Oil & Gas Exploration & Production

High rates have hurt real estate and, now, banks. The next shoes to drop: Loan growth, profits, and employment. Stay defensive. Recession is probable, but risk assets have not priced it in.

China’s victory in getting KSA and Iran to restore diplomatic relations is of far greater consequence to commodity markets than the past weeks’ bank failures in the US. For China, further success in sorting long-standing security issues in the Middle East could incentivize oil and gas capex and affect oil flows. With short- to medium-term fundamentals largely unchanged, we are keeping our 2023 and 2024 Brent forecasts similar to last month, at $95/bbl and $110/bbl, respectively.

Central Banks remain in thrall to the mistaken impression that backwardated oil futures markets are signaling lower headline inflation over the next 2-3 years. This is not the signal the markets are sending: Backwardation is an indication inventories are being drawn down to cover a physical supply deficit brought about by strong demand. We remain long broad equity-market exposure to energy producers via the XOP ETF, and to outright commodity exposure (and backwardation) via the COMT ETF.

When does rising unemployment become a bigger problem than inflation? The Fed won't cut rates until that happens, probably thwarting market hopes of big cuts in 2H.

The G7’s attempt to insert itself in the oil-price-formation process performed by global trading markets will distort markets and the signals driving production, consumption and investment. The G7 will need a face-saving off-ramp to ditch this planner-based proposal. We expect Brent prices to move toward our expectations of $105/bbl in 4Q22 and $118/bbl in 2023, and remain long the XOP ETF.

Executive Summary The Ukraine war reinforces our key view that commodity producers will use their geopolitical leverage this year. The market is growing complacent again about Russian risks. Iran is part of the same dynamic. If US-Iran talks fail, as we expect, the Middle East will destabilize and add another energy supply risk on top of the Russian risk. The Ukraine war also interacts with our other two key views for 2022: China’s reversion to autocracy and the US’s policy insularity. Both add policy uncertainty and weigh on risk sentiment. The war also reinforces our strategic themes for the 2020s: Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism. Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Cyclically Long Global Defensives Versus Cyclicals 2022-01-20 10.8% Bottom Line: Tactically stay long global defensives and large caps. Cyclically stay long gold, US equities, aerospace/defense, and cyber security. Feature In our annual outlook, “The Gathering Storm,” we argued that the post-pandemic world economy would destabilize due to intensifying rivalry among the leading nations. We argued that China’s reversion to autocracy, US domestic divisions, and Russia’s commodity leverage would produce a toxic brew for global investors in 2022. By January 27 it was clear to us that Russia would invade Ukraine, so the storm was arriving sooner than we thought, and we doubled down on our defensive and risk-averse market positioning. We derived these three key views from new cyclical trends and the way they interact with our underlying strategic themes – Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism (Table 1). These themes are mutually reinforcing, rooted in solid evidence over many years, and will not change easily. Table 1Three Geopolitical Strategic Themes Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Related Report  Geopolitical Strategy2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm The Ukraine war reinforces them: Russia took military action to increase its security relative to the US and NATO; the West imposed sanctions that reduce globalization with Russia and potentially other states; Russian aggression stemmed from nationalism and caused a spike in global prices that will spur more nationalism and populism going forward. In this report we examine how these trends will develop in the second quarter and beyond. We see stagflation taking shape and recommend investors prepare for it by continuing to favor defensive sectors, commodities, and value plays. Checking Up On Our Russia View For 2022 Our third key view for 2022 – that oil producers like Russia and Iran possessed immense geopolitical leverage and would most likely use it – is clearly the dominant geopolitical trend of the year, as manifested in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.1 Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 and curtailed operations after commodity prices crashed. It launched a new and larger invasion in 2022 when a new commodity cycle began (Chart 1). Facing tactical setbacks, Russia has begun withdrawing forces from around the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. But it will redouble its efforts to conquer the eastern Donbas region and the southern coastline. The coast is the most strategic territory at stake (Map 1). Chart 1Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, 2022 Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours The most decisive limitation on Russia’s military effort would come from a collapse of commodity exports or prices, which has not happened yet. Europe continues to buy Russian oil and natural gas, although it is debating a ban on the $4.4 billion worth of coal that it imports. With high energy prices making up for a drop in export volumes, Russian armed forces can still attempt a summer and fall campaign (Chart 2). The aim would be to conquer remaining portions of Donetsk and Luhansk, the “land bridge” to Crimea, and potentially the stretch of land between the Dnieper river and eastern Moldova, where Russian troops are already stationed. Chart 2Russia’s War Financing Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Ukraine’s military neutrality is the core Russian objective. Ukraine is offering neutrality in exchange for security guarantees in the current ceasefire talks. Hence a durable ceasefire is possible if the details of neutrality are agreed – Ukraine forswears joining NATO and hosting foreign military infrastructure while accepting limitations on military exercises and defense systems. The security guarantees that Ukraine demands are mostly symbolic, as the western powers that would be credible guarantors are already unwilling to use military force against Russia (e.g. the US, UK, NATO members). However, Russia’s withdrawal from Kyiv will embolden the Ukrainians, so we do not expect a durable ceasefire in the second quarter. Global investors will be mistaken if they ignore Ukraine in the second quarter, at least until core problems are resolved. What matters most is whether the war expands beyond Ukraine: The likelihood of a broader war is low but not negligible. So far the Russian regime is behaving somewhat rationally: Moscow attacked a non-NATO member to prevent it from joining NATO; it limited the size of the military commitment; and it is now accepting reality and withdrawing from Kyiv while negotiating on Ukrainian neutrality. But a major problem emerges if Russia’s military fails in the Donbas while Ukraine reneges on offers of neutrality. Any ceasefire could fall apart and the war could re-escalate. Russia could redouble its attacks on the country or conduct a limited attack outside of Ukraine to trigger a crisis in the western alliance. Moreover, if sanctions keep rising until Russia’s economy collapses, Moscow could become less rational. Finland and Sweden have seen a shift of public opinion in favor of joining NATO. Any intention to do so would trigger a belligerent reaction from Russia. These governments are well aware of the precarious balance that must be maintained to prevent war, so war is unlikely. But if their stance changes then Russia will threaten to attack. Russia would threaten to bomb these states since it cannot now credibly threaten invasion by land (Charts 3A & 3B). Chart 3ANordic States Joining NATO Would Trigger Larger War Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours ​​​​​ Chart 3BNordic States Joining NATO Would Trigger Larger War Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours ​​​​​​ The Black Sea is vulnerable to “Black Swan” events or military spillovers. Russia is re-concentrating its military efforts in the Donbas and land bridge to Crimea. Russia could expand its offensive to Odessa and the Moldovan border. Or Russia could attempt to create a new norm of naval dominance in the Black Sea. Or ships from third countries could hit mines or become casualties of war. For these and other reasons, investors should not take on additional risk in their portfolios on the basis that a durable ceasefire will be concluded quickly. Russia’s position is far too vulnerable to encourage risk-taking. Moscow could escalate tensions to try to save face. It is also critical to ensure that Russia and Europe maintain their energy trade: Neither side has an interest in total energy cutoff. Russia needs the revenue to finance its war and needs to discourage Europe from fulfilling its pledges to transition rapidly to other sources and substitutes. Europe needs the energy to avoid recession, maintain some tie with Russia, and enable its energy diversification strategy. So far natural gas flows are continuing (Chart 4). Chart 4Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) ​​​​​​ Chart 5Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance ​​​​​​ However, risks to energy trade are rising. Russia is threatening to cut off energy exports if not paid in rubles, while the EU is beginning to entertain sanctions on energy. Russia can reduce oil or gas flows incrementally to keep prices high and prevent Europe from rebuilding stockpiles for fall and winter. Partial energy cutoff is possible. Europe’s diversification makes Russia’s predicament dire. Substantial sanction relief is highly unlikely, as western powers will want to prevent Russia from rebuilding its economy and military. Russia could try to impose significant pain on Europe to try to force a more favorable diplomatic solution. A third factor that matters is whether the US will expand its sanction enforcement to demand strict compliance from other nations, at pain of secondary sanctions: Secondary sanctions are likely in the case of China and other nations that stand at odds with the US and help Russia circumvent sanctions. In China’s case, the US is already interested in imposing sanctions on the financial or technology sector as part of its long-term containment strategy. While the Biden administration’s preference is to control the pace of escalation with China, and thus not to slap sanctions immediately, nevertheless substantial sanctions cannot be ruled out in the second quarter. Secondary sanctions will be limited in the case of US allies and partners, such as EU members, Turkey, and India. Countries that do business with Russia but are critical to US strategy will be given waivers or special treatment. Russia is not the only commodity producer that enjoys outsized geopolitical leverage amid a global commodity squeeze. Iran is the next most critical producer. Iran is also critical for the stability of the Middle East. In particular, the consequential US-Iran talks over whether to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal are likely to come to a decision in the second quarter. Chart 6Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply If the US and Iran agree to a strategic détente, then regional tensions will briefly subside, reducing global oil disruption risks and supply pressures. Iran could bring 1.3 million barrels per day of oil back online, adding to President Biden’s 1 million per day release of strategic petroleum reserves. The combination would amount to 2.3% of global demand and more than cover the projected quarterly average supply deficit, which ranges from 400k to 900k barrels per day for the rest of 2022 (Chart 5). If the US and Iran fail to agree, then the Middle East will suffer another round of instability, adding a Middle Eastern energy shock on top of the Russian shock. Not only would Iran’s 1.3 million barrels per day be jeopardized but so would Iraq’s 4.4 million, Saudi Arabia’s 10.3 million, the UAE’s 3.0 million, or the Strait of Hormuz’s combined 24 million per day (Chart 6). This gives Iran leverage to pursue nuclear weaponization prior to any change in US government that would strengthen Israel’s ability to stop Iran. We would not bet on an agreement – but we cannot rule it out. The Biden administration can reduce sanctions via executive action to prevent a greater oil shock, while the Iranians can accept sanction relief in exchange for easily reversible moves toward compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. But this would be a short-term, stop-gap measure, not a long-term strategic détente. Conflict between Iran and its neighbors will revive sooner than expected after the deal is agreed, as Iran’s nuclear ambitions will persist. OPEC states are already producing more oil rapidly, suggesting no quick fix if the US-Iran deal falls apart. While core OPEC states have 3.5 million barrels per day in spare capacity to bring to bear, a serious escalation of tensions with Iran would jeopardize this solution. Finally, if commodity producers have geopolitical leverage, then commodity consumers are lacking in leverage. This is clear from Europe’s inability to prevent Russia’s attack or ban Russian energy. It is clear from the US’s apparent unwillingness to give up on a short-term deal with Iran. It is clear from China’s inability to provide sufficient monetary and fiscal stimulus as it struggles with Covid-19. Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan are geopolitically significant importers of Russian and Ukrainian grain that are likely to face food insecurity and social unrest. We will address this issue below under our Populism/Nationalism theme. Bottom Line: Investors should not be complacent. Russia’s military standing in Ukraine is weak, but its ability to finance the war has not yet collapsed, which means that it will escalate the conflict to save face. What About Our Other Key Views For 2022? Our other two key views for 2022 are even more relevant in the wake of the Ukraine re-invasion. China’s reversion to autocracy is a factor in China’s domestic and foreign policy: Domestically China needs economic and social stability in the advance of the twentieth national party congress, when President Xi Jinping hopes to clinch 10 more years in power. In pursuit of this goal China is easing monetary and fiscal policy. However, with depressed animal spirits, a weakening property sector, and high debt levels, monetary policy is proving insufficient. Fiscal policy will have to step up. But even here, inflation is likely to impose a limitation on how much stimulus the authorities can utilize (Chart 7). Chart 7China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation ​​​​​​ Chart 8Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 China is also trying but failing to maintain a “Covid Zero” policy. The more contagious Omicron variant of the virus is breaking out and slipping beyond the authorities’ ability to suppress cases of the virus to zero. Shanghai is on lockdown and other cities will follow suit. China will attempt to redouble its containment efforts before it will accept the reality that the virus cannot be contained. Chinese production and shipping will become delayed and obstructed as a result, putting another round of upward pressure on global prices (Chart 8). Stringent pandemic restrictions could trigger social unrest. China is ripe for social unrest, which is why it launched the “Common Prosperity” program last year to convince citizens that quality of life will improve. But this program is a long-term program that will not bring immediate relief. On the contrary, the economy is still suffering and the virus will spread more widely, as well as draconian social restrictions. The result is that the lead up to the national party congress will not be as smooth as the Xi administration had hoped. Global investors will remain pessimistic toward Chinese stocks. In foreign affairs, China’s reversion to autocracy is reinforced by Russia’s clash with the West and the need to coordinate more closely. Xi hosted Putin in Beijing on February 4, prior to the invasion, and the two declared that their strategic partnership ushers in a “new era” of “multipolarity” and that their cooperation has “no limits,” which really means that military cooperation is not forbidden. China agreed to purchase an additional 10 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas over 30-years. While this amount would only replace 3% of Russian natural gas exports to Europe, it would mark a 26% increase in Russian exports to China. More importantly it acts as a symbol of Chinese willingness to substitute for Europe over time. There is a long way to go for China to replace Europe as a customer (Chart 9). But China knows it needs to convert its US dollar foreign exchange reserves, vulnerable to US sanctions, into hard investments in supply security within the Eurasian continent. Chart 9Long Way To Go For China NatGas Imports To Replace EU Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours China is helping Russia circumvent sanctions. China’s chief interest is to minimize the shock to its domestic economy. This means keeping Russian energy and commodities flowing. China could also offer military equipment for Russia. The US has expressly warned China against taking such an action. China could mitigate the blowback by stipulating that the assistance cannot be used in Ukraine. This would be unenforceable but would provide diplomatic cover. While China is uncomfortable with the disturbance of the Ukraine war – it does not want foreign affairs to cause even larger supply shocks. At the same time, China does not want Russia to lose the war or Putin’s regime to fall from power. If Russia loses, Taiwan and its western allies would be emboldened, while Russia could pursue a détente with the West, leaving China isolated. Since China faces US containment policy regardless of what happens in Russia, it is better for China to have Putin making an example out of Ukraine and keeping the Americans and Europeans preoccupied. Chart 10China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China must also preserve ties with Europe. Diplomacy will likely succeed in the short run since Europe has no interest or desire to expand sanctions to China. The Biden administration will defer to Europe on the pace of sanctions – it is not willing or able to force Europe to break with China suddenly. Eventually Europe and China may sever relations but not yet – China has a powerful incentive to preserve them (Chart 10). China will also court India and other powers in an attempt to hedge its bets on Russia while weakening any American containment. Beyond the party congress, China will be focused on securing the economic recovery and implementing the common prosperity agenda. The first step is to maintain easy monetary and fiscal policy. The second step is to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. relaxing social and regulatory controls to try to revive entrepreneurship and animal spirits, which are heavily depressed. Xi will have the ability to do this after re-consolidating power. The third step will be to try to stabilize economic relations with Europe and others (conceivably even the US temporarily, though no serious détente is likely). The remaining key view for 2022 is that the Biden administration’s domestic focus will be defensive and will invite foreign policy challenges. The Ukraine war vindicates this view but the question now is whether Biden has or will change tack: The Biden administration is focused on the midterm elections and the huge risk to the Democratic Party’s standing. Biden has not received a boost in opinion polls from the war. He is polling even worse when it comes to handling of the economy (Chart 11). While he should be able to repackage his budget reconciliation bill as an energy security bill, his thin majorities in both houses make passage difficult. Chart 11Biden And Democrats Face Shellacking In Midterm Election Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Biden’s weak standing – with or without a midterm shellacking – raises the prospect that Republicans could take back the White House in 2024, which discourages foreign nations from making any significant concessions to the United States in their negotiations. They must assume that partisanship will continue to contaminate foreign policy and lead to abrupt policy reversals. In foreign policy, the US remains reactive in the face of Russian aggression. If Russia signs a ceasefire, the US will not sabotage it to prolong Russian difficulties. Moreover Biden continues to exempt Europe and other allies and partners from enforcing the US’s most severe sanctions for fear of a larger energy shock. Europe’s avoidance of an energy ban is critical and any change in US policy to try to force the EU to cut off Russian energy is unlikely. China will not agree to structural reform or deep concessions in its trade negotiations, knowing that former President Trump could come back. The Biden administration’s own trade policy toward China is limited in scope, as the US Trade Representative Katherine Tai admitted when she said that the US could no longer aim to change China’s behavior via trade talks. Biden’s only proactive foreign policy initiative, Iran, will not bring him public kudos if it is achieved. But American inconstancy is one of the reasons that Iran may walk away from the 2015 nuclear deal. Why should Iran’s hawkish leaders be expected to constrain their nuclear program and expose their economy to future US sanctions if they can circumvent US sanctions anyway, and Republicans have a fair chance of coming back into power as early as January 2025? Biden’s unprecedented release of strategic petroleum reserves will not be able to prevent gasoline prices from staying high given the underlying supply pressures at home and abroad. This is especially true if the Iran talks fail as we expect. Even if inflation abates before the election, it is unlikely to abate enough to save his party from a shellacking. That in turn will weaken the global impression of his administration’s staying power. Hence Biden will focus on maintaining US alliances, which means allowing Europe, India, and others to proceed at a more pragmatic and dovish pace in their relations with Russia and China. Bottom Line: China’s reversion to autocracy and America’s policy insularity suggest that global investors face considerable policy uncertainty this year even aside from the war in Europe. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s Russia’s invasion strongly confirmed our three strategic themes of Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism. These themes are mutually reinforcing: insecurity among the leading nation-states encourages regionalization rather than globalization, while populism and nationalism encourage nations to pursue economic and security interests at the expense of their neighbors. First, the Ukraine war confirms and exacerbates Great Power Rivalry: Chart 12China And Russia Both Need To Balance Against US Preponderance Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Russia’s action vindicates the “realist” school of international relations (in which we count ourselves) by forcing the world to wake up to the fact that nations still care primarily about national security defined in material ways, such as armies, resources, and territories. The paradox of realism is that if at least one of the great nations pursues its national self-interest and engages in competition for security, then all other nations will be forced to do the same. If a nation neglects its national security interests in pursuit of global economic engagement and cooperation, then it will suffer, since other nations will take advantage of it to enhance their security. Hence, as a result of Ukraine, nations will give a higher weight to national security relative to economic efficiency. The result will be an acceleration of decisions to use fiscal funds and guide the private economy in pursuit of national interests – i.e. the Return of Big Government. Since actions to increase deterrence will provoke counteractions for the same reason, overall insecurity will rise. For example, the US and China will take extra precautions in case of future sanctions and war. But these precautions will reduce trust and cooperation and increase the probability of war over the long run. For the same reason, China cannot reject Russia’s strategic overture – it cannot afford to alienate and isolate Russia. China and Russia have a shared interest in countering the United States because it is the only nation that could conceivably impose a global empire over all nations (Chart 12). The US could deprive Beijing and Moscow of the regional spheres of influence that they each need to improve their national security. This is true not only in Ukraine and Taiwan but in other peripheral areas such as Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China has much to gain from Russia. Russia is offering China privileged overland access to Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources and markets. This resource base is vital to China’s strategic needs, given its import dependency and vulnerability to US maritime power (Chart 13). Chart 13China’s Maritime Vulnerability Forces Eurasian Strategy, Russian Alliance Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Investors should understand Great Power Rivalry in a multipolar rather than bipolar sense. As Russia breaks from the West, investors are quick to move rapidly to the bipolar Cold War analogy because that is what they are familiar with. But the world today has multiple poles of political power, as it did for centuries prior to the twentieth. While the US is the preponderant power, it is not hegemonic. It faces not one but two revisionist challengers – Russia and China. Meanwhile Europe and India are independent poles of power that are not exclusively aligned with the US or China. For example, China and the EU need to maintain economic ties with each other for the sake of stability, and neither the US nor Russia can prevent them from doing so. The same goes for India and Russia. China will embrace Russia and Europe at the same time, while hardening its economy against US punitive measures. India will preserve ties with Russia and China, while avoiding conflict with the US and its allies (the maritime powers), whom it needs for its long-term strategic security in the Indian Ocean basin. Ultimately bipolarity may be the end-game – e.g. if China takes aggressive action to revise the global order like Russia has done – but the persistence of Sino-European ties and Russo-Indian ties suggest we are not there yet. Second, the Ukraine war reinforces Hypo-Globalization: Since the pandemic we have argued that trade would revive on the global economic snapback but that globalization – the deepening of trade integration – would ultimately fall short of its pre-2020 and pre-2008 trajectory. Instead we would inhabit a new world of “hypo-globalization,” in which trade flows fell short of potential. So far the data support this view (Chart 14). Chart 14Globalization Falling Short Of Potential Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours The Ukraine war has strengthened this thesis not only by concretely reducing Russia’s trajectory of trade with the West – reversing decades of integration since the fall of the Soviet Union – but also by increasing the need for nations to guard against a future Chinese confrontation with the Western world. Trust between China and the West will further erode. China will need to guard against any future sanctions, and thus diversify away from the US dollar and assets, while the US will need to do a better job of deterring China against aggression in Asia, and will thus have to diversify away from Chinese manufacturing and critical resources like rare earths. While China and Europe need each other now, the US and China are firmly set on a long-term path of security competition in East Asia. Eventually either the US or China will take a more aggressive stance and Europe will be forced to react. Since Europe will still need US support against a decaying and aggressive Russia, it will likely be dragged into assisting the US against China. Third, the Ukraine war reflects and amplifies Populism/Nationalism: Populism and nationalism are not the same thing but they both stem from the slowing trend of global income growth, the rise of inequality, the corruption of the elite political establishments, and now the rise in inflation. Nations have to devote more resources to pacifying an angry populace, or distracting that populace through foreign adventures, or both. The Ukraine war reflects the rise in nationalism. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period in which Moscow lost control of its periphery, while the diverse peoples could pursue national self-determination and statehood. The independence and success of the Baltic states depended on economic and military cooperation with the West, which eroded Russian national security and provoked a nationalist backlash in the form of President Putin’s regime. Ukraine became the epicenter of this conflict. Ukraine’s successful military resistance is likely to provoke a dangerous backlash from Moscow until either policy changes or the regime changes. American nationalism has flared repeatedly since the fall of the Soviet Union, namely in the Iraq war. The American state has suffered economically and politically for that imperial overreach. But American nationalism is still a potent force and could trigger a more aggressive shift in US foreign policy in 2024 or beyond. European states have kept nationalism in check and tried to subsume their various nationalist sentiments into a liberal and internationalist project, the European Union. The wave of nationalist forces in the wake of the European debt crisis has subsided, with the exception of the United Kingdom, where it flowered in Brexit. The French election in the second quarter will likely continue this trend with the re-election of President Emmanuel Macron, but even if he should suffer a surprise upset to nationalist Marine Le Pen, Europe’s centripetal forces will prevent her from taking France out of the EU or euro or NATO (Chart 15). Over the coming decade, nationalist forces will revive and will present a new challenge to Europe’s ruling elites – but global great power competition strongly supports the EU’s continued evolution into a single geopolitical entity, since the independent states are extremely vulnerable to Russia, China, and even the US unless they unite and strengthen their superstructure. Chart 15Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective In fact the true base of global nationalism is migrating to Asia. Chinese and Indian nationalism are very potent forces under President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Xi is on the verge of clinching another ten years in power while Modi is still favored for re-election in 2024, so there is no reason to anticipate a change anytime soon. The effects are various but what is most important for investors is to recognize that as China’s potential GDP has fallen over the past decade, the Communist Party has begun to utilize nationalism as a new source of legitimacy, and this is expressed through a more assertive foreign policy. President Xi is the emblem of this shift and it will not change, even if China pursues a lower profile over certain periods to avoid provoking the US and its allies into a more effective coalition to contain China. Chart 16Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism The surge in global prices will destabilize regimes that lack food security and contribute to new bouts of populism and nationalism. Turkey is the most vulnerable due to a confluence of political, economic, and military risks that will unsettle the state. But Egypt is vulnerable to an Arab Spring 2.0 that would have negative security implications for Israel and add powder to the Middle Eastern powder keg. Pakistan is already witnessing political turmoil. Investors may overlook any Indonesian unrest due to its attractiveness in a world where Russia and China are scaring away western investment (Chart 16). All three of these strategic themes are mutually reinforcing – and they tend to be inflationary over the long run. Great powers that redouble the pursuit of national interest – through defense spending and energy security investments – while simultaneously being forced to expand their social safety nets to appease popular discontent, will drive up budget deficits, consume a lot of natural resources, and purchase a lot of capital equipment. They will also more frequently engage in economic or military conflicts that constrain supply (Chart 17). Chart 17War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary Bottom Line: The Ukraine war is a powerful confirmation of our three strategic themes. It is also a confirmation that these themes have inflationary macroeconomic implications. Investment Takeaways Chart 18Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Now that great power rivalry is intensifying immediately and rapidly, and yet China’s and Europe’s economies are encountering greater difficulties, we expect stagflation to arrive sooner rather than later. High headline and core inflation, the Ukraine war, tacit Chinese support for Russia, persistent Chinese supply kinks, US and EU sanctions, US midterm elections, and a potential US-Iran diplomatic breakdown will all weigh on risk sentiment in the second quarter. In Ukraine, Russia’s position is too weak to give comfort for investors, who should continue to favor defensive over cyclical equities and US stocks over global stocks. Russia’s break with the West, and the West’s use of sanctions to prevent Russia from accessing its foreign exchange reserves, has raised new questions about the global currency reserve system and the dollar’s status within that system. Over the coming years China will redouble the efforts it began in the wake of the Great Recession to reduce its dependency on US dollar assets within its reserve basket, while also recycling new current account surpluses into non-dollar assets. However, the evidence does not suggest that King Dollar will suffer a structural breakdown. First, the world lacks alternative safe-haven assets to US Treasuries – and net foreign purchases of US bonds rose in the face of the Ukraine war (Chart 18). Second, the return of war to Europe will weaken the perceived long-term security of European currency and government bonds relative to US counterparts. Even if the Ukraine war is contained in the short run, as we expect, Russia is in structural decline and will remain a disruptive player for some time. We are not at all bearish on the euro or European bonds but we do not see the Ukraine war as increasing their value proposition, to put it lightly. The same logic extends to Japanese bonds, since China, like Russia, is an autocratic and revisionist state that threatens to shake up the security order in its neighborhood. Japan is relatively secure as a nation and we are bullish on the yen, but China’s de facto alliance with Russia weakens Japan’s security outlook over the very long run, especially relative to the United States. Thus, on a cyclical basis the dollar can depreciate, but on a structural basis the US dollar will remain the dominant reserve currency. The US is not only the wealthiest and most secure country in the world but also the largest oil producer. Meanwhile Chinese potential growth, domestic political stability, and foreign relations are all worsening. The US-Iran talks are the most critical geopolitical dynamic in the second quarter aside from Russia’s clash with the West. The fate of the 2015 nuclear deal will be decided soon and will determine whether an even bigger energy shock begins to emanate from the Middle East. We would not bet on a new US-Iran deal but we cannot rule it out. Any deal would be a short-term, stop-gap deal but would prevent an immediate destabilization of the Middle East this year. As such it would reduce the risk of stagflation. Since we expect the deal to fail, we expect a new energy shock to emerge. We see stagflation as more likely than the BCA House View. It will be difficult to lift productivity in an environment of geopolitical and political uncertainty combined with slowing global growth, rising interest rates, and a worsening commodity shock (Chart 19). We will gladly revise this stance if Biden clinches an Iran deal, China relaxes its Covid Zero policy and stabilizes domestic demand, Russia and Europe maintain energy trade, and commodity prices fall to more sustainable levels for global demand. Chart 19Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Strategically we remain long gold, overweight US equities, overweight UK equities, long British pound and Japanese yen, long aerospace/defense stocks and cyber security stocks. We remain short Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar and short emerging European assets. Our short Chinese renminbi trade and our short Taiwanese versus Korean equity trade are our worst-performing recommendations. However, the above analysis should highlight – and the Ukraine war should underscore – that these two economies face a fundamentally negative geopolitical dynamic. Both Chinese and Taiwanese stocks have been underperforming global peers since 2021 and our short TWD-USD trade is in the money. While we do not expect war to break out in Taiwan this year, we do expect various crisis events to occur, particularly in the lead up to the crucial Taiwanese and American 2022 midterms and 2024 presidential election. We also expect China to depreciate the renminbi when inflation peaks and commodity prices subside. Cyclically we remain long North American and Latin American oil producers and short Middle Eastern producers, based on our pessimistic read of the Iran situation. The Americas are fundamentally better protected from geopolitical risks than other regions, although they continue to suffer from domestic political risks on a country-by-country basis. Cyclically we continue to take a defensive positioning, overweighting defensive sectors and large cap equities.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      That the Russian threat fell under our third key view for 2022 implies that we did not get our priorities straight. However, consider the timing: shortly after publishing our annual outlook on December 15, the Russians issued an ultimatum to the western powers demanding that NATO stop expanding toward Russia. Diplomats from Russia and the West met on January 12-13 but Russia’s demands were not met. We upgraded the odds that Russia would invade Ukraine from 50% to 75% on January 27. Shuttle diplomacy ensued but failed. Russia invaded on February 24. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades () Section II: Special (EDIT this Header) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  Petrocurrencies have lagged the surge in crude prices. This has been specific to the currency space since energy stocks have been in an epic bull market.Both cyclical and structural factors explain this conundrum.Cyclically, rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms-of-trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy (Feature Chart).Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (and a net exporter of natural gas). This has permanently shifted the relationship between the foreign exchange of traditional oil producers and the US dollar.Oil prices are overbought and vulnerable tactically to any resolution in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. That said, they are likely to remain well bid over a medium-term horizon, ultimately supporting petrocurrencies.Petrocurrencies also offer a significant valuation cushion and carry relative to the US dollar, making them attractive for longer-term investors.Tactically, the currencies of oil producers relative to consumers could mean revert. It also suggests the Japanese yen, which is under pressure from rising energy imports, could find some footing, even as oil prices remain volatile.RECOMMENDATIONINCEPTION LEVELINCEPTION DATERETURNShort NOK/SEK1.112022-03-24-Bottom Line: Given our thesis of lower oil prices in the near term, but firmer prices in the medium term, we will be selling a basket of oil producers relative to oil consumers, with the aim of reversing that trade from lower levels.FeatureOil price volatility is once again dominating global market action. After hitting a low of close to $96/barrel on March 16th, Brent crude is once again at $120 as we go to press. Over the last two years, Brent crude has been as cheap as $16, and as expensive as $140. Energy stocks (and their respective bourses) have been the proximate winner from rising oil prices (Chart 1).Related ReportForeign Exchange StrategyWhat Next For The RMB?In foreign exchange markets, the currencies of commodity-producing countries have surprisingly lagged the improvement in oil prices (Chart 2). Historically, higher oil prices have had a profound impact on the external balance of oil producing versus consuming countries in general and petrocurrencies in particular. Chart 1Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices   Chart 2Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices  Based on the observation above, this report addresses three key questions:Are there cyclical factors depressing the performance of petrocurrencies?Are there structural factors that have changed the relationship of these currencies with the US dollar?What is the outlook for oil, and the impact on short term versus longer-term currency strategy?We will begin our discussion with the outlook for oil.Russia, Oil, And PetrocurrenciesA high-level forecast from our Commodity & Energy Strategy colleagues calls for oil prices to average $93 per barrel this year and next.1 The deduction from this forecast is that we could see spot prices head lower from current levels this year but remain firm in 2023. From our perspective, there are a few factors that support this view:Forward prices tend to move in tandem with the spot fixing (Chart 3), but recently have also been a fair predictor of where current prices will settle over the medium term. Forward oil prices are trading at a significant discount to spot, suggesting some measure of mean reversion (Chart 4). Chart 3Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together   Chart 4The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices  There is a significant geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices. According to the New York Federal Reserve model, the demand/supply balance would have caused oil prices to fall between February 11 and February 25 this year. They however rose. This geopolitical risk premium has surely increased since then (Chart 5).Chart 5Oil Prices Embed A Significant Geopolitical Risk Premium The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Russian crude is trading at a sizeable discount compared to other benchmarks. This means that the incentive for substitution has risen significantly. Our Chief Commodity expert, Robert Ryan, noted on BLU today that intake from India is rising. This is helping put a floor on the Russian URAL/Brent discount blend at around $30 (Chart 6). Oil is fungible, and seaborne crude can be rerouted from unwilling buyers to satiate demand in starved markets.A fortnight ago, we noted how the US sanctions on Russia could shift the foreign exchange landscape, especially vis-à-vis the RMB. Specifically, RMB-denominated trade in oil is likely to increase significantly going forward. China has massively increased the number of bilateral swap lines it has with foreign countries, while stabilizing the RMB versus the US dollar.2Finally, smaller open economies such as Canada, Norway and even Mexico are opening the oil spigots (Chart 7). While individually these countries cannot fill any potential gap in Russian production, collectively they could help in the redistribution of oil supplies. Chart 6Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount   Chart 7Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices  The observations above suggest that the currencies of small oil-producing nations are likely to benefit in the medium term from a redistribution in oil demand. Remarkably, there has been little demand destruction yet from the rise in prices, according to the New York Fed. This suggests that as the global economy reopens, and the demand/supply balance tightens, longer-term oil prices will remain well bid.The key risk in the short term is the geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices fades, especially given the potential that Europe, China, and India continue to buy Russian supplies. We have been playing this very volatile theme via a short NOK/SEK position. We are stopped out this week for a modest profit and are reinitiating the trade if NOK/SEK hits 1.11.On The Underperformance Of Petrocurrencies? Chart 8Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  The more important question is why the currencies of oil producers like the CAD, NOK, MXN or even BRL have not kept pace with oil prices as they historically have. As our feature chart shows (Chart 8), petrocurrencies have severely lagged the improvement in their terms of trade. This has been driven by both cyclical and structural factors.Cyclically, the underlying driver of FX in recent quarters has been the nominal interest rate spread between the US and its G10 counterparts. We have written at length on this topic, and on why we think there is a big mispricing in market behavior in our report – “The Biggest Macro Question By FX Investors Could Potentially Be The Least Relevant.” In a nutshell, two-year yields in the G10 have been lagging US rates, despite other central banks being ahead of the curve in hiking interest rates. This means that rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms of trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy.Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (Chart 9). This means the CAD/USD and NOK/USD exchange rates are experiencing a tectonic shift on a terms-of-trade basis. In 2010, the US accounted for only about 6% of global crude output. Collectively, Canada, Norway, and Mexico shared about 10% of global oil production. The elephant in the room was OPEC, with a market share just north of 40%. Today, the US produces over 14%, with Russia and Saudi Arabia around 13% each, the US having grabbed market share from many other countries. Chart 9The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production   Chart 10The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil  As a result of this shift, the positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has gradually eroded. Measured statistically, the dollar had a near-perfect negative correlation with oil around the time US production was about to take off. Since then, that correlation has risen from around -0.9 to around -0.2 (Chart 10).A Few Trade IdeasThe analysis above suggests a few trade ideas are likely to generate alpha over the medium term:Long Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers: This trade will suffer in the near term as oil prices correct but benefit from a relatively tighter market over a longer horizon. It will also benefit from the positive carry that many oil producers provide (Chart 11). We will go long a currency basket of the CAD, NOK, MXN, BRL, and COP versus the euro at 5% below current levels.Chart 11Real Rates Are High Amongst Petrocurrencies The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Sell CAD/NOK As A Trade: Norway is at the epicenter of the likely redistribution that will occur with a Russian blockade of crude, while Canada is further away from it. Terms of trade in Norway are doing much better than a relative measure in Canada (Chart 12). The discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has also widened, which has historically heralded a lower CAD/NOK exchange rate. Chart 12CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade  Follow The Money: Oil now trades above the cash costs for many oil-producing countries. This means the incentive to boost production, especially when demand recovers, is quite high. This incentivizes players with strong balance sheets to keep the taps open. This could be a particular longer-term boon for the Canadian dollar which is seeing massive portfolio inflows (Chart 13). Chart 13Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows  On The Yen (And Euro): Rising oil prices have been a death knell for the yen which is trading in lockstep with spot prices. Ditto for the euro. However, the yen benefits from very cheap valuations and extremely depressed sentiment. Any temporary reversal in oil prices will boost the yen (Chart 14). In our trading book, we were stopped out of a short CHF/JPY position last Friday, and we will look to reinitiate this trade in the coming days.  Chart 14The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices   Chester NtoniforForeign Exchange Strategistchestern@bcaresearch.comFootnotes1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply”, dated March 17, 2022.2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, “What Next For The RMB?”, dated March 11, 2022.Trades & ForecastsStrategic ViewTactical Holdings (0-6 months)Limit OrdersForecast Summary

Executive Summary Earnings Growth Outpacing Multiple Expansion Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) The US Energy sector is in a good place right now: Rising demand and faltering supply from OPEC 2.0 translate into a price of oil anchored at around $80 to $85/bbl. This price is twice the breakeven production cost for the majority of US producers. High prices have also created an opening for US Energy producers to restart Capex to increase production. Further, the Energy sector tends to outperform in an environment of high inflation and rising rates. As a real asset, oil is also a good inflation hedge, a quality that extends to Energy-related equities.  The favorable macro backdrop is also complimented by bombed-out valuation. Meanwhile, technicals are overbought signaling that a near-term pause is needed for prices to reset. Bottom Line: We reiterate our cyclical overweight in the Energy sector, despite the rising probability or a near-term pullback. Within Energy, we recommend a cyclical overweight of the upstream and equipment & services segments, underweight midstream, and equal weight downstream and integrated stocks.  Feature Dear client, In lieu of the February 28th publication, we will be sending you a Special Report on Wednesday, February 23rd written by our US Political Strategy service colleagues. Our regular weekly publication will resume Monday, March 7th. Kind Regards, Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy Part I Recap Last week, in Part I of this Special Report, we described the structure of the Energy sector, its value chain, key industry drivers, and supply/demand/oil price dynamics. The Energy value chain consists of four distinct segments, with each segment corresponding to a section of the oil production value chain. The GICS classifies them as Oil & Gas Exploration and Production (Upstream or E&P), Oil & Gas Equipment and Services (E&S), Storage and Transportation (Midstream or S&T), and Refining and Marketing (Downstream or R&M). Integrated Oil & Gas straddles the entire supply chain (Integrated). Demand exceeds supply: We concluded that crude oil demand is expected to return to trend, driven by strong economic growth and the receding pandemic. In the meantime, production remains suppressed because of curtailments by OPEC 2.0 members, investment restraint from US producers, and multiple supply disruptions. Sizzling tensions with Iran, Russia, and a possible new market share war with the Saudis exacerbate supply problems and lead to heightened volatility in crude oil prices. The US Energy producers are ramping up supply: To meet the increasing oil demand, US shale oil producers are now perfectly positioned to pick up the slack in supply. To ramp up production, the US oil companies will have to invest in new and existing wells, starting a new Capex cycle, after “seven lean years” of Capex (Chart 1). There are early signs that the US Energy sector is in the early innings of new Capex and production. This week, we rely on our investment process, i.e., analysis of the macroeconomic backdrop, fundamentals, valuations, and technicals to shape our view on each segment of the Energy value chain. We are currently overweight the Energy sector and are ahead of the benchmark by 35%. Chart 1The Energy Industry Is In The Early Innings Of New Capex Cycle The Energy Industry Is In The Early Innings Of New Capex Cycle The Energy Industry Is In The Early Innings Of New Capex Cycle Macroeconomic Backdrop Can Withstand Rising Rates And High Inflation The Energy sector tends to outperform in the environment of high inflation and rising rates (Chart 2). As a real asset, oil is also a good inflation hedge, a quality that extends to Energy-related equities. Appreciating Dollar Is A Temporary Phenomenon There is a tight inverse relationship between the USD and energy prices due to the simple fact that commodity prices are quoted in dollars. Over the past seven years, the nominal WTI oil price has been over 70% inversely correlated with the strength of the USD trade-weighted index (TWI), with a beta of oil to USD of -1.6. That is, a 1% change in the TWI would be expected to translate into a $1.60/barrel change in the price of WTI (Chart 3). Chart 2The Energy Sector Is Resilient To Rising Rates Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Chart 3Price Of Oil And USD Are Inversely Correlated Price Of Oil And USD Are Inversely Correlated Price Of Oil And USD Are Inversely Correlated According to the BCA Research FX Strategy team, the recent dollar strengthening is a temporary phenomenon, catalyzed by the rising interest-rate differential with the rest of the world. However, historically, equity portfolio flows have been more important than other factors in explaining dollar moves. Rising rates undermine the performance of US equities and are likely to lead to a reversal in cross-border equity flows, damaging the key pillar of support for the dollar. Hence, risks to the dollar are on the downside. Fundamentals And Valuations The Energy Sector Is Enjoying Strong Sales EIA reports that “global oil consumption outpaced oil production for the six consecutive quarters, ending with the fourth quarter of 2021 (4Q21), which has led to persistent withdrawals from global oil inventories and significant increases in crude oil prices”.1 As a result of higher production, and WTI prices increasing from $52 to $85 over 2021, energy company sales have soared (Chart 4). Looking ahead, we expect sales growth to remain robust, albeit lower than in 2021: Not only are comparables more challenging, but economic growth is also decelerating. What can bring the strong sales growth to a halt? The answer is that it may be either higher prices or higher volumes: Surging prices destroy demand while surging volumes suppress oil prices, which, eventually, weigh on Capex and production. At the moment, both production levels and price are in a sweet spot: All segments of the value chain are benefiting from high but not excessive prices and volumes. Chart 4Energy Sales Surged In 2021 Energy Sales Surged In 2021 Energy Sales Surged In 2021 Chart 5Sector Profitability Is Tied To The Price Of Oil Sector Profitability Is Tied To The Price Of Oil Sector Profitability Is Tied To The Price Of Oil Profit Recovery Continues The overall profitability of the Energy sector is also tightly linked to the price of oil (Chart 5). The BCA Research house view is WTI centered around $80-85, with substantial volatility triggered by geopolitical tensions. With oil prices likely peaking, barring any negative geopolitical developments, earnings growth normalization off the high levels is expected (Chart 6). However, even if they are slowing, Energy sector earnings are expected to grow by 26% over the next 12 months, exceeding S&P 500 earnings by 17%. Further, over the next five years, energy earnings growth is expected to re-accelerate towards the 26% range. Chart 6Energy Sector's Earnings Growth To Exceed The Market's Energy Sector's Earnings Growth To Exceed The Market's Energy Sector's Earnings Growth To Exceed The Market's Chart 7Margins To Continue To Expand Margins To Continue To Expand Margins To Continue To Expand Importantly, sector operating margins are expected to expand towards 10% (Chart 7), which is quite a feat considering the broad-based margin contraction of the other S&P 500 sectors and industries. Our verdict? Earnings growth expectations look darn good! Despite Recent Outperformance, Valuations Are Still Attractive The BCA valuation indicator, which is a composite of P/B, P/S, and DY relative to the S&P 500, standardized relative to its own history, shows that the sector is still undervalued (Chart 8), despite a recent run of performance – earnings growth still outpaces multiple expansion (Chart 9). The energy sector is currently trading with a nearly 40% discount to the S&P 500 (Table 1) on a forward earnings basis (12.4x vs 20.3x). Chart 8Still Undervalued… Still Undervalued… Still Undervalued… Chart 9Earnings Growth Outpacing Multiple Expansion Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Table 1Valuation Summary Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Cheap But Overbought! Curiously, despite modest valuations, from a technical standpoint the sector appears overbought (Chart 10). Worse yet, our Energy Sentiment Composite is outright in the bullish zone (Chart 11) with a reading last achieved in 2009. This is certainly concerning, as euphoria is inevitably followed by panic and disappointment. However, we need to keep in mind that the technical indicators are short term in scope by design, and their main use is to help refine the position entry and exit timing. Chart 10...But Overbought! ...But Overbought! ...But Overbought! Chart 11Sentiment Is Extended Sentiment Is Extended Sentiment Is Extended Why such a pronounced dichotomy with valuations? Technical indicators are based on returns, which have been rather outstanding for the sector, while valuations take into account earnings growth, which explains and justifies the surging returns. Too Much Cash Our analysis would be amiss if we did not bring energy companies’ free cash flow (FCF) into the discussion. With a curtailed supply of energy and rising prices, these companies have been awash in cash (Chart 12) – their FCF has increased by nearly 80% year over year, and profits have surged. What will companies do with this windfall? Well, first and foremost, during the seven lean years of extreme Capex discipline, these companies have gotten their commitment to returning cash to shareholders embedded in the corporate psyche, which is something that is unlikely to change fast. Energy continues to be the highest-yielding sector in the S&P 500 (Chart 13). However, having learned the lesson the hard way, many companies are adopting variable dividends to avoid potential disappointment if the oil price collapses. In addition to disbursing cash, the energy companies are paying off debt and are investing in expanding production. Chart 12Windfall Of Cash Windfall Of Cash Windfall Of Cash Chart 13Energy Is The Highest Yielding Sector Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Energy: After Seven Lean Years (Part II) Investment Outlook By Segments Of The Energy Value Chain The macroeconomic backdrop for Energy appears benign, with rates rising, inflation elevated, and the dollar likely contained. The sector also appears attractive from both a profitability and a valuation standpoint. However, a near-term pullback is likely as the sentiment around the sector is overly bullish – but that is likely to be short-lived. While we like the sector overall, we aim to provide granular industry group recommendations. To do so, we will zoom in on each segment of the value chain. Oil And Gas Exploration & Production (Upstream) Strong demand recovery and OPEC 2.0 oil production shortages bode well for the US E&P companies, which are cautiously starting to restart capital investment and ramp up production. We expect the E&P, especially shale oil production, companies to be one of the best performing energy subsectors, with WTI anchored around a consensus of $80-85/bbl. The upstream segment is highly dependent on the price of oil, which is currently in a sweet spot: High but not high enough to cause demand destruction (Chart 14). With oil prices peaking, E&P sales growth is decelerating (Chart 15). However, upstream also benefits from the sustainable cost reductions achieved through improved experience in well siting, drilling, and completion techniques. Chart 14Upstream Earnings Depend On The Price Oil Upstream Earnings Depend On The Price Oil Upstream Earnings Depend On The Price Oil Chart 15Sales Growth Is Normalizing Sales Growth Is Normalizing Sales Growth Is Normalizing As a result of growing, albeit decelerating, sales and effective cost management, E&P is one of the most profitable segments of the energy complex: Operating margins are currently at 22% and are expected to expand to 27% (Chart 16). From a valuation standpoint, the industry is trading at 10 times forward earnings, which represents an 50% discount to the S&P 500. The BCA valuation indicator for the industry group is also in the undervalued territory (Chart 17). Chart 16Margins To Continue To Expand Margins To Continue To Expand Margins To Continue To Expand Chart 17E&P Is Still Cheap E&P Is Still Cheap E&P Is Still Cheap Overweight Oil and Gas Exploration & Production industry Equipment And Services Is A High Octane Play On The New Capex Cycle Upstream Capex is revenue for E&S companies. After “seven lean years” of the Capex cycle, the fortunes of E&S companies are finally turning, with a rising price of oil finally enticing upstream companies to expand production by reopening existing and drilling new wells (Chart 18). According to CFRA, upstream Capex is expected to increase by 25% in 2022, and 7% in 2023. With the new energy Capex cycle in sight, Oil Services is the only energy segment for which sales growth is expected to accelerate over the coming year (Chart 19). In fact, sales will continue to grow at a healthy clip until the cycle matures – a time period measured in years. Chart 18Capex Has Restarted Capex Has Restarted Capex Has Restarted Chart 19Sales Growth Is Rebounding Sharply Sales Growth Is Rebounding Sharply Sales Growth Is Rebounding Sharply   The profitability of the sector is also normalizing after a pandemic slump, and margins are expected to stay flat (Chart 20) despite industry labor costs rising sharply to 8% year over year (Chart 21). Earnings are expected to rise by a third in 2022, albeit off very low levels. Chart 20Profit Margins Will Stabilize Profit Margins Will Stabilize Profit Margins Will Stabilize Chart 21Rising Wages Are Cutting Into Profitability Rising Wages Are Cutting Into Profitability Rising Wages Are Cutting Into Profitability In terms of valuations, the E&S industry is one of the cheapest in the sector, with the BCA Valuations Indicator standing at -1.5 standard deviations below a long-term average. We are positive on the Energy Equipment and Services space, which we consider a high octane play on the upcoming production increases and the new energy cycle. Overweight Energy Equipment and Services Storage And Transportation Will Benefit From Rising Production Volumes The midstream segment is one of the most profitable in the energy supply chain. This industry has high fixed costs, and its profitability is a function of production volume, not oil price. (Chart 22). From that standpoint, the industry is in a good place: US production volume, especially of shale oil, is poised to increase, filling the pipelines and driving sales growth. However, there are also challenges: Pipelines installed in older shales start to see original contractual commitments expiring, resulting in lower cash flows as the pipelines try to re-commit suppliers within a market that has an abundance of pipeline capacity. On the cost side, the S&T segment is seeing an increase in labor costs, with average hourly earnings (AHE) rising close to 10%. Chart 22Production Volume Is A Driver Of Midstream Segment's Profitability Production Volume Is A Driver Of Midstream Segment's Profitability Production Volume Is A Driver Of Midstream Segment's Profitability With challenges on the sales side and rising costs, it is not surprising that the market expects earnings in the S&T industry to stay flat over the next year or so (Chart 23). Operating profit margins will contract over the next year from the 19% the industry is enjoying now to roughly 14% (Chart 24). Chart 23Midstream Earnings Are To Stay Flat Midstream Earnings Are To Stay Flat Midstream Earnings Are To Stay Flat Chart 24Industry Is Highly Profitable But Margins Are Contracting Industry Is Highly Profitable But Margins Are Contracting Industry Is Highly Profitable But Margins Are Contracting In addition, it is important to note that pipelines run through public land. The recent tightening of EPA regulations and an administration hostile to fossil fuel may halt or slow down pipeline build-out. This may be a short-term negative as some companies may have to forego some of their investments. Over the long run, this may limit pipeline availability and lead to higher energy transportation and storage costs. Underweight Energy Storage and Transportation Industry Energy Refining And Marketing– Favorable Backdrop But No Oomph Similar to the midstream segment, refiners are a high fixed cost operation, and their business is only loosely dependent on the price of oil. Profitability of downstream companies is a function of capacity utilization of the refining facilities, and the crack spread or price differential between the price of crude and refined oil. Thanks to rising demand for oil, and rising volumes, capacity utilization stands at nearly 90% and is approaching pre-pandemic levels (Chart 25, bottom panel). Crack spreads are also high in absolute terms thanks to low inventories (Chart 25, top panel). Chart 25High Capacity Utilization and Wide Crack Spreads Are A Boon For Downstream… High Capacity Utilization and Wide Crack Spreads Are A Boon For Downstream… High Capacity Utilization and Wide Crack Spreads Are A Boon For Downstream… Chart 26...But Razor-Thin Margins Make The Industry Vulnerable ...But Razor-Thin Margins Make The Industry Vulnerable ...But Razor-Thin Margins Make The Industry Vulnerable With the upstream segment ramping up production, refining volumes should increase, further improving capacity utilization. And while margins are razor-thin, they are projected to increase over the next year (Chart 26). The key concern about the industry is that, with margins this narrow, there is little or no buffer to absorb changes in crack spreads or capacity utilization should oil prices rise or volumes decline. And yet, downstream, while cheap, is more expensive than Oil Services, midstream, or Integrated Oil. Equal-weight Energy Refining and Marketing industry Integrated Oil & Gas Is A Safe Bet Integrated Oil is an industry that is diversified across all the segments of the value chain. The characteristics that allowed Integrated Companies to maintain their stock prices better during the downturn – less financial leverage, less reinvestment volatility, stronger dividend support, and counter-cyclical improvement of downstream operations – will work against these stocks during an oil price recovery. As such, while Integrated stocks should benefit from higher prices and production volumes, this is a lower beta proposition: It is better to own Integrated Oil on the way down, but riskier and higher beta E&P or Oil Services stocks during the up leg of the energy cycle. Equal-Weight Integrated Oil & Gas Investment Implications The US Energy sector is in a good place right now: Rising demand and faltering supply from OPEC 2.0, translates into a price of oil anchored around $80 to $85/bbl. This price is twice the breakeven production cost for the majority of the US producers. Rising oil prices had resulted in windfall profits and surging free cash flow, which the Energy companies are dutifully returning to shareholders. High prices have also created an opening for US Energy producers to restart their Capex to increase production. This positive stance of upstream companies is benefiting the entire supply chain. Energy Equipment and Services providers are enjoying accelerated sales growth as E&P increases Capex. Transportation and storage companies are benefiting from higher volumes. And last, the downstream segment benefits from high-capacity utilization of its refineries and wide crack spreads thanks to low refined oil inventories. We are cyclically positive on the Energy sector, the fundamentals of which are solid, and for which valuations are modest. However, overextended technicals indicate that a near-term correction after a strong run is highly likely. We won’t sell to avoid the pullback but will use it as an opportunity to add to the existing positions. Within the Energy Sector, we are constructive on the upstream and E&S segments, both of which benefit from the high price of oil. We are less keen on the midstream segment, which, despite the benefits of increased production volume, is handicapped by rising labor costs, and expiring transportation contracts. And lastly, we are equal-weight the downstream segment, which, despite rising volumes and wide crack spreads, has razor-thin margins. Integrated Oil is the most diversified segment, which is more resilient during the down leg of the energy cycle, but too tame during the upcycle. Bottom Line We recommend a cyclical overweight to the Energy sector as it is in the early innings of the new energy cycle, thanks to surging demand and constrained production capacity out of the US. It is also the highest yielding sector in the S&P 500. However, a near-term pullback after a strong run is likely – we will leverage it to add to our existing overweight. We also recommend a cyclical overweight of the upstream and Oil Equipment & Services segment, underweight midstream, and equal weight downstream.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/   Recommended Allocation

Highlights The US government issued its first-ever water-shortage declaration for the Colorado River basin in August, due to historically low water levels at the major reservoirs fed by the river (Chart of the Week). The drought producing the water shortage was connected to climate change by US officials.1 Globally, climate-change remediation efforts – e.g., carbon taxes – likely will create exogenous shocks similar to the oil-price shock of the 1970s. Remedial efforts will compete with redressing chronic underfunding of infrastructure. The US water supply infrastructure, for example, faces an investment shortfall of ~ $3.3 trillion over the next 20 years to replace aging plants and equipment, based on an analysis by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).  This will translate to a $6,000 per-capita cost by 2039 if the current funding gap persists. Fluctuating weather and the increasing prevalence of droughts and floods will increase volatility in markets such as agriculture which rely on stable climate and precipitation patterns.We are getting long the FIW ETF at tonight's close. The ETF tracks the performance of equities in the ISE Clean Edge Water Index, which covers firms providing potable water and wastewater treatment technologies and services. This is a strategic recommendation. Feature A decades-long drought in the US Southwest linked by US officials to climate change will result in further water rationing in the region. The drought has reduced total Colorado River system water-storage levels to 40% of capacity – vs. 49% at the same time last year. It has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on daily life, and the acute need for remediation efforts. The US Southwest is a desert. Droughts and low water availability are facts of life in the region. The current drought began in 2012, and is forcing federal, state, and local governments to take unprecedented conservation measures. The first-ever water-shortage declaration by the US Bureau of Reclamation sets in motion remedial measures that will reduce water availability in the Lower Colorado basin starting in October (Map 1). Chart 1Drought Hits Colorado River Especially Hard Drought Hits Colorado River Especially Hard Drought Hits Colorado River Especially Hard Map 1Colorado River Basin Investing In Water Supply Investing In Water Supply The two largest reservoirs in the US – Lake Powell and Lake Meade, part of the massive engineering projects along the Colorado – began in the 1930s and now supply water to 40mm people in the US Southwest. Half of those people get their water from Lake Powell. Emergency rationing began in August, primarily affecting Arizona, but will be extended to the region later in the year. Lake Powell is used to hold run-off from the upper basin of the Colorado River from Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. Water from Powell is sent south to supply the lower-basin states of California, Arizona, and Nevada. Reduced snowpack due to weather shifts caused by climate change has reduced water levels in Powell, while falling soil-moisture levels and higher evaporation rates, contribute to the acceleration of droughts and their persistence down-river. Chart 2Southwests Exceptionally Hard Drought Southwests Exceptionally Hard Drought Southwests Exceptionally Hard Drought Steadily increasing demand for water from agriculture, energy production and human activity brought on by population growth and holiday-makers have made the current drought exceptional (Chart 2). Most of the Southwest has been "abnormally dry or even drier" during 2002-05 and from 2012-20, according to the US EPA. According to data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, most of the US Southwest was also warmer than the 1981 – 2010 average temperature during July (Map 2). The Colorado River Compact of 1922 governing the water-sharing rights of the river expires in 2026. Negotiations on the new treaties already have begun, as the seven states in the Colorado basin sort out their rights alongside huge agricultural  interest, native American tribes, Mexico, and fast-growing urban centers like Las Vegas. Map 2Most Of The US Southwest Is Warmer Than Average Investing In Water Supply Investing In Water Supply Global Water Emergency States around the globe are dealing with water crises as a result of climate change. "From Yemen to India, and parts of Central America to the African Sahel, about a quarter of the world's people face extreme water shortages that are fueling conflict, social unrest and migration," according to the World Economic Forum. Droughts, and more generally, changing weather patterns will make agricultural markets more volatile. Food production shortages due to unpredictable weather are compounding lingering pandemic related supply chain disruptions, leading to higher food prices (Chart 3). This could also fuel social unrest and political uncertainty. Floods in China’s Henan province - a key agriculture and pork region - inundated farms. Drought and extreme heat in North America are destroying crops in parts of Canada and the US. While flooding in July damaged Europe’s crops, the continent’s main medium-term risk, will be water scarcity.2  Droughts and extreme weather in Brazil have deep implications for agricultural markets, given the variety and quantity of products it exports. Water scarcity and an unusual succession of polar air masses caused coffee prices to rise earlier this year (Chart 4). The country is suffering from what national government agencies consider the worst drought in nearly a century. According to data from the NASA Earth Observatory, many of the agricultural states in Brazil saw more water evaporate from the ground and plants’ leaves than during normal conditions (Map 3). Chart 3The Pandemic and Changing Weather Patterns Will Keep Food Prices High The Pandemic and Changing Weather Patterns Will Keep Food Prices High The Pandemic and Changing Weather Patterns Will Keep Food Prices High Chart 4Unpredictable Weather Will Increase Volatility In Markets For Agricultural Commodities Unpredictable Weather Will Increase Volatility In Markets For Agricultural Commodities Unpredictable Weather Will Increase Volatility In Markets For Agricultural Commodities Map 3Brazil Is Suffering From Its Worst Drought In Nearly A Century Investing In Water Supply Investing In Water Supply Agriculture itself could be part of a longer-term and irreversible problem – i.e. desertification. Irrigation required for modern day farming drains aquifers and leads to soil erosion. According to the EU, nearly a quarter of Spain’s aquifers are exploited, with agricultural states, such as Andalusia consuming 80% of the state’s total water. Irrigation intensive farming, the possibility of higher global temperatures and the increased prevalence of droughts and forest fires are conducive to soil infertility and subsequent desertification. This is a global phenomenon, with the crisis graver still in north Africa, Mozambique and Palestinian regions. Changing weather patterns could also impact the production of non-agricultural goods and services. One such instance is semiconductors, which are used in machines and devices spanning cars to mobile phones. Taiwan, home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company – the world’s largest contract chipmaker - suffered from a severe drought earlier this year (Chart 5). While the drought did not seriously disrupt chipmaking, in an already tight market, the event did bring the issue of the impact of water shortages on semiconductor manufacturing to the fore. According to Sustainalytics, a typical chipmaking plant uses 2 to 4 million gallons of water per day to clean semiconductors. While wet weather has returned to Taiwan, relying on rainfall and typhoons to satisfy the chipmaking sector’s water needs going forward could lead to volatility in these markets. Chart 5Taiwan Faced Its Worst Drought In History Earlier This Year Investing In Water Supply Investing In Water Supply Climate Change As A Macro Factor The scale of remediating existing environmental damage to the planet and the cost of investing in the technology required to sustain development and growth will be daunting. Unfortunately, there is not a great deal of research looking into how much of a cost households, firms and governments will incur on these fronts. Estimates of the actual price of CO2 – the policy variable most governments and policymakers focus on – range from as little as $1.30/ton to as much as $13/ton, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics.3 PIIE's Jean Pisani-Ferry estimates the true cost is around $10/ton presently, after accounting for a lack of full reporting on costs and subsidies that reduce carbon costs. The cost of carbon likely will have to increase by an order of magnitude – to $130/ton or more over the next decade – to incentivize the necessary investment in technology required to deal with climate change and to sufficiently induce, via prices, behavioral adaptations by consumers at all levels. The PIIE notes, "… the accelerated pace of climate change and the magnitude of the effort involved in decarbonizing the economy, while at the same time investing in adaptation, the transition to net zero is likely to involve, over a 30-year period, major shifts in growth patterns." These are early days for assessing the costs and global macro effects of decarbonization. However, PIIE notes, these costs can be expected to "include a significant negative supply shock, an investment surge sizable enough to affect the global equilibrium interest rate, large adverse consumer welfare effects, distributional shifts, and substantial pressure on public finances." Much of the investment required to address climate change will be concentrated on commodity markets. Underlying structural issues, such as lack of investment in expanding supplies of metals and hydrocarbons required during the transition to net-zero CO2 emissions, will impart an upward bias to base metals, oil and natural gas prices over the next decade. We remain bullish industrial commodities broadly, as a result. Investment Implications Massive investment in infrastructure will be needed to address emerging water crises around the world. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) projects an investment shortfall of ~ $3.3 trillion over the next 20 years to replace aging water infrastructure in the US alone. This will translate to a $6,000 per-capita cost by 2039 if the current funding gap persists.4 At tonight's close we will be getting long the FIW ETF, which is focused on US-based firms providing potable water and wastewater treatment services. This ETF provides direct investment exposure to water remediation efforts and needed infrastructure modernization in the US. We also remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF – as a way to retain exposure to the higher commodity-price volatility that climate change will create in grain and food markets. This volatility will keep the balance of price risks to the upside.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Hurricane Ida shut in ~ 96% of total US Gulf of Mexico (GoM) oil production. Colonial Pipeline, a major refined product artery for the US South and East coast closed a few of its lines due to the hurricane but has restarted operations since then. Since the share of US crude oil from this region has fallen, WTI and RBOB gasoline prices have only marginally increased, despite virtually zero crude oil production from the GoM (Chart 6). Prices are, however, likely to remain volatile, as energy producers in the region check for damage to infrastructure. Power outages and a pause in refining activity in the region will also feed price volatility over the coming weeks. Despite raising the 2022 demand forecast and pressure from the US, OPEC 2.0 stuck to its 400k b/d per month production hike in its meeting on Wednesday.     Base Metals: Bullish A bill to increase the amount of royalties payable by copper miners in Chile was passed in the senate mining committee on Tuesday. As per the bill, taxes will be commensurate with the value of the red metal. If the bill is passed in its current format, it will disincentivize further private mining investments in the nation, warned Diego Hernandez, President of the National Society of Mining (SONAMI). Amid a prolonged drought in Chile during July, the government has outlined a plan for miners to cut water consumption from natural sources by 2050. Increased union bargaining power - due to higher copper prices -, a bill that will increase mining royalties, and environmental regulation, are putting pressure on miners in the world’s largest copper producing nation.   Precious Metals: Bullish Jay Powell’s dovish remarks at the Jackson Hole Symposium were bullish for gold prices. The chairman of the US Central Bank stated the possibility of tapering asset purchases before the end of 2021 but did not provide a timeline. Powell reiterated the absence of a mechanical relationship between tapering and an interest rate hike. Raising interest rates is contingent on factors, such as the prevalence of COVID, inflation and employment levels in the US. The fact that the US economy is not close to reaching the maximum employment level, according to Powell, could keep interest rates lower for longer, supporting gold prices (Chart 7). Ags/Softs: Neutral The USDA crop Progress Report for the week ending August 29th reported 60% of the corn crop was good to excellent quality, marginally down by 2% vs comparable dates in 2020. Soybean crop quality on the other hand was down 11% from a year ago and was recorded at  56%. Chart 6 Investing In Water Supply Investing In Water Supply Chart 7 Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold     Footnotes 1     Please see Reclamation announces 2022 operating conditions for Lake Powell and Lake Mead; Historic Drought Impacting Entire Colorado River Basin. Released by the US Bureau of Reclamation on August 16, 2021. 2     Please refer to Water stress is the main medium-term climate risk for Europe’s biggest economies, S&P Global, published on August 13, 2021. 3    Please see 21-20 Climate Policy is Macroeconomic Policy, and the Implications Will Be Significant by Jean Pisani-Ferry, which was published in August 2021.  4    Please see The Economic Benefits of Investing in Water Infrastructure, published by the ASCE and The Value of Water Campaign on August 26, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades