absolute terms when the curve is flat but is steepening rather than flattening. The same is true for U.S. structured product. In terms of excess returns relative to government issues, both U.S. IG and HY corporates have tended to underperform when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range. Surprisingly, the underperformance is worse when the curve is steepening than when it is flattening. This appears to reflect an anomalous period in early 2006 when the curve was flattening but corporate bonds enjoyed strong excess returns. Emerging market equities show very strong returns in all three curve phases. This reflects the inclusion of the pre-2000 period in the mean calculations, a time when EM equities were much less correlated with U.S. financial conditions. EM equity returns have been significantly lower on average since 2000 when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range (and especially when the curve is flattening) The bottom line is that risk assets can still reward investors with positive returns during periods when the yield curve is flat. However, it is a dangerous time, especially when the global economy is up to its eyeballs in debt. This month’s Special Report beginning on page 17 argues that, although regulation has made the global financial system more resilient to shocks compared to the pre-Lehman years, the number of potentially destabilizing shocks has increased. Moreover, the trade war and Brexit risks make the investment backdrop all the more precarious. No Quick End To The Trade War The honeymoon following the trade ceasefire between the U.S. and China, agreed at the G20 summit in early December, did not last long. The arrest of the chief financial officer of Chinese telecom maker Huawei and continuing hawkish tweets from the U.S. president dampened hopes that a trade agreement can be negotiated by March. Even news that China intended to cut tariffs on U.S. auto imports did not help much. We highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019 that negotiations will prove to be protracted and testy. It will take a lot more than some token market-opening action on the part of China to placate the U.S. Our geopolitical team emphasizes that “trade war” is a misnomer for a broader strategic conflict that is centered on the military-industrial balance rather than the trade balance.1 For example, while China is rapidly catching up to the U.S. in research and development spending, it is only spending about half as much as the U.S. relative to its overall economy (Chart I-8). While the U.S. can accept China’s eventually surpassing it in economic output, it cannot accept China’s technological superiority. This would translate into military and strategic supremacy over time. Chart I-8R&D Expenditure By Country R&D Expenditure By Country R&D Expenditure By Country U.S. demands will also be hard for China to swallow. Most importantly, the U.S. is requesting that China rein in its hacking and spying, shift its direct investment to less tech-sensitive sectors, adjust its “Made in China” targets to allow for more foreign competition, and lower foreign investment equity restrictions. These stumbling blocks will make it difficult to strike a deal on trade. We continue to believe that a final trade deal between the U.S. and China will not arrive in the 90-day timeframe of the ceasefire. Thus, global risk assets will be subject to swings in sentiment regarding the likelihood of a trade deal well beyond March. Meanwhile, as previously discussed, Chinese policy stimulus has not yet become aggressive enough to spark animal spirits in the private sector. The Chinese authorities are proceeding cautiously so as to avoid adding significantly to private- and public-sector’s debt mountain. This month’s Special Report also discusses the risks that the surge in debt over the past decade poses for the global financial system, including escalating risk in China’s shadow banking system. Brexit Pain Continues Politics surrounding the torturous Brexit process will also remain a source of volatility for global markets in 2019. Prime Minister May survived a leadership challenge, but this is hardly confidence-inspiring. The question is whether any deal can get through Westminster. The votes appear to be in place for the softest of soft Brexits, the so-called Norway+ option, if May convinces the Labour Party to break ranks. Such a deal would entail Common Market access, but at the cost of having to essentially pay for full EU membership with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. The alternative is to call for a new election (which may usher the even less pro-Brexit Labour Party into power), or to delay Brexit for a more substantive period of time, or simply to buckle under the pressure and call for a second referendum. We disagree that the failure of the Tories to endorse May’s proposed agreement means that the “no deal Brexit,” or the “Brexit cliff,” is nigh. Such an outcome is in nobody’s interest and both May and the EU can offer delays to ensure that it does not happen. Whatever happens, one thing is clear; the median voter is turning forcefully towards Bremain (Chart I-9). It will soon become untenable to delay the second referendum. The bottom line is that, while a soft Brexit is the most likely outcome, the path from here to the end result will be punishing. We do not recommend Brexit-related bets on the pound, despite the fact that it is cheap. Chart I-9A Shift Toward Bremain A Shift Toward Bremain A Shift Toward Bremain 2019: A Tale Of Two Halves For EM, Commodities And The Dollar One of our key themes in the BCA Outlook 2019 is that the growth divergence between China and the U.S. will persist at least for the first half of 2019. The result will be weak EM asset prices and currencies, little upside for base metals and a strong U.S. dollar. We expect the Chinese authorities will do enough to stabilize growth by mid-year, providing the impetus for a playable bounce in EM and commodity prices in the second half of 2019, coinciding with a peak in the U.S. dollar. Nonetheless, the dollar still has some upside potential in broad trade-weighted terms in the first half of 2019. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to show a greater need for policy tightening in the U.S. than in the rest of the major countries. The dollar has usually strengthened when this has been the case historically. In particular, the ECB’s Central Bank Monitor has slipped back into “easy money required” territory, reflecting moderating economic momentum and still-depressed consumer price inflation (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar The ECB announced the well-anticipated end of its asset purchase program in December. The central bank will now focus on forward guidance as its main policy tool outside of setting short-term interest rates. Lending via targeted LTROs will also be considered under certain circumstances. Policymakers retained the latest forward guidance after the December MPC meeting, that rates are on hold “through the summer of 2019”. The latest reading from our ECB Monitor suggests that the central bank could be on hold for longer than that. We expect Eurozone growth to improve somewhat through the year, but we still believe that interest rate differentials will move further in favor of the dollar relative to the euro and the other major currencies. Periods of slow global growth also tend to favor the greenback. The bottom line is that, while a correction is possible in the very near term, investors with at least a six-month horizon should remain long the dollar. Investment Conclusions: Our outlook for the U.S. and global economies has not changed since we published our 2019 Outlook. The risks facing investors have not diminished either, especially given the precarious nature of late-cycle investing and the uncertainty regarding the neutral level of the fed funds rate. Historically, the returns to stocks, corporate bonds and commodities have not been particularly attractive on average when the yield curve is this flat. Nonetheless, we believe that the risk/reward balance has improved enough as prices fell over the past month to justify upgrading equities in the advanced economies to overweight. Move to a neutral level of cash, and keep bonds underweight on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Despite our more positive view on equities, we remain cautious on credit. Spreads have widened recently to more attractive levels, but we remain concerned about the high leverage of U.S. corporates, whose debt/assets ratio is on average higher now than in 2009. Signs of strain are already showing in the junk bond market, with new issuance having largely dried up since early December. If this continues, borrowers may struggle to refinance maturing debt in early 2019.  Credit is an asset class that is likely to perform particularly poorly in the next recession. Our upgrade to stocks in the advanced markets does not carry over to emerging markets. The backdrop will remain hostile to EM assets until China pulls out the big policy stimulus guns and the dollar peaks. Stay clear of EM assets and neutral on base metals for now. Global government bonds could rally a little more in the near term if the risk-off phase continues. Nonetheless, with little chance of any more rate hikes discounted in the U.S. yield curve, the risks for U.S. and global yields are tilted to the upside. Bond investors with a 6-12 month horizon should ride out the near-term volatility with a short-duration position. Oil markets are still in the process of re-adjusting to an extraordinary policy reversal by the Trump Administration on its Iranian oil-export sanctions in November, as last-minute waivers were granted to Iran’s largest oil importers. We believe that oil prices have overshot to the downside. Following OPEC 2.0’s decision to cut 1.2mm b/d of production to re-balance markets in the first half of the year, we continue to expect prices to recover on the back of solid global energy demand. Canada also mandated energy firms to trim production. Our energy experts expect oil prices to reach $82/bbl in 2019. We also like gold as long as the fed funds rate remains below its neutral level. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 21, 2018 Next Report: January 31, 2019 II. (Part II) The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis This is the second of a two-part Special Report on the structural changes that have occurred as a result of the Great Recession and financial crisis. We look at three issues: asset correlation, the safety of the financial system, and the level of global debt. First, correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. Some believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has shifted permanently higher for two main reasons: (1) trading factors such as the increased use of exchange-traded funds and algorithms; and (2) the risk-on/risk-off environment in which trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We have sympathy for the second explanation. The equity risk premium (ERP) was forced higher on a sustained basis by the financial crisis, driven by fears that the advanced economies had entered a ‘secular stagnation’. Elevated correlation among risk assets was a result of a higher-than-normal ERP. The ERP should decline as fears of secular stagnation fade, leading to a lower average level of risk asset correlation than has been the case over the last decade. Second, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. But is the financial system really any safer today? Undoubtedly, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. The propensity for contagion among banks has diminished and there has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities. The bad news is that the level of global debt has increased at an alarming pace. The third part of this report highlights that elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system. Choking debt levels boost the vulnerability to negative shocks. The number and probability of potential shocks appear to have increased since 2007, including extreme weather events, sovereign debt crises, large-scale migration, populism, water crises and cyber & data attacks. The lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide any fiscal relief in the event of a negative shock. Moreover, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend more in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. The Great Recession and Financial Crisis cast a long shadow that will affect economies, policy and financial markets for years to come. Rather than reviewing the roots of the crisis, the first of our two-part series examined the areas where we believe structural change has occurred related to the economy or financial markets. We covered the changing structure of the corporate bond market, the inflation outlook, central bank policymaking and equilibrium bond yields. We highlighted that the financial crisis transformed the corporate bond market in several ways that heighten the risk for quality spreads in the next downturn. We made the case that the prolonged inflation undershoot is sowing the seeds of an overshoot in the coming years, in part related to central bank policymakers that are doomed to fight the last war. Finally, we argued that the forces behind the structural and cyclical bull market in bonds reached an inflection point in 2016/2017. In Part II, we examine the theory that the financial crisis has permanently lifted market correlations among risk assets. Next, we look at whether regulatory changes implemented as a result of the financial crisis have made the global financial system safer. Finally, we highlight the implications of the continued rise in global leverage over the past decade in the context of BCA’s Debt Supercycle theme. The bottom line is that the global financial system still faces substantial risks, despite a more highly regulated banking system. (1) Are Risk Asset Correlations Permanently Higher? Correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. For example, risk assets became more highly correlated, suggesting little differentiation within or across asset classes. Chart II-1 presents a proxy for U.S. equity market correlations, using a sample of current S&P 100 companies. The average correlation was depressed in the 1990s and 2000s relative to the 1980s. It spiked in 2007 and fluctuated at extremely high levels for several years, before moving erratically lower. It has jumped recently and is roughly in the middle of the post-1980s range. Chart II-1Two Factors Driving Correlation bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 Correlations will undoubtedly ebb and flow in the coming years and will spike again in the next recession. But a key question is whether correlations will oscillate around a higher average level than in the 1990s and 2000s. The consensus seems to believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has indeed shifted higher on a structural basis for two main reasons: Market Structure Changes: Many investors point to trading factors such as the increased use of index products (exchange-traded funds for example), and high-frequency/algorithmic trading as likely culprits. Macro “theme” investing has reportedly become more popular and is often implemented through algorithms. The result is an increase in stock market volatility and a tendency for risk-asset prices to move up and down based on momentum because they are all being traded as a group. These factors would likely be evident today even if the financial crisis never happened, but the popularity of algorithm trading may have been encouraged by the fact that the macro backdrop was so uncertain for years after Lehman collapsed. Risk On/Off Trading Environment: Trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Even after the recession ended, the headwinds to growth were formidable and many felt that the sustainability of the recovery hinged largely on the success or failure of unorthodox monetary policies. The general feeling was that either the policies would “work”, the output gap would gradually close and risk assets would perform well, or it would fail and risk assets would be dragged down by a return to recession. Thus, markets traded on an extreme “risk-on/risk-off” basis, as sentiment swung wildly with each new piece of economic and earnings data. While the market structure thesis has merit on the surface, the impact should only be short term in nature. It is difficult to see how a change in the intra-day microstructure of the market could have such a fundamental, wide-ranging and permanent impact on market prices. Previous research suggests that any impact on market correlation beyond the very short term is likely to be small. For the sake of brevity, we won’t present the evidence here, but instead refer readers to two BCA Special Reports.2 The risk on/off trading environment thesis is a more plausible explanation. However, we find it more useful to think about it in terms of the equity risk premium (ERP). A higher ERP causes investors to revalue cash flows from all firms, which, in turn, causes structural shifts in the correlation among stocks. A lower ERP results in less homogenization of the present value of future cash flows, and raises the effect of differentiation among business models. A rise in the ERP could occur for different reasons, but the most obvious are an increase in the perceived riskiness of firms, a shift in investor risk aversion, or both. Shifts in the ERP are sometimes structural in nature, but there is also a strong cyclical element in that persistent equity declines historically have had the effect of temporarily raising the ERP and correlations. A simple model based on the ERP and volatility explains a lot of the historical variation in equity correlation, including the elevated levels observed in the years after 2007 (Chart II-2).3 The shift lower in correlations after 2012 reflects both a lower equity risk premium and a dramatic decline in downside volatility. Chart II-2Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation It is tempting to believe that the lingering shell-shock related to the financial crisis means that the underlying equity risk premium has shifted permanently higher. The ERP is still elevated by historical standards, but this is more reflective of extraordinarily low bond yields than an elevated forward earnings yield. Investors evidently believe that the U.S. and other developed economies are stuck in a “secular stagnation”, which will require low interest rates for many years just to keep economic growth near its trend pace. In other words, the equilibrium interest rate, or R-star, is still very low. The ERP and correlations among risk assets will undoubtedly spike again in the next recession. Nonetheless, in the absence of recession, we expect fears regarding secular stagnation to fade further. If the advanced economies hold up as short-term interest rates and bond yields rise, then concerns that R-star is extremely low will dissipate and expectations regarding equilibrium bond yields will shift higher. The ERP will move lower as bond yields, rather than the earnings yield, do most of the adjustment. The underlying correlations among risk asset prices should correspondingly recede. This includes correlations among a wide variety of risk assets, such as corporate bonds and commodities. While this describes our base case outlook, there is a non-trivial risk that the next recession arrives soon and is deep. This would underscore the view that R-star is indeed very low and the economy needs constant monetary stimulus just to keep it out of recession (i.e. the secular stagnation thesis). The ERP and correlations would stay elevated on average in that scenario. What About The Stock/Bond Correlation? Chart II-3 shows the rolling correlation between monthly changes in the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the S&P 500. The correlation was generally negative between the late-1960s and the early-2000s. Bond yields tended to rise whenever the S&P 500 was falling. Over the past two decades, however, bond yields have generally declined when the stock market has swooned. Chart II-3Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Inflation expectations can help explain the shift in stock/bond correlation. Expectations became unmoored after 1970, which meant that inflationary shocks became the primary driver of bond yields. Strong growth became associated with rising inflation and inflation expectations, and the view that central banks had fallen behind the curve. Bond yields surged as markets discounted aggressive tightening designed to choke off inflation. And, given that inflation lags the cycle and had a lot of persistence, central banks were not in a position to ease policy at the first hint of a growth slowdown. This was obviously a poor backdrop for stocks. When inflation expectations became well anchored again around the late 1990s, investors no longer feared that central banks would have to aggressively stomp on growth whenever actual inflation edged higher. Central banks also had more latitude to react quickly by cutting rates at the first sign of slower economic growth. Fluctuations in growth became the primary driver of bond yields, allowing stock prices to rise and fall along with yields. The correlation has therefore been positive most of the time since 2003. Bottom Line: A negative correlation between stocks and bond yields reared its ugly head in the last quarter of 2018. The equity correction reflected several factors, but the previous surge in bond yields and hawkish Fed comments appeared to spook markets. Investors became nervous that the fed funds rate had already entered restrictive territory, at a time when the global economy was cooling off. We expect more of these episodes as the Fed normalizes short-term interest rates over the next couple of years. Nonetheless, we see no evidence that inflation expectations have become unmoored. This implies that the stock-bond correlation will generally be positive most of the time over the medium term. In addition, the average level of correlation among risk assets has probably not been permanently raised, although spikes during recessions or growth scares will inevitably occur. (2) Is The Global Financial System Really Safer Today? The roots of the great financial crisis and recession involved a global banking and shadow banking system that encouraged leverage and risk-taking in ways that were hard for investors and regulators to assess. Complex and opaque financial instruments helped to hide risk, at a time when regulators were “asleep at the switch”. In many countries, credit grew at a much faster pace than GDP and capital buffers were dangerously low. Banking sector compensation skewed the system toward short-term gains over long-term sustainable returns. Lax lending standards and a heavy reliance on short-term wholesale markets to fund trading and lending activity contributed to cascading defaults and a complete seizure in parts of the money and fixed income markets. A vital question is whether the financial system is any less vulnerable today to contagion and seizure. The short answer is that the financial system is better prepared for a shock, but the problem is that the number of potential sources of instability have increased since 2007. Since the financial crisis, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. Reforms have come under four key headings: Capital: Regulators raised the minimum capital requirement for banks, added a buffer requirement, and implemented a surcharge on systemically important banks. Liquidity: Regulators implemented a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) in order to ensure that banks have sufficient short-term funds to avoid liquidity shortages and bank runs.4 Risk Management: Banks are being forced to develop systems to better monitor risk, and are subject to periodic stress tests. Resolution Planning: Banks have also been asked to detail options for resolution that, hopefully, should reduce systemic risk should a major financial institution become insolvent. Global systemically-important banks, in particular, will require sufficient loss-absorbing capacity. A major study by the Bank for International Settlements,5 along with other recent studies, found that systemic risk in the global financial system has diminished markedly as a result of the new regulations. On the whole, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. Lending standards have tightened almost across the board relative to pre-crisis levels, particularly for residential mortgages. Additional capital and liquid assets provide a much wider buffer today against adverse shocks, allowing most banks to pass recent stress tests (Chart II-4). Financial institutions have generally re-positioned toward retail and commercial banking and wealth management, and away from more complex and capital-intensive activities (Chart II-5). The median share of trading assets in total assets for individual G-SIBs has declined from around 20% to 12% over 2009-16. Chart II-4 Chart II-5 Moreover, the propensity for contagion among banks has diminished. The BIS notes that assessing all the complex interactions in the global financial system is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, a positive sign is that banks are focusing more on their home markets since the crisis, and that direct connections between banks through lending and derivatives exposures have declined. The BIS highlights that aggregate foreign bank claims have declined by 16% since the crisis, driven particularly by banks from the advanced economies most affected by the crisis, especially from some European countries (Chart II-6). It is also positive that European banks have made some headway in diminishing over-capacity, although problems still exist in Italy. Finally, and importantly, there has been a distinct shift toward more stable sources of funding, such as deposits, away from fickle wholesale markets (Charts II-7 and II-8). Chart II-6Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently)   Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Outside of banking, many other regulatory changes have been implemented to make the system safer. One important example is that rules were adjusted to reduce the risk of runs on money market funds. What About Shadow Banking? Of course, more could be done to further indemnify the financial system. Concentration in the global banking system has not diminished, and it appears that the problem of “too big to fail” has not been solved. And then there is the shadow banking sector, which played a major role in the financial crisis by providing banks a way of moving risk to off-balance sheet entities and securities, and thereby hiding the inherent risks. Shadow banking is defined as credit provision that occurs outside of the banking system, but involves the key features of bank lending including leverage, and liquidity and maturity transformation. Complex structured credit securities, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations, allowed this type of transformation to mushroom in ways that were difficult for regulators and investors to understand. A recent study by the Group of Thirty6 concluded that securitization has dropped to a small fraction of its pre-crisis level, and that growing non-bank credit intermediation since the Great Recession has primarily been in forms that do not appear to raise financial stability concerns. Much of the credit creation has been in non-financial corporate bonds, which is a more stable and less risky form of credit extension than bank lending. Other types of lending have increased, such as corporate credit to pension funds and insurance companies, but this does not involve maturity transformation, according to the Group of Thirty. There has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities such as collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial paper, and structured investment vehicles since 2007 (Chart II-9). While the situation must be monitored, the Group of Thirty study concludes that the financial system in the advanced economies appears to be less vulnerable to bouts of self-reinforcing forced selling, such as occurred during the 2008 crisis. Chart II-9Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization One exception is the U.S. leveraged loan market, which has swelled to $1.13 trillion and about half has been pooled into Collateralized Loan Obligations. As with U.S. high-yield bonds, the situation is fine as long as profitability remains favorable. But in the next recession, lax lending standards today will contribute to painful losses in leveraged loans. The Bad News That’s the good news. The bad news is that, while the financial system might have become less complex and opaque, the level of debt has increased at an alarming rate in both the private and public sectors in many countries. Elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system, especially as global bond yields return to more normal levels by historical standards. We discuss other pressure points such as Emerging Markets and China in the next section, although the latter deserves a few comments before we leave the subject of shadow banking. The Group of Thirty notes that 30% of Chinese credit is provided by a broad array of poorly regulated shadow banking entities and activities, including trust funds, wealth management products, and “entrusted loans.” Links between these entities and banks are unclear, and sometimes involve informal commitments to provide credit or liquidity support. The study takes some comfort that most of Chinese debt takes place between Chinese domestic state-owned banks and state-owned companies or local government financing vehicles. Foreign investors have limited involvement, thus reducing potential direct contagion outside of China in the event of a financial event. Still, the potential for contagion internationally via global sentiment and/or the economic fallout is high. The other bad news is that, while regulators in the advanced economies have managed to improve the ability of financial institutions to weather shocks, potential risks to the financial system have increased in number and in probability of occurrence. The Global Risk Institute (GRI) recently published a detailed comparison of potential shocks today relative to 2007.7 The report sees twice the number of risks versus 2007 that are identified as “current” (i.e. could occur at any time) and of “high impact”. The most pressing risks today include extreme weather events, asset bubbles, sovereign debt crises, large-scale involuntary migration, water crises and cyber & data attacks. Any of these could trigger a broad financial crisis if the shock is sufficiently intense, despite improved regulation. The GRI study also eventuates how the risks will evolve over the next 11 years. Readers should see the study for details, but it is interesting that the experts foresee cyber dependency rising to the top of the risk pile by 2030. The increase is driven by the importance of data ownership, the increasing role of algorithms and control systems, and the $1.2 trillion projected cost of cyber, data and infrastructure attacks. Our computer systems are not prepared for the advances of technology, such as quantum computing. Climate change moves to the number two risk spot in its base-case outlook. Space limitations precluded a discussion of the rise of populism in this report, but the GRI sees the political tensions related to income inequality as the number three threat to the global financial system by 2030. Bottom Line: Regulators have managed to substantially reduce the amount of hidden risk and the potential for contagion between financial institutions and across countries since 2007. Banks have a larger buffer against stocks. Unfortunately, the number and probability of potential shocks to the financial system appear to have increased since 2007. (3) Implications Of The Global Debt Overhang The End of the Debt Supercycle is a key BCA theme influencing our macro view of the economic and market outlook for the coming years. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness of monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Federal Reserve and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit up-cycle. However, since the 2007-09 meltdown, even zero (or negative) policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed economies, except in a few cases. The end of the Debt Supercycle has severely impaired the key transmission channel between changes in monetary policy and economic activity. The combination of high debt burdens and economic uncertainty has curbed borrowers’ appetite for credit while increased regulatory pressures and those same uncertainties have made lenders less willing to extend loans. This has severely eroded the effectiveness of lower interest in boosting credit demand and supply, forcing central banks to rely increasingly on manipulating asset prices and exchange rates. On a positive note, the plunge in interest rates has lowered debt servicing costs to historically low levels. Yet, it is the level, rather than the cost, of debt that seems to have been an impediment to the credit cycle, contributing to a lethargic economic expansion. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publishes an excellent dataset of credit trends across a broad swath of developing and emerging economies. Some broad conclusions come from an examination of the data (Charts II-10 and II-11):8 Chart II-10Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Chart II-11EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started Private debt growth has only recently accelerated for the advanced economies as a whole. There are only a handful of developed economies where private debt-to-GDP ratios have moved up meaningfully in the past few years. These are countries that avoided a real estate/banking bust and where property prices have continued to rise (e.g. Canada and Australia). The high level of real estate prices and household debt currently is a major source of concern to the authorities in those few countries. Even where some significant consumer deleveraging has occurred (e.g. the U.S., Spain and Ireland), debt-to-income ratios remain very high by historical standards. In many cases, a stabilization or decline in private debt burdens has been offset by a continued rise in public debt, keeping overall leverage close to peak levels. This is a key legacy of the financial crisis; many governments were forced to offset the loss of demand from private sector deleveraging by running larger and persistent budget deficits. Weak private demand accounts for close to 50% of the rise in public debt on average according to the IMF. Global debt of all types (public and private) has soared from 207% of GDP in 2007 to 246% today. The Debt Supercycle did not end everywhere at the same time. It peaked in Japan more than 20 years ago and has not yet reached a decisive bottom. The 2007-09 meltdown marked the turning point for the U.S. and Europe, but it has not even started in the emerging world. The financial crisis accelerated the accumulation of debt in the latter as investors shifted capital away from the struggling advanced economies to (seemingly less risky) emerging markets. Both EM private- and public-sector debt ratios have continued to move up at an alarming pace. The lesson from Japan is that deleveraging cycles following the bursting of a major credit bubble can last a very long time indeed. One key area where there has been significant deleveraging is the U.S. household sector (Chart II-12). The ratio of household debt to income has fallen below its long-term trend, suggesting that the deleveraging process is well advanced. However, one could argue that the ratio will undershoot the trend for an extended period in a mirror image of the previous overshoot. Or, it may be that the trend has changed; it could now be flat or even down. Chart II-12U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... What is clear is that U.S. attitudes toward saving and spending have changed dramatically since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) (Chart II-13). Like the Great Depression of the 1930s that turned more than one generation off of debt, the 2008/09 crisis appears to have been a watershed event that marked a structural shift in U.S. consumer attitudes toward credit-financed spending. The Debt Supercycle is over for this sector. Chart II-13...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change Developing Countries: Debt And Economic Fundamentals BCA’s long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Trade wars and a tightening Fed are negative for EM assets, but the main headwinds facing this asset class are structural. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries. EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart II-14). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart II-14, bottom panel). Chart II-14EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... The 2019 Key Views9 report from our Emerging Markets Strategy team highlights that excessive capital inflows over the past decade have contributed to over-investment and mal-investment. Much of the borrowing was used to fund unprofitable projects, as highlighted by the plunge in productivity growth, profit margins and return on assets in the EM space relative to pre-Lehman levels (Chart II-15) Decelerating global growth in 2018 has exposed these poor fundamentals. Chart II-15...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability As we highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019, emerging financial markets may enjoy a rally in the second half of 2019 on the back of Chinese policy stimulus. However, this will only represent a ‘sugar high’. The debt overhang in emerging market economies is unlikely to end benignly because a painful period of corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization and structural reforms are required in order to boost productivity and thereby improve these countries’ ability to service their debt mountains. China’s Debt Problem Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the complex debt situation in China and the risks it poses for the global financial system. Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to 260% of GDP at present (Chart II-16). Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, China has ended up with a severe overcapacity problem. The rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart II-17). Chinese banks are currently being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not sour. This has become an impossible feat. Chart II-16China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... Chart II-17Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets The previous section highlighted that much of the debt has been created in the opaque shadow banking system, where vast amounts of hidden risk have likely accumulated. Whether or not the central government is willing and/or able to cover a wave of defaults and recapitalize the banking system in the event of a negative shock is hotly debated, both within and outside of BCA. But even if a financial crisis can be avoided, bringing an end to the unsustainable credit boom will undoubtedly have significant consequences for the Chinese economy and the emerging economies that trade with it. Interest Costs To Rise Globally, many are concerned about rising interest costs as interest rates normalize over the coming years. In Appendix Charts II-19 to II-21, we provide interest-cost simulations for selected government, corporate and household sectors under three interest-rate scenarios. The good news is that the starting point for interest rates is still low, and that it takes years for the stock of outstanding debt to adjust to higher market rates. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, interest burdens will increase but will generally remain low by historical standards. It would take a surge of 300 basis points across the yield curve to really ‘move the needle’ in terms of interest expense. This does not imply that the global debt situation is sustainable or that a financial crisis can be easily avoided. The next economic downturn will probably not be the direct result of rising interest costs. Nonetheless, elevated government, household and/or corporate leverage has several important long-term negative implications: Limits To Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Government indebtedness will limit the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy during the next economic downturn. Chart II-18 highlights that structural budget deficits and government debt levels are higher today compared to previous years that preceded recessions. The risk is especially high for emerging economies and some advanced economies (such as Italy) where investors will be unwilling to lend at a reasonable rate due to default fears. Even in countries where the market still appears willing to lend to the government at a low interest rate, political constraints may limit the room to maneuver as voters and fiscally-conservative politicians revolt against a surge in budget deficits. This will almost certainly be the case in the U.S., where the 2018 tax cuts mean that the federal budget deficit is likely to be around 6% of GDP in the coming years even in the absence of recession. A recession would push it close to a whopping 10%. Even in countries where fiscal stimulus is possible, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend and take on more debt. Chart II-18 Growth Headwinds: The debt situation condemns the global economy to a slower pace of trend growth in part because of weaker capital spending. From one perspective this is a good thing, because spending financed by the excessive use of credit is unsustainable. Still, deleveraging has much further to go at the global level, which means that spending will have to be constrained relative to income growth. The IMF estimates that deleveraging in the private sector for the advanced economies is only a third of historical precedents at this point in the cycle. The IMF also found that debt overhangs have historically been associated with lower GDP growth even in the absence of a financial crisis. Sooner or later, overleveraged sectors have to retrench. Vulnerability To Negative Shocks: If adjustment is postponed, debt reaches levels that make the economy highly vulnerable to negative shocks as defaults rise and lenders demand a higher return or withdraw funding altogether. IMF work shows that economic downturns are more costly in terms of lost GDP when it is driven or accompanied by a financial crisis. This is particularly the case for emerging markets. Bottom Line: Although credit growth has been subdued in most major advanced economies, there has been little deleveraging overall and debt-to-GDP is still rising at the global level. Elevated debt levels are far from benign, even if it appears to be easily financed at the moment. It acts as dead weight on economic activity and makes the world economy vulnerable to negative shocks. It steals growth from the future and, in the event of such a shock, the lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide fiscal relief. The end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst APPENDIX Chart II-19Corporate Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-20Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-21U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our tactical upgrade of equities to overweight this month goes against most of our proprietary indicators. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators for the U.S., Japan and Europe are all heading lower. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors are clearly moving funds away from the equity market at the moment. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continues to issue a ‘sell’ signal. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Momentum remains out of sync with valuation and policy, supporting the view that caution is still warranted. The U.S. net earnings revisions ratio has dropped into negative territory. The earnings surprises index has also declined, although it remains above 60%. Finally, our Composite Technical Equity Indicator has broken below the zero line and its 9-month exponential moving average, sending a negative technical signal. On the positive side, our Monetary Indicator has hooked up, although it is still in negative territory for equities. From a contrary perspective, the fact that equity sentiment has turned bearish is positive for stocks. In fact, this is the main reason why we upgraded stocks this month. While it is late in the U.S. economic expansion and the Fed is tightening, sentiment regarding U.S. and global growth has become overly pessimistic. Thus, we are playing a late-cycle bounce in stocks. For bonds, the term premium moved further into negative territory in December, which is unsustainable from a long-term perspective. Long-term inflation expectations are also too low to be consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% target over the medium term. These facts suggest that bond yields have not peaked for the cycle, although at the moment they have not yet worked off oversold conditions according to our technical indicator. The U.S. dollar is overbought and very expensive on a PPP basis. Nonetheless, we believe it will become more expensive in the first half of 2019, before its structural downtrend resumes in broad trade-weighted terms. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators   Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator   Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields   Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP   Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator   Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals   Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators   Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop   Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot   Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions   Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   1      For more details, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "U.S.-China: The Tech War And Reform Agenda," dated December 12, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "The Bane Of Investors’ Existence: Why Is Correlation High And When Will It Fall?" dated January 4, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Also see BCA Global ETF Strategy Special Report "The Passive Menace," dated September 13, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 3       We use only below average returns in the calculation of volatility (downside volatility) because we are more concerned with the risk of equity market declines for the purposes of this model. 4       The LCR requires a large bank to hold enough high-quality liquid assets to cover the net cash outflows the bank would expect to occur over a 30-day stress scenario. The NSFR complements the LCR by requiring an amount of stable funding that is tailored to the liquidity risk of a bank’s assets and liabilities, based on a one-year time horizon. 5       Structural Changes in Banking After the Crisis. CGFS Papers No.60. Bank for International Settlements, January 2018. 6       Shadow Banking and Capital Markets Risks and Opportunities. Group of Thirty. Washington, D.C., November 2016. 7       Back to the Future: 2007 to 2030. Are New Financial Risks Foreshadowing a Systemic Risk Event? Global Risk Institute. 8       For more details on public and private debt trends, please see BCA Special Report "The End Of The Debt Supercycle: An Update," dated May 11, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 9       Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "2019 Key Views: Will The EM Lost Decade End With A Bang Or A Whimper?" dated December 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Differences of opinion are what make a market, and we’ve got a big one when it comes to the Fed: The money market says the fed funds rate goes no higher than 2.75%; BCA says 3.5% by the end of 2019, and possibly 4% sometime in 2020. We are confident in our assessment of the economy’s underlying strength, … : Fiscal stimulus will keep the economy growing above trend in 2019, and the unemployment rate will almost certainly continue to grind lower. ... even if many commentators are accentuating the negative: The experts quoted in Barron’s found abundant fault with the November employment situation report, and the yield curve is out-trending all of the Kardashians combined. Amidst all the uncertainty, we’re sticking with an investment strategy that is more cautious than our outlook: The monetary backdrop is still too accommodative to spell the end of the equity bull market, but we are waiting for a better entry point to put our cash overweight to work. Feature Dear Client, This is our last report of 2018. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on Monday, January 7th. We wish you a happy, healthy and prosperous new year. Best regards, Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy   We have often remarked how we feel that we are watching a different game than the money market when it comes to the gap in our respective terminal fed funds rate expectations. Both we and the market expect a 25-basis-point (“bps”) hike to 2.5% at the conclusion of the FOMC’s two-day meeting on Wednesday, but from there our paths diverge sharply. The market grudgingly allows that one more hike, to 2.75%, is possible, though it is by no means certain. It sees about a 60% chance that the Fed will make that additional rate hike toward the end of 2019, but then proceeds to price that hike out by the end of 2020 (Chart 1). Chart 1Mind The Gap Mind The Gap Mind The Gap The terminal rate’s ultimate destination, and the path it follows along the way, is not just an academic matter. Once the fed funds rate crosses above the equilibrium fed funds rate (r-star, in economics-speak), monetary policy will become restrictive for the first time since the crisis began to break. We expect the shift to a restrictive policy setting will herald the end of the expansion. Most importantly for investors, it will mark the point when asset allocation should become considerably more defensive. Getting the Fed right, then, is of the utmost importance, and we need to get to the bottom of our differences with the market. We suspect they come down to disparate assessments of the state of the economy and the state of policy. The money market seems to believe that the economy is weaker than we perceive, and that the fed funds rate is currently much closer to equilibrium than we realize. In both cases, we are vulnerable if it is later in the cycle than we think, because we are not positioned for an imminent inflection. Is The Business Cycle Closer To Ending Than We Think? Real GDP growth will slow in 2019, just as one would expect when 60 bps of fiscal thrust is taken away from an economy that was already operating at its full 2-2.25% capacity (Chart 2). Per the IMF’s fiscal estimates, 2020 shapes up as the real challenge for the economy, especially once the Fed crosses the equilibrium-rate Rubicon. In October and November, however, financial markets acted as if they feared the beginning of the recession was considerably nearer (Chart 3). Our clients’ concerns seemed to coalesce around the implications of a slowdown in housing. Chart 2Lessened Thrust, Lessened Growth Lessened Thrust, Lessened Growth Lessened Thrust, Lessened Growth   Chart 3Growth Scare Growth Scare Growth Scare We do not worry about residential investment pulling down the economy,1 but we do pay close attention to nonfarm payrolls. Employment may be a coincident indicator, but it is powerfully self-reinforcing, and the sub-NAIRU2 unemployment rate looms large in the Fed’s policy calculus. Payrolls growth is robust, and our model projects that it will continue to be over the near term (Chart 4, top panel), as all of its components are in fine fettle, especially initial jobless claims (Chart 4, second panel), and small businesses’ hiring intentions (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Payrolls Should Keep Growing, ... Payrolls Should Keep Growing, ... Payrolls Should Keep Growing, ... As we have noted before, it only takes about 110,000 net new jobs every month to keep unemployment at a steady state. Even if our model turns out to be overly optimistic, the unemployment rate appears to be several months away from bottoming, unless the participation rate rises enough to materially increase the size of the labor force. Demographics argue against that, as the baby boomers, ages 54 to 72, exit the work world in a nearly interminable conga line. The participation rate has done well to stabilize in the face of the boomer headwind (Chart 5), but there’s a limit to how much more it can close the gap when businesses are already lamenting the difficulty of finding qualified workers (Chart 6). Chart 5... But The Part Rate Probably Won't ... But The Part Rate Probably Won't ... But The Part Rate Probably Won't   Chart 6Good Help Is Hard To Find Good Help Is Hard To Find Good Help Is Hard To Find A robust labor market suggests that households in the aggregate will have the means to support consumption. Now that payrolls have expanded for a record 98 straight months, the lowest-income households are finally in line to capture some of the benefits. Those households have the highest marginal propensity to consume, which may provide spending with an additional fillip. With the savings rate now back to its late-‘90s levels, better-heeled households are also in a position to do their part to keep consumption humming (Chart 7). Chart 7Plenty Of Dry Powder For Spending Plenty Of Dry Powder For Spending Plenty Of Dry Powder For Spending The near-term consumption outlook is additionally supported by the expectations component of the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey, which has been a reliable coincident indicator throughout its entire history (Chart 8). The unusual divergence between the two series suggests that consumers may have more of an appetite to spend than they’ve demonstrated so far. Employment gains and real consumption also have a well-established history of traveling together (Chart 9). Chart 8Consumers' Optimism Points To More Spending ... Consumers' Optimism Points To More Spending ... Consumers' Optimism Points To More Spending ... \   Chart 9... And So Do Solid Employment Gains ... And So Do Solid Employment Gains ... And So Do Solid Employment Gains Bottom Line: We find it hard to believe the economy is set to weaken in a worrisome way when the labor market still has plenty of momentum, and consumption is well supported on multiple fronts. Is The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Further Along Than We Realize? The Real Economy Our equilibrium fed funds rate model continues to suggest that the target fed funds rate is well below its equilibrium level and will not exceed it until late next year.3 Equilibrium is only a concept, however, so we actively seek out objective data that may confirm or disprove our assessment. Our approach is to trust our modeled estimate of a concept, but verify it with as much real-time evidence as we can muster. Based on the current level of activity, housing seems to be the only major segment that is experiencing some indigestion from higher rates. Corporate investment may not have lived up to the most optimistic post-tax-cut estimates, but there is no evidence that corporations are holding back because of higher rates. A back-of-the-envelope proxy, calculating the difference between the S&P 500’s return on capital and the after-tax interest rate on BBB-rated corporate bonds, suggests that prospective returns to borrowing are near their best level in 30 years, even with the reduction in the debt tax shield4 (Chart 10). Through December 14th, the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model was projecting an increase of 3.8% in fourth-quarter final domestic demand, forcefully pushing back against the notion that r-star is at hand. Chart 10Higher Rates Aren't Biting Yet Higher Rates Aren't Biting Yet Higher Rates Aren't Biting Yet The ongoing application of fiscal thrust to an economy already operating at capacity argues for a higher equilibrium rate than would otherwise apply. The equilibrium rate is also higher because the unemployment rate is well below NAIRU (4.5%, per the dots), suggesting that the Fed will have to push harder against the economy than it otherwise would to keep it from overheating. Tepid post-crisis investment, mixed with unnecessary fiscal stimulus, and combined with a red-hot labor market, is a recipe for inflation pressures that can only be neutralized by a higher r-star. Financial Conditions As last week’s Google Trends chart of yield-curve searches made clear, investors have developed something of an obsession with an inverted yield curve. The yield curve’s ability to flag overly tight monetary policy in real time has made it a reliable leading indicator of recessions, and it is a key input into our simple recession indicator. The curve has flattened over the last five-plus weeks as the 10-year Treasury yield has melted, stoking recession fears. Before they get too worked up, however, investors should bear in mind that the depressed term premium has the potential to distort its signal in this cycle. The term premium is the yield differential between a Treasury note or bond, and a strip of T-bills, laddered to match the note or bond’s maturity. In line with its name, the term premium is typically positive, as investors have typically demanded compensation for bearing the increased interest-rate volatility embedded in longer-maturity instruments. That volatility may well have been restrained by the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase program, along with long yields themselves, though the entire matter of QE’s impact is subject to spirited debate. Whatever the mechanism, the term premium is considerably lower than it has been across the five decades that the yield curve has had a nearly perfect record of calling recessions (Chart 11). If the term premium were in line with its historical mean value, the yield curve would be nowhere near inverting. We continue to trust in the yield curve’s propensity to sense danger, but concede that the anomalously low term premium may render it somewhat less timely now. Given the preponderance of evidence to the contrary, we are not concerned that it is signaling that r-star is materially closer than our equilibrium fed funds rate model estimates. Chart 11The Bar For Inversion Is A Lot Lower In This Cycle The Bar For Inversion Is A Lot Lower In This Cycle The Bar For Inversion Is A Lot Lower In This Cycle QE raises one more issue for our equilibrium fed funds rate model, which does not account for any tightening of monetary conditions occasioned by the unwinding of the Fed’s balance sheet. We assume that such tightening occurs only at the margin, but it could delay our recognition that policy has shifted from accommodative to restrictive. Attempting to isolate the impact of balance sheet reduction on monetary conditions would be more trouble than it’s worth, however, and we simply assume that it will cause the confidence interval around our equilibrium estimate to widen a little. Bottom Line: Our equilibrium fed funds rate model projects that policy is not nearing restrictive territory, and our interpretation of the whole of the real-time data supports that view. We think that the Fed is still several hikes away from reaching r-star. Investment Implications As we noted in last week’s 2019 outlook, the view that the economy is strong enough to overheat undergirds all of our recommendations. The potential for overheating is what will impel the Fed to hike aggressively through 2019 and possibly beyond. Investors should therefore underweight Treasuries in balanced portfolios, while maintaining below-benchmark duration. The idea that the economy will gather more momentum on its way to overheating keeps us constructive on equities. We do not believe the bull market is over, and are therefore keeping an eye out for an opportunity to overweight the S&P 500 before it makes new highs. We are confident that the unemployment rate will continue to decline, but must concede that the key outcome for Fed policy – higher wages – has been slow to materialize. Several investors have become impatient with waiting for the Phillips Curve to assert itself, and we cannot blame them. Shorn of its fancy trappings, though, the Phillips Curve is just a supply-and-demand story, and we have always found it hard to argue against supply-and-demand stories’ plain logic. The action in the 10-year Treasury nonetheless has us reviewing our call closely in search of anything that we may be missing. It appears that the decline in yields is better explained by the unwinding of lopsided positioning and sentiment (Chart 12), than by anything connected to economic growth. We are acutely conscious of how a worsening of U.S.-China trade tensions could impair global growth and subvert our constructive take on risk assets. U.S. equities may shine on a relative basis in the worst-case scenario, but absolute losses would be assured. We remain in wait-and-see mode, open to deploying our cash overweight if the opportunity presents itself, but happy to have it for ballast and insurance in the meantime. Chart 12Stretched Rubber Bands Snap Back Stretched Rubber Bands Snap Back Stretched Rubber Bands Snap Back   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Special Reports, “Housing: Past, Present And (Near) Future,” and “Housing Seminar,” published November 19 and December 3, 2018, respectively, at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 NAIRU, the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (also known as the natural rate of unemployment), is the unemployment rate that can be sustained over time without causing the economy to overheat. 3 Our model estimates that equilibrium fed funds is currently around 3%, will be around 3.25% by the middle of 2019, and will settle near 3⅜% at year end. 4 Before the 2017 tax reform act, corporations faced a top marginal rate of 35%, and could deduct interest expense without limit. After-tax interest expense for large corporations amounted to (1-.35), or 65% of the pre-tax expense. Now that the top marginal rate is 21%, after-tax interest expense is (1-.21), or 79% of pre-tax expense.

Highlights Late-cycle pressures will keep pushing bond yields higher. Global growth will remain above trend in 2019, keeping unemployment rates low and preventing central banks from turning dovish. The unwind of crisis-era global monetary policies will continue. Slowing central bank asset purchases will worsen the supply/demand balance for government bonds, resulting in gentle upward pressure on yields via higher term premia. It is too early to worry about inverted yield curves. The time to be concerned about the recessionary implications of an inverted U.S. Treasury curve will come after the Fed has lifted real interest rates to above neutral (R*), which should occur in the latter half of 2019. Expect poor corporate bond returns from an aging credit cycle. While default risk is likely to stay benign through 2019, the greater risk for corporates could come from concerns over future credit downgrades, as well as diminished inflows in a “post-QE” world. Feature BCA’s annual Outlook report, outlining the main investment themes that will drive global asset markets in 2019, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this Weekly Report, we discuss the four broad implications of those themes for global fixed income. In a follow-up report to be published next week, we will translate those themes into strategic investment recommendations and allocations within our model bond portfolio framework. Key View #1: Late-Cycle Inflation Pressures Will Keep Pushing Bond Yield Higher The main theme from last year’s BCA Outlook was that markets and policy would collide in 2018. This year’s Outlook concluded that those same frictions would persist in 2019, and for similar reasons. The global economy is likely to see another year of above trend growth, after the current deceleration phase bottoms out in the first half of the year. Tight labor markets will continue to force developed market central banks, who still strongly believe in the Phillips Curve relationship as the best way to forecast inflation, to move toward less dovish monetary policies, putting steady upward pressure on global bond yields. Our own Central Bank Monitors signal a need for tighter monetary policy (Chart of the Week), most notably in the U.S. That may sound strange given the recent softening of global growth momentum and plunge in oil prices. Yet economic survey data (like the global ZEW index) show a huge divergence between actual and expected growth, with real bond yields responding more to the former than the latter (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekStill A Bearish Bond Backdrop Still A Bearish Bond Backdrop Still A Bearish Bond Backdrop   Chart 2Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 Global Yields Will Remain Resilient In 2019 The fear of a global economic downturn appears greater than the current reality - a trend likely magnified by the ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions and the sharp fall in oil prices which some are interpreting to be a sign of weaker demand. BCA’s commodity strategists view the oil decline as purely supply driven, and expect that a tighter demand/supply balance will result in oil prices recovering recent losses and rising smartly in 2019. This should lead to a rebound in the inflation expectations component of global bond yields later next year (bottom panel). As was argued in the 2019 BCA Outlook, the conditions for a deep pullback in global growth are not yet in place, especially in the U.S. where consumer fundamentals remain solid (strong income growth, booming net worth and a low debt service ratio). China, where growth is currently slowing, remains the biggest wild card for the world economy, especially given the degree to which emerging market economies are levered to Chinese growth. Yet the most likely outcome is that Chinese authorities will make enough policy adjustments to stabilize the economy in the first half of 2019, which will help put a floor under global growth. With over 80% of OECD economies now with an unemployment rate below estimates of “full employment”, the backdrop today is more conducive to sustained higher inflation than at any point since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Chart 3). This means that actual inflation readings are likely to be stickier to the upside, especially for domestically focused measures like wages and services which are accelerating in many countries. Chart 3Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation Tight Labor Markets Will Prevent A Sharp Drop In Inflation From the point of view of global central bankers, this means that as long as global growth does not slow sustainably below trend, then unemployment rates are unlikely to begin to rise. For policymakers who slavishly follow the Phillips Curve when forecasting inflation, that will make it difficult to shift to a more dovish policy bias, even if inflation remains below target for a time thanks to the recent pullback in oil prices (Chart 4). Chart 4Central Banks Who Believe In The Phillips Curve Can’t Turn Dovish 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" The degree of policy bias in 2019 will not be uniform, though, which was also the case in 2018. Central banks in countries with core inflation rates closer to policymaker targets (the U.S., Canada, the U.K. if the Brexit uncertainty fades, Sweden) will be more likely to raise rates than those where inflation is still well below target (Japan, the euro area, Australia). Relative government bond market performance over the course of 2019 should reflect those trends. U.S. Treasury yields will still most likely to see the largest increase from current levels as the Fed will lift rates over the full 2019 calendar by more than markets are currently discounting (only 33bps are currently priced in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap curve – a low hurdle to beat). Key View #2: The Unwind Of Crisis-Era Global Monetary Policies Will Continue Quantitative easing (QE) – central banks buying huge amounts of bonds to help keep yields low enough to sustain economic growth amid weak inflation expectations – has been a dominant feature of global bond markets since the 2009 recession. Policymakers have been forced to engage in such unusual activities to try and boost weak inflation expectations even after policy interest rates have been cut to 0% (and even lower in some cases). Now, a decade later, inflation expectations are more stable and much closer to central bank targets in most countries (except, as always, Japan). That means government bond returns are no longer negatively correlated to equity returns (Chart 5), reducing the value of bonds as a hedge to stocks. Chart 5Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation Bonds Are A Less-Effective Hedge For Equities With More Stable Inflation In the 2019 BCA Outlook, several other reasons were given as to why that correlation has been weakening, including a shift towards more consumption and less savings from aging populations entering their retirement years. The biggest change, however, has been the move from QE to “QT” (quantitative tightening) as central banks buy fewer bonds or, in the case of the U.S. Fed, actually letting bonds run of its massive balance sheet. The new year will bring an end to the net new buying phase of the European Central Bank (ECB) Asset Purchase Program. That represents a loss of €180 billion of liquidity into European bond markets compared to 2018 (twelve months at €15bn per month), both for government debt and investment grade corporates which are also part of the ECB’s program. This will come on top of reduced purchases from the Bank of Japan (BoJ), who will likely buy at a reduced ¥30 trillion pace in 2019 (down from around ¥40 trillion in 2018), and from the Fed who will let $600bn of maturing bonds run off its balance sheet ($360bn of which will be Treasuries). That slowing pace of central bank asset accumulation means that private investors must absorb an even greater supply of government bonds next year. The BCA Outlook estimated that the change in the supply of government bonds available to private investors would equal $1.2 trillion in 2019, a huge increase from the $400bn seen in 2018 (Chart 6). This will come at a time when new government bond issuance is set to increase once again thanks to wider U.S. budget deficits, further worsening the global supply/demand balance for government debt from the major developed economies. Chart 6Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds The reduction in the pace of central bank bond buying will continue to put gentle upward pressure on government bond yields, as has been the case since the pace of ECB purchases peaked in 2016 (Chart 7). More importantly, the diminished central bank liquidity expansion means there will be less money going into risky assets via the portfolio balance channel (i.e. private investors taking the funds earned from selling bonds to central banks and placing that in equity and credit markets). Chart 7Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' Upward Pressure On Yields & Vol From 'QT' This creates a backdrop where volatility spikes will be more frequent, as has been the case in 2018 (bottom panel). Risky asset valuations will also be impacted from reduced inflows from yield-seeking investors who have sold government bonds to central banks. This suggests wider credit spreads and lower equity price/earnings multiples, all else equal (Chart 8). Chart 8Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Risk Asset Valuations Will Continue To Suffer From QT In 2019 Of course, all is not equal. A rebound in global growth could trigger a new wave of inflows into global equity and credit markets with valuations having cheapened in recent months. The important point is that, without central bank liquidity propping up asset prices, global risk assets will trade more off fundamentals in 2019 than has been the case during the past couple of years. Key View #3: Too Soon To Worry About Inverted Yield Curves “Yield curve inversions lead to recessions” is a well-known (if not well understood) relationship that has gained almost mythical status among investors. As the widely-watched spread between 2-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury yields (the 2/10 curve) has melted away during the course of 2018 – now sitting at a mere 13bps – the prognosticating power of the curve has many worried that a U.S. recession could be just around the corner. Especially after the Fed has raised the fed funds rate by 200 basis points over the past three years. Those fears are misguided, for several reasons: 1. The Treasury curve segment with the most successful track record in heralding U.S. recessions is the spread between the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate (Chart 9). That spread is still a firmly positive 42bps. We showed in a Special Report published last July that, on average, the length of time between the inversion of the 3-month/10-year Treasury curve and the beginning of a recession is seventeen months.2 Chart 9UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal UST Curve Not Close To A True Recessionary Inversion Signal 2. The slope of the Treasury curve is unusually flat given the level of the fed funds rate measured in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The previous three episodes where the 2-year/10-year Treasury curve has inverted over the past thirty years have occurred when the real fed funds rate was between 300-400bps (Chart 10). The current level of the real funds rate (deflated by headline CPI inflation) is near zero which, in the past, has occurred alongside a 2-year/10-year Treasury curve that had a positive slope between 150-200bps. Chart 10Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... Global Yield Curves Look Too Flat Vs Real Policy Rates... 3. The depressed level of bond term premia is weighing on longer-dated Treasury yields and dampening the slope of the curve. This is happening not only in the U.S., but also in other major bond markets in Germany, the U.K. and Japan (Chart 11). The impact of global QE programs is the most likely common factor. Chart 11...With Global Term Premia Depressed ...With Global Term Premia Depressed ...With Global Term Premia Depressed 4. The 2-year/10-year U.S. Treasury curve has never been inverted without the real fed funds rate being above the neutral real rate, also known as R-star (Chart 12). Chart 12No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* No 2/10 UST Inversion Before Real Rates Exceed R* The implication for fixed income investing for 2019 is that it is too soon in the Fed’s monetary tightening cycle to expect an inverted yield curve driven by an overly tight monetary policy. That outcome is more likely by late 2019 after inflation expectations pick up and the Fed delivers at least another 75bps over the course of the year, pushing the funds rate into restrictive territory. Key View #4: Poor Corporate Returns From The Aging Credit Cycle The other major fixed income implication of the 2019 BCA Outlook is that global corporate bond markets are likely to see another year of poor returns (both in absolute terms and relative to government bonds). Spreads remain near historically tight levels across most spread product sectors, suggesting that credit risk premia will need to be repriced higher as the endgame of the multi-year credit cycle draws nearer (Chart 13). Both investors and policymakers have grown increasingly worried about the risks to the U.S. corporate bond market from high corporate leverage. However, as was discussed in the Outlook, U.S. corporate interest coverage remains well above levels that have preceded the end of previous credit cycles and BCA’s models suggest U.S. corporate profit growth will remain solid (albeit much slower than the rapid +20% growth seen in 2018). Chart 13Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy That does not mean that corporate bonds are without risk. With 50% of global investment grade bond indices now rated BBB (one notch above junk), the greater threat to corporates may come from downgrades. While those are less likely in a growing economy, investors in lower-rated investment grade bonds may require higher yields and spreads to compensate for the future risk of losses as those bonds could become “fallen angel” high-yield debt in the next economic downturn. This impact would be magnified as how many large fixed income managers have mandates that forbid investment in bonds rated below investment grade, thus creating forced selling in the event of downgrades. More fundamentally, the outlook for global corporate bonds, with spreads still much closer to historical tights than long-run averages, remains reliant on strong economic growth momentum and supportive monetary policy. On the former, we do not anticipate a move to sub-trend global growth, as discussed earlier, and corporate bond returns could stabilize once the current downtrend in the world economy subsides (Chart 14). This would likely represent a final period of calm, however. Tightening global monetary policies – both Fed hikes and diminished asset purchases – will create a more bearish backdrop for credit in the latter half of 2019 as markets begin to discount slower economic growth in 2020. Chart 14Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy Fading Support For Corporate Bonds From Growth & Policy   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the December 2018 edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2019 – Late Cycle Turbulence”, available at bca.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Three Frequently Asked Questions About Global Yield Curves”, dated July 31st 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" 2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The "New Normal" Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns